During the COVID-19 pandemic, European states have taken numerous measures to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. Several states have introduced various forms of compulsory vaccination against COVID-19. While vaccines are one of the most effective tools for protecting people against COVID-19, it raises the question to which extent states may justifiably make vaccination schemes compulsory in the pursuit of public health. This paper, therefore, analyses the compatibility between compulsory vaccination and the right to respect for private life as set out in Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the ECHR). As of today, the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) has not decided whether vaccine mandates are compatible with the right to respect for private life.  An interference in the right to respect for private life must be in accordance with the law and fulfil one of the legitimate aims that are set out in Article 8.2 of the ECHR. An interference also needs to be necessary in a democratic society in order to achieve that legitimate aim. The protection of health as well as the protection of the rights and freedoms of others are two of the legitimate aims stipulated in Article 8 of the ECHR that are relevant in relation to the introduction of compulsory vaccination in society. In assessing whether an interference is necessary in a democratic society, the states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. However, their assessment remains subject to review by the ECtHR. The principle of proportionality is an important part in assessing whether the interference has been necessary in a democratic society or not. The interference in question must remain proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In this paper, the compatibility between compulsory COVID-19 vaccination and the right to respect for private life is examined primarily by analysing prior case law of the ECtHR concerning vaccination and other medical interventions. This paper concludes that the states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation when assessing the necessity of introducing compulsory COVID-19 vaccinations, mainly because of the lack of European consensus regarding such vaccination schemes. Furthermore, it is concluded that compulsory COVID-19 vaccinations can be compatible with the right to respect for private life as set out in Article 8 of the ECHR, provided that the vaccines are considered safe and efficient by the research community, the vaccines used are monitored and the vaccine mandate is only indirectly imposed by sanctions of a protective nature. In addition, necessary precautions must be taken by prior assessment of potential contraindications and there must exist a possibility to receive compensation as a result of potential injuries caused by the vaccine.

Tous les etats issus du démembrement de l'urss ont dû résoudre, depuis 15 ans, une question fondamentale : celle de la définition et de l'affirmation de leur identité. ayant tous la même aspiration à la liberté, à l'autonomie productive, à l'ouverture au monde, ces pays ont commencé à réformer leurs systèmes juridiques, politiques et économiques. toutefois le droit international soviétique, spécifique, fermé dans son propre système et lié fortement à la politique extérieure de l'urss, continue à persister dans les etats post-soviétiques, malgré leur aspiration aux règles des sociétés occidentales juste après l'indépendance. ainsi, le renouvellement de la doctrine et de la pratique internationale des etats post-soviétiques se passe d'abord dans des conditions de permanence de la conception soviétique du droit international d'un côté et du désir de trouver sa place dans la communauté internationale de l'autre. cette rénovation ayant ses particularités dans chaque etat ex-soviétique, a affecté non seulement la formation de la pensée juridique et la pratique diplomatique de ces etats, mais aussi les rapports entre les droits internes et le droit international. c'est à l'époque de la fin de l'antagonisme des blocs qu'on observe l'intégration des etats issus de l'urss dans le monde de la nouvelle répartition des forces /... / International law is a « common language » but the vision of international law is far from being universal. It is a « multiplicity of particular national, regional, individual, institutional visions of international law. One can speak of the existence of regional American, Latin American, European, Asian, African approaches of law, but what about the geographical region of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics? In the XXth century one spoke about the Soviet conception of international law, which was a complex phenomenon, having its roots in the Russian legal school, combining the multiculturalism of the Russian Empire and the Soviet state and causing the division of the world into two blocks : Western and Soviet. For over twenty years that the Soviet Union no longer exists and the former Soviet states became independent and sovereign actors in the international arena. Can we therefore speak today about the existence of national approaches to international law of each state of the former USSR ? The objective of this thesis is to present the current state of doctrine and practice of the post-Soviet international law, considering the renewal of approaches of foreign policies of the post-Soviet states, and doctrinal concepts of international legal scholars. Does the post-Soviet doctrine of international law exist ? The contemporary international law is faced with challenges such as regionalization, globalization and the establishment of the rule of law in international law. Faced with these challenges, the doctrine and practice post-Soviet international law have been renewed. What approaches the post-Soviet states adopt in response to the contemporary challenges of regionalization, globalization and the establishment of the rule of law in international law?

