Diese kumulative Dissertation besteht aus drei Abschnitten.                                 I. Geopolitics, Aid and Growth Wir untersuchen den Effekt kurzfristiger politischer Motive auf die Effektivität von Entwicklungshilfe. Dabei testen wir, ob der Effekt der Hilfe auf Wirtschaftswachstum reduziert wird durch den Anteil der Jahre während der Hilfsvergabe, die ein Land temporäres Mitglied des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen war. Diese Mitgliedschaft sorgt für eine quasi zufällige Variation in der Höhe der vergebenen Hilfsgelder. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Zusammenhang zwischen Hilfe und Wachstum schwächer und niedriger ist für Hilfe, die während der temporären Mitgliedschaft vergeben wurde. Unsere zwei Schlussfolgerungen sind: Erstens, der Einfluss politischer Motive untergräbt die Effektivität der vergebenen Hilfsgelder. Zweitens, Variablen die politisches Interesse widerspiegeln sind ungeeignet als ökonometrische Instrumente für Entwicklungshilfe. Dies weckt Zweifel an einer großen Anzahl existierender Forschungsergebnisse. II. Is there a Home Bias in Sovereign Ratings? Kreditratingagenturen werden oftmals für angeblich verzerrte Länderratings kritisiert. Dieser Abschnitt diskutiert, wie das Heimatland einer Ratingagentur deren Ratingentscheidungen aufgrund polit-ökonomischer Einflüsse und kultureller Unterschiede beeinflussen kann. Mithilfe von Daten über neun Agenturen aus sechs unterschiedlichen Ländern testen wir, ob die Agenturen bessere Ratings an ihr Heimatland oder mit ihnen ökonomisch, politisch oder kulturell verbundene Länder vergeben. Unsere Ergebnisse liefern Belege für die Existenz einer Verzerrung zugunsten des jeweiligen Heimatlandes, kulturell ähnlicher Länder, und von Ländern, in denen die Banken des Heimatlandes größeren Risiken ausgesetzt sind. Dabei scheint die linguistische Ähnlichkeit der Sprache die Haupterklärung für den gemessenen Vorteil des Heimatlandes zu sein. III. Crime, Incentives and Political Effort: A Model and Empirical Application for India Der große Anteil an Politikern, gegen welche kriminelle Vorwürfe erhoben werden, hat eine öffentliche Debatte und eine Literatur über dessen Gründe und Auswirkungen ausgelöst. Um die Auswirkungen von Kriminalität abzuschätzen, entwickeln wir ein Modell über die Anreize, welchen Abgeordnete ausgesetzt sind wenn sie entscheiden ob sie sich für ihren Wahlkreis engagieren sollen. Wir nutzen drei direkte und gut messbare Maße für das Engagement der Abgeordneten in der vierzehnten Lok Sabha während der Legislaturperiode von 2004-2009: Anwesenheitsquoten, Aktivität im Parlament und die Nutzungsrate eine Fonds für lokale Entwicklungsprojekte. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe dass kriminelle Abgeordnete im Schnitt ungefähr 5% niedrigere Anwesenheitsquoten haben, und niedrige Nutzungsraten des Fonds, aber sich nicht bezüglich der Aktivität im Parlament unterscheiden. Diese Unterschiede hängen vom ökonomischen Entwicklungsstand des Wahlkreises, einem Proxy für Möglichkeiten illegale Renten zu extrahieren und für die Intensität der Überwachung des Abgeordneten durch die Wähler, sowie von der Definition von Kriminalität ab. Wir nutzen beobachtbare Kontrollvariablen, Matchingtechniken und „Treatment Effect“ Regressionen, um zu zeigen, warum diese negativen Koeffizienten eine Obergrenze für den tatsächlich wohl noch größeren negativen Zusammenhang darstellen. Darüber hinaus analysieren wir, warum es unwahrscheinlich ist, dass Selektionsprobleme aufgrund unbeobachtbarer Einflussfaktoren unsere Ergebnisse vollständig erklären können.

