American Ways of War and Strategic Culture: A Reflection in Domestic and Foreign Cinematography Katarína Kondrótová Abstract This thesis examines the portrayal of American strategic culture in movies from the USA and two countries with which the USA has been in conflict with - Vietnam and Afghanistan. The research focuses on comparing them with official US strategies and contrasting the different national portrayals among themselves. The aim is to discover how the USA and its way of war is depicted at home and abroad through movies - a popular medium with the power to shape perceptions. The research is anchored in the international relations theory of post-structuralism and the concepts of strategic culture and national ways of war. They serve as a lens through which the most popular war movies from each country are analyzed. The findings showed that American movies were more precise in depicting their real-life strategic approaches and tended to be more derogatory in their portrayal of their adversaries. They also showed a more critical depiction of US conduct in Vietnam compared to Afghanistan. When it comes to the foreign movies, Vietnamese films were more critical of the USA than Afghan films, but not as disdainful of the enemy as the USA. Afghan depictions exhibited the dual nature of their opinion of...

This Master thesis aims to study how the EU’s strategic culture shapes the EU as a security actor in the Sahel. A region stricken with poverty and conflict with no end in sight in which the EU and European states are deeply involved.  The Master thesis considers the EU’s interests in the Sahel, such as the security of Europe and economic development, as well as the interests of national states as France, The United States of America, and China. Analyzing these interests through neorealism and social constructivism provide insights to the relationship between EU’s strategic culture and its actions in the Sahel. The theoretical framework used to study the problem consists of Snyder’s theory of Strategic culture together with political neorealism and social constructivism. By using a qualitative case study design with text analysis, I study different sources consisting of official policy documents, official statements, news reports, and previous research.  The results show that the protection of the EU homeland calls for external security actions which drives the EU’s strategy for Sahel. By stabilizing the region, the EU can better control irregular migration flows and hinder future jihadist attacks in Europe. France and the US have put pressure on increasing the EU’s military and strategic policy focus, slowly shifting the EU strategic culture from a value-based humanitarian actor to a more utility-based and policy driven security actor. The EU is taking a more supportive role as a security actor by increasingly pushing good governances’ reforms in the Sahelian authorities. These aim to enable local actors to take charge of the security operations in the Sahel as well as combating the root causes of this decade long conflict.

Daniel Dolejší The causes of continuing existence of the French Foreign Legion 2015 Abstract The core theme of this diploma thesis is the French Foreign Legion that is examined from the point of view of national interests and strategic culture of France. It is very unusual in developed countries to have foreigners as a part of national army. Goal of the thesis is to discover and describe the causes of continuing existence of the French Foreign Legion. First of all, the author defines national interests and strategic culture of France for certain periods, and then he assesses the contribution of the Legion to fulfillment of goals connected to the national interests and the strategic culture. To the main conclusions of this work belongs that the first hypothesis was confirmed, the French Foreign Legion helped to reach goals based on national interests in certain periods. On the other hand, the second hypothesis was not completely confirmed. The author expected that the strategic culture always stabilizes and supports the role of the Legion, but he found out the opposite for the interwar period. The author supposes higher importance of the Legion in the area of peacekeeping operations under a mandate of the UN or NATO because the EU currently lacks troops prepared to be deployed abroad.

How a rising China might adapt to the existing international order has remained a challenge in the international relations debate since the turn of the millennium. While the international balance of power continues to tilt in China’s favor the level of uncertainty regarding how China will use its power remains high. Departing from the assumption that national role conceptions can guide state behavior, this study explores a potential link between strategic culture, national role conceptions, and foreign policy behavior. It examines the explanatory power of role theory through an exploration of strategic culture as a potential driver in the adoption of national role conceptions by looking at Chinese foreign policy developments during the presidency of Xi Jinping. The study aims to theoretically verify tendencies of continuity and change by doing a quantitative and qualitative content analysis on remarks, statements, and articles that can be tied to the Communist Party of China. By looking at how China sees itself through the roles China believes it plays or can play in the international system one aim is to conduct an analysis reaching beyond traditional international relations frameworks. This approach can be useful as it can contribute to an explanation reaching beyond assumptions relying exclusively on structure, rational choice, or causality. The study shows that role theory can explain trends of continuity and change by reflecting claims of increased assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy while simultaneously reflecting China’s peaceful intentions as the dominant trend, as such, the study provides a foundation from which to draw inferences that can be seen as indicative of China’s orientation in the international system.

