The twin ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, California have become the focal point of the influx of containers from East Asia and China. The purpose of this study is to determine the relationship between monthly Class I Transportation (T&E) employment and combined monthly TEU traffic at the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, California for the years 1997 through 2006. The Spearman Rank-order Correlation Coefficient was administered to analyze the relationships. Results indicated that proximity is not the sole factor in a relationship between monthly Class I Transportation(T&E) employment and combined monthly TEU traffic at the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles. This study also contains a historical analysis of the development of railroad intermodal transportation.

The aim of this thesis is to find an explanation of the obstacles to deploying Article 7 TEU measures as we see it today. This explanation will be sought in the events in this field starting from the formation of the provision, all the way up to this writing moment. The explanation will be searched for by using the research question: What in the process offorming and amending Article 7 TEU can explain the hesitancy and hardship to deploy the article today? Four hypotheses for explanations are identified; 1) Article 7 TEU is a political rather than legal provision, and is thus infiltrated with political subjectiveness rather than legal objective- ness, 2) lessons from the Haider affair have caused hesitancy, 3) adding intermediate steps and alternative procedures have weakened the nature of the provision, and 4) the nuclear notion has falsely created hesitancy to take action and oblivion of the softer mechanisms of the provision. This study concludes, that to fully understand the Article 7 TEU struggles as of today, both political implications, intermediate steps, alternative mechanisms and lessons from the Haider affair has to be taken into account. This com- plexity does then confirm the sufficiency of the explanation: Many factors has played a role in forming the hesitancy and hardship to deploy Article 7 TEU, but the intergovernmental and political nature of the provision explains why it still have not been fully implemented. This is although the scope and appli- cation of the provision fully fits the problems of democratic backsliding, that permeates some of the member states of the EU.

No description available.

No description available.

Despite the rule of law being one of the founding values and objectives of the European Union, some of the Member States have disrespected the rule of law. In response, the European Commission has invented new tools to reinforce the rule of law. The newest tool is the Rule of Law Report, and the purpose of this thesis is to study the Report’s significance in ensuring respect for the rule of law in the EU. To do so a combination of legal methods and a range of sources, such as EU primary law, case-law, EU documents and doctrine, have been used. The Report is issued annually, so far it has been published in three editions stretching from 2020 to 2022. The Report builds on a general part and 27 country chapters assessing the rule of law situation in each Member State. From the 2022 Report onwards, the Report is also accompanied with recommendations to each Member State. The Report is to be considered soft law. It is non-binding and can, hence, not be subject to judicial review by the European Court of Justice, but it imposes a moral obligation on the institutions addressed. Mainly on the Member States, but also on the Council, the European Parliament, and other bodies of the EU. It is descriptive, interpretative and has a connection to hard law but can only be enforced by soft enforcement. Furthermore, the Report does not explicitly mention a legal basis, but the Commission appears to have the conferred powers to adopt the act. Moreover, the Report have had practical effects at national and EU-level, and it has potential to have even more effects. It urges national rule of law reforms and causes debate in the institutions and national parliaments about the rule of law situation. It could be subject to interpretation in the ECJ and in national courts and it could serve as a source to activate other hard tools in the rule of law toolbox. Despite being criticised, the Report has significance in ensuring respect for the rule of law in the EU. It might have a low legal status, but it has legal relevance, and it has the potential to have even higher legal relevance in the future.