Aufgrund des wachsenden Bedarfs an kohärenter Interaktion zwischen dem Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, dem Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union und den Gerichten der EMRK-Mitgliedstaaten, untersucht diese Arbeit die Problematik von Kompetenzkonflikten, die die Glaubwürdigkeit der europäischen und nationalen Gerichtshöfe untergraben und die Effektivität des gerichtlichen Rechtsschutzes in Europa schwächen, und schlägt die Lösungen vor, um Rechtsprechungskonflikte zwischen den Gerichtshöfen zu verringern. Es erfolgt eine Betrachtung der Fragen, wie Inkonsistenzen der gerichtlichen Rechtsprechung der europäischen und nationalen Gerichte vermieden werden können, wie der Beitritt der EU zur EMRK angegangen werden kann und wie das Piloturteilsverfahren des EGMR und nationalen gerichtlichen Überprüfungsverfahren wirksam funktionieren kann. Die Arbeit kommt zu dem Schluss, dass es für die Koordination der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Gerichten wichtig ist, ihre Interaktionen zu verstärken, indem bewährte Verfahren auf allen Ebenen ausgetauscht werden. Um eine tiefere Integration der Staaten in die europäische und internationale Gemeinschaft zu erreichen und das Risiko von sich widersprechenden gerichtlichen Entscheidungen zu reduzieren, wird von den Mitgliedstaaten erwartet, dass sie ihre Verpflichtungen aus dem EU-Recht und der EMRK verlässlich erfüllen, und die europäischen Gerichtshöfe werden ihrerseits die Möglichkeit eines Eingriffs in die Souveränität der Staaten ausschlieβen lassen. Nur wenn einvernehmlich beschlossene Lösungen angenommen werden, wird eine größere Kohärenz in Rechtsprechung der europäischen und nationalen Gerichtshöfe erreicht und ein einheitliches System zum Schutz der Menschenrechte gewährleistet. / In light of the growing need to establish a coherent relationship between the European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the courts of the ECHR member states, this study explores the challenges of jurisdictional competition that undermine the credibility of the courts and weaken the effectiveness of judicial protection of fundamental rights in Europe, and suggests ways to reduce emerging judicial tensions between these courts. It examines how to avoid inconsistencies in judicial practices of the European and national courts, how to approach accession of the EU to the ECHR, and how to ensure effective functioning of the pilot judgment mechanism and national judicial review procedures. It concludes that in order to coordinate cooperation between the courts it is important to strengthen their interactions through adhering to best practices at all levels. To pursue deeper integration of states into the European and international community and minimise the chance of rendering contradicting judgments by the courts, member states are expected to comply faithfully with their obligations under EU law and the ECHR, and the European courts shall exclude the possibility of encroachment on state sovereignty. Only if mutually agreed solutions are adopted will a greater consistency in their case law be achieved and a uniform system of protection of human rights ensured.

With the increase in unaccompanied children in 2015, it has become common to discuss the legal status of unaccompanied children. By the Swedish law persons under the age of 18 are considered to be minors and therefore have no ability to make decisions in personal matters with legally binding effects. A childs case does not always require the same seriousness as adult cases to be able to obtain a residence permit. This leads to at different asylum process for unaccompanied children who lack guardians upon arriving to Sweden. Various assessments are made for unaccompanied children that adults do not need to undergo for a residence permit. Through the legal dogmatic method, an analysis and report has been made in relation to the EU law, current Swedish laws and international commitments that affect unaccompanied childrens rights within Swedish legislation. The courts way of assessing grounds for protection, as well as how these are tried has been analyzed. The concept of unaccompanied children has been defined, but the focus on their rights in Sweden has also been reported. / I samband med ökningen av ensamkommande barn under år 2015 har det blivit ofta förekommande att diskutera ensamkommande barns rättsliga ställning. Personer som är under 18 år betraktas enligt svensk rätt som omyndiga och har därför ingen förmåga att med rättslig bindande verkan fatta beslut i personliga angelägenheter. Ett barns ärende behöver inte alltid ha samma allvar och tyngd som krävs för att vuxna personer ska kunna få uppehållstillstånd vilket leder till en annorlunda asylprocess för ensamkommande barn som saknad vårdnadshavare vid ankomsten till Sverige. Det görs olika bedömningar för ensamkommande barn som vuxna inte behöver genomgå för uppehållstillstånd. Genom den rättsdogmatiska metoden har det gjorts en analys och redogörelse i relation till EU-rätten, gällande svenska lagar och internationella åtaganden som påverkar ensamkommande barns rättigheter inom den svenska lagstiftningen. Domstolarnas sätt att bedöma skyddsgrunder samt hur dessa prövas inför domstolar har bedömts och analyserats. Begreppet ensamkommande barn har definierats men även fokus på deras rättigheter i Sverige har redogjorts.