<p>This paper analyses head of state immunity, a traditional rule of international law, in relation to the indictments by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2009 against the current Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir. It can be agreed that the doctrine of immunity in international law attempts to overcome the tension between the protection of human rights and the demands of state sovereignty. The statutes and decisions of international criminal courts make it clear that no immunity for international crimes shall be attached to heads of states or to senior government officials. However, the case against the Sudanese President, where the jurisdiction of the ICC was triggered by the UN Security Council‟s referral of the situation in Darfur to the Court, represents the first case where a serving head of state has, in fact, been indicted before the ICC. From this case, a number of legal issues have arisen / such as the questions where the ICC‟s jurisdiction over an incumbent head of state, not party to the ICC Statute, is justified, and the obligations upon ICC state parties to surrender such a head of state to the requesting international criminal court. This paper gives an analysis of these questions.</p>

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Angesichts der Gefahr für Kulturgüter, die sich gerade in jüngeren Konflikten wie beispielsweise dem Mali-Konflikt zeigen, untersucht das Paper die Rolle, die der Sicherheitsrat seit 1990 beim Schutz von Kulturgütern in bewaffneten Konflikten einnimmt. Anhand einer Wortlautanalyse der Resolutionen des Sicherheitsrates und einer Analyse der beschlossenen Maßnahmen wird die Entwicklung aufgezeigt, dass der Sicherheitsrat dem Schutz von Kulturgut in bewaffneten Konflikten eine zunehmend hohe Bedeutung beimisst und sich entsprechend auch verstärkt für dessen Schutz einsetzt. Es wird gezeigt, dass der Sicherheitsrat dazu im Rahmen der UN-Charta grundsätzlich auch kompetent ist und sich der verstärkte Einsatz durch das wachsende Bewusstsein der internationalen Gemeinschaft für die Gefahr für Kulturgüter in bewaffneten Konflikten sowie die generelle Ausweitung des Tätigkeitsbereichs des Sicherheitsrates erklären lässt. Die Entwicklung des Schutzes durch den Sicherheitsrat erscheint daher folgerichtig und wünschenswert und gleichzeitig noch nicht abgeschlossen. / In the light of recent conflicts like the conflict in Mali, which show the risks for cultural property during armed conflicts, the present paper evaluates the role of the Security Council in the protection of cultural property during armed conflicts. Based on an analysis of the wording of resolutions and of the measures adopted by the Security Council, a development will be illustrated: the Security Council attaches greater importance to the protection of cultural property in armed conflict and strengthens its effort for the protection. Furthermore it will be argued that the Security Council is competent in this matter according to the Charter of the United Nations and that its increased efforts can be explained by the growing awareness of the international community about the risks for cultural property during armed conflict and the general increase of the Security Council’s activities. The development of the protection of cultural property provided by the Security Council therefore seems reasonable and not yet completed.

La saisine de la Cour pénale internationale désigne l'ensemble des mécanismes d'ouverture de l'instance pénale internationale. Elle naît formellement de l'acte introductif d'instance qui peut être le fait des États parties au Statut, du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU et du Procureur. Les procédures diligentées à la suite des saisines ont pour finalité de situer la responsabilité pénale individuelle et de réprimer les violations massives des droits de l'homme et du droit international humanitaire. L'évaluation de la pratique sélective des saisines permet de déceler la lenteur des procédures en cours. Si cette lenteur a des justifications endogènes, elle est explicable, au plan exogène, par les rapports complexes que la juridiction entretient avec les États au regard du principe de complémentarité. Il en est de même de l'emprise du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU sur la compétence de la Cour et le traitement des saisines. Par ailleurs, en raison de l'exécution discutable de l'obligation de coopération par les États, la CPI assure avec difficulté l'objectif de la lutte contre l'impunité des crimes graves. En tout état de cause, l'essor de la saisine est tributaire d'une application optimale des dispositions statutaires et d'un rééquilibrage des rapports entre les États, le Conseil de sécurité et la Cour / The referral to the International Criminal Court refers to all the opening mechanisms of the international criminal trial. It officially comes from the writ of summons which can be the fact of States parties in the Status, of the UN Security Council and the Prosecutor. The procedures undertaken following the Court referrals have for purpose to locate the individual criminal responsibility and to repress the massive violations of the human rights and the international humanitarian law. The assessment of the selective referrals allows to reveal the slowness of the current procedures. If this slowness has endogenous reasons, it is explained, in the exogenous plan, by the complex relationships that the jurisdiction maintains with States towards the principle of Complementarity. It is the same about the influence of the UN Security Council on the jurisdiction of the Court and the referrals processing. Moreover, because of the questionable performance of the obligation of cooperation by States, the ICC insures with difficulty the objective of the fight against the impunity for serious crimes. In any case, the development of the Court referral is dependent on an optimal application of the statutory disposals and a rebalance of relationships between States, Security Council and Court

