<p>The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) was adopted in 1950. One of the most important rights established therein is the right to life, which can be found in article 2.</p><p>The purpose of this thesis is to examine how far the scope of this right reaches concerning the beginning and the end of life. This is mainly done by examining the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) which is set to monitor the observance of the rights. To make this thesis manageable, the three areas of abortion, euthanasia and the death penalty have been chosen as the starting-point of the examination.</p><p>The position of the three areas among the member states varies. Abortion and euthanasia have been regarded by the Court as sensitive areas in which the states have a wide margin of appreciation to decide on their own. This is much due to the lack of consensus within the states as to how they should be regulated.</p><p>Whether the unborn foetus is protected by the Convention and in such case to what extent is still in dispute. This is also the case concerning when life begins. The Court has stated that any right the foetus may possess is limited by the rights of the mother. They have also said that they do not want to impose a certain view on the member states.</p><p>The Commission has stated that if the foetus would have an absolute right to life under the Convention, then it would lead to serious implications for the mother, as she would not be able to have an abortion in any circumstance. Also, in <em>Vo v. France</em> one of the dissenting judges stated that the foetus’ right to life have to be narrower in scope than the right of the born.</p><p>In the case <em>Pretty v. the United Kingdom</em> the Court unanimously ruled that article 2 does not include a right to die. However some member states, like the Netherlands, have made euthanasia legal without being found to violate its obligations under the Convention. Consequently, it does not seem to be against the Convention for states to make their own legislation allowing for euthanasia to be practiced.</p><p>One important aspect to this debate is whether one considers life to be inalienable or not. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has said that even though the rights of the terminally ill should be respected, it does not mean that one has the right to die at the hands of someone else. The Court has also said that in this area, it is important to protect those vulnerable from being used, and therefore states have the right to legislate against euthanasia.</p><p>The situation is different when it comes to the death penalty. Two additional protocols have been adopted restricting or completely abolishing the penalty since the adoption of the Convention. In 1950 there was no possibility to exclude the right to use the death penalty from the Convention since many European states still retained it in their domestic laws. However, the development since has moved towards a complete abolition. This is for instance evident since aspiring members of the Council of Europe have to be willing to abolish the penalty to be accepted.</p><p>The Court has dealt with the death penalty in several cases. In <em>Soering v. the United Kingdom</em> they said that extraditing someone to a state where he or she risks being executed not automatically means a violation of the right to life or the prohibition of torture. In <em>Öcalan v. Turkey</em> they established that the imposition of the death penalty after an unfair trial was a violation of article 3. Also, they considered the death penalty to now be regarded as an unacceptable punishment in peace time. Abolition of the death penalty is something the Council of Europe has worked for in decades to realise.</p>

The subject of this Paper is „The right to life regulation under the European Convention on Human Rights“. The right to life is the most basic human right. It is guaranteed under many international conventions and it is protected by constitutions of all states of the world. The right to life is the first right guaranteed in the European Convention of Human Rights. Scope of this right has changed during the years. It was strongly influenced by the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.

International arbitration The purpose of the thesis is to determine the role of international arbitration in the system of domestic law, discuss the basic aspects of its character and show its relation to the decision-making practice of the European Court of Human Rights and to the Czech law. The methods used in the thesis are mainly legal-analytical, descriptive and comparative. Besides the introduction and conclusion, this work is divided into four main sections, which are further divided into subsections. The first chapter is devoted to alternative dispute resolution and its relation to the arbitration. There we find an explanation of the concept itself, the list of reasons for the exclusion or inclusion of arbitration into this system, and last but not least, the advantages and disadvantages of this method of dispute resolution, which are described for better clarity on the most frequently used method of alternative dispute resolution in Czech Republic, i.e. mediation. The following chapter focuses on the general specifics of the arbitration proceedings, which are common to the national and international arbitration. First part of this chapter is devoted to the European Convention on Human rights and its Article 6 paragraph 1, which guarantees the right to a fair trial, and to its application on the...

