Under what conditions and for what reasons do American leaders seek the endorsement of relevant international organizations (IOs) such as the UN or NATO for prospective military interventions? My central hypothesis is that U.S. government efforts to obtain IO approval for prospective interventions are frequently the result of significant bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining between hawkish policy leaders who emphasize the likely positive payoffs of a prompt use of force, on the one side, and skeptical officials--with the top military brass and war veterans in senior policy positions at the forefront--who highlight its potential downsides and long-term costs, on the other. The military leaders--the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the regional combatant commanders, and senior planners on the Joint Staff in Washington--are generally skeptical of humanitarian and other "idealist" interventions that aim to change the domestic politics of foreign countries; they naturally tend to consider all the potential downsides of intervention, given their operational focus; and they usually worry more than activist civilian policy officials about public and congressional support for protracted engagements. Assuming that the military leaders are not merely stooges of the civilian leadership, they are at first likely to altogether resist a prospective intervention, when they believe that no vital American interests are at stake and fear an open-ended deployment of U.S. troops. Given the military's professional expertise and their standing in American society, they come close to holding a de facto veto over prospective interventions they clearly oppose. I hypothesize that confronted with such great initial reluctance or opposition on the part of the military brass, civilian advocates of intervention from other government agencies will seek inter alia to obtain an advance endorsement from relevant IOs, so as to lock in international support and thereby reassure the military and their bureaucratic allies that the long-term costs to the United States in terms of postwar peacekeeping and stabilization will be limited. That, in turn, can be expected to help forge a winning bureaucratic coalition in Washington and persuade the president to authorize military action. United States multilateralism for military interventions is thus often a genuine policy resultant--the outcome of sustained bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining--and it may not actually reflect the initial preferences of any particular government agency or senior official.

Cette thèse est une réflexion originale sur le droit international dans la crise, car elle aborde le droit international grâce à une théorie peu connue en droit, celle des systèmes dynamiques complexes. L’étude du cas particulier de la gestion normative de la crise par le Conseil de sécurité illustre les intérêts de l’utilisation d’une théorie novatrice en droit. La théorie des systèmes dynamiques complexes offre les outils d’une réflexion sur le droit, fondée sur les interactions du droit avec le contexte particulier dans lequel il intervient, la crise, et ses acteurs. La mise en lumière de ces interactions favorise une lecture critique du droit international dans la crise et permet de renouveler l’ontologie de ce droit. Les dynamiques complexes appréhendées et définies par cette théorie sont utiles lorsqu’il s’agit d’expliquer les atouts et les limites de l’action normative du Conseil. Par ailleurs en renouvelant l’ontologie du droit, la théoriedes systèmes dynamiques complexes facilite une lecture prospective de l’action normative du Conseil et insiste sur le rôle institutionnel du droit. / This thesis is an original reflection on international law in time of crisis, as it addresses international law through a little-known theory in law, that of complex dynamic systems. The study of the specific case of the normative management of the crisis by the Security Council illustrates the interest of the use of an innovative theory in law.The theory of complex dynamic systems provides the tools to think differently the law, based on the interaction of law with the particular context in which it operates, the crisis, and its actors. The highlighting of these interactions favors a critical reading of international law in time of crisis and helps to renew the ontology of law. The complex dynamic understood and defined by this theory are useful when explaining the strengths and limitations of the Council’s action in time of crisis. In addition to renewing the ontology of law, complex dynamic systems theory facilitates a prospective reading of the normative action of the Council and stresses the institutional role of law.

