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過去相關文獻從公司治理的角度、股權結構的角度、所有權與經營權分離及代理問題的角度等等來探討董監事持股對公司經營績效的關係，而與其他研究不同者，本研究係從董監持股成數差異數的角度，分析董監持股與公司經營績效的關係。 本研究以2005年到2011年在台灣證券交易所上市之一般產業公司為研究樣本，在控制公司治理與公司特性相關變數，以資產報酬率、股東權益報酬率、每股盈餘EPS衡量公司績效，探討董監持股與規定持股成數之差異數對公司績效之影響。實證結果發現，董監事持股成數超過規定持股成數之公司，其公司經營績效較佳。分析結果可能表示，董監持股比例高，因為其自身的財富與公司財務運作之結果關係密切，監督管理者的動機會較強，而使得公司表現較佳，支持董監事持股比例高於公開發行成數規定之公司，其經營績效較佳之研究假說。換言之，本研究發現符合立法者期望透過較多之董監持股，增強其對公司努力經營及監督管理之動機，以達到提升公司經營績效之目的。 / Most previous studies focus on the effect of ownership structure on firm performance. Different from studies from other countries, the institutional setting in Taiwan concerning minimal board members shareholdings required by the “Rules and Review Procedures for Director and Supervisor Share Ownership Ratios at Public Companies (the Rules henceforth)” provides a unique research opportunity to examine the effect of the Rules on firm performance. Based on a sample of general industry firms listed in Taiwan Stocks Exchange over the period of 2005 to 2011, this study investigates whether companies with board members holdings more shares than required shareholdings by the Rules have better firm performance. This study employs return on assets, return on common stockholders’ equity and earnings per share as measures for firm performance, and difference in shareholdings over the required shareholdings as the primary explanatory variable. After controlling for governance related and firm characteristic related variables, the empirical results indicate that firms with positive differences in board ownership from the required shareholdings by the Rules have better performance. This empirical evidence implies that the legislative purpose of the Rules—enhance firm performance through the alignment of ownership interest— is supported.

邱俊榮與黃鴻 (2006) 一文在忽略租稅負擔的情況下，探討公營廠商民營化的最適釋股比例問題，文中發現：在開放體系下，廠商邊際成本固定並採Cournot數量競爭，唯在公營廠商生產效率較民營廠商生產效率低時政府才有動機將產業民營化，然而實際上租稅負擔會影響到廠商的有效邊際成本，進而影響其產出決策，最後再影響民營化的最適釋股比例。有鑑於此，本文在邱俊榮與黃鴻 (2006) 一文中導入利潤稅制與公司稅制，別探討此二種稅制的引進如何影響到最適的釋股比例。文中發現：利潤稅的存在將提高政府的最適釋股比例，而且最適釋股比例隨著稅率增加而增加，不過，在利潤稅制下唯在公營廠商生產效率較民營廠商生產效率低時政府才有動機將產業民營化。然而，公司稅對於最適釋股比例影響方向並不明確。比較有趣的是，在公司稅制下即使公營廠商生產效率與民營廠商相同，政府仍有動機將產業民營化，此部份有異於邱俊榮與黃鴻 (2006) 一文所獲致的結果。

