La montée en puissance des groupes industriels et des conglomérats basés en Asie, en Amérique latine, en Europe centrale et orientale, au Moyen-Orient ou bien en Afrique, bouscule les agendas de nombreux fleurons mondiaux et ouvre de nouvelles brèches pour la communauté académique. Elle pose la question de la pérennité de la multinationale d´inspiration anglo-saxonne, longtemps présentée comme la quintessence du capitalisme. Il faut désormais compter avec la Périphérie, ce monde composé de pays émergents et de pays en développement. La Périphérie d´hier et d´aujourd´hui sera le Centre de demain et d´après-demain. Les groupes étatiques et privés chinois rebattent les cartes à l´intérieur et à l´extérieur de celui-ci pour faire la course en tête dans l´économie mondialisée des 50-100 prochaines années. Les études empiriques consacrées aux entreprises originaires des pays émergents (EMNE) fleurissent. A ce jour, aucune nouvelle théorie n´a émergé des débats contradictoires, donnant ainsi crédit au courant évolutionniste. Selon Dunning, Kim et Park (2008), l´internationalisation des EMNE serait la version contemporaine de l´expansion des multinationales des pays développés à la fin des années 1970. Leurs stratégies et leurs modes opératoires ressembleraient à du “vieux vin dans de nouvelles bouteilles”. Le contenu serait quasiment le même. Seul le contenant aurait vraiment changé. Notre recherche vise à décrypter les dynamiques stratégiques, transactionnelles et opérationnelles des groupes chinois dans le monde émergent et en développement. Nous cherchons à comprendre comment le fleurons de l´Empire du Milieu s´emparent de territoires a priori imprenables et préemptent le long terme dans les pays de la Périphérie. Notre étude révèle qu´ils jouissent de leviers et d´atouts spécifiques leur permettant de se battre (war-fighting capabilities) et de conquérir des positions de leaders mondiaux (war-winning capabilities). A rebours du courant évolutionniste, nous mettons en évidence l´originalité des dynamiques chinoises. Les stratégies de conquête des groupes chinois sont travaillées par les questions existentielles (les masses critiques chinoises) et la culture multimillénaire (l´art des combinatoires, la dynamique des flux, l´entresoi) de la Chine. Nous montrons que la préemption institutionnelle habilement orchestrée par l´Etat chinois auprès de la gouvernance défaillante ou mitée des pays hôtes constitue le mode d´entrée privilégié des dragons dans les pays émergents et en développement. Les fleurons chinois investissent massivement dans les vides et déploient des stratégies liquides, que nous appelons “stratégies de l´eau”. Face à elles, les stratégies de la pierre des groupes occidentaux et non occidentaux apparaissent vulnérables. L´eau est supérieure à la pierre. Nos travaux réhabilitent le rôle de la culture dans le champ de la stratégie, et identifient un nouveau paradigme, dénommé IFLC (Institutionalize-Fill-Leverage-Combine), qui pourrait ouvrir la voie à de nouveaux agendas dans le domaine du management stratégique / The rising power of industrial firms and conglomerates from Asia, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, shakes up the agendas of many global companies and opens the door to further academic research. We argue that it challenges the sustainability of the multinational corporations of Anglo-Saxon inspiration. The Periphery of the global economy composed of emerging and developing countries is likely to shift to the Center in the mid- and long-term. Both Chinese State and private enterprises are reshuffling the cards within and outside the Periphery to gain and, ultimately, preserve a strong leadership in the next 50-100 years. Empirical studies dedicated to emerging market multinationals (EMMs) have failed to create a new theory so far, thus providing material for the advocates of evolutionism. Dunning, Kim and Park (2008) viewed the internationalization of EMMs as the contemporary version of the patterns implemented