The object of this thesis is to investigate the application of international law in municipal law, and more specifically to focus on international human rights law. A determination of the sources of international human rights law constitutes the point of departure. Treaties are the primary source of international human rights law, followed by customary law. Recent authority indicates that the formation of customary human rights law differs from that of customary international law in general. There are, however, also international documents on human rights not falling within the scope of the traditional sources as embodied in section 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Non-binding sources of law, or soft law - most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - are shown to play an important role in the formation of both treaties and custom and directly influence state practice. Theoretical explanations expounding the application of international law in the domestic law of states are examined, assessing their suitability for effective implementation of international human rights instruments. Since the application of international law in municipal law depends on, and is regulated by rules of domestic law, the relevant rules of legal systems which may, due to historical factors or regional proximity, impact on South Africa, are examined. State practice points to two primary methods of dealing with international law obligations in domestic law, namely transformation (associated with the dualist theory) or direct application (associated with the monist theory). The specific method of incorporation adopted by a state is often closely related to that state's constitutional system. The advantages and disadvantages associated with each particular method are related to the intricacies of individual legal systems. From an internationalist perspective the often misunderstood doctrine of direct application, has the advantage of making the intended protection afforded by human rights treaties to individuals directly enforceable by domestic courts with a minimum of state intervention. The position of international law in South Africa is assessed against this background. South Africa's constitutional history under British rule followed British law requiring legislative transformation of treaty obligations, but permitting customary law to be directly incorporated into common law. The position of international law became constitutionally regulated in South Africa with the introduction of a constitutional democracy. Drafting errors and practical difficulties experienced with the 1993 Constitution, were largely ironed out by the 1996 Constitution. The post-apartheid Constitutions introduced changes and new dimensions compared to the pre-1993 position of international law, including: the consideration of international law when interpreting the constitutionally protected human rights; the involvement of the legislature in the treaty-making process; and provisions for both transformation and direct application of treaties subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Customary international law is confirmed as forming part of South African law, and courts are obliged to interpret legislation in accordance with international law. An analysis of court decisions after 1993 reveals the following broad trends: (i) The impact of international law as part of South African law is still largely overlooked. (ii) The majority of references to international law by the courts are to international human rights agreements and decisions by international tribunals under section 39 of the Bill of Rights. (iii) The distinction between international law and comparable foreign case law, as directed by section 39, is often blurred. (iv) No distinction is made between international hard and soft law when deciding on human rights matters. (v) Courts have refrained from applying international human rights obligations which form part of South African law because they are self-executing or form part of customary international law. (vi) Binding international human rights obligations are only referred to for comparative purposes. (vii) The term "treaty" is interpreted in accordance with the definition of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The intention to create legally binding obligations is therefore implicit. It has been the policy of the post-apartheid South African government to ratify or accede to the major international human rights agreements as swiftly as possible. The execution of this policy has, however, met with numerous problems. As a result, South Africa has to date not become party to the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. Many treaties to which South Africa is a party have not yet been incorporated into South African law and compulsory reports on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are overdue. Despite the post-apartheid euphoria about the creation of a human rights culture in South Africa and the formal commitment by government to give effect to international human rights instruments, much remains to be done before South Africa can be regarded as formally complying with international human rights standards. / Law / LL. D. (Law)