Since the US National Security Agency’s former contractor Edward Snowden exposed the Agency’s mass surveillance, the EU has been making a series of attempts toward a more safeguarded and stricter path concerning its data privacy protection. On 8 April 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the CJEU) invalidated the EU Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC on the basis of incompatibility with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter). After this judgment, the CJEU examined the legality of the Safe Harbour Agreement, which had been the main legal basis for transfers of personal data from the EU to the US under Decision 2000/520/EC. Subsequently, on 6 October 2015, in the case of Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, the CJEU declared the Safe Harbour Decision invalid. The ground for the Court’s judgment was the fact that the Decision enabled interference, by US public authorities, with the fundamental rights to privacy and personal data protection under Article 7 and 8 of the Charter, when processing the personal data of EU citizens. According to the judgment, this interference has been beyond what is strictly necessary and proportionate to the protection of national security and the persons concerned were not offered any administrative or judicial means of redress enabling the data relating to them to be accessed, rectified or erased. The Court’s analysis of the Safe Harbour was borne out of the EU Commission’s own previous assessments. Consequently, since the transfers of personal data between the EU and the US can no longer be carried out through the Safe Harbour, the EU legislature is left with the task to create a safer option, which will guarantee that the fundamental rights to privacy and protection of personal data of the EU citizens will be respected. However, although the EU is the party dictating the terms for these transatlantic transfers of personal data, the current provisions of the US law are able to provide for derogations from every possible renewed agreement unless they become compatible with the EU data privacy law. Moreover, as much business is at stake and prominent US companies are involved in this battle, the pressure toward the US is not only coming from the EU, but some American companies are also taking the fight for EU citizens’ right to privacy and protection of their personal data.

La tesi ha per oggetto l’autotutela amministrativa, specialmente quella c.d. decisoria “spontanea”, ovvero quell’insieme di poteri che consentono all’amministrazione di riesaminare i propri provvedimenti e di rimuoverli a vario titolo.
