L'interprétation est un domaine du droit très complexe, dont l'intérêt est de définir ou de déterminer le sens et la portée des règles de droit en vigueur. L'interprétation va ainsi clarifier un texte juridique. Là où l'obscur réside, l'interprétation, telle une lanterne, vient éclaircir l'acte juridique. L'interprète aura alors recours à une argumentation pour convaincre son auditoire. Certains États interpréteront de manière extensive les textes juridiques. Ce phénomène se constate notamment au moment de l'interprétation des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité. Face au pouvoir discrétionnaire des États, la mise en place d'un régime juridique donné éviterait toutes interprétations abusives. La première partie de cette étude aura pour objet d'étudier les différentes règles en matière d'interprétation, telles précisées dans la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969. La deuxième partie sera consacrée d'une part à un historique des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité et d'autre part à l'application des règles d'interprétation à deux études de cas. L'historique retracera l'évolution des résolutions avec comme césure la fin de la Guerre Froide. Ensuite, nous verrons à travers deux exemples, comment les États peuvent interpréter de manière extensive, voir abusive les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité. Ces études de cas nous conduiront à étudier la pertinence de l'argumentaire utilisé par les États pour justifier leur interprétation. Ceci aura pour intérêt de montrer le rôle stratégique du phénomène interprétatif pour la mise en oeuvre des intérêts étatiques. Cela permettra d'ouvrir une réflexion sur le contrôle de la légalité des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité, ce dernier devenant nécessaire face à la liberté dont jouie le Conseil. Ce contrôle permettrait d'une part de rétablir un équilibre organique au sein du système onusien, et il permettrait d'autre part de redorer le blason du Conseil de sécurité en lui conférant une certaine légitimité. / Interpretation is a very complex dimension of law whose relevance lies in defining or determining the meaning and the scope of the legal mIes. In this respect, interpretation elucidates a judicial text. Where obscurity lies, interpretation -like a lantem- brings light to the judicial act. The interpreter will thus resort to argumentation in order to convince the « interpretative community ». Sorne States will not hesitate to interpret judicial texts in a broad manner. This phenomenon can better be observed in the interpretation of Security Council resolutions. Faced with the discretionary powers of States, the creation of a judicial framework would bring to an end most instances of abusive interpretations. Part 1 studies the several mIes in of interpretation as established by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Rights of Treaties. Part II will focus on both the history of the Security Council resolutions of and the application of the interpretation mIes of the Vienna Convention in light of two cases. The historical overview will retrieve the evolution of the resolutions until the end of the Cold War. Following this, we will see through the examples of the Kosovo and Iraq conflicts, how broadly, and even abusively, States can interpret Security Council resolutions. The two case studies will lead us to an analysis of the pertinence of the argumentation used by the States to justify their interpretation. This will show the strategie role that the interpretative phenomena play in the carrying out of State interests. It will lead to a reflection on the control of the legality of Security Council resolutions, a control necessary considering the liberty that the Council currently enjoys. On the one hand, this control would allow to reestablish an organic equilibrium within the UN. On the other hand, it would enhance the Security Council's image by conferring on it a certain legitimacy. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures En vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en droit (L.L.M)"

The changing nature of today’s wars, shows that civilians have been involved in these wars as both victims and perpetrators. Since these are internal wars, many civilians are often displaced, and they end up becoming refugees. In the midst of all this, women and children suffer most in this transition, with women suffering from sexual violence. In this context of armed conflict, it is observed that women, men, girls and boys experience conflict differently and they also respond differently in times of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and also in post-conflict reconstruction. Women are not only the victims of war; they are also denied full participation in decision-making in areas of peace and security. Furthermore, their vital roles in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are rarely acknowledged. The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 in October 2000, with the theme “Women, Peace and Security”. Although there are other forums that have addressed women in peace and security, there is none that has been more vocal, unanimous and holistic than Resolution 1325. The Resolution recognizes the need for women to be involved in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. It also calls for the participation of women in decision making and peace processes. It further calls for the integration of gender perspectives in peacekeeping operations and the protection of women and girls from gender based violence in conflict zones. Resolution 1325 refers to other various previously adopted resolutions and other policies and gives mandates to the different role players like the United Nations, member countries and all parties involved in conflicts. In its efforts to implement the Resolution, the United Nations developed a System-Wide Action Plan for 2005- 2006 which was later reviewed and updated for 2008-2009 with performance indicators, monitoring and accountability procedures. The member states are under the obligation to ensure that the policy on peace and security is incorporated in their national policies. This study has cited Liberia being a country that has emerged from civil war and how the Resolution has been applicable in the reconstruction of that country. Though progress has been recorded in the implementation of the Resolution, there are still gaps and great challenges in the use of the action plans. However, the United Nations entities are working on the revised action plans and their report will only be given in 2010. This study has compared Resolution 1325 with the landmines campaign which has been referred to as the most successful humanitarian advocacy ever in history. There are various lessons learnt from the landmines campaign which could be used for the successful implementation of Resolution 1325. This study has assessed the impact of Resolution 1325 since its adoption to date and found out that there has been little progress. The gender perspective in preventing armed conflict has not made it any easier for women to participate in decision making and peace processes. / Thesis (M.Com.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Westville, 2010.