The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) was adopted in 1950. One of the most important rights established therein is the right to life, which can be found in article 2. The purpose of this thesis is to examine how far the scope of this right reaches concerning the beginning and the end of life. This is mainly done by examining the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) which is set to monitor the observance of the rights. To make this thesis manageable, the three areas of abortion, euthanasia and the death penalty have been chosen as the starting-point of the examination. The position of the three areas among the member states varies. Abortion and euthanasia have been regarded by the Court as sensitive areas in which the states have a wide margin of appreciation to decide on their own. This is much due to the lack of consensus within the states as to how they should be regulated. Whether the unborn foetus is protected by the Convention and in such case to what extent is still in dispute. This is also the case concerning when life begins. The Court has stated that any right the foetus may possess is limited by the rights of the mother. They have also said that they do not want to impose a certain view on the member states. The Commission has stated that if the foetus would have an absolute right to life under the Convention, then it would lead to serious implications for the mother, as she would not be able to have an abortion in any circumstance. Also, in Vo v. France one of the dissenting judges stated that the foetus’ right to life have to be narrower in scope than the right of the born. In the case Pretty v. the United Kingdom the Court unanimously ruled that article 2 does not include a right to die. However some member states, like the Netherlands, have made euthanasia legal without being found to violate its obligations under the Convention. Consequently, it does not seem to be against the Convention for states to make their own legislation allowing for euthanasia to be practiced. One important aspect to this debate is whether one considers life to be inalienable or not. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has said that even though the rights of the terminally ill should be respected, it does not mean that one has the right to die at the hands of someone else. The Court has also said that in this area, it is important to protect those vulnerable from being used, and therefore states have the right to legislate against euthanasia. The situation is different when it comes to the death penalty. Two additional protocols have been adopted restricting or completely abolishing the penalty since the adoption of the Convention. In 1950 there was no possibility to exclude the right to use the death penalty from the Convention since many European states still retained it in their domestic laws. However, the development since has moved towards a complete abolition. This is for instance evident since aspiring members of the Council of Europe have to be willing to abolish the penalty to be accepted. The Court has dealt with the death penalty in several cases. In Soering v. the United Kingdom they said that extraditing someone to a state where he or she risks being executed not automatically means a violation of the right to life or the prohibition of torture. In Öcalan v. Turkey they established that the imposition of the death penalty after an unfair trial was a violation of article 3. Also, they considered the death penalty to now be regarded as an unacceptable punishment in peace time. Abolition of the death penalty is something the Council of Europe has worked for in decades to realise.

Le principe de subsidiarité, en droit de la Convention européenne, est un principe empreint d’ambiguïtés. D’origine prétorienne, il ne fait l’objet d’aucune définition formelle dans les textes ou la jurisprudence afférente et se voit ainsi marqué d’une indétermination sémantique et juridique certaine. Doté d’une double dimension à la fois procédurale et matérielle, il n’en reste pas moins un principe fondamental du droit européen, un principe qui structure, d’une part, l’organisation et le fonctionnement même du système et guide, d’autre part, l’interprétation et le contrôle du juge de Strasbourg. Parce que naturellement ambigu mais néanmoins directeur du droit européen, le principe de subsidiarité se présente donc comme un principe souple et malléable, par conséquent, adaptable. L’analyse de sa mise en oeuvre dans la jurisprudence européenne met ainsi en exergue l’inconstance et la variabilité d’application du principe, à la libre disposition du juge strasbourgeois. Mais analysée à la lumière du contexte actuel d’un engorgement sans précédent du système et donc d’une réaffirmation urgente de son caractère subsidiaire, l’utilisation fluctuante du principe s’apprécie sous un jour nouveau, visant à faire de la subsidiarité un principe non plus garant des libertés nationales mais désormais source d’un encadrement de celles-ci. Parce que moteur d’une responsabilisation accrue des Etats membres, le principe de subsidiarité apparaît donc comme une pièce maîtresse de la politique jurisprudentielle du juge européen. / As part of the European Convention, the principle of subsidiarity is marked by ambiguity. Originating from judges, it has not been formally defined in legal texts nor in any related jurisprudence and is therefore characterized by a semantic and legal indeterminacy. Featuring both a procedural and a tangible dimension, it remains a fundamental principle of European law. On the one hand, it structures, the system’s organization and operations. On the other hand, it guides the court of Strasbourg’s interpretation and review. Naturally ambiguous but still guiding European law, the principle of subsidiarity is presented as a flexible and malleable principle, and therefore adaptable. The analysis of its implementation in the European jurisprudence highlights its inconsistency and variability at the free disposal of the court of Strasbourg. However, in the light of the current context of an unprecedented saturation of the system and therefore of an urgent reassertion of its subsidiary nature, a fluctuating use of the principle is assessed differently to make it not a guarantee of national liberties, but a guide for them. As a driving force for increased accountability of member states, the principle of subsidiarity appears to be essential to the judicial policy of the European court.

MASTER'S THESIS Evolution of the protection of the freedom of assembly and association under the ECHR and the ICCPR in the Russian Federation. Author: Daria Solomina Supervisor: JUDr. Milan Lipovský, Ph.D. Study programme: MAIN Academic Year: 2020/2021 Abstract The rights of assembly and association are vital elements of the international system of human rights. The democratic society needs to protect those freedoms to let the population a chance to express important ideas, concerns, raise political and social issues and make sure the government knows what is important to pay attention to. The international legal system (in particular created by the ECHR and the ICCPR), has come up with fundamental basis for the realization of the rights of assembly and association. However, the main responsibility of the implementation of those rules and norms lays on the states and their domestic legal systems. This thesis researches the structure of the legal protection of the freedoms of assembly and association in the Russian Federation, discovers the significant discordances between it and the provisions of the ECHR and the ICCPR, and attempts to give the political reasoning that is behind those differences. Analyzing the case-law, historical developments of the political life of the Russian Federation and the...

