In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan with the intention to secure the Afghan communist regime from collapsing. Rebels, called the Mujahideen, began to resist the invasion and the Soviet Union soon found themselves fighting a tedious guerrilla war. The aim of this paper is to examine why the Soviet Union lost this asymmetrical war, even though they had a clear military superiority and stronger actors historically tend to win these types of conflicts. This paper has the ambition to explain in what ways soviet forces lacked proper understanding of not only asymmetrical warfare, but also counterinsurgency warfare, using theories that more closely look at the importance of strategic interactions between actors in asymmetrical wars, and principles of conducting successful counterinsurgencies. The empirical findings can succinctly be summarized by two factors: The Soviet Union was, despite tremendous effort, incapable of breaking Mujahideens will to fight. Insufficient attention was also paid towards cultivating trust with the Afghan populace, nor were strategies employed to rally support for the war against the Mujahideen.

This study investigates The Committee for Nordic exploration of Russian archives and what we can learn about the historiographical situation in the interwar period. The committee was active during 1928-1932 and was a collaboration between many senior historians from Sweden, Denmark and Norway. During the 1920s they gained permission and access to the Soviet central archives in Moscow, to look at documents that was related to Scandinavian history. The problem this study is trying to tackle is what kind of shape historiography took in Sweden when historians were involved in a large international project. The study’s purpose is to learn what Swedish historians thought was interesting and important in the subject of history, which in turn can aid the understanding of the historiography of military history since that is a subcategory of history in large. To achieve the purpose this study asks the question “is there a type of historiography that characterized the planning and work carried out by the Committee for Nordic Exploration of Russian Archives?”. As theory this study will use Carsten Holbraad’s interpretation of the concepts of liberal nationalism and liberal internationalism and to see if these concepts can be observed within the work and research of The Committee for Nordic exploration of Russian archives. The research will rely on qualitative methodology and will use textual analysis to answer the research question. During the research it will be established that the Swedish historians within the committee, was the most interested in obtaining and copy documents from the years after 1809, the 1760s and from 1648. In the end this study concludes that the committee represented the academia’s general view on history but were sometimes hindered in publishing everything they found due to pressure from above. The historians also did not mind the research into periods of peace and periods of national trauma. In the case of the concepts of liberal nationalism and internationalism, the study concludes that they are somewhat present in the committee’s work.

<p>Begreppet counterinsurgency har fått stor uppmärksamhet efter 2001 och USA:s militäraengagemang i Afghanistan och Irak. USA har bedrivit ett gediget utvecklingsarbete sedan dess och en ny doktrin för just counterinsurgency presenterades 2006. Redan 1964 utkom fransmannen David Galula med en bok i ämnet. Det har alltså funnits teorier om counterinsurgency sedan dess. Sovjetunionens engagemang i Afghanistan under 1980-talet slutade med att den afghanska kommunistregimen kollapsade. Viljan att vinna konflikten borde ha funnits där och precis som USA har dragit erfarenheter, borde något ha gjorts för att försöka vinna konflikten även på 1980-talet. Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka om de parter som försökte besegra den afghanska motståndsrörelsen gjorde det på ett sätt som kom att likna Galulas teorier om counterinsurgency. Konflikten har analyserats utifrån Galulas teori om upprorsbekämpning med både politiska och militära medel. Analysen har visat att Sovjetunionen och den afghanska kommunistregimen inte utvecklade sitt sättatt hantera konflikten i en riktning som motsvarade Galulas teorier. Den primära politiska orsaken var att regimen förlitade sig på förtryck för att försöka avskräcka motståndssympatier. Detta tillvägagångssätt ledde istället till ökat stöd för motståndsrörelsen. Militärt saknades medlen att befästa närvaro i nya områden där regimen kunde ha börjat utöva inflytande. I förlängningen innebardet att regimen saknade förmåga att bredda sin inflytandesfär.</p> / <p>The term counterinsurgency has received a lot of attention since 2001 and the U.S commitment in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S has conducted thorough developmental work since then and a new doctrine on counterinsurgency was presented in 2006. As early as 1964, the Frenchman David Galula issued a book on the subject, and there have existed theories on counterinsurgency ever since. The Soviet Union’s commitment in Afghanistan during the 1980s ended with the collapse of the Afghan communist regime. The will to win the conflict should have been present there, and in the same way that the U.S have capitalized on their experiences something ought to have been done to try to win the conflict during the 1980s. The purpose of this study is to examine whether the parties involved in the fight against the Afghan resistance acted in a way that resembles Galula’s theories on counterinsurgency. The conflict has been analyzed with Galulas theories on how to defeat an insurgency by both political and military means. The analysis has shown that the Soviet Union and the Afghan communist regime did not develop their way of handling the conflict in a way which is consistent with Galula’s theories. The primary political cause was that the regime put its trust in oppression in their attempts to discourage resistance sympathies. This approach resulted in an increase in support for the Afghan resistance rather than the support of the regime. Militarily, the lack of means to secure the regime’s political presence in new areas meant that the regime was unable to broaden its sphere of influence.</p>