by developed country multinationals in the late 1970s. According to these authors, the strategies of EMMs, and their execution in the host countries, are “an old wine in new bottles”. The content is similar; only the container is different. Our research aims at decoding the strategic, transactional, and operational dynamics at stake in the maneuver warfare waged by Chinese multinational companies in emerging and developing economies. Our five empirical studies strived to shed a new light on how Chinese multinationals conquer new territories, on how they dismantle invincible positions held by historic players, and on how they preempt the long term in countries of the Periphery. Our survey demonstrates that they leverage an unrivalled collection of specific levers and assets that help them wage the war (war-fighting capabilities) and conquer global leadership positions (war-winning capabilities). Unlike the evolutionist trend, we found out that the Chinese expansion strategies and footprint are unique. They are driven by China’s existential questions (critical masses of resources) and long history. The case studies show that the institutional preemption of the flawed, moth-eaten governance of the host countries, skillfully orchestrated by the Chinese State, is the favorite mode of entry of the Chinese dragons in emerging and developing countries. They also show that the latter invest heavily in voids of all natures (1), and that they deploy liquid strategies named ‘water strategies’ as opposed to ‘stone strategies’ (2). Facing water strategies, the ‘stone strategies’ of Western multinationals appear vulnerable. Our research makes it clear that water wins over the stone. Our findings rehabilitate the role of culture in the field of international strategy, and lead to a new theoretical paradigm: IFLC (Institutionalize – Fill – Leverage – Combine). The IFLC model could pave the way to brand new agendas and practices in strategic management.

欲瞭解一個國家的行為，就必須要瞭解這個國家的整體行為，而這整體的行為所表現者，即是「文化」。從戰略文化的研究途徑做一切入點，正可深入瞭解一個國家戰爭的行為，甚而可以預測未來戰爭的發生。而維繫國防安全的軍人自當對中共戰略與戰爭模式，應有相當的了解與認知；也希望藉著對戰略文化的瞭解，探照中共對外戰爭實例，探尋中共對外戰爭的模式，進而提供國防戰略因應對策，才不愧於自己的職責所在。 就中華民國的生存發展而言，海峽對岸的中共無疑是我生存發展的最大威脅，而兩岸在軍事武力的不對稱下，中共時時以「不放棄武力」，極盡挑釁之威脅，而台灣除了默默軍事備戰外，在政治，外交生存上，也只能低調回應，這也可看出中共武力對台已具有足夠的軍事力量解決統一台灣問題。目前兩岸之間最大的障礙是由領土主權爭議所衍生的問題，而領土主權問題又很容易引起戰爭，在這種壓力下，台灣將如何去面對，這是一門重要的課題。國內學術界對於兩岸關係的研究，多偏向政策方面而較少理論方面的探討，其實，藉由理論層面的研究而詮釋海峽兩岸互動過程與未來發展，有助於強化政策建議的內涵與深度，觀諸台海兩岸未來的安全發展，若能以戰略文化研究途徑，作為觀察的理論基礎，對於台海武力衝突的可能性，及中共對於使用武力的政治目的、手段與效用或許能提供新的詮釋與政策建議，由於潛在的戰略文化，會使決策者的戰略偏好及使用兵力解決爭議的傾向產生影響，因此，武力在未來台海安全的發展中，仍會是一個關鍵的重要角色，所以透過對中共戰略文化內涵的分析與掌握的研究途徑，進而對其軍事戰略與對外戰爭模式加以研究，期能深入瞭解中共在何種情況下，會不惜一切的以戰爭來解決問題，進而思考台海雙方在既有戰略思維下審慎避免誤判或誤認，讓動武甚至檫槍走火的意外情勢均不會發生；以提供吾人從事國家安全政策及國防戰略規劃相關人員參考研究與運用。 / In order to understand the behavior of a country, it is necessary to learn its behavior in a macro scale, and the representation of such behaviors is known as the “Culture”. From the strategic culture perspective, it provides an in-depth understanding of a country’s use of military forces, as well as the prediction of future wars. Especially for the military personnel who are the key to the national security, they shall have the understanding and knowledge to the People’s Republic of China’s initiation on wars; through the study of strategic culture, examples of PRC’s use of military power, research of PRC’s initiation on wars, I shall fulfill my duty by providing recommendation towards the national security strategies in order to protect the country. To the Republic of China, the PRC from the cross strait is the biggest threat to our country’s survival and development, under the unbalance of military power, PRC constantly provokes and threatens by stating “not giving up the use of force”. In contrast, Taiwan is much more low-profile in the military preparation, politics, and diplomacy. This is a strong indicator that the PRC’s military force has the capability and could to use its power to unify Taiwan. Currently the biggest obstacle between the two sides