Wetgewing wat onbestaanbaar is met die bepalings van Wet 200 van 1993 as die hoogste reg is nietig tensy geoorloof volgens die maatstawwe van art 33 (1) 1 en die Konstitusionele Hof en die provinsiale en plaaslike afdelings van die Hooggeregshof is bevoeg om dit ongeldig te verklaar. Die beoordeling van die geldigheid van wetgewing waardeur inbreuk gemaak word op 'n Fundamentele Reg of Vryheid in Hoofstuk 3 verleen 1 vereis in eerste instansie die vertolking van die betrokke bepaling van die Hoofstuk. In die lig van die besondere karakter van 'n grondwet en die gebrek aan omlyning van die verleende regte en vryhede 1 moet die vertolking nie volgens geykte metodes geskied nie I maar wel doelgerig aan die hand van die waardes onderliggend tot die Handves as geheel. Waardes wat nie herleibaar is tot die grondwet self nie en die persoonlike filosofiee van die regters behoort die howe egter nie te beinvloed nie. / Legislation inconsistent with the provisions of Act 200 of 1993 as the supreme law is of no force and effect and the Constitutional Court and the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court may declare it invalid, unless it complies with the criteria of a permissible limitation under sec 33(1). Before the validity of legislation impinging upon a Fundamental Right or Freedom conferred in Chapter 3 can be considered, the relevant provision of the Chapter must first be interpreted. In view of the special nature of a constitution and the generality of the conferred rights and freedoms, the ordinary methods of interpretation should not be applied. Chapter 3 must be interpreted purposively taking into account the values underlying the Bill of Rights as a whole. Values not founded in the Constitution and the personal philosophies of the judges ought not to influence the courts. / Private Law / LL.M.

This paper assesses U.S. national security policies in surveillance, detention, interrogation and torture, and targeted killing to determine whether they comport with international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The U.S. is responsible for adhering to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Geneva Conventions. These human rights law documents can be understood through court decisions, congressional statutes, and widely accepted interpretations from organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the UN Human Rights Council. Further, this paper offers prescriptions on how international human rights law and international humanitarian law can be updated to better deal with the current war on terror. / text

Al investigar este problema en el caso específico de Ecuador podemos ver algunos patrones que otros investigadores y políticos podrían aplicar en otros contextos de abusos laborales y trabajo infantil. En un mundo más consciente de los derechos humanos, es necesario impedir el trabajo infantil donde se pueda o por lo menos asegurar que los niños que trabajan lo hagan en la forma más sana y segura. En esta investigación se analizan las leyes y regulaciones de las últimas dos décadas, la implementación, y los efectos en las vidas de los niños trabajadores. La implementación de las leyes y regulaciones es mayormente analizada a través del papel de las inspecciones. Las entrevistas mencionadas en la investigación son realizadas por otros grupos pero muestran las experiencias de los niños. Usando reportes anuales de Ecuador, Estados Unidos, y organizaciones internacionales la investigación explora las varias razones por las cuales Ecuador no ha logrado eliminar el trabajo infantil. La investigación sugiere recomendaciones para realizar inspecciones más eficaces y hacer esfuerzos más impactantes en el campo de trabajo infantil. Ecuador ya lleva dos décadas de regulaciones e iniciativas dirigidas al trabajo infantil sin embargo no ha logrado erradicar este fenómeno. En fin el bienestar y protección de los derechos de los niños es lo que está siendo comprometido; por eso es urgente poder encontrar las soluciones que harán Ecuador el país exitoso en erradicar trabajo infantil.

Plusieurs critiques ont été adressées à Lévinas quant à la difficulté de conjuguer le caractère infini de la responsabilité éthique, qu’il présente comme condition de possibilité de l’expérience, et la mesure de l’obligation envers autrui qui naît inévitablement dans le politique. En effet, la distinction semble si prononcée entre l’obligation éthique transcendante envers l’autre et la logique politique, univers de sens associé à l’ontologie et présenté comme violent et immanent, que l’éthique peut apparaître compromise dès qu’elle est exprimée dans un contexte social. En réponse à ces difficultés, ce mémoire vise à démontrer qu’en dépit de leur opposition fondamentale, l’ordre éthique et l’ordre ontologico-politique font partie d’une structure unique. À la lumière de l’entrée en scène du tiers et de la nécessité de justice qui l’accompagne, l’existence d’un carrefour entre ces couches de significations distinctes, mais interdépendante, peut être illustrée. De fait, la justice constitue un concept amphibologique chez Lévinas qui, participant à la fois de l’éthique et du politique, permet de mettre au jour l’ancrage a priori social de l’éthique. Cette étude présentera des réflexions critiques reliées à la discipline juridique et aux droits de l’homme, qui démontreront comment la pensée de Lévinas non seulement peut, mais doit s’ouvrir à une expression sociale. / Many critics have been addressed to Lévinas concerning the difficulty of combining the infinite ethical responsibility, presented as the precondition of experience, and the limitation of the obligation towards the other that rise inevitably within the political. The distinction seems so stark between the transcendent ethical responsibility towards the other and the political logic, associated with the violent and immanent ontological order, that ethics can appear to be jeopardized as soon as it is expressed in a social context. This essay aims to overcome these difficulties by demonstrating that despite their fundamental opposition, the ethical order and the onto-political order are part of a unique structure. In the light of the presence of the third and of the necessity of justice that accompanies it, it is possible to prove the existence of a junction between these distinct but interdependent layers of signification. In fact, the concept of justice is an amphibological concept that at the same time is part of ethics and of politics. It shows that ethics is situated a priori in a social realm. This study will present critical reflection related to law and to human rights law that will demonstrate that Levinas’ philosophy not only can, but has to open itself to a social expression.