Di questi poteri si è indagato il fondamento dogmatico e positivo. La questione del fondamento è stata per lunghi anni affrontata dalla dottrina e dalla giurisprudenza in termini totalmente pre-critici e non problematici: l’esistenza di questi poteri era semplicemente scontata e le riflessioni sulla loro base giuridica si esaurivano perlopiù nella constatazione della loro necessità nell’immemore consenso circa la loro ammissibilità. Negli ultimi anni, invece, una parte degli Autori ha disconosciuto la natura implicita e per così dire “originaria” di questi poteri e ne ha perciò patrocinato la stretta riconduzione al principio di legalità: in altre parole, l’annullamento e la revoca non sarebbero affatto conseguenza della c.d. inesauribilità del potere amministrativo – negata da questa dottrina – e sarebbero perciò oggi ammissibili unicamente nei casi e nei modi disciplinati dalle due norme introdotte nella legge sul procedimento nel 2005. Ciò a garanzia della certezza dei rapporti giuridici e del legittimo affidamento dei destinatari dei provvedimenti ampliativi. Secondo un filone ricostruttivo in pare contrastante con il primo, altri Autori hanno inteso valorizzare gli elementi de iure condito a favore della obbligatorietà dell’avvio del procedimento di riesame, auspicandone contemporaneamente la generalizzazione, nell’ottica di una più complessiva trasformazione dell’annullamento d’ufficio in un nuovo istituto ibrido, rispondente alla funzione di alternative dispute risolution system o, se si vuole, di ricorso gerarchico. Per le stesse ragioni, l’istituto dovrebbe perdere il carattere ampiamente discrezionale, in favore di una vincolatezza totale o parziale. Questo secondo “fronte di attacco” alla ricostruzione tradizionale intende offrire soluzione al venir meno del sistema dei controlli di legalità sull’azione amministrativa. Lo studio ha sottoposto a verifica entrambi i filoni evolutivi richiamati, discostandosi dal secondo e, pur accogliendo parte delle argomentazioni ad esso sottostanti, anche dal primo. Quanto alla teoria dell’esauribilità del potere amministrativo, oggetto della prima linea evolutiva, si è ritenuto di condividere le considerazioni circa la tutela dell’affidamento degli interessati e della stabilità dei rapporti giuridici. È parsa tuttavia meglio rispondente alle categorie generali e alle esigenze del sistema (anche sulla base di una visione del diritto amministrativo quale “diritto dei terzi”, per natura volto alla tutela dell’interesse generale e non solo dell’interesse privato particolare coinvolto dall’esercizio del potere) la conservazione della tradizionale inesauribilità del potere, seppur assai mitigata, nella pratica, con riferimento all’esercizio dei poteri di ritiro degli atti favorevoli ai privati il cui affidamento sia concretamente meritevole di tutela. La natura discrezionale dell’annullamento d’ufficio (e della revoca), sottoposta a critica dalla seconda linea evolutiva, viene difesa sia sul piano del diritto positivo e pretorio (attraverso la riconduzione dei principali casi di annullamento c.d. doveroso al modello generale), sia sul piano delle categorie generali, a partire dalla natura dei poteri coinvolti e dall’analisi delle posizioni giuridiche dei soggetti interessati dai procedimenti di secondo grado. / The thesis focuses on the Italian system of so called autoprotection or selfprotection. This expression refers to the powers of public administration to revoke its own acts when deemed necessary to repair a vice of legitimacy or a vice of opportunity, without being bind to resort to the courts. Given the aim of this powers – the same of first grade powers plus a semi-judicial one – they are usually meant by judges and scholars as “widely discretionary”. Furthermore, it has always been believed that the choice to activate the correspondent proceeding is totally free for public administration; consequently, a demand of interested parties does not make binding the start of the procedure, opposite to what happens with administrative appeal proceedings. In recent years ECJ, ECHR and national case law has emboldened the limits to selfredress, making clear that legitimate expectations and the public interest to legal certainty must be taken into consideration and given sufficient protection. Lately, also the Legislator followed, making the annulment and the revocation harder to be put in effect when the first act is favorable to the addressed subject. In such cases, the revocation cannot be ordered for a mere reconsideration of already known circumstances (ius poenitendi) but only if new ones show up. At the same time, ex officio annulment is precluded after 18 months from the issuing of the first act, instead of the previous general limit of a “reasonable time”. On the other hand, the case law has apparently pointed out some hypothesis of mandatory annulment, such as for “anticomunitarian acts” and cost-producing acts. Based on these two orientation, some scholars suggested a global rethinking of the self-protection, its bases and its rules. The study analyzes the case law and the latest legislative reforms, proving that no mandatory annulment exists in the Italian legal system. Therefore, nor the ECJ principle of equivalence nor other principles require that selfredress become generally obliged. The thesis also aims to prove that selfprotection remains a discretionary power, in order to ensure that the contrasting needs (the rule of law on the one hand, and the legal certainty and legitimate expectation on the other hand) can be properly balanced in every decision, according to the Constitutional provision of article 97, which requires that both impartiality and good administration are pursued.