is the territorial dispute from sovereignty, and it is a subject that can easily trigger wars. It is an important subject for Taiwan to deal with under pressure. Many of the existing academic researches focus on the policy aspect and less on the theoretical perspective. In fact, through the theoretical interpretation of cross-strait interaction and future development can strengthen the content and depth of policy recommendations, and the future safety development. Through the use of strategic culture as the research methodology, it will identify the probability of cross-strait conflict, the PRC’s political execution of military power, tactics, and effectiveness. This strategic cultural perspective may provide new definition and policy recommendation, as it studies the decision maker’s strategic preferences and their tactics. Therefore, the military power plays a significant role in the development of the cross-strait safety, and by analyzing the PRC’s strategic culture and research of its military strategy and war mode, will provide in-depth understanding of the circumstances under which the PRC will stop at nothing to solve the problem with war, and to avoid misunderstanding or misinterpretation through the strategic culture from both sides. This will further prevent wars from occurred by accidents: hence, this national security policy and defense strategic referencing may provide values to be researched and utilized by the associated members.

本論文的問題意識在於，中國是否將與其古代帝國一樣，在力量強大時追求以武力或其他強制手段達成戰略目標，並試圖建立以其為核心的東亞勢力範圍與國際秩序，結果導致升高與周邊國家甚至美國在內的其他亞太強國的緊張關係與衝突發生機率，與其所宣稱的「和平發展/崛起」、「和諧世界」不符。 中國戰略菁英繼承了帝國時代遺留下來的天下觀、內政導向戰略文化與陸權性格等地緣戰略遺產。同時，缺乏海軍戰略傳統的中國也在1950年代從同為大陸強國的蘇聯之處承接了19、20世紀的法國、德國、蘇聯等歐陸國家發展出來的以劣抗優的大陸國家縱深防禦海軍戰略與積極防禦艦隊海戰戰略。這些遺產與當代外來海軍戰略共同促成了中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略。 在中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略中，古代天下觀在當代因為中國的國力迅速發展與中國戰略菁英的自信加強，而逐漸形成強調中國制度與文化優越性的新「中國中心主義」。此一新中國中心主義配合中國追求實現其領土主權聲索的現代「九州一統」周邊地緣政治密碼，壓倒日本、印度、東協等區域競爭對手，組織以其為核心的東亞地緣戰略領域的區域地緣政治密碼，以及中國自冷戰時期起就發展出的追求全球體系多極化與建立國際政治經濟新秩序，和在冷戰後希望消除美國於東亞的影響力，追求將亞太地緣政治次體系轉變為美中並立兩極結構的體系/次體系地緣政治密碼，使得中國難以成為一個維持現狀的國家。而中國的內政導向戰略文化雖然強調對內優先於對外，但其實際上具備相當重視權力政治與武力在國際事務中效用的強現實政治特徵和備戰本質。而中國的陸權性格與從蘇聯繼承而來的陸權式海洋地緣戰略，使當代中國的地緣戰略重心與方向皆位於東亞大陸與周邊海域，並未真正跨出亞太邊緣地區，只是將西太平洋的島鏈作為海上長城、島鏈周圍的海洋作為新的資源開發地區與戰略緩衝區，以此區隔與美國在亞太的勢力範圍，並按照安西、靠北、爭東南的地緣戰略操作來組織受其支配的東亞地緣戰略領域。 本論文認為中國擴大參與東亞整合的原因，只是為了因應目前其實力尚無法獨力以軍事、政治等強制性手段完成組織受其支配的東亞地緣戰略領域的戰略目的的間接戰略運用，目的是藉此極大化中國的利益，並取得東亞整合的主導權。中國並無意在傳統安全議題與領土爭端和周邊國家與其他亞太主要強國妥協，並利用多邊傳統安全國際建制達成地緣政治安排，促成亞太地緣政治均衡。中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略雖然限於中國的海上戰略交通線控制能力，最終目的並不在取代美國成為體系中的新海權，但卻能嚴重威脅美國的海權地位，以及其他亞太主要強國和中國周邊中小型濱海國家的地緣政治利益。因此安西、靠北、爭東南的地緣戰略操作除了在北線地緣之外，皆激起其他次體系主要大國與東協的競爭性權力平衡反應。此種戰略反饋又使中國增強本身的競爭性權力平衡作為，難以形成達成均衡必要的協作性權力平衡。因此，中國的地緣戰略仍是傳統爭奪控制戰略交通線與要地的類型，不是為了追求和諧世界與地緣政治均衡的新類型，故無法促進目前不存在均衡的亞太地緣政治次體系達成均衡，反而可能升高與周邊國家甚至美國的衝突機率。 但是，中國受制於本身有限的戰略交通線控制能力，目前仍無法形成其他次體系主要強國真正的傳統安全威脅，更為了繼續實施經濟建設，必須盡力維持周邊國際環境的穩定。其他亞太主要強國為了繼續藉由與中國的交往獲得的龐大經濟利益，在中國還未成為真正戰略威脅的情況下，亦不願意真正與中國敵對，導致亞太地緣政治次體系的局勢將逐漸走向中國與海洋國家之間政治上經常引發緊張關係，但其他方面互動熱絡，不致立即引發武裝衝突危機的「冷和平」狀態，無法形成真正的地緣政治均衡。 關鍵字：中國、亞太地緣政治次體系、權力平衡、地緣政治均衡、地緣政治密碼、戰略文化、地緣戰略 / The research question of this dissertation is that whether China might seek to apply coercive measures to create an East Asia Geostrategic Realm and to dominate the turf by itself, which just like what pre-modern China’s Empires did. Because of the increasing possibility of armed conflicts between China and other regional powers, including the United States, these measures will put the international security of the Asia-Pacific region in jeopardy. Furthermore, this is not according to what China’s claim on “peaceful development/rising” or the so-called “harmonious world.” Modern Chinese strategic elites inherit three main geo-strategic legacies such as the Chinese traditional concept of “Tianxia” (天下觀), domestic-oriented strategic culture, and national land-power nature in China’s history. China also receives the European thought of continental-oriented naval strategy