A presente tese trata do objetivo brasileiro de ocupar uma cadeira permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas. Primeiramente, aborda-se o tema da reforma do Conselho sob uma perspectiva geral, apresentando-se uma retrospectiva histórica e explanando a composição e o método decisório desse Órgão. Na seqüência, parte-se para o debate sobre a reforma, enfatizando-se o posicionamento dos principais grupos de países. A partir daí, passa-se a analisar o tema sob a ótica dos interesses brasileiros, analisando-se a intenção em ocupar uma cadeira permanente quando da criação das Nações Unidas, assim como o posicionamento brasileiro sobre as atividades do Conselho e as perspectivas de reforma no período entre 1945 e 1992, ano este em que a Assembléia Geral passou a tratar oficialmente dessa questão. Uma vez que o tema passou a ser estudado pela Organização Internacional, a presente pesquisa analisa a candidatura brasileira a membro permanente nos governos Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso e Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a fim de se comparar como o tema da reforma foi abordado por cada um deles. Ao final, conclui-se que as políticas adotadas por esses governos foram diferentes. No governo Itamar, não obstante o curto período, percebe-se grande empenho quando do lançamento da candidatura brasileira. Por outro lado, Fernando Henrique, ao assumir a Presidência da República, deu continuidade às pretensões brasileiras, porém de forma mais tímida. O Presidente Lula, por sua vez, retomou a importância do tema, empenhando-se cada vez mais para alcançar esse objetivo. No entanto, também se pôde perceber que fatores externos influenciaram as políticas adotadas. / This paper concerns about the Brazilian purpose to become a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. First of all, it presents the issue about the reform of the Security Council, presenting an historical review and explaining its composition, functions and powers. Next, it deals with the discussion about the reform, emphasizing the opinion of the main group of States. From then on, it turns to analyze the subject matter on the Brazilian interest’s point of view, observing the intention to occupy a permanent seat by the time of the UN creation, as well as the Brazilian opinion about the Council activities and the possibility of a reform between 1945 e 1992, the year the General Assembly officially became concerned. Once the issue turned to be examined by this International Organization, this research analyses the Brazilian candidacy for a permanent seat during the governments of Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in order to compare how the reform issue was deal by each one. At the end, it concludes that the policies they put in force were different one another. During Itamar’s period, despite its shortness, it shows great commitment to become a permanent member. On the other hand, when Fernando Henrique acceded the Presidency, he kept the same goals, but not that hard. The President Lula, in his turn, rescued the importance and focused that aim. Nevertheless external matters affected those policies.

A tese estuda a evolução histórica do atitude multilateral do Brasil. Parte da noção que o multilateralismo é um aspecto significativo da política externa brasileira, desde as primeiras conferências internacionais dos países americanos, que começam ainda no fim do século XIX. Em tempos recentes, na Liga das Nações, mas sobretudo nas Nações Unidas, a importância das instituições multilaterais só fez crescer. O estudo parte, no ângulo teórico, da perspectiva de que o multilateralismo tem uma lógica própria e que, ao aceitá-la, o comportamento diplomático dos Estados deve naturalmente estar em sintonia com o que aquela lógica impõe. A concepção de John Ruggie apóia a parte teórica da tese e sustenta o seu objetivo central, que é o de procura definir o que seriam constantes do comportamento multilateral do Brasil. Procura-se mostrar que suas origens estariam nas reações que a diplomacia brasileira teve ao Pan Americanismo, se fixaram com nossa participação na II Conferência da Haia, quando, com Ruy Barbosa, defendemos que as instituições multilaterais deveriam estar fundadas na igualdade entre os Estados e com a aspiração a uma participação influente nos processos decisórios internacionais, expresso recentemente com a aspiração a um lugar permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações. / The thesis studies the evolution of Brazil´s multilateral attitude. It accepts the notion that multilateralism has been a meaningful aspect of Brazilian foreign policy since the first conferences of American States, a series of international gatherings that began at the end of nineteenth century. From them on, after the creation of the League of Nations and, specially, the United Nations, the importance of multilateral institutions for Brazil has grown consistently. From the theoretical perspective, the thesis accepts the idea that multilateralism is defined by a singular logic and States, when working in multilateral institutions, are bound by that logic. John Ruggie´s conception of nultilateralism supoorts that idea and frames the main goal of the thesis, that is, a investigation of the constant patterns of Brazil´s multilateral behavior. The origins of those patterns could be identified in the diplomatic reactions to the challenges of the Pan American conferences. But, the patterns became more evident during our participation in the II Peace Conference (Hague, 1907) when our delegation, headed by Ruy Barbosa, advocated the understanding that necessary foundation of the multilateral institutions is the equality among States. Another constant is the Brazilian wish to have a more influential participation in the decision making process of the international institutions, as today shown in our aspiration to occupy a permanent seat at the Security Council of the United Nations.