Ce travail vise à déterminer dans le cadre des sociétés s’introduisant en bourse les facteurs explicatifs de la présence d’engagements contractuels par les principaux actionnaires d’une part et leur impact sur la valeur de la firme d’autre part. Le terme « engagement contractuel » fait référence à deux mécanismes mis en place au moment de l’introduction en bourse : les engagements de conservation d’actions par les dirigeants et les pactes d’actionnaires. Notre étude porte sur un échantillon de 292 entreprises introduites en bourse entre 1996 et 2000 sur le nouveau marché et le second marché de la bourse de Paris. Nos résultats montrent que la présence et la durée des engagements de conservation d’actions des dirigeants servent à signaler la valeur de la firme lorsque l’asymétrie d’information est grande mais aussi à compenser certaines inefficiences du système de gouvernance de l’entreprise. Nous observons également un impact négatif sur la valeur de la firme des engagements de conservation des dirigeants alors que ceux concernant les sociétés de capital risque l’influence positivement. Concernant les pactes d’actionnaires, nos travaux montrent que leur mise en place est d’autant plus probable que les dirigeants anticipent une cession future de l’entreprise. Ils ont par ailleurs une influence positive sur la valeur de la firme tant qu’ils ne protègent pas les signataires d’une prise de contrôle hostile ; dans ce dernier cas l’effet sur la valeur de la firme est négatif. Finalement, nous montrons qu’il existe une réaction négative du cours de bourse autour du jour de l’expiration des engagements de conservation. / Using a sample of IPO firms, we try to figure out what are the factors influencing the adoption of lockups and shareholder agreements and we also try to assess the impact on firm value of these two commitments. Our study is based on a sample of 292 IPOs made between 1996 and 2000 on the French nouveau marché and second marché. We found that the adoption of lockups and their length may serve to alleviate information asymmetry at the IPO time. Our results also give pieces of evidence that this mechanism may compensate for some inefficiencies of the corporate governance setting. We found that lockups undertaken by managers have a negative effect on firm value whereas lockups by venture capital firms have a positive one. With regards to shareholder agreements, our tests show that the probability of adopting such a commitment is positively related to managers’ anticipation of a future sale of the firm. We also found that shareholder agreements have a positive effect on firm value as long as they do not insulate the company from the threat of a hostile takeover. In this latter case, the effect on firm value is negative. Finally, we found a negative return around the day where lockups are released.

本研究針對我國1996年至2006年之上市櫃公司，以最終控制集團發生異動之公司作為經營權異動樣本，探討經營權異動之決定性因素，與異動後經營績效表現與公司治理機制間之關聯。 實證結果顯示，董監事持股比率愈低、最終控制者無超額持股、經營控制權與所有權偏離愈大、董監事持股質押比率愈高之公司，其經營權發生異動之可能性愈高。獨立董監事之設置雖與經營權異動之可能性呈正向相關，惟其關聯性未達顯著水準。經營權異動之公司，其財務績效在異動前後並無顯著差異，表示經營權異動之目的可能不在取代無效率之管理當局，也可能表示併購的綜效需要較長的時間才得以顯現。其中，董監事持股比率較高之公司，其經營績效在經營權異動後表現較佳。本研究顯示董監最低持股可發揮利益連結的效果，對於近期金管會擬取消董監最低持股規範之提案，本研究認為有作更深入討論之需要。 / Using companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and GreTai Securities Market over the period of 1996 to 2006, this study empirically investigates the determinants of change in corporate control and the subsequent period performance after the change. The change in corporate control is measured in terms of change in business group of a specific firm. The empirical results show that companies with less shareholdings owned by their board members, inadequate shareholdings to support their control, larger deviation in cash flow right from voting right, and higher ratio of shareholding pledged by their board members, have higher probabilities of occurrence of change in corporate control. However, the result doesn’t support that independent directors play a role in corporate control change. With respect to the firm performance in the period subsequent to the corporate control change, there exists no significant difference as compared to that of prior period. The evidence thus suggests that the replacing unqualified management may not be the primary purpose of corporate control change, or simply that the synergies take more time to show. In addition, this study also finds that firms subject to corporate control change tend to perform better if their board members hold a larger fraction of shares. This result lends itself to the proposal recently discussed by the Financial Supervisory Commission, Executive Yuan Taiwan on abolition of requirement of minimal shareholding by the board members. It appears that shareholdings by the board members can have interest-alignment effect.