Diplomatic stalemate at the seat of the UN Security Council is by no means a recent problem. Nevertheless, it may be argued that 'American unilateralism' reached its apex in July 2002, when the United States stood its ground and demanded immunity from prosecution before the International Criminal Court ("ICC") for US peacekeepers. This request was accompanied by the heavy-handed and deadly serious threat to veto the renewal of the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, a threat which was realised over the course of the debates. This political brinkmanship, which pitted the United States against friends and foes alike, finally ceased when the US agreed to accept a Security Council Resolution offering a twelve-month deferral of prosecution for peacekeepers before the ICC. It is the legality of this Resolution which is the focus of this thesis. This thesis will expose the Resolution to the limits of international law and question the legitimacy of the tactics employed by the US. It will argue that in order to appease the recalcitrant superpower, the Security Council passed a Resolution contrary to both the Rome Statute of the ICC and the UN Charter. With the ICC still in its embryonic stage, this thesis will suggest the responses available to the Court when faced with a Resolution of such dubious legality which affects its jurisdiction to try the most heinous crimes known to humanity.

The UN Security Council is the preeminent multilateral decision-making body and has the legal authority to initiate military interventions if it first determines a threat to international peace and security, including from civil wars or widespread state repression. While traditional norms of non-intervention and the politics of the Cold War curtailed the body’s ability to fulfil this role, evolving understandings and practices of sovereignty and security in the post-Cold War era have led to the apparent emergence of a new norm permitting ‘humanitarian intervention’ and an in principle acceptance that the body has a ‘responsibility to protect’ vulnerable civilians residing inside the borders of their own state, including through military means. In this context, the thesis argues that the situation in Darfur, western Sudan, has represented a quintessential case for the Council to fulfil its ‘responsibility to protect’. According to a number of authoritative investigations, since 2003 the Sudanese government and government-allied Arab militias have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity on a widespread and systematic basis against Darfur’s non-Arab population. As a result, over 200,000 people died either directly from violence or indirectly from conflict-induced disease and malnutrition, while a further two million fled from their homes and villages in fear. A number of nonmilitary measures were attempted by the Council but failed to create adequate security on the ground. As such, there was a compelling legal-institutional, normative and moral case for the Council to coercively deploy a military intervention in Sudan to protect vulnerable civilians in Darfur. However, during the 2003-06 period of study, no such intervention was deployed. The thesis argues that intervention by the Council was precluded by the national interests of its permanent members, including a lucrative economic relationship between China and Sudan, and because of valuable Sudanese intelligence cooperation in Western counter-terrorism operations in the region. The thesis concludes that the Council’s members chose to preserve these national interests at the expense of protecting civilians in Darfur.

During the past decade, a significant change in use of force norms took place within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The United Nations (UN) is founded on a collective security agreement, which gives the UNSC the power to authorize the use of force to protect UN member-states. The UN Charter explicitly provides the UNSC with a mandate to keep peace between states, not within them. In 2006, however, the UNSC unanimously adopted the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) doctrine, which expanded what I call the UNSC's circle of protection to include "human protection." Further, in exceptional circumstances, R2P gives the UNSC the power to authorize the use of force in a country without the consent of its government. Many UNSC members initially resisted institutionalizing R2P, especially those with contested territory and a history of foreign intervention, such as China. This dissertation attempts to explain how and why this change in use of force norms developed. I argue this macro-level change was principally due to two often overlooked factors: an epistemic community pushing the Council to become more empathetic and altruistic, and Council members wanting to gain social status. In order to adequately explain the development of R2P you must explain the significant role the epistemic community played. And to adequately explain the significance of the epistemic community you must explain the significant role empathy played. Further, to sufficiently explain the UNSC's decision to adopt R2P you must explain the significance of China's acceptance. And to sufficiently explain China's acceptance you must explain the significant role status-seeking played. Explanations for the adoption of R2P that do not acknowledge the significant role of empathy and social influence are incomplete and insufficient. Although others have argued emotion and social influence are important causal variables in international relations, few offer specific mechanisms or micro-processes demonstrating how these factors work. This dissertation attempts to fill this gap. The implications are that empathy and status-seeking matter far more to international relations than many suggest.