A presente tese trata do objetivo brasileiro de ocupar uma cadeira permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas. Primeiramente, aborda-se o tema da reforma do Conselho sob uma perspectiva geral, apresentando-se uma retrospectiva histórica e explanando a composição e o método decisório desse Órgão. Na seqüência, parte-se para o debate sobre a reforma, enfatizando-se o posicionamento dos principais grupos de países. A partir daí, passa-se a analisar o tema sob a ótica dos interesses brasileiros, analisando-se a intenção em ocupar uma cadeira permanente quando da criação das Nações Unidas, assim como o posicionamento brasileiro sobre as atividades do Conselho e as perspectivas de reforma no período entre 1945 e 1992, ano este em que a Assembléia Geral passou a tratar oficialmente dessa questão. Uma vez que o tema passou a ser estudado pela Organização Internacional, a presente pesquisa analisa a candidatura brasileira a membro permanente nos governos Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso e Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a fim de se comparar como o tema da reforma foi abordado por cada um deles. Ao final, conclui-se que as políticas adotadas por esses governos foram diferentes. No governo Itamar, não obstante o curto período, percebe-se grande empenho quando do lançamento da candidatura brasileira. Por outro lado, Fernando Henrique, ao assumir a Presidência da República, deu continuidade às pretensões brasileiras, porém de forma mais tímida. O Presidente Lula, por sua vez, retomou a importância do tema, empenhando-se cada vez mais para alcançar esse objetivo. No entanto, também se pôde perceber que fatores externos influenciaram as políticas adotadas. / This paper concerns about the Brazilian purpose to become a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. First of all, it presents the issue about the reform of the Security Council, presenting an historical review and explaining its composition, functions and powers. Next, it deals with the discussion about the reform, emphasizing the opinion of the main group of States. From then on, it turns to analyze the subject matter on the Brazilian interest’s point of view, observing the intention to occupy a permanent seat by the time of the UN creation, as well as the Brazilian opinion about the Council activities and the possibility of a reform between 1945 e 1992, the year the General Assembly officially became concerned. Once the issue turned to be examined by this International Organization, this research analyses the Brazilian candidacy for a permanent seat during the governments of Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in order to compare how the reform issue was deal by each one. At the end, it concludes that the policies they put in force were different one another. During Itamar’s period, despite its shortness, it shows great commitment to become a permanent member. On the other hand, when Fernando Henrique acceded the Presidency, he kept the same goals, but not that hard. The President Lula, in his turn, rescued the importance and focused that aim. Nevertheless external matters affected those policies.

Esta dissertação analisa uma novidade introduzida na política externa brasileira pelo governo de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva: a não-indiferença. Esta diretriz surgiu como contraponto ao princípio da não-intervenção, no entanto o governo não delimitou adequadamente como aplicá-la, tendo em vista que em contextos similares a diplomacia Lula tomou atitudes diferentes. Para isso, são estudados sete casos de atuação do Brasil com relação a outros países: Venezuela, Bolívia, Paraguai, Honduras, Cuba, Irã e Haiti. A hipótese que orientou este estudo é de que na busca por aumentar o perfil político do Brasil, representado pela candidatura a um assento permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, o governo brasileiro exerceu um excessivo ativismo que exigiu esforços políticos (omitindo-se inclusive em questões sobre direitos humanos), financeiros e militares. A diplomacia da solidariedade surge nesse contexto como justificativa à mediação de crises, cooperação técnica e até mesmo à intervenção, da qual o engajamento brasileiro no Haiti seria o melhor exemplo devido a sua multidimensionalidade. / The present dissertation analyzes an innovation in Brazilian foreign policy introduced by the Lula da Silva administration: the non-indifference. This guideline emerged in opposition to the principle of non-intervention, however the government did not define it properly nor have created rules to enforce it, considering that Lula`s diplomacy had different approaches to similar situations. To find out more about this trend, it was chosen seven case studies in which Brazilian foreign policy had to cope with other countries, such as: Venezuela, Bolivia, Paraguay, Honduras, Cuba, Iran and Haiti. The hypothesis which has oriented this research addresses that in order to increase Brazil`s political profile, represented by the pursue for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, the government has excessively raised its initiatives abroad which required political (neglecting human rights), financial and military efforts. The diplomacy of solidarity emerges as an argument to justify the Brazilian role in peace talks, cooperation measures and even intervention, which makes Haiti the best example due its multidimensionality.