The aim of this paper is to gain a greater understanding of the meaning-making process behind Finland and Sweden’s decision to join NATO in 2022, and by so, deviate from their long-standing tradition of military non-alignment. Instead of solely pointing to the Russian invasion of Ukraine as the official reason for NATO membership this paper suggests that the concept of strategic culture can provide one with a greater understanding of their decision to join NATO. Resulting in the question: How can the concept of strategic culture help us understand the decision by Sweden and Finland to apply for NATO membership in 2022, despite their longstanding tradition of non-military alignment? With the concept of strategic culture, the analytical framework argues that the decision-making in Finland and Sweden was shaped by historical experiences that in turn influenced their strategic culture, which worked as a shaping context for their respective strategic behaviour. This is done through an entanglement analysis, a close reading and interpretation of the empirical material such as books, peer-reviewed articles, statements, government reports, and speeches, to demonstrate if the decision to join NATO followed Finland and Sweden’s typical strategic behaviour. This paper argues that the decision to join NATO did not represent a shift in the two state’s respective behaviour, instead the decision was in line with the strategic behaviour the states have followed since the end of the Cold War. Hence, the decision to join NATO demonstrates a sign of continuity rather than a historical shift in their foreign and security policy.

Researchers seem to disagree to which extent the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led to a change in the United States' view of the legitimate use of military force. Therefore, this interpretive case study aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the American strategic culture at the national level and whether the war on terror indicates a fundamental change or a fine-tuning of their strategic culture. Based on the first generation of research, which emphasizes the importance of context, I first identified through previous research which norms that can be considered to be the foundational elements in the U.S. strategic culture in a previous context: War is understood as a crusade against evil, American values are considered to be universal, victory in war must be quickly attainable and U.S. casualties should be minimal. These norms were later analyzed in various national strategies published both before and after the terrorist attacks to identify changes and continuity in the collective identity. The result shows that the war on terror points towards a fine-tuning in the strategic culture that took place primarily in synchronization. Even as the measures presented in the strategies - such as a stronger emphasis on preemptive, unilateral actions and an innovation of the military forces - indicated a change in the strategic culture, and as the fourth norm could not be identified as well in two of the strategies published during the war on terror, none of the identified norms were replaced with new ones. Instead, through revised security policy standpoints that can be seen through these observable changes in the strategies, the norms seem to have been adapted and received different values to suit the new external environment.

One of the key features of the 2002 United States National Security Strategy was an abrupt shift from the traditional U.S. approach to proliferation threats that prioritized deterrence and promotion of nondiscriminatory nonproliferation norms, to an approach called counterproliferation that emphasized military preemption and direct challenges to adversarial state identity. This thesis asks the question, what caused counterproliferation to largely replace deterrence and nonproliferation as the central national security policies of the U.S. concerning unconventional weapons? The thesis argues that to understand this policy change requires not merely an appreciation of changes in the post-Cold War international security environment, but also an examination of how culturally shaped threat conceptions among American policymakers interacted with capabilities development and policy institutionalization within the U.S. military. As no current theory adequately addresses those dynamics, complimentary strategic culture and organizational theory models are presented as the framework for analysis. This thesis will contend that policy shift from NP to CP resulted from the merging of strategic cultural efforts aimed at legitimizing conceptions of proliferation threats as originating from state identity, with a military organizational drive to avoid uncertainty through the development of counterproliferation capabilities. Together these strategic cultural and organizational responses to shifting proliferation threats altered the menu of choice for policymakers by institutionalizing and legitimizing a policy response that directly challenged existing nonproliferation norms and practices. This thesis relies on a detailed case study of the evolution of counterproliferation policy from 1993 to 2002, with particular focus on the analysis of public discourse, declassified policy planning and Department of Defense documents, and participant interviews.