from the Soviet Union while Maoist China built its navy which supported by the Soviet’s help in the 1950s. These legacies and foreign naval strategic thought not only shape modern China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy,” but also affect the nature, gravity, directions, and the major operations of the geo-strategy. Base on China’s rapid economic growth and military modernization, the self-confidential Chinese elites gradually transform the traditional concept of Tianxia into the new “Sino-centricism,” which stress on the superiority of China’s culture and politico-economic systems. In terms of the geopolitical codes of modern China, they pursue the realization of territorial claims for the purpose of “union” on the local level; overwhelming the competitions of leadership in East Asia from Japan, India, and the ASEAN for creating a Chinese-dominated East Asian Geostrategic Realm on the regional level; pursuing multi-polarization of the international system and, establishing new international politico-economic orders on the systemic level, and dispel the influence of United States in East Asia by transforming the Asia-Pacific geopolitical structure into a bipolarity on the sub-systemic level. Over all, these three levels of geopolitical codes and the new “Sino-centricism” would not make China be a status-quo power in the Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. Additionally, with regard to the domestic-oriented strategic culture, although it stresses the priority of domestics, it also values power politics and the effectiveness of forces in the international politics. The domestic-oriented strategic culture of China, therefore, has the strong characteristics of hard “realpolitik” and “parabellum”. China’s traditional land-power nature aside, its continental-oriented naval strategy is developed from the thought of the Soviet naval strategy and put the gravity and directions of China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy” in East Asian continent. China does not go beyond the “Asia-Pacific Rim” actually. What China does is using the “two island-chain” defense in West Pacific as a “Great Wall at Sea,” and the seas around the island chains as strategic buffer zone to distinguish the sphere of influence between China and the United States. China applies the strategic principles of “stabilizing West, relying on North, competing for the Southeast” to organize the region in the west of the island chains and shaping its dominance in the East Asian Geostrategic Realm. The dissertation argues that since China cannot organize the East Asian Strategic Realm by political and military means at present, China’s participations in East Asian integrations are indirect strategic behavior. The purposes of indirect approaches are to utilize China’s economic interests and to obtain the leadership of East Asian integrations. China would not like to compromise with its neighbors and other Asia-Pacific Powers on highly sensitive traditional security issues, like territorial disputes essentially. Nor does China attempt to shape multi-pole geopolitical arrangements to achieve the geopolitical equilibrium of Asia-Pacific Geopolitical Sub-system by applying multi-pole international regimes. Furthermore, the purpose of China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy” is not to replace the United States as the Sea Power in the system just because China lacks the ability of controlling global strategic sea lines of communications. The Chinese naval strategy of active layer defense can still seriously threaten the Sea Power status of the United States and the important geopolitical interests of China’s neighbors. Therefore, the implementations of aforesaid geo-strategy of “stabilizing West, relying on North, competing for the Southeast,” seriously raise “adversary balance of power” in both West and Southeast fronts due to the convergences of geopolitical interests between China and other powers. Nevertheless, the adversary