No description available.

Esta dissertação analisa uma novidade introduzida na política externa brasileira pelo governo de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva: a não-indiferença. Esta diretriz surgiu como contraponto ao princípio da não-intervenção, no entanto o governo não delimitou adequadamente como aplicá-la, tendo em vista que em contextos similares a diplomacia Lula tomou atitudes diferentes. Para isso, são estudados sete casos de atuação do Brasil com relação a outros países: Venezuela, Bolívia, Paraguai, Honduras, Cuba, Irã e Haiti. A hipótese que orientou este estudo é de que na busca por aumentar o perfil político do Brasil, representado pela candidatura a um assento permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, o governo brasileiro exerceu um excessivo ativismo que exigiu esforços políticos (omitindo-se inclusive em questões sobre direitos humanos), financeiros e militares. A diplomacia da solidariedade surge nesse contexto como justificativa à mediação de crises, cooperação técnica e até mesmo à intervenção, da qual o engajamento brasileiro no Haiti seria o melhor exemplo devido a sua multidimensionalidade. / The present dissertation analyzes an innovation in Brazilian foreign policy introduced by the Lula da Silva administration: the non-indifference. This guideline emerged in opposition to the principle of non-intervention, however the government did not define it properly nor have created rules to enforce it, considering that Lula`s diplomacy had different approaches to similar situations. To find out more about this trend, it was chosen seven case studies in which Brazilian foreign policy had to cope with other countries, such as: Venezuela, Bolivia, Paraguay, Honduras, Cuba, Iran and Haiti. The hypothesis which has oriented this research addresses that in order to increase Brazil`s political profile, represented by the pursue for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, the government has excessively raised its initiatives abroad which required political (neglecting human rights), financial and military efforts. The diplomacy of solidarity emerges as an argument to justify the Brazilian role in peace talks, cooperation measures and even intervention, which makes Haiti the best example due its multidimensionality.

O objetivo primeiro deste trabalho é discutir o posicionamento do Brasil sobre a região do Oriente Médio no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas durante os biênios 1993-1994, 1998-1999 e 2004-2005, nos quais o Brasil ocupou uma vaga como membro não permanente no órgão. O argumento central é o de que as transformações estruturais no sistema internacional ocorridas a partir da década de 1990 representaram os fatores primeiros para o relativo distanciamento da diplomacia brasileira em relação aos temas envolvendo o Oriente Médio. Com o fim da Guerra Fria, os Estados Unidos intensificaram sua influência sobre essa região. Ademais, a convergência entre os membros do Conselho de Segurança aumentou consideravelmente a partir dos anos de 1990. A política externa brasileira, por sua vez, sofreu uma reorientação paradigmática nesse mesmo período. Em 2004 e 2005, por outro lado, as posições assumidas pelo Governo Lula (2003-2010) no Conselho de Segurança revelariam uma nova interpretação da ordem pós-bipolaridade, ocasionada por eventos como o 11 de Setembro e a resposta estadunidense ao terrorismo internacional. / The main objective of this research is to discuss Brazil’s position regarding the Middle East region in the United Nations Security Council during the years of 1993-1994, 1998-1999 and 2004-2005, in which Brazil occupied a non-permanent seat. The central argument is that the transformations in international structure which occurred since the 1990’s represented the key factor for the relative disengagement of Brazilian diplomacy from subjects involving the Middle East. After the end of the Cold War, the United States intensified its influence over the region. Besides, convergence among the members of the UN Security Council increased since the years of 1990’s. Brazilian foreign policy, in its turn, suffered a paradigmatic reorientation during the same period. In 2004 and 2005, however, the positions assumed by the Lula da Silva Administration (2003-2010) in the Security Council revealed a new interpretation of the post-bipolarity order, triggered by events such as September 11 and US response to international terrorism.