本研究主要係探討財務比率資訊對外國專業投資機構投資決策之資訊內涵。主要實證議題包括：（一）探討不同產業下，影響外資投資策略之重要財務屬性為何？（二）前述財務屬性與外資持股變動之關係；及（三）財務比率資訊對外資持股變動之解釋能力是否因產業別之不同而有所差異？ 本研究以民國84年至88年間之台灣上市電子業、紡織業、塑膠業、食品業公司為樣本，首先運用因素分析將十八項財務比率萃取出獲利能力、償債能力、經營能力、帳款變現性及財務結構等五個不同構面的財務屬性，並加入公司規模、本益比及產業加權指數變動作為控制變數，以迴歸模式進行產業別分析。 實證研究結果發現，就整體而言，獲利能力為外資持股最具決策攸關性之財務屬性。就個別財務因素觀之，獲利能力、經營能力、帳款變現性及財務結構屬性均符合本研究假說預期與外資平均持股比例呈正向關係。償債能力屬性在電子業、紡織業及食品業均與預期相符呈正相關，僅在塑膠業與外資持股呈現負相關，與預期假說相違。由於負債比對償債能力屬性之影響為負向，故負相關之研究結果表示負債比相較於其他財務比率對塑膠產業樣本公司之償債能力屬性具更明顯的影響力。如併考量塑膠業之流動比及速動比均較其他產業為高之情形，此發現可能意謂，外資基於塑膠業之產業特性，並不希望塑膠業公司積壓過多資源而導致喪失投資獲利的機會。 此外，實證結果亦顯示，迴歸模式之解釋力在不同產業下確實存在產業之差異性，故產業性質對財務比率分析具有重要影響力。 / By examining whether the detailed financial ratios are informative about subsequent changes in Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors’(QFII) shareholdings, this thesis investigates the usefulness of accounting fundamental signals in the QFII investment decisions. Using a sample of firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange from electronics, textile, plastic and food industries over the period of 1995 to 1999, this thesis explores three empirical issues: (1) What are the important financial attributes for QFII’s investment decisions, measured in terms of changes in QFII shareholdings of specific companies? (2) The relationship between the shareholding change and the financial attributes. And (3) Would such relationship differentiate across industries? Based upon a factor analysis approach, this thesis first extracts 18 financial ratios into five dimensions of financial attributes: profitability, operating management, account receivable turnover, liquidity, and financial structure. By incorporating these five financial attributes with company size, price-earning ratio and industrial stock price index into a multiple regression, the relationship between financial attributes and QFII shareholdings is then investigated. The empirical findings indicate that profitability is the most relevant factor that affects the QFII shareholdings. The evidence also shows that consistent with the hypothesis, profitability, operating management, accounts receivable turnover, and financial structure are significantly and positively associated with QFII shareholdings for all industries related. With the exception of the plastic industry, liquidity is negatively related to QFII shareholdings. There is cross-industry difference in explanatory power of regression models used. This result might thus imply that industry factor plays a role in the usefulness of financial ratio analysis.

對於我國是否應開放合法賭場？在台灣已爭論十年以上。2009年1月23日修正公布《離島建設條例》增訂第10條之2，正式開啟我國於離島設置合法賭場之可能。 從中國澳門及美國開放合法賭場帶來經濟效益的經驗，加以新加坡2005年4月18日宣布，將開放成立兩處賭場度假村(Integrated Resort)以掌握賭場帶來的巨大觀光收益與稅收，似提供贊成我國引進合法賭場經營的有利論證。然對我國政府或官員而言，甚至學術研究領域，仍屬於相當陌生的新興產業；尚缺乏全盤性理解，尤其是外國法制的規範架構及內容的了解。 本論文以新加坡及澳門賭場管理法制為研究中心，採比較法學的方法，分析此二政府對賭場管理法制架構之異同，以作為我國未來建構賭場管理法制架構及內容之參考。另歸納賭場管理法的法律性質，及引進經濟學分析闡述其與賭場管理法制設計之關聯，是本論文另一重點所在。透過經濟學比較靜態的分析，提供新的法制設計思維。 本論文不辦證「開放合法賭場之利弊得失？」，而直接進入「政策已決定我國將開放合法賭場經營」之假設。就賭場管理法之法律性質，本研究歸納五項：一、是引進新興產業及增加投資的法律；二、是特許經營的法律；三、是具嚴格監控的法律；四、是慎選國家代理人的法律；五、是重視社會成本最小化的法律。此於第二章有詳細說明，並定位本論文之總論。 本論文第三章以下為各論之法制研究。分別以賭場特許執照之核發與撤銷、賭場營運之治理、賭場內部控制制度、賭場專責機關之設立等4章，作為分析新加坡及澳門賭場管理法制之架構。 最後，提出本研究之結論與建議：一、開放賭場合法化，應同時考量經濟利益與社會成本的效益；二、應建立嚴格治理的監理法制；三、設計降低社會影響衝擊的機制；四、強化股權控制與關係人之規範；五、賭場內部控制內容應提升至法律位階；六、賦予賭場專責機關較大的監理權限。