Le Myanmar traverse un processus de libéralisation politique qui a été entamé par le haut. Le régime militaire a tenu des élections générales en 2010, lesquelles ont placé au pouvoir un nouveau gouvernement composé à la fois de civils et de militaires. Depuis, la majorité des sanctions imposées par plusieurs États occidentaux au Myanmar ont été levées, et on observe une diversification des relations internationales du pays. Imbriqué à la sphère d’influence chinoise depuis quelques années, celui-ci rétablit des contacts diplomatiques et économiques avec l’Occident. Peu de chercheurs ont tenté d’expliquer les causes de cette transition politique, et le lien entre libéralisation politique et diversification des relations internationales n’a pas encore été expliqué. Ce mémoire propose de le faire en utilisant un modèle théorique issu de deux types de littérature, celle sur la culture stratégique et celle sur les transitions politiques. Il suggère que la libéralisation politique du Myanmar s’explique par les luttes d’influences au sein du régime entre deux sous-cultures stratégiques, les hardliners et les softliners. L’application des normes favorisées par les hardliners ayant échoué dans l’atteinte des objectifs stratégiques du régime, les softliners ont pu imposer leurs propres préférences normatives. Il propose également que la libéralisation politique était une étape nécessaire pour que le gouvernement birman puisse diversifier ses relations internationales. / Myanmar is going through a political liberalization process which was initiated from above. The military regime held a general election in 2010, which brought to power a new government composed of both civilians and militaries. Since then, most of the sanctions imposed to Myanmar by Western states were lifted, and we observe a diversification of the country's international relations. Nested in the Chinese sphere of influence in recent years, Myanmar restores diplomatic and economic ties with the West. Few researchers have attempted to explain the causes of this political transition, and the links between the political liberalization and the diversification of international relations has not yet been explained. This thesis proposes to do so by using a theoretical model derived from two types of literature, the one on strategic culture and the one on political transitions. It suggests that Myanmar’s political liberalization is due to power struggles within the regime between two strategic subcultures, the hardliners and softliners. The application of norms favored by hardliners having failed in achieving the strategic objectives of the regime, softliners were able to impose their own normative preferences. It also suggests that the political liberalization process was a necessary step for the Burmese government to be able to diversify its international relations.

Tentant de sortir du seul modèle connu et qui s’offre aux partenaires européens, à savoir l’OTAN, l’UE se fonde sur un système original et spécifique qui se veut plus efficace devant les défis de sécurité d’aujourd’hui et de demain. En parallèle, l’Alliance atlantique, qui tire pour beaucoup, sa légitimité de l’Histoire du continent européen, essaie de se maintenir en tant qu’acteur privilégié en matière de défense et de sécurité collective. L’objectif de cette thèse est de défendre l’idée de la pertinence de l’Union européenne en tant qu’acteur majeur dans le domaine de la défense et de sécurité tout en mettant en évidence les différences fondamentales entre celle-ci et l’action de l’Alliance atlantique. Ce travail de recherche fournit une analyse doctrinale et conceptuelle, à la fois « éclectique et pluraliste », pour répondre à la question de l’établissement de relations entre plusieurs institutions internationales de sécurité à partir des comportements étatiques en matière de sécurité et de défense collective. Cette analyse ne peut se faire sans se fonder sur les développements politiques et techniques ayant marqué ces vingt-cinq dernières années. Ces faits constituent des éléments tant explicatifs qu’évaluatifs du processus par lequel ces institutions naissent ou se modifient. Ils contribuent également à mettre en lumière les mécanismes d’interdépendance étroite entre l’Alliance atlantique et le processus de la PESD de l’Union européenne, et par ailleurs, de souligner l’originalité de cette dernière. Cette interdépendance existe sur le plan politique et dans ses différents aspects militaires (stratégique, opérationnel et tactique), ainsi que dans le volet technico-industriel ; elle résulte directement tant de la double appartenance historique des États membres à des instruments multilatéraux de sécurité, d’événements politiques majeurs touchant le continent européen, que des efforts entrepris pour faire converger les intérêts nationaux et, donc, le façonnage d’une culture stratégique. / The European Union bases its security system on genuine and specific approach which would allow the face the forthcoming challenges. Meanwhile it has attempted to untangle from the unique model of collective security in the Euroatlantic area, that is to say NATO. This study aims to defend the relevancy of the EU as a major international actor in a large scale of security missions. Moreover it highlights the main differences between the EU vis-à-vis the Alliance’s activities. It is based on a theoretical and conceptual analysis which uses both an eclectic and pluralist approach in order to provide answers on how States’ behavior in defense and collective security matters influences the setting up of relations between several international security institutions. This analysis derives from the political and technical developments that influenced the security landscape the last twenty-five years. These facts help to explain and to evaluate the process by which such institutions arise and develop. They finally contribute to highlight the tight and original interdependency of the between the Atlantic Alliance and the European Security and Defense Policy of the European Union. This interdependency is real from political, military (strategic, operational and tactical) and technical-industrial perspectives ; it directly originates from the historical dual belonging to the multinational security frameworks, from major political events on the European continent, as much as a joint effort to focus on common interests and the shaping of a strategic culture.