SKV and Tullverket have several important tools and methods available in each activity to ensure that taxes and fees are paid and charged rightfully. Among other things they use tax or customs surcharges, targeted and general third party injunctions or targeted and general third party audits. The targeted controls, ergo targeted injunctions and audits, are targeted towards specific persons or documents while during the general controls these are not specified. The methods have repeatedly been the subject of discussions and attempts to simplify the tax procedure and increase the Rule of Law for the individual. The government appointed a commission on March 8 of the year 2012 with the assignment to prepare proposals to increase the Rule of Law in the tax procedure. The assignment was therefore to analyze the areas of tax and customs injunctions, reimbursement because of expenses and agents and also third party controls. This study was delimited, partly due to space considerations, to examine the commission's proposals to increase the Rule of Law regarding third party controls as well as to SKV as the investigating authority. Consideration will therefore not be given to Tullverket as the investigating authority. The system concerning third party controls has repeatedly over the years been the subject of criticism and debate. Not least because of that the general third party controls are indistinct due to the fact that the person who is the subject of the control is not aware of the control and that the procedure is considered to contravene the protection of privacy in the RF and the right to private and family life of the ECHR. It has hence been considered that there is a need for change. The commission would thus investigate and make proposals to increase the Rule of Law but given the precondition that third party control, including general controls, would still remain as control methods. Therefore the commission had to consider a proportionality assessment between the protection of individual privacy and SKV:s control effectiveness. In this study focus was on SOU 2013:62 and the consultation bodies’ responses received on account of the proposals. The commission proposed that the decision making on general third party controls will stay with SKV as the decision making authority and that it should be clarified in the legislative text that SKV has to relate to the principle of proportionality when deciding on general third party controls. The commission also proposed that it should be clarified in the legislative text that SKV only may search for documents and information covered by the decision but that surplus information that was discovered spontaneously also may be used. The commission held that there is no need for clarification of the legislative texts regarding that SKV shall take into account the proportionality principle in the choice of method and choice of control object. The commission also held that there is no need to legislate any imposes for SKV towards the subject of control to inform about the control if the information gathered nevertheless is intended to be the basis for decisions on taxation. Furthermore it was proposed an imposition of legislative texts regarding that the controlled, in connection with the information about the control, should be given the opportunity to request documents and information excluded from the basis for decisions on taxation. That is, after the control is carried out and provided that the information will be added basis for decisions on taxation. The majority of the consultation bodies felt that the commission was inadequate, that the proposals did not add anything new on the merits and that a new commission should be appointed with the mission to increase the Rule of Law in the tax procedure. The studies’ concluding parts contain a pro et contra analysis of the proposals on the basis of the consultation bodies’ responses, my own conclusions and general concluding comments. In these parts my own proposals are submitted for improvement to further enhance the Rule of Law in tax procedures. My own proposals are due to that the commission in my opinion may be deemed deficient in several aspects. / SKV och Tullverket har flera viktiga metoder att tillgå i respektive verksamhet för att säkerställa att skatter och avgifter lämnas och tas ut rätteligen. Bland annat så kan kontrollmyndigheterna använda skatte- eller tulltillägg, riktade och generella tredjemansförelägganden eller riktade och generella tredjemansrevisioner. Vid riktade kontroller, ergo riktade förelägganden och riktade revisioner, är kontrollerna riktade mot specificerade personer eller handlingar och vid generella kontroller är dessa inte specificerade. Metoderna har upprepade gånger varit föremål för diskussioner och försök att förenkla skatteförfarandet och öka rättssäkerheten för den enskilde. Regeringen tillsatte den 8 mars år 2012 en utredning med uppgiften att framställa förslag för en ökad rättssäkerhet i skatteförfarandet. Uppdraget var att undersöka områdena skatte- och