Almost four decades have passed since the European Court of Human Rights introduced the concept of positive obligations. Positive obligations mean that the member states must take affirmative action in order to secure the rights and freedoms provided for by the European Convention on Human Rights. Since then, the scope of positive obligations has extended tremendously, and today all substantive rights generally contain positive obligations. The reason behind the development is to maintain the full effectiveness of human rights enforcement within the European context, and it has been enabled, inter alia, through dynamic interpretation and because the European Convention on Human Rights is considered a living instrument.  The fact that European companies operating transnationally, i.e. in a non-European context, sometimes through its commercial activities violates human rights has given rise to discussion in legal doctrine on whether the scope of positive obligations should be further extended so that the member states to the European Convention on Human Rights will incur state responsibility for national corporates’ extraterritorial human rights violations. Thus, the purpose of the thesis is to examine whether the European Court of Human Rights can and should proceed with such expansion. An expansion creates methodological and technical problems as it challenges the traditional notion of jurisdiction, however, it is not impossible. Whatever the European Court of Human Rights will decide to do, the thesis will provide arguments both for why home state responsibility for national corporates’ extraterritorial activities that violates human rights can and should be imposed, as well for why it is beyond its (the European Court of Human Rights) competence.

A Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos é uma instância jurídico política que integra o Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos e é responsável pela análise de denúncias de violações a direitos ocorridos nos diversos países das Américas. A proposta deste trabalho é analisar as decisões de admissibilidade, mérito e acordos de solução amistosa publicadas pela Comissão e verificar a incidência de casos de violação a direitos humanos das mulheres. Mais do que simples casos em que a mulher é vítima, os casos objeto de análise deste trabalho apresentam situações em que justamente a violência ocorreu porque a vítima é do sexo feminino. Esta pesquisa congrega dados quantitativos e qualitativos sobre a ocorrência destas demandas no Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos e os impactos que as decisões da Comissão trazem para a observância dos direitos humanos das mulheres na região, bem como para a própria reformulação do conceito de direitos humanos / The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is a political and juridical instance which is part of the Inter-American Human Rights System and analyzes human rights violations reports in many countries in the American continent. This research evaluates the rulings of admissibility, merit and friendly solution agreements published by the Commission; it also verifies the frequency of womens human rights violation cases. More than just simple cases in which a woman is a victim, these analyzed episodes show that the violence took place precisely because the victim was a woman. This dissertation is based upon quantitative and qualitative data concerning the occurrence of these cases in the Inter- American Human Rights System and the impact that this decisions had on womens human rights observance in the region and on the re-formulation of human rights concept itself.