Ce mémoire a pour objectif d’analyser la pertinence d’une culture stratégique particulière, celle de l’Inde. Au moins quatre variables culturelles à dimension sécuritaire – l’identité, les valeurs, les normes et les perceptions – permettent d’expliquer la conception de la sécurité et du pouvoir indiens. L’hypothèse avancée dans ce mémoire est la suivante : à cause de l’influence de la culture stratégique indienne, l’océan Indien est perçu par l’élite indienne comme l’endroit où réside la principale menace à la sécurité de l’Inde. En outre, cette perception particulière de la menace permet de mieux comprendre les ambitions maritimes de l’Inde dans l’océan Indien à l’aube du 21e siècle. Afin de confirmer l’hypothèse, nous analysons l’influence de la culture stratégique indienne sur les approches stratégiques privilégiées par les décideurs Indiens au sein de l’océan Indien. Nous concluons, sur la base de l’étude cas, que l’objectif stratégique de New Delhi est de devenir la puissance maritime dominante de l’océan Indien. Le moyen privilégié est la création d’une marine océanique puissante, capable de maintenir en permanence une escadre en patrouille loin de ses bases navales. Sur le plan théorique, les actions indiennes – qui ont surtout un caractère défensif – sont justifiées par une doctrine de non-ingérence des grandes puissances dans les affaires indiennes, doctrine calquée sur la doctrine Monroe. Selon la doctrine indienne, seules les puissances régionales sont à même de préserver la stabilité dans la région de l’océan Indien. Conséquemment, le Gouvernement indien œuvre à réduire l’ingérence des marines de guerre étrangères au sein de l’océan Indien. / This thesis aims to analyze the relevance of a particular strategic culture, that of India. At least four cultural variables, each with a specific security dimension - identity, values, norms and perceptive lens - help us understand the Indian notions of security and power. The main hypothesis put forward in our paper is as follows: because Indian elite are deeply influenced by the prevailing Indian strategic culture, they perceive the Indian Ocean as the place where the main security threat to the country’s security lies. In addition, this particular security perception makes it possible to better understand India’s maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean at the dawn of the 21st century. To confirm this, we analyze the influence of Indian strategic culture on strategic approaches privileged by Indian decision-makers within the Indian Ocean. We conclude that New Delhi’s strategic objective is to become the dominant maritime power in the Indian Ocean. The means to bring about this end is the creation of a strong blue water navy capable of sustaining a permanent squadron on patrol far from its naval bases. Furthermore, Indian naval activities - which are mainly defensive in nature - are justified by a doctrine of non-interference by major powers in Indian domestic affairs, a doctrine modeled on the Monroe Doctrine. According to the Indian doctrine, only the regional powers are able to preserve stability in the Indian Ocean region. Consequently, the Indian Government works to reduce the presence of foreign naval forces in the Indian Ocean.