tulltillägg, ersättning för kostnader och ombud samt tredjemanskontroller. Denna studie har bland annat på grund av utrymmesskäl avgränsats till att undersöka utredningens förslag som avser ökad rättssäkerhet vid tredjemanskontroller samt till SKV som kontrollerande myndighet. Hänsyn kommer således inte tas till Tullverket som kontrollerande myndighet. Tredjemanskontrollförfarandet har upprepade gånger genom åren varit föremål för kritik och diskussioner. Inte minst för att generella tredjemanskontroller ansetts olämpliga på grund av att den kontrollerade inte har vetskap om att denna är eller har varit föremål för kontroll samt att förfarandet ansetts strida mot integritetsskyddet i RF och rätten till privat- och familjeliv i EKMR. Det har därav ansetts att behov av förändring föreligger. Utredningen skulle således undersöka och lämna förslag för att öka rättssäkerheten för den enskilde men med hänsyn till att tredjemanskontroller, i dessa inbegripet generella tredjemanskontroller, alltjämt skulle kvarstå som metod i SKV:s kontrollverksamhet. Det fordrades följaktligen av utredningen att genomföra en proportionalitetsavvägning mellan skyddet för den enskildes integritet och SKV:s kontrolleffektivitet. I denna studie har fokus lagts på SOU 2013:62 och de remissyttranden som inkommit med anledning av förslagen. Utredningen föreslog att beslutsordningen vid generella tredjemanskontroller ska stå oförändrad med SKV som beslutsfattande instans och att det ska förtydligas i lagtext att SKV ska förhålla sig till proportionalitetsprincipen vid beslut om generella tredjemanskontroller. Utredningen föreslog även att det ska förtydligas i lagtext att SKV endast får eftersöka handlingar och uppgifter som omfattas av beslutet men att överskottsinformation som anträffats spontant får användas. Vidare angav utredningen att det inte behövs något förtydligande i lagtext avseende att SKV ska beakta proportionalitetsprincipen vid val av metod och val av kontrollobjekt. Utredningen angav även att det inte behöver införas någon underrättelseskyldighet för SKV gentemot den kontrollerade om informationen som inhämtats ändå inte är avsedd att läggas till grund för beslut om beskattning. Vidare föreslogs ett införande i lagtext avseende att den kontrollerade ska ges möjlighet att begära handlingar och uppgifter undantagna från att läggas till grund för beslut om beskattning i samband med en underrättelse, det vill säga efter att kontrollen ägt rum och under förutsättning att informationen kommer läggas till grund för beslut om beskattning. Flertalet remissinstanser ansåg att utredningen var bristfällig, att förslagen inte innebar någonting nytt i sak samt att en ny utredning bör tillsättas med uppdrag att öka rättssäkerheten i skatteförfarandet. I studiens avslutande delar redovisas en pro et contra-analys av förslagen med utgångspunkt i remissyttrandena, egna slutsatser avseende förslagen samt allmänna avslutande kommentarer. I dessa delar lämnas egna förbättringsförslag för att ytterligare öka rättssäkerheten, eftersom utredningen enligt min mening får anses bristfällig i flera avseenden.

No description available.

La première partie de l’étude est consacrée à l’invocation, intra et extra muros, du droit à un procès équitable. Sont analysés ainsi, dans un premier temps, l’applicabilité directe de l’article 6 et la subsidiarité de la Convention par rapport au droit national et de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme par rapport aux juridictions nationales. Le droit à un procès équitable étant un droit jurisprudentiel, l’étude se focalise, dans un second temps, sur l’invocabilité des arrêts de la Cour Européenne et plus précisément sur l’invocabilité directe de l’arrêt qui constate une violation du droit à un procès équitable dans une affaire mettant en cause l’Etat et l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme à l’arrêt qui interprète l’article 6 dans une affaire mettant en cause un Etat tiers. L’introduction dans l’ordre juridique français et hellénique de la possibilité de réexamen de la décision pénale définitive rendue en violation de la Convention a fait naitre un nouveau droit d’accès à la Cour de cassation lequel trouve son terrain de prédilection aux violations de l’article 6 et constitue peut-être le pas le plus important pour le respect du droit à un procès équitable après l’acceptation (par la France et la Grèce) du droit de recours individuel. Quant au faible fondement de l’autorité de la chose interprétée par la Cour Européenne, qui est d’ailleurs un concept d’origine communautaire, cela explique pourquoi un dialogue indirect entre la Cour Européenne et la Cour de cassation est possible sans pour autant changer en rien l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme et le fait que l’existence d’un précédent oblige la Cour de cassation à motiver l’interprétation divergente qu’elle a adoptée.La seconde partie de l’étude, qui est plus volumineuse, est consacrée aux garanties de bonne administration de la justice (article 6§1), à la présomption d’innocence (article 6§2), aux