Im Idealfall bilden die Kopenhagener Kriterien zusammen mit dem Art.-7-Verfahren EUV einen lückenlosen Schutzmechanismus der EU-Werte. Die Verfassungskrisen in Ungarn und Polen haben allerdings nicht nur die Schwächen des Art.-7-Verfahren aufgedeckt, sondern auch die Frage aufgeworfen, ob die gegenwärtige Anwendungsweise des Kopenhagener Mechanismus ausreichend ist. Da das Beitrittsverfahren an sich Regierung-zentrisch ist, ist es offenkundig, dass dieses Verfahren nicht viel dazu beiträgt, die Bürger in den politischen Prozess ihres Landes einzubinden und die Zivilgesellschaft zu stärken. Es dauert eine gewisse Zeit, bis die konstitutionelle Grundwerte in die Herzen der Bürger eines neulich demokratisierten Landes gebracht werden. Die EU wurde allerdings dadurch unter Zeitdruck gesetzt, dass sie die Osterweiterung in einem relativ kurzen Zeitraum vollenden musste, um die Gunst der Stunde für ein vereintes Europa nutzen können. Der aktuellen Zustand der EU entspricht dem echten Bund im Schmittschen Sinn. Die Substanz der Homogenität in einem echten Bund ist das Produkt des Zusammenspiels der Verfassungsordnung des Bundes und seiner Mitglieder. Daraus ergibt sich, dass mit jedem Beitritt eines neuen Mitgliedstaats die Verfassungsidentität der EU mit einer neuen Verfassungsidentität angereichert und wesentlich geändert wird. Wenn man die Eingriffskapazität der EU in die innerstaatlichen Verfassungsordnungen über die heutige Intensität hinaus noch verstärken will, darf man die politische Natur der Werte-Frage in einem echten Bund nicht außer Acht lassen. Der Priorisierung der politischen Kriterien vor den wirtschaftlichen Kriterien, mit der die EU die Beitrittsverhandlungen durchgeführt hat, ist für Taiwans China-Politik ebenso wichtig. Eine entscheidende Aufgabe für Taiwan ist, klar zu machen, dass Taiwan politische Verhandlungen nur mit einem Ansprechpartner führen wird, der die gleichen politischen Werte einhält. / In the course of developing a general theory aiming at reversing and preventing the deterioration of political values in the European and East-Asian context, this study answered two sets of questions. First, on the empirical level, how reasonable and effective are the current pre-accession evaluations? Regarding the existing deterioration in the post-accession context, does it reflect any short coming in the way the EU implements the Copenhagen Criteria? Since Taiwan has not established such monitoring mechanism yet, what are the damages already done to Taiwan’s constitutional values? Second, on the normative level, this study followed two very different approaches. On the one hand, it clarified where the limits of judicial solution to this problem are. The fact that the sanction procedures prescribed in the current Art. 7 TEU take the form of collective actions revealed that what is at stake here is a shared value system. On the other hand, this study took into account the interaction between law and politics. The accession of new member states, as well the sanction against member states which failed to respect the political values of the Union, are in essence political decisions of the European Union. Since Taiwan needs to set up political conditions for it negotiations with China, the task is highly political, too. By identifying elements that caused or prevented the deterioration of political values, this study proposed suggestions for correcting and preventing deterioration by understanding its operation. A protective mechanism for Taiwan’s political values can create a reverse “lock-in effect.” By enunciating stringent negotiation guidelines and a code of conduct for Taiwanese government that requires cautiousness and vigilance, this mechanism will place the cross-strait negotiations under a legal framework which ensures that any given Taiwanese government could not sacrifice Taiwan’s constitutional values in exchange for advancing its political agenda.

The European court of Justice (ECJ) has the stance that EU-law, within the confines of EU competence, has primacy over national law, regardless of its source, even if it’s the national constitutions.  Although generally the ECJ:s  stance is accepted, sometimes it is instead the EU that has had to indirectly (through inaction) accept the conclusions of the national constitutional courts. When this happens, it can however only be noticed as the EU commission’s decision to not start infringement proceedings against the member state, and as such it appears as a legal vacuum or absence of enforced law. Inside this vacuum there is lacking enforcement of EU-law, which the member states can use as a de facto exemption from EU-law to regain or uphold national sovereignty. Thus the member states can fill the vacuum by deciding cases on the basis of their own constitutional law rather than (the unenforced) EU-law. It appears to be an in EU-law unregulated transfer of sovereignty.  This paper intends to shed light on possible problems that arise in this situation due to the lack of legality and certainty that ensues from these exemptions from EU-law being upheld through the inaction of the commission rather than positive legal regulation. I will also attempt to find a coherent model for the explanation of this seemingly contradictory situation, describing it as a “sovereignty-vacuum”, an opposing but related concept to the “exemption” of Carl Schmitt.  Through use of Schmitt’s political theology, I attempt to find a solution to the problem of legality with an analogy to the concept of “mercy” and “forgiveness” in the context of constitutional law. Ultimately, I propose a solution de lege ferenda that these implicit exemptions from EU-law be written down as explicit exemptions.