O objetivo desta dissertação é examinar o grau de concertação política do IBAS no ano de 2011, período onde os três países – Índia, Brasil e África do Sul – participaram pela primeira vez como um bloco e como membros não permanentes do CSNU. Como objetivo geral, a pesquisa examinará por intermédio do comportamento de votação e temas de agendas como forma de verificar se a concertação do IBAS para temas de alta política, de fato pode ser caracterizada como eixo central desta coalizão. Para examinar o comportamento do bloco, serão abordados os conceitos teóricos de potências médias, de system affecting states e de geometria variável para melhor compreender o prestígio e legitimidade internacional deste bloco, percebido na forma limitada de influenciar o sistema internacional. Além disso, também se examinará a partir do discurso de Bandung e da Declaração de Brasília, se o IBAS se mantém na retórica ou se de fato insere um mecanismo novo para apoiar e promover o desenvolvimento na plataforma do eixo Sul-Sul. A pesquisa se fundamentou em levantamento documental dos seguintes referenciais bibliográficos: a) artigos e literatura acadêmica com abordagem conceitual sobre as coalizões, potências médias, cooperação Sul-Sul; b) declarações multilaterais; c) reportagens; d) think-tanks em torno deste tema e o site oficial da ONU (Conselho de Segurança-UNBISNET). Diante do examinado, a hipótese central foi constatada, sendo que o IBAS de fato tem como pilar central o eixo Sul-Sul Hard como plataforma para fortalecer o grau de influência para a ampliação e reforma do CSNU. Conclui-se que a convergência apresentada pelo bloco em 2011 como membros não permanentes imprimiu uma postura que foi além da interlocução, mostrando um alinhamento e convergência quantos aos temas de alta política voltados para os temas de governança global. / The aim of this dissertation will examine the degree of political consensus of IBSA in 2011, a period where the three countries participated in the first time as a block, and as non- permanent members of the UNSC. As a general objective, the research will examine through voting behavior issues and agendas as a way to verify that the IBSA dialogue to issues of high politics, in fact it can be characterized as the centerpiece of this coalition. For examining the behavior of the block will be approached the theoretical concepts of middle power, the System Affecting States and the variable geometry coalition to better understand the prestige and international legitimacy of this block , realized in a limited way to influence the international system. Furthermore, also it will examine the speech from Bandung and Brasilia Declaration, if the IBSA remains in rhetoric or actually inserts a new mechanism to support and promote the development plataform on the South-South axis. The research was based on documentary survey of the following bibliographic references : a) articles and academic literature on the conceptual approach to coalitions; middle powers; South-South cooperation; b ) multilateral declarations; c ) reports; d ) think-tanks around this theme and the official website of the UN (Security Council - UNBISNET). Before the examination, it was concluded that IBSA actually has as the central pillar of the South- South Hard as a platform to strengthen the degree of influence on the expansion and reform of the UNSC. It is inferred that from the consultation policy presented by the bloc in 2011 as non-permanent members, printed a posture that was beyond the dialogue, it showed an alignment and convergence on the issues of high politics focused on issues of global governance.

Are peace agreements more likely to include gender provisions if women participate in the peace negotiations? The international community, national governments and civil societies around the world have assumed that women’s inclusion in peace negotiations result in higher quality peace agreements, where women’s interests are better taken into consideration. To date, there is a lack of empirical underpinning of the assumption. This study uses a twofold research design, combining statistical and qualitative methods to examine the interrelation between women’s descriptive and substantive representation in peace negotiations in the post-Cold War era. First, the statistical analysis suggests that peace agreements are more likely to include at least one gender provision referring to women’s rights and security if women participate in the negotiation. At the same time, the agreements are not more likely to address a higher number of different areas for increased rights and security measures for women. Second, the qualitative analysis examining the mechanisms shows that there is no guarantee that women will push for gender provisions, but that their particular experiences and interests in conflict, and the expectations from others give them strong reasons to do so. Important factors for women to successfully push for gender provisions have to do both with their individual will and personal ability, and external factors relating to the presence of traditional gender norms and the power balance between men and women in the country of conflict.