balancing feedback of other Asia-Pacific powers and even the ASEAN countries enhance China’s adversary behavior as well. This reciprocal process cannot create the necessary “associational balance of power” of geopolitical equilibrium. In other words, China’s geo-strategy belongs to the “traditional” type, which stresses the importance of controlling strategic communication in the Asia-Pacific region. It is not the “new” type of pursuing “harmonious world” and geopolitical equilibrium. Therefore, China’s geo-strategy cannot advance the equilibrium of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. On the contrary, it may raise the possibility of conflicts between China and Asia-Pacific countries, even the United States. China is not deemed as major traditional threat by other major Asia-Pacific regional powers due to lacking the capabilities of controlling strategic communication of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. China must do its best to maintain the stability of the surrounding international environment to continue its economic development. Other major Asia-Pacific powers would like to obtain huge economic interests by engaging with China. As a result, the security of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system will gradually develop into a “cold peace” situation, but not the situation of geopolitical equilibrium. The “cold peace” is a situation not only can fill with geopolitical tensions between China and other major Asia-Pacific powers, but also can interact closely with each other on social, economic, cultural and other dimensions, which prevent the crisis of the outbreak of immediate armed conflicts in the region. Key Words: China, Asia-Pacific Geopolitical Subsystem, Balance of Power, Geopolitical Equilibrium, Geopolitical Code, Strategic Culture, Geo-strategy

The relationship between a country's political decision-making and top military leadership is central, but also debated. Not least whether the military side should take political life into account and to what extent one should become a part of it. This essay aims to increase the understanding of the challenges of the military-political relationship, focusing on the borderland between peace and war that is usually described as a gray zone. Through scenario-based interviews with senior officials and politicians within the Swedish government and government office, it is investigated what impact a gray zone problem can have on the military advice provided. By combining a future scenario with interviews, an empirical material unique to the research field is created. The results show that the gray zone affects the strategic decision-making process, but not really by adding any completely new challenges, but mainly by strengthening and partly developing existing ones. The logic of peace, rather than war, on strategy should therefore form the basis for how the gray zone is viewed from a decision-making process perspective. The gray zone's character of ambiguity creates and reinforces tensions between different actors in the strategy process, which in turn risks delaying strategic decisions. The ambiguities arise mainly in three areas: the view of the strategic problem, the political consequences and the organization that will deal with the gray zone. Some of the ambiguities are amplified by the opponent, while others are more the result of internal factors. In order to reduce the negative effects of the gray zone problem, a much closer integration between the military and politics is proposed than in peacetime: policy-making must take place jointly and traditional boundaries need to be redrawn. The key is spelled relationships and these must be created and maintained in good time before the gray zone enters. / Relationen mellan ett lands politiska beslutsfattning och högsta militärledning är central, men också omdebatterad. Inte minst huruvida den militära sidan ska ta hänsyn till det politiska livet och i vilken grad man själv ska bli en del