droits qui trouvent leur fondement conventionnel dans l’article 6§1 mais leur fondement logique dans la présomption d’innocence et aux droits de la défense (article 6§3). Sont ainsi analysés le droit à un tribunal indépendant, impartial et établi par la loi, le délai raisonnable, le principe de l’égalité des armes, le droit à une procédure contradictoire, le droit de la défense d’avoir la parole en dernier, la publicité de l’audience et du prononcé des jugements et arrêts, l’obligation de motivation des décisions, la présomption d’innocence, dans sa dimension procédurale et personnelle, le « droit au mensonge », le droit de l’accusé de se taire et de ne pas contribuer à son auto-incrimination, son droit d’être informé de la nature et de la cause de l’accusation et de la requalification envisagée des faits, son droit au temps et aux facilités nécessaires à la préparation de la défense, y compris notamment la confidentialité de ses communications avec son avocat et le droit d’accès au dossier, son droit de comparaître en personne au procès, le droit de la défense avec ou sans l’assistance d’un avocat, le droit de l’accusé d’être représenté en son absence par son avocat, le droit à l’assistance gratuite d’un avocat lorsque la situation économique de l’accusé ne permet pas le recours à l’assistance d’un avocat mais les intérêts de la justice l’exigent, le droit d’interroger ou faire interroger les témoins à charge et d’obtenir la convocation et l’interrogation des témoins à décharge dans les mêmes conditions que les témoins à charge et le droit à l’interprétation et à la traduction des pièces essentielles du dossier. L’analyse est basée sur la jurisprudence strasbourgeoise et centrée sur la position qu’adoptent la Cour de cassation française et l’Aréopage. / The first party of the study is dedicated to the invocation of the right to a fair trial intra and extra muros and, on this basis, it focuses on the direct applicability of Article 6 and the subsidiarity of the Convention and of the European Court of Human Rights. Because of the fact that the right to a fair trial is a ‘‘judge-made law’’, the study also focuses on the invocability of the judgments of the European Court and more precisely on the direct invocability of the European Court’s judgment finding that there has been a violation of the Convention and on the request for an interpretation in accordance with the European Court’s decisions. The possibility of reviewing the criminal judgment made in violation of the Convention has generated a new right of access to the Court of cassation which particularly concerns the violations of the right to a fair trial and is probably the most important step for the respect of the right to a fair trial after enabling the right of individual petition. As for the weak conventional basis of the authority of res interpretata (“autorité de la chose interprétée”), this fact explains why an indirect dialogue between the ECHR and the Court of cassation is possible but doesn’t affect the applicant’s right to request an interpretation in accordance with the Court’s decisions and the duty of the Court of cassation to explain why it has decided to depart from the (non-binding) precedent.The second party of the study is bigger than the first one and is dedicated to the guarantees of the proper administration of justice (Article 6§1), the presumption of innocence (Article 6§2), the rights which find their conventional basis on the Article 6§1 but their logical explanation to the presumption of innocence and the rights of defence (Article 6§3). More precisely, the second party of the study is analyzing the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, the principle of equality of arms, the right to adversarial proceedings, the right of the defence to the last word, the right to a public hearing and a public pronouncement of the judgement, the judge’s duty to state the reasons for his decision, the presumption of innocence, in both its procedural and personal dimensions, the accused’s right to lie, his right to remain silent, his right against self-incrimination, his right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation and the potential re-characterisation of the facts, his right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence, including in particular the access to the case-file and the free and confidential communication with his lawyer, his right to appear in person at the trial, his right to defend either in person or through legal assistance, his right to be represented by his counsel, his right to free legal aid if he hasn’t sufficient means to pay for legal assistance but the interests of justice so require, his right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him and his right to the free assistance of an interpreter and to the translation of the key documents. The analysis is based on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and focuses on the position taken by the French and the Greek Court of Cassation (Areopagus) on each one of the above mentioned rights.