As operações de manutenção da paz da Organização das Nações Unidas vêm sendo empregadas há mais de 60 anos com o objetivo de assegurar a paz e a segurança internacionais. A partir dos conflitos da Somália, Bósnia e Ruanda ocorridos na década de 1990, caracterizados pelas massivas violações de direitos humanos e pela incapacidade da Organização de impedi-las, esta deu início a uma série de debates acerca de como melhor operacionalizar suas peacekeeping operations, a fim de que violações como aquelas não mais voltassem a ocorrer. Ademais, o entendimento, por parte do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, de que violações de direitos humanos e estabilidade internacional guardam estreita relação, colaborou para que esses debates se desenvolvessem. O presente trabalho tem como obejtivo analisar as propostas sugeridas com vistas ao aperfeiçoamento do modus operandi das peacekeeping operations em virtude das citadas violações de direitos humanos e a verificar se tais propostas estão sendo aplicadas nas operações de manutenção da paz atuais / The peacekeeping operations of the United Nations have been used for over 60 years with the goal of ensuring international peace and security. From the conflicts in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda occurred in the 1990s, characterized by massive human rights violations and the inability of the Organization of preventing them, United Nations have initiated a series of debates about how to best operationalize its peacekeeping operations, in manner that those violations no longer occur. Moreover, the understanding by the United Nations Security Council that human rights violations and international stability are closely related, contributed to the development of these discussions. The present work aims, therefore, to assess the proposals suggested for the improvement of the modus operandi of peacekeeping operations in view of the aforementioned human rights violations and to verify whether they are being applied in todays peacekeeping operations.

L’objet de notre réflexion est de voir que l’articulation entre le Conseil de sécurité et les juridictions pénales internationales s’appréhende essentiellement sous deux angles complètement nouveaux en droit international : la participation directe ou indirecte à la création d’organes juridictionnels et l’intrusion dans les procédures de fonctionnement de ceux-ci. Juridiquement, le Conseil de sécurité exerce pleinement ce double rôle sous le prisme de l’article 24 de la Charte des Nations Unies qui lui attribue la responsabilité principale en matière de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. En effet, qu’il s’agisse de la création des T.P.I., de son rôle peu ou prou variable dans l’établissement des juridictions mixtes, du pouvoir de saisine et de suspension de la C.P.I. que lui confère le Statut de Rome, de l’obligation de coopération des Etats dont il est l’ultime gardien ou de son pouvoir discrétionnaire dans la qualification du crime d’agression, le Conseil de sécurité est devenu, grâce à l’inépuisable fondement du Chapitre VII, le véritable catalyseur de la justice pénale internationale. Cependant, le revers de la médaille de cette importance du Conseil n’est pas anodin ou sans intérêt. Son irruption, très contestée au départ, dans le domaine de la justice pénale internationale donne lieu à une confrontation ancienne en droit international : celle de la politique et du juridique. Les termes de ce conflit transparaissent assez clairement de l’esprit de notre analyse. On ne peut d’ailleurs y échapper tant les préoccupations liées à la justice pénale internationale et celles relatives au maintien de la paix sont consubstantiellement imbriquées. Nous observons, non sans une certaine distance et une forme de retenue, que les termes mêmes de l’articulation alimentent toutes formes de conjectures sur l’indépendance et l’impartialité des juridictions pénales internationales. / The purpose of our research is to acknowledge that the link between the Security Council and international criminal jurisdictions is to be understood essentially under two entirely new perspectives in international law: the direct or indirect involvement of the Security Council in the creation of jurisdictional bodies and its intrusion in the operating procedures of the latter. Legally, the Security Council fully exercises this double role in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, which devolves to it the main responsibility in the matter of maintaining peace and international security. Indeed, the Security Council, whether it is in the creation of ICCs, in its variable role in the setting up of mixed courts, in its power of submission and suspension of cases before the ICP which is imparted to it by the Statute of Rome, in its ultimate part in ensuring the obligation mutual cooperation amongst states, or in its discretionary power in the characterization of the crime of aggression, has become, thanks to the abiding foundation of Chapter VII, the genuine catalyst of international criminal justice. However, the downside to this importance of the Security Council is neither to be overlooked nor without interest. The sudden, and at first highly debated emergence of the Security Council in the area of international criminal justice has rekindled an old debate in international law: that of the political and the juridical order. The terms of this conflict show quite clearly through the approach of our analysis. We cannot evade this debate, considering how intricately the issues and concerns of international criminal justice and those of relating to peacekeeping are consubstantially interwoven. We may notice, albeit at some distance and some restraint, that the very terms of this link nurture all sorts of conjectures over the independence and impartiality of the international criminal courts.