av detta. Denna uppsats syftar till att öka förståelsen för den militär-politiska relationens utmaningar, med fokus på det gränsland mellan fred och krig som brukar betecknas som en gråzon. Genom scenariobaserade intervjuer med högre tjänstemän och politiker inom Sveriges regering och regeringskansli undersöks vilken påverkan en gråzonsproblematik kan ha på de militära råd som lämnas. Genom att kombinera ett framtidsscenario med intervjuer skapas ett för forskningsfältet unikt empiriskt material. Resultatet visar att gråzonen påverkar den strategiska beslutsprocessen men egentligen inte genom att tillföra några helt nya utmaningar, utan främst genom att förstärka och till del utveckla redan existerande. Fredens, snarare än krigets, logik på strategi bör därför ligga till grund för hur gråzonen betraktas ur ett beslutsprocessperspektiv. Gråzonens karaktär av otydlighet skapar och förstärker spänningar mellan olika aktörer inom strategiprocessen, som i sin tur riskerar att försena strategiska beslut. Otydligheterna uppstår främst inom tre områden: synen på det strategiska problemet, de politiska konsekvenserna och den organisation som ska hantera gråzonen. Vissa av otydligheterna förstärks av motståndaren, medan andra mer är ett resultat av interna faktorer. För att minska gråzonsproblematikens negativa effekter föreslås en betydligt närmare integrering mellan militär och politik än i fredstid: policyskapandet måste ske gemensamt och traditionella gränser behöver dras om. Nyckeln stavas relati-oner och dessa måste skapas och underhållas i god tid innan gråzonen träder in.

The following dissertation develops a theoretical framework for guiding the strategy of democratic states in successfully countering the hostilities of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs), and effectively manipulating the terrorist group’s (and its supporting elements’) decision-making calculus. In particular, the theory of strategic coercion has been chosen as a basis for formulating this framework, based upon: 1) the invaluable guidance it offers in dynamically drawing upon all instruments of national power—economic, diplomatic, military, etc.—to accomplish politico-strategic objectives; and 2) the unique insights it provides into making strategic moves aimed at influencing the choices taken by an adversary. However, strategic coercion theory as it currently stands is inadequate for applications against substate terrorist organizations. As a quintessential cornerstone for prescriptive policy in strategic studies, such a looming deficiency vis-à-vis one the most important security threats of the modern age is unacceptable. The new theoretical framework established in this dissertation—entitled the Balance Theory of strategic coercion—addresses this deficiency. The Balance Theory stresses that three key coercive elements of strategic coercion are fundamentally important for successfully ending the hostilities posed by NSTOs, being: A) Isolation of external/international support; B) Denial; and C) Isolation of popular support. It posits that these three aspects of strategic coercion serve as the sine qua non for success in countering an NSTO’s campaign of violence and effectively manipulating its decision-making process. Implementation of these three elements, moreover, must be pursued in tandem, taking care so as not to sacrifice one aspect for the other. The Balance Theory is tested through the employment of case-study analysis. In pursuing this end, both cross-case and within-case analyses are performed, accompanied by the utilization of the methods of focused, structured comparison. The cases examined are those of: 1) The United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs (1969-2007); and 2) Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs (1967-present). The dissertation concludes with an examination of how the Balance Theory may provide insights for the formulation of counter-terrorism strategy against Al Qaeda in the current "War on Terror".