This thesis explores the prerequisites for peace in Ukraine from a typology of the conflict’s constituent elements. The material examined consist of accounts from open sources and official statements from the warring parties. The thesis concludes that the high intensity combat between two state parties and the ostensible lack of veto-players warrants a conflict with a shorter duration and relatively good prerequisites for solution. Underpinning territorial aspects and general scale of conflict together with lingering features of Russian strategic culture points to a longer and more intractable conflict. The western support for Ukraine contributes both to scale and intensity, but also induces a risk for horizontal escalation.

For over two centuries, Sweden has maintained a policy of non-alignment. This tradition broke on May 18, 2022, when Sweden applied for NATO membership. According to the government, the membership was seen as essential for protecting Sweden due to the worsening security situation caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Nonetheless, this raises a critical question: Given that Sweden has faced similar crises historically without turning to NATO, why choose to do so now? By conducting a descriptive ideal-type analysis based on the theoretical concept of strategic culture, this thesis argues that Sweden’s decision to apply for NATO membership was primarily driven by a series of external pressures and shifts in the regional security landscape. More specifically, the decision was influenced by the exposure of Sweden’s inadequate defense capabilities in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Finland’s concurrent shift towards NATO. Crucially, this strategic shift to join a military alliance does not reflect a change in Sweden’s underlying strategic culture. Instead, it marks a pragmatic evolution in Sweden’s defense strategy, responding to new challenges while upholding its foundational values to ensure both national and regional stability amid global uncertainties.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 promoted Sweden to abandon a 200-year-old policy of non-alignment by applying for NATO-membership. This study investigates factors that influenced the decision to change policy and contrasts it to the decision to not apply for NATO-membership after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. A theoretical model is created to connect Snyders definition of strategic sub-cultures and Westberg’s definitions of strategic methods. The model uses the Swedish perception on NATO, EU, non-alignment/neutrality, and Russia as factors for security as described in the Swedish Defence Commission rapports from 2003-2022. An exploratory qualitative textual analysis is undertaken, and the result is then analyzed through Legros model of policy-transformation. The study reveals three clearly defined strategic sub-cultures within the Swedish strategic culture. The major factors that influence the change of Sweden’s strategy is that security guarantees isn’t developed outside of Nato and the perceived threat-level of Russia.

Is the credibility of today's Swedish security policy under question? Through two world wars and the years that followed Sweden has invoked a policy of neutrality and military nonalignment. This policy has come to be perceived as an integral part of the Swedish national identity. Is it possible then that Sweden’s past and present strategic narratives could be contested? This thesis investigates whether or not there is consistency in the narratives expressed by both right wing Swedish governments and socialist Swedish governments. The narratives of both parties are examined during two separate eras of history; the Cold War era of the 1980s is compared with the current more globalized era of the 2010s. A constructivist perspective is utilized in the analysis and a narrative analysis is applied. The results show that there has been significant consistency in the narratives of Swedish security policy from both right wing and socialist governments. There is much greater variation shown between the two eras than there is between the two parties themselves. / Är dagens svenska säkerhetspolitik trovärdig eller omstridd? Allt sedan världskrigen har svenska regeringar förhållit sig till en grundläggande idé om svensk neutralitet och alliansfrihet. Denna politik har kommit att betraktas som en väsentlig del av svensk nationell identitet. Samtidigt har inriktningen för den svenska säkerhetspolitiken förändrats vid ett antal tillfällen under de senaste decennierna och gått från neutralitet till solidaritet. Är det då möjligt att gångna som nutida svenska strategiska narrativ är omstridda? Denna uppsats undersöker hur konsekventa svenska säkerhetspolitiska narrativ har varit. Detta genom att granska de narrativ som konstruerats av respektive socialdemokratiska och borgerliga regeringskoalitioner. Dessa narrativ jämförs både inom och mellan två historiska epoker; det kalla krigets 1980-tal och det nutida globaliserade 2010-talet, med specifika nedslag för åren 1982, 1987, 2009 och 2015. Uppsatsen tar utgångspunkt i ett konstruktivistiskt perspektiv och en narrativanalys tillämpas i analysen. Resultatet indikerar en betydande samstämmighet inom svensk säkerhetspolitik mellan borgerliga och socialdemokratiska regeringar. En betydligt större variation framträder i en jämförelse emellan de olika tidsepokerna än emellan samtida regeringar av olika politiska färger.

The relationship between a country's political decision-making and top military leadership is central, but also debated. Not least whether the military side should take political life into account and to what extent one should become a part of it. This essay aims to increase the understanding of the challenges of the military-political relationship, focusing on the borderland between peace and war that is usually described as a gray zone. Through scenario-based interviews with senior officials and politicians within the Swedish government and government office, it is investigated what impact a gray zone problem can have on the military advice provided. By combining a future scenario with interviews, an empirical material unique to the research field is created. The results show that the gray zone affects the strategic decision-making process, but not really by adding any completely new challenges, but mainly by strengthening and partly developing existing ones. The logic of peace, rather than war, on strategy should therefore form the basis for how the gray zone is viewed from a decision-making process perspective. The gray zone's character of ambiguity creates and reinforces tensions between different actors in the strategy process, which in turn risks delaying strategic decisions. The ambiguities arise mainly in three areas: the view of the strategic problem, the political consequences and the organization that will deal with the gray zone. Some of the ambiguities are amplified by the opponent, while others are more the result of internal factors. In order to reduce the negative effects of the gray zone problem, a much closer integration between the military and politics is proposed than in peacetime: policy-making must take place jointly and traditional boundaries need to be redrawn. The key is spelled relationships and these must be created and maintained in good time before the gray zone enters. / Relationen mellan ett lands politiska beslutsfattning och högsta militärledning är central, men också omdebatterad. Inte minst huruvida den militära sidan ska ta hänsyn till det politiska livet och i vilken grad man själv ska bli en del av detta. Denna uppsats syftar till att öka förståelsen för den militär-politiska relationens utmaningar, med fokus på det gränsland mellan fred och krig som brukar betecknas som en gråzon. Genom scenariobaserade intervjuer med högre tjänstemän och politiker inom Sveriges regering och regeringskansli undersöks vilken påverkan en gråzonsproblematik kan ha på de militära råd som lämnas. Genom att kombinera ett framtidsscenario med intervjuer skapas ett för forskningsfältet unikt empiriskt material. Resultatet visar att gråzonen påverkar den strategiska beslutsprocessen men egentligen inte genom att tillföra några helt nya utmaningar, utan främst genom att förstärka och till del utveckla redan existerande. Fredens, snarare än krigets, logik på strategi bör därför ligga till grund för hur gråzonen betraktas ur ett beslutsprocessperspektiv. Gråzonens karaktär av otydlighet skapar och förstärker spänningar mellan olika aktörer inom strategiprocessen, som i sin tur riskerar att försena strategiska beslut. Otydligheterna uppstår främst inom tre områden: synen på det strategiska problemet, de politiska konsekvenserna och den organisation som ska hantera gråzonen. Vissa av otydligheterna förstärks av motståndaren, medan andra mer är ett resultat av interna faktorer. För att minska gråzonsproblematikens negativa effekter föreslås en betydligt närmare integrering mellan militär och politik än i fredstid: policyskapandet måste ske gemensamt och traditionella gränser behöver dras om. Nyckeln stavas relati-oner och dessa måste skapas och underhållas i god tid innan gråzonen träder in.