L’échec de l’opération des Nations Unies Restore Hope conduite en Somali sous le leadership des États-Unis d’Amérique et le génocide rwandais de 1994 ont modifié les rapports du monde occidental aux conflits armés internes en Afrique. D’une volonté initiale affichée en faveur du renforcement des capacités des acteurs africains dans la gestion de la conflictualité à l’intérieur des États africains, le monde occidental a adopté une posture de désengagement de la conflictualité interne en Afrique. La directive présidentielle américaine Presidential Decision Directive 25 du 3 mai 1994 et la recommandation du Sénat belge du 28 janvier 1998 resteront certainement les plus significatifs en matière de modification de l’attitude occidentale en faveur de l’Afrique en conflit. Cependant, et « ramant à contre courant », le Royaume-Uni de Grande Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord d’une part et la France d’autre part ont décidé d’assumer leur part de responsabilité historique dans la vie, parfois mouvementée de leurs anciennes colonies en Afrique. Pour ces deux anciennes puissances coloniales, les difficultés internes auxquelles les États africains post-guerre froide étaient confrontés constituaient de véritables défis pour lesquels, ces États avaient besoin d’une assistance contre vents et marrées. Cette profession de foi partagée sur les deux rives de la Manche a permis de stabiliser et ramener la paix dans deux États africains dans l’ère post génocide rwandais. Ce sont la Sierra Leone et la Côte d’Ivoire. Comment le Royaume-Uni et la France ont-ils réussi à stabiliser la Sierra Leone et la Côte d’Ivoire et les sortir de leurs conflits en apparence insolubles eu égard à la profondeur des divergences qui en opposaient les acteurs ? Quels ajustements stratégiques le Royaume-Uni et la France ont-ils opéré dans leur politique interventionniste dans le cadre de la résolution des conflits armés internes en Sierra Leone et en Côte d’Ivoire et quelles actions entreprises par elles ont permis d’aboutir aux succès enregistrés dans ces deux États ? A travers une recherche bibliographique, du reste, bien disponible, des entretiens conduits auprès du monde diplomatique, des personnalités politiques, d’anciens acteurs en conflit et d’autorités militaires, cette thèse révèle comment par une synergie d’actions bien coordonnées, le Royaume-Uni et la France ont permis de ramener la paix et la quiétude en Sierra Leone et en Côte d’Ivoire. Ayant agi ainsi, ces deux puissances moyennes, membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies ont donné à l’Afrique et au monde des raisons de croire en l’intervention internationale. / He failure of the United Nations Restore Hope operation in Somalia under the leadership of the United States of America and the 1994 Rwandan genocide altered the Western world's relationship to internal armed conflict in Africa. From an initial desire to strengthen the capacity of African actors to manage conflicts within African states, the Western world adopted a position of disengagement from internal conflict in Africa. The United States’ Presidential Decision Directive 25 of May 3, 1994 and the recommendation of the Belgian Senate of January 28, 1998 are particularly significant in terms of changing the Western world’s attitude in favor of Africa in conflict. However, and "going against the current," the United Kingdom on the one hand and France on the other hand have decided to shoulder their share of historical responsibility in the fate of their former colonies in Africa. For these two former colonial powers, the internal difficulties facing the post-Cold War African states were real challenges which these states needed assistance in dealing with. This commitment on both sides of the Channel helped to stabilize and restore peace in two African states in the Rwandan post-genocide era, namely Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast. How did the United Kingdom and France manage to stabilize Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast and extricate them from seemingly intractable conflicts, given the depth of the differences between the actors? What strategic adjustments did the United Kingdom and France make in their interventionist policies in the context of the resolution of internal armed conflicts in Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast, and what actions did they take to achieve success in both these countries? Through a review of the literature as well as through interviews of diplomats, politicians, military leaders and other actors, this thesis demonstrates how, through a synergy of well-coordinated actions, the United Kingdom and France brought peace and tranquility to Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast. Having done so, these two middle-ranking powers, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, gave Africa and the world reason to believe in international interventions.

<p>This paper analyses head of state immunity, a traditional rule of international law, in relation to the indictments by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2009 against the current Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir. It can be agreed that the doctrine of immunity in international law attempts to overcome the tension between the protection of human rights and the demands of state sovereignty. The statutes and decisions of international criminal courts make it clear that no immunity for international crimes shall be attached to heads of states or to senior government officials. However, the case against the Sudanese President, where the jurisdiction of the ICC was triggered by the UN Security Council‟s referral of the situation in Darfur to the Court, represents the first case where a serving head of state has, in fact, been indicted before the ICC. From this case, a number of legal issues have arisen / such as the questions where the ICC‟s jurisdiction over an incumbent head of state, not party to the ICC Statute, is justified, and the obligations upon ICC state parties to surrender such a head of state to the requesting international criminal court. This paper gives an analysis of these questions.</p>