This study is a single case study to investigate the connection between women's fear of sexual violence, human rights, and the state's responsibility to protect women from the fear of sexual violence. The thesis accomplishes this by combining existing research on sexual violence and fear of sexual violence, as well as its relationship to human rights, with a case study based on the Haga Man, a serial rapist in Sweden. The Social Contract Theory was utilized as a theoretical framework to assess the government's responsibility to its citizens. Article 5 of the ECHR is used in this study to argue for the need for state protection. The findings indicate that Sweden as a state has a responsibility to protect women from the threat of sexual violence. This thesis adds to previous research pointing to the necessity to consider sexual assault and the fear of sexual violence as a human rights concern.

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This thesis examines gender verifications issues in track and field from a feminist and antiracist perspective. In 2019 the international governing body for the sport of athletics (World Athletics) introduced limits on blood testosterone levels for women with some types of Differences in sex development (DSD) in races from 400 metres to 1 mile. According the eligibility rules Caster Semenya and other athletes with heightened testosterone levels need to lower their testosterone levels in order to be eligible to compete in middle distance running races in the women’s class. This thesis discuss the relationship between gender verifications in athletics and the protection of athletes right to privacy according to article 8 ECHR and prohibition of gender and race discrimination according to article 14 ECHR. The balance between the interests for fair competition in sports and the protection of athletes human rights is an ongoing discussion. Complex relationship between states accountability and international non-governmental sports organizations can put athletes in a vulnerable position.  This paper includes three research questions. Firstly, can the state parties to the ECHR be accountable if the eligibility rules infringe human rights? Secondly, is the eligibility rules in compliance with the right to respect for private and family life according to article 8 ECHR? Thirdly, is the eligibility rules in compliance with prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex and race according to article 14 ECHR.

Cette thèse tente de mettre en exergue les difficultés que soulèvent les relations du droit de la concurrence avec la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme.Tous les acteurs du droit de la concurrence s’accordent à dire que le comportement concurrentiel des entreprises sur le marché doit être encadré. Le maintien d’une concurrence saine et efficace dépend, entre autres, des pouvoirs des autorités de concurrence, de l’effectivité des procédures visant les comportements anticoncurrentiels et des sanctions infligées aux entreprises auteurs d’infractions. Néanmoins, la pratique révèle une forte carence de l'application des droits de la défense résultant de la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme. Cette défaillance peut s’expliquer en partie par le caractère relativement récent et mouvant du droit de la concurrence. Plus préoccupées par le maintien d’une concurrence effective que par le respect des droits de la défense des entreprises, les autorités ont relégué au second plan la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme. Pourtant, cette dernière est profondément ancrée dans notre système juridique et les droits de la défense qui en découlent constituent de surcroît le fondement d’un Etat de droit.Face aux incessantes critiques de praticiens et d’universitaires, les autorités et juridictions ont commencé à accorder plus d’importance au respect des droits de la défense. Par ailleurs, un certain nombre de mesures a été mis en place afin de permettre un respect accru de la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme en droit de la concurrence. La réalité démontre que toutes ces mesures ne peuvent suffire à assurer le respect satisfaisant des droits de la défense des entreprises mises en cause par les autorités de concurrence. Néanmoins, même timide, cette évolution mérite d’être approuvée et encouragée. / This thesis tries to highlight the difficulties that may occur as a result of the correlations between competition law and the European Convention on Human Rights. All the actors of competition law agree to say that the competitive behavior of companies in the market must be framed. The preservation of a healthy and effective competition depends on many factors. Among them, the focus can be given on the powers of competition authorities and the effectiveness of the procedures aiming at a better competitive behavior. Furthermore, it can be added the role of the penalties imposed on companies breaching the rules of antitrust law. However, the practice shows that this goal is often pursued to the detriment of the rights of defense resulting from the European Convention on Human Rights.Nevertheless, the fundamental rights are profoundly anchored in our legal system and besides, improve the respect of the rule of law. Unlike other law areas, the youth of competition law might explain the reason why the authorities of competition have a more flexible approach of the European Convention on Human Rights. Entitled by the preservation of an effective competition, the authorities have pushed aside the European Convention on Human Rights.Coping with the constant critics of practitioners and academics, the authorities and the jurisdictions have gradually begun to pay attention to the violations of the defense rights. Moreover, measures have been set up to enforce a greater respect for the European Convention on Human Rights in the sphere of competition law. There is no doubt that all these measures cannot be enough to assure respect for the rights of defense of companies questioned by the authorities of competition. Nevertheless, it can be considered as a first step.