Efter första världskriget var Sovjetunionen en av de första moderna stater som uttryckligen ägnade sig åt att övervaka och styra kulturen, vilket tog sig formen av en formaliserad och institutionaliserad statlig kulturpolitik. I denna övervakningsoch styrningsprocess försåg vetenskap och teknologi staten med konceptuella och materiella resurser vilka användes för att definiera såväl själva processen som föremålet för den. Efter andra världskriget gav utvecklingen inom naturvetenskap och teknik upphov till en ny vetenskap som behandlade frågor kring kontroll och kommunikation, Norbert Wieners cybernetik, vilken fick en bred tillämpning inte enbart inom ingenjörsvetenskapen utan även i frågor som rörde förståelsen av människor, maskiner och samhällen. Denna avhandling undersöker hur cybernetiken påverkade utformningen av den sovjetiska kulturpolitiken. Fokus ligger särskilt på sovjetiska Litauen. Det huvudsakliga argumentet är att en särskilt inflytelserik diskurs rörande cybernetisk styrning och övervakning utformades i Sovjetunionen från 50-talet och framåt. Som ett resultat av en överföring från tekniska och vetenskapliga diskurser var denna diskurs användbar inte bara som ett verktyg för att tjäna staten utan kunde även användas av kulturella aktörer för att kritisera själva sovjetsystemet. Genom att analysera organisatoriska praktiker och officiella och samhälleliga diskurser avslöjar denna studie komplexiteten i förhållandet mellan styrning och övervakning, kultur och vetenskap och teknologi. / After World War I, the Soviet Union was one of the first modern states to engage explicitly in the governance of culture, which was formalised and institutionalised as state cultural policy. In this process of governance, sciences and technologies provided the state with conceptual and material resources, which were used to define both the process and the object of governance. After World War II, scientific and technological progress gave birth to a new science of control and communication, Norbert Wiener’s cybernetics, which was widely used not only in engineering, but also in the conceptualisation of humans, machines and societies. This thesis explores how cybernetics influenced the construction of cultural policy in the Soviet Union. It focuses particularly on the Soviet republic of Lithuania. The main argument is that since the 1950s a particularly powerful discourse of cybernetic governance was formed in the Soviet Union. A result of translation from techno-science, this discourse not only served the purposes of authoritarian rule, but was also used as a resource by cultural operators to criticise the Soviet government itself. By analysing organisational practices and official and public discourses, the study reveals the complexity of the relationship between governance, culture and sciences and technologies.

In this Bachelor Thesis The Writers Aim To investigate the portrayal of the Soviet Union in the cold war. This portrayal is investigated using two different approaches, one qualitative and one quantitative. The qualitative method examine, through a textual analysis, the portrayal of the Soviet Union in two schoolbooks produced in different years. The first textbook produced in the year of 1996 and the second one in 2012. The quantitative method approach the problem by using a content analysis were the aim focus is to see if the portrayal of the Soviet Union is more positive than negative or vice versa. This is Examined By using a formulation called the coefficient of imbalance, Which is applied to classify content data as positive or negative. Four books are included in the quantitative content analysis, the earliest one is produced in 1986 and the latest in 2011. Both analysis uses the same theoretical background and previous researches, the theoretical background is in this case the use of history. Klas-Göran Karlssons typology over the use of history is the base of the theoretical background. Both analysis are presented separately to be presented together beneath "7. Slutsats" and "8. Diskussion". By merging the two analysis the two authors Could draw a conclusion. The conclusion show That the textbooks portray the Former Soviet Union in a dismissive manor. Some of the use of history had influenced the content in the textbooks, but the Majority didn't. The two use of history that had influenced the textbooks were “non-use of history” and “ideological history”. But the authors clarify that “none-use of history” has affected the portrayal of the cold war history of the Soviet Union.

Russian application of deception in warfare has an extensive history. A lot of previous research has explored both its application and development through different historical conflicts. However, the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea has raised a debate that challenges the classic application of Russian deception methods. Nevertheless, many researchers claim that Russia continues to use traditional methods of warfare and deception, albeit adapted to a modern context.   This thesis explores these claims by a concrete comparison of the application of Russian deception methods during the annexation of Crimea with a successful historical Russian deception operation, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This is done by a comparative case study, which breaks down both cases with theoretical support from Barton Whaley's theory of deception. The study validates claims that traditional Russian deception methods are being applied in a contemporary context. What has changed, however, is how the different types of deception mutually support one another and are utilized to achieve synergy effects.