Between 1953 and 1963, during the administrations of President Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy, the United States government transformed the way it formulated and executed foreign and defense policies. These changes gave the White House its own foreign policy staff, in the form of the National Security Council, and increased the powers of the Secretary of Defense. Most of these changes began under Eisenhower in the 1950s. Eisenhower, however, delayed making several key reforms despite the recommendations of his staff. He believed some reforms were unnecessary and remained ambivalent about others. Moreover, he wanted to avoid sending complex reorganization legislation through Congress, which Eisenhower feared would allow legislators to interfere in matters of the Executive Branch. Democrats in the 1960 presidential election capitalized on the failure to push through these reforms. The Democratic attacks proved remarkably compelling to a bipartisan audience. Kennedy used this bipartisan agreement to enact many of the reforms Eisenhower had ignored. The motivating factor for many of these decisions was not merely an attempt by either President to concentrate power in the White House, it was a belief that the post-1945 world was so unstable that only giving the White House unfettered access and oversight of the levers of power could ensure the safety of the nation. This work merges Diplomatic History with the field of American Political Development to examine these dramatic changes to the structure of the US government. Historians traditionally have examined these Kennedy era administrative changes in isolation. Studying them together with those that took place under Eisenhower yields a more complete picture of how the national security state developed. Despite Eisenhower’s reluctance to adopt some of the reforms embraced by Kennedy, both presidents believed that major reforms were necessary. Any sound analysis of the ways the contemporary United States makes its foreign and defense policies requires understanding momentous changes that took place during the transformational period of the early Cold War

No description available.

Why have states requested international authorization for their projections of military force more after 1989? One perspective suggests powerful states should not make such requests. Rather, they should look to their own power instead of international organizations. Another view suggests international authorization is a way to provide credible signals about state intentions. A third perspective suggests states view international authorization of military force as appropriate. I establish that states have changed their behavior, requesting international authorization more often after 1989. Then, I develop hypotheses involving material power, burden-sharing, informational signaling, and international norms. I assess their ability to explain the increase in authorization requests through evidence from over 150 military force projections by a wide range of states and through a detailed evaluation of United States behavior. The U.S. provides a strong test case for the theories evaluated, since powerful states should be least susceptible to pressures for requesting authorization, and yet it does so more frequently after 1989. I find the expectation that states should request international authorization emerged after the U.S. set a precedent during the Persian Gulf War. The end of the Cold War changed the perceived "viability" of different strategies for projecting military force for U.S. policy-makers. Requesting authorization from the UN became a plausible alternative. The decision to request international authorization--and the justifications U.S. decision makers offered for doing so--led to the expectation by other states that the U.S. would do so for future projections of military force. This international norm helps explain the politics of international authorization for the airstrikes on Iraq (1998), the Iraq War (2003) and the Libyan intervention (2011). The response of other countries to the Clinton Administration's failure to request authorization for airstrikes on Iraq in 1998 demonstrates that expectations regarding whether the U.S. should request authorization had shifted. The subsequent consolidation of the norm helps explain the requests for authorization by the Bush Administration for the Iraq War in 2003 and by the Obama Administration for Libya in 2011. The dissertation increases our understanding of the relationship, and the role of authority, between states and international organizations.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar as mudanças institucionais ocorridas no Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos entre 2001 e 2016. Ele se enquadra nas Resoluções nº 114/2014 e 115/2014 da Câmara de Pós-Graduação da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul e, portanto, é dividido em três partes. A PARTE I é composta por uma contextualização do objeto, contendo uma descrição geral do objetivo do trabalho, bem como a delimitação do objeto, marco teórico, e marco temporal. A PARTE II é comporta pelo artigo em si, que analisa as mudanças no sistema do Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos através das administrações dos presidentes George W. Bush (2001-2008) e Barack Obama (2008-2016). O objetivo é demonstrar que mudanças em agencias de segurança nacional podem ser pontuais ou incrementais, dependendo das suas causas e consequências. Para tal, foram utilizadas técnicas de analise qualitativa e teoria do equilíbrio pontuado no exame de documentos oficiais e registros públicos. Primeiro, uma matriz institucional formada por normas, organizações, regras, capacidades e incentivos foi usada para comparar as mudanças no Conselho de Segurança Nacional para comparar as mudanças nas duas presidências. Em seguida, possíveis causas de mudanças selecionadas foram identificadas – design original da agencia, interesses dos atores burocráticos, ou eventos externos –, e finalmente, determinamos as consequências que essas mudanças podem ter para instituições ou politicas. A PARTE III apresenta a descrição da agenda de pesquisa a ser seguida. / This paper aims to analyze the institutional changes that took place in the National Security Council of the United States between 2001 and 2016. It is in accordance with Resolutions 114/2014 and 115/2014 of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, and therefore is divided into three parts. PART I is composed of a contextualization of the object, containing a general description of the objective of the work, as well as the delimitation of the object, theoretical framework, and time frame. PART II is composed by the article itself, which analyzes the changes in the system of the United States National Security Council through the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush (2001-2008) and Barack Obama (2008-2016). The objective is to demonstrate that changes in national security agencies can be punctual or incremental, depending on their causes and consequences. In order to do so we used techniques of qualitative analysis and theory of punctuated equilibrium in the examination of official documents and public records. First, an institutional matrix consisting of norms, organizations, rules, capabilities, and incentives was used to compare changes in the National Security Council to compare changes in the two presidencies. Then, possible causes for selected changes have been identified - original agency design, bureaucratic actors’ interests, or external events - and finally we determine the consequences that such changes can have for institutions or policies. PART III presents the description of the research agenda to be followed.

No description available.