This research develops the social psychological study of lay perception of human rights and of rights-based reactions to perceived injustice. The pioneering work by social representation theorists is reviewed. Of particular interest is the use of rights-based responses to perceived relative subgroup disadvantage. It is argued that these responses are shaped by the historical development of the legal concept of unique subgroup rights; rights asserted by a subgroup that cannot be asserted by outgroup members or by members of a broader collective that includes all subgroups. The assertion of unique subgroup rights in contrast to individual rights was studied by presenting participants with scenarios suggestive of human rights violations. These included possible violations of privacy rights of indigenous Australians (Study 1), civil and political rights of indigenous Australians under mandatory sentencing schemes (Study 2), privacy rights of students in comparison to public servants (Study 3), refugee rights (Study 4), and reproductive rights of lesbians and single women in comparison to married women and women in de facto relationships (Study 5). The scenarios were based on real policy issues being debated in Australia at the time of data collection. Human rights activists participated in Studies 4 and 5. In Study 5, these activists participated via an online, web-based experiment. Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected. A social identity theory perspective is used drawing on concepts from both social identity theory and self-categorization theory. The studies reveal a preference for an equality-driven construal of the purpose of human rights law (i.e. that all Australians be treated equally regardless of subgroup membership) in contrast to minority support for a vulnerable groups construal of the purpose of human rights (i.e. that the purpose of human rights law is to protect vulnerable subgroups within a broader collective). Tajfelian social belief orientations of social mobility and social change are explicitly measured in Studies 3-5. Consistent with the social identity perspective, these ideological beliefs are conceptualised as background knowledge relevant to the subjective structuring of social reality (violation contexts) and to the process of motivated relative perception from the vantage point of the perceiver. There is some indication from these studies that social belief orientation may determine construals of the purpose of human rights. In Study 5 the observed preference for using inclusive human rights rhetoric in response to perceived subgroup injustice is explained as an identity-management strategy of social creativity. In Studies 4 and 5, explicit measurement of activist identification was also made in an attempt to further explain the apparently-dominant preference for an equality-driven construal of the purpose of human rights law and the preferred use of inclusive, individualised rights rhetoric in response to perceived subgroup injustice. Activist identification explained some action preferences, but did not simply translate into preferences for using subgroup interest arguments. In Study 5, metastereotyping measures revealed that inclusive rights-based protest strategies were used in order to create positive impressions of social justice campaigners in the minds of both outgroup and ingroup audiences. Ideas for future social psychological research on human rights is discussed.

Univ., Diss.--Speyer, 2005. / Literaturverz. S. [567] - 578.

Plusieurs critiques ont été adressées à Lévinas quant à la difficulté de conjuguer le caractère infini de la responsabilité éthique, qu’il présente comme condition de possibilité de l’expérience, et la mesure de l’obligation envers autrui qui naît inévitablement dans le politique. En effet, la distinction semble si prononcée entre l’obligation éthique transcendante envers l’autre et la logique politique, univers de sens associé à l’ontologie et présenté comme violent et immanent, que l’éthique peut apparaître compromise dès qu’elle est exprimée dans un contexte social. En réponse à ces difficultés, ce mémoire vise à démontrer qu’en dépit de leur opposition fondamentale, l’ordre éthique et l’ordre ontologico-politique font partie d’une structure unique. À la lumière de l’entrée en scène du tiers et de la nécessité de justice qui l’accompagne, l’existence d’un carrefour entre ces couches de significations distinctes, mais interdépendante, peut être illustrée. De fait, la justice constitue un concept amphibologique chez Lévinas qui, participant à la fois de l’éthique et du politique, permet de mettre au jour l’ancrage a priori social de l’éthique. Cette étude présentera des réflexions critiques reliées à la discipline juridique et aux droits de l’homme, qui démontreront comment la pensée de Lévinas non seulement peut, mais doit s’ouvrir à une expression sociale. / Many critics have been addressed to Lévinas concerning the difficulty of combining the infinite ethical responsibility, presented as the precondition of experience, and the limitation of the obligation towards the other that rise inevitably within the political. The distinction seems so stark between the transcendent ethical responsibility towards the other and the political logic, associated with the violent and immanent ontological order, that ethics can appear to be jeopardized as soon as it is expressed in a social context. This essay aims to overcome these difficulties by demonstrating that despite their fundamental opposition, the ethical order and the onto-political order are part of a unique structure. In the light of the presence of the third and of the necessity of justice that accompanies it, it is possible to prove the existence of a junction between these distinct but interdependent layers of signification. In fact, the concept of justice is an amphibological concept that at the same time is part of ethics and of politics. It shows that ethics is situated a priori in a social realm. This study will present critical reflection related to law and to human rights law that will demonstrate that Levinas’ philosophy not only can, but has to open itself to a social expression.