This Bachelor of Arts paper in Media and Communication Studies from Stockholm University examines the image of Russia in Sweden in 1986 and 1993. I studied the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 in Pripyat, Ukraine in the former Soviet Union and the crisis in the White house in Moscow in today’s Russia in 1993. The aim of this paper is to examine how the view on former Soviet Union and today’s Russia was portrayed in Sweden after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. I have analysed 20 articles from Dagens Nyheter (DN) and Svenska Dagbladet (SvD). I have used “framing” as a method for analysing the articles in relation to Swedish foreign politics and foreign journalism. My research questions are following: what kind of problems, identifying causes, moral judgements and improvements to solutions were found in the investigated articles? What differences, if any, were discovered between DN and SvD’s journalism?   The results of my study showed that DN focused on general news reporting regarding the Chernobyl disaster and Sweden’s critique to the Soviet Union and the poor maintenance of the nuclear power station in a larger extent than SvD. Sweden was the first country to reveal abroad that they had discovered nuclear radiation on Swedish soil. DN framed, among others, how the Soviet Union was incapable of solving the Chernobyl crises on their own. SvD focused on how Sweden was affected by the Chernobyl disaster and the nuclear radiation. SvD framed how the Soviet Union kept quiet during the aftermath and how the Soviets tried to “conceal” information. Both DN and SvD framed the Soviet Union as “unpredictable”. After the crisis in the White house in Moscow DN and SvD were milder in their criticism towards Russia since there was a political and journalistic hope in Sweden that Russia would become a democratic country. Swedish foreign correspondents could therefore in 1993 create their own image of Russia since the Swedish foreign policy was not as clear after the events in Moscow in 1993 as they were after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Both newspapers focused on how Boris Yeltsin struggled to solve the crisis and Russia was now torn between the nostalgic Soviet communism and a new democratic Russia. DN and SvD received continually information about the events taking place in Moscow and reported how Russia was torn between a new tsar Russia/a new Soviet Union and a democratic Russia.

No description available.

Filmmediet idag är den mest populära formen av masskultur. Med sin världstäckande genomslagskraft och sitt stereotypa porträtterande av verklighet, påverkar filmen världsåskådningen för människor runtom i världen. Ett brinnande ämne i amerikansk film har alltid varit Ryssland, på grund av de politiska motsättningarna och den historiska rivaliteten med USA. Studiens syfte är att undersöka hur Ryssland porträtteras i amerikanska filmer från perioden för presidenterna Dmitrij Medvedevs respektive Barack Obamas första mandatperiod. Frågeställningen för uppsatsen är: hur ser stereotypa föreställningar om Ryssland ut i amerikansk film 2008-2011? Trettiotal filmer med ryska motiv valdes ut för undersökningen och analyserades utifrån de visuella och sociala aspekterna. Resultatet visar på att det förekommer tre skikt av stereotyper om Ryssland: de eviga, som har existerat i hundratals år och spridits av resenärer; stereotyper från epoken för det kalla kriget; och stereotyper om det moderna Ryssland inspirerade av medias nyhetsrapporteringar.

Begreppet counterinsurgency har fått stor uppmärksamhet efter 2001 och USA:s militäraengagemang i Afghanistan och Irak. USA har bedrivit ett gediget utvecklingsarbete sedan dess och en ny doktrin för just counterinsurgency presenterades 2006. Redan 1964 utkom fransmannen David Galula med en bok i ämnet. Det har alltså funnits teorier om counterinsurgency sedan dess. Sovjetunionens engagemang i Afghanistan under 1980-talet slutade med att den afghanska kommunistregimen kollapsade. Viljan att vinna konflikten borde ha funnits där och precis som USA har dragit erfarenheter, borde något ha gjorts för att försöka vinna konflikten även på 1980-talet. Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka om de parter som försökte besegra den afghanska motståndsrörelsen gjorde det på ett sätt som kom att likna Galulas teorier om counterinsurgency. Konflikten har analyserats utifrån Galulas teori om upprorsbekämpning med både politiska och militära medel. Analysen har visat att Sovjetunionen och den afghanska kommunistregimen inte utvecklade sitt sättatt hantera konflikten i en riktning som motsvarade Galulas teorier. Den primära politiska orsaken var att regimen förlitade sig på förtryck för att försöka avskräcka motståndssympatier. Detta tillvägagångssätt ledde istället till ökat stöd för motståndsrörelsen. Militärt saknades medlen att befästa närvaro i nya områden där regimen kunde ha börjat utöva inflytande. I förlängningen innebardet att regimen saknade förmåga att bredda sin inflytandesfär. / The term counterinsurgency has received a lot of attention since 2001 and the U.S commitment in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S has conducted thorough developmental work since then and a new doctrine on counterinsurgency was presented in 2006. As early as 1964, the Frenchman David Galula issued a book on the subject, and there have existed theories on counterinsurgency ever since. The Soviet Union’s commitment in Afghanistan during the 1980s ended with the collapse of the Afghan communist regime. The will to win the conflict should have been present there, and in the same way that the U.S have capitalized on their experiences something ought to have been done to try to win the conflict during the 1980s. The purpose of this study is to examine whether the parties involved in the fight against the Afghan resistance acted in a way that resembles Galula’s theories on counterinsurgency. The conflict has been analyzed with Galulas theories on how to defeat an insurgency by both political and military means. The analysis has shown that the Soviet Union and the Afghan communist regime did not develop their way of handling the conflict in a way which is consistent with Galula’s theories. The primary political cause was that the regime put its trust in oppression in their attempts to discourage resistance sympathies. This approach resulted in an increase in support for the Afghan resistance rather than the support of the regime. Militarily, the lack of means to secure the regime’s political presence in new areas meant that the regime was unable to broaden its sphere of influence.