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Samhället befinner sig i en digital tid som är mycket snabbföränderlig vilket ger ökade möjligheter, samtidigt som det förändrar kommunikationsmönster och till viss del ersätter fysisk interaktion (Statens medieråd, 2019). Den digitala medieanvändningen sträcker sig längre ner i åldrarna och ses numera som en del av småbarns dagliga rutiner. I takt med små barns ökade mediebruk har det väckts oro kring hur barns socioemotionella utveckling kan komma att påverkas (Statens medieråd, 2019). Syftet med aktuell studie är att i en svensk kontext undersöka om det föreligger samband mellan 4-6 åriga flickor och pojkars digitala medieanvändning och deras mentaliseringsförmåga och emotionsförståelse. Samt om ordförståelse har ett förklaringsvärde i ToM-förmåga. Därtill syftar studien att undersöka om det förekommer samband mellan vårdnadshavares skärmtid och förskolebarns mentaliseringsförmåga och emotionsförståelse. I studien deltog 35 barn med vårdnadshavare. Barnen testades på Baby- och barnlabbet vid Linköpings universitet i olika uppgifter som mäter mentaliseringsförmåga och emotionsförståelse. Ett mått på vårdnadshavares och barns medieanvändning samlades in med hjälp av en webbaserad enkät. Det förekom resultat från studien som tidigare inte återfunnits i svensk kontext (Rönneke & Walfridsson, 2020). Studien fann ett negativt samband mellan barnens mentaliseringsförmåga och digital medieanvändning. Dessutom återfanns resultat som går i linje med tidigare studier som pekar på att ordförståelse och mentaliseringsförmåga samvarierar (Miller, 2012; Milligan et al., 2007; Perner & Ruffman, 2005). Avslutningsvis förekom inget resultat som visar att barns mentaliseringsförmåga samvarierar med vårdnadshavares skärmtid, till skillnad från vårdnadshavares skärmtid och barnens emotionsförståelse, som samvarierar positivt.

The purpose of the study was to explore children's understanding of mind shown in children's play in a preschool classroom. Previous research on children's theory of mind has relied on empirical studies utilizing several tasks, such as false belief tasks. Since children's emerging understanding of self and others is a complex process of entering a community of theories of mind (Nelson, Henseler, & Plesa, 2000), it is important to expand our understanding of children's theories of mind through qualitative inquiry with contextually-relevant methods. This study was guided by the following questions: How is children's theory of mind manifested in play and social interactions with other children in a preschool classroom? How do children negotiate differences between their own and others' theory of mind in their interactions? How are children's relationships extended through their understanding of each other's theories of mind? The main tool for exploration of the study was an interpretive analysis based on data collected through participant observation, along with dialogic interviews, audio and video taping, my reflections, and review of the literature. This study of one preschool classroom presents that theory of mind is not made up of isolated constructs but richly integrated states of mind. It appeared that interplay between social and cognitive factors was more evident in social contexts. Diverse aspects of children's theory of mind were discussed through detailed descriptions and interpretations of play episodes. A new way of looking at children's theory of mind should be more qualitative, contextual, and holistic. / Ph. D.

The clinical presentation of social phobia suggests that alterations in theory of mind (TOM) may play a systematic role in the development and maintenance of the disorder. In the current study we leverage a quantitative neuroeconmic approach to probe for neural and behavior markers of cognitive TOM, as well as rejection estimation, with a particular focus on social phobia. Participants comprised a non-clinical sample that was divided into low (N = 10) and high (N = 7) social anxiety groups based on self-report. Participants completed a one-sided uncertainty ultimatum game designed to probe individual differences in cognitive TOM, as well as rejection estimation. Contrary to predictions, there were no behavioral differences between high and low social anxiety groups in terms of rejection estimation. Although no between-group differences emerged in the traditional TOM network, significant differences were observed in subregions of the striatum during formulation of offers, likely corresponding to estimation of reward expectations. As hypothesized, and consistent with past research, imaging results support the existence of a network regions implicated in TOM, including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the temporal parietal junction (TPJ). In addition to these regions, additional areas, including the caudate and insula, were also active during mentalizing components of the task. Collectively, results suggest a novel role for expected-value computations in the development and maintenance of social phobia. / Master of Science

Previous studies on the relation between language and social cognition have shown that children’s mastery of embedded sentential complements plays a causal role for the development of a Theory of Mind (ToM). Children start to succeed on complementation tasks in which they are required to report the content of an embedded clause in the second half of the fourth year. Traditional ToM tasks test the child’s ability to predict that a person who is holding a false belief (FB) about a situation will act "falsely". In these task, children do not represent FBs until the age of 4 years. According the linguistic determinism hypothesis, only the unique syntax of complement sentences provides the format for representing FBs. However, experiments measuring children’s looking behavior instead of their explicit predictions provided evidence that already 2-year olds possess an implicit ToM. This dissertation examined the question of whether there is an interrelation also between implicit ToM and the comprehension of complement sentences in typically developing German preschoolers. Two studies were conducted. In a correlational study (Study 1 ), 3-year-old children’s performance on a traditional (explicit) FB task, on an implicit FB task and on language tasks measuring children’s comprehension of tensed sentential complements were collected and tested for their interdependence. Eye-tracking methodology was used to assess implicit ToM by measuring participants’ spontaneous anticipatory eye movements while they were watching FB movies. Two central findings emerged. First, predictive looking (implicit ToM) was not correlated with complement mastery, although both measures were associated with explicit FB task performance. This pattern of results suggests that explicit, but not implicit ToM is language dependent. Second, as a group, 3-year-olds did not display implicit FB understanding. That is, previous findings on a precocious reasoning ability could not be replicated. This indicates that the characteristics of predictive looking tasks play a role for the elicitation of implicit FB understanding as the current task was completely nonverbal and as complex as traditional FB tasks. Study 2 took a methodological approach by investigating whether children display an earlier comprehension of sentential complements when using the same means of measurement as used in experimental tasks tapping implicit ToM, namely anticipatory looking. Two experiments were conducted. 3-year-olds were confronted either with a complement sentence expressing the protagonist’s FB (Exp. 1) or with a complex sentence expressing the protagonist’s belief without giving any information about the truth/ falsity of the belief (Exp. 2). Afterwards, their expectations about the protagonist’s future behavior were measured. Overall, implicit measures reveal no considerably earlier understanding of sentential complementation. Whereas 3-year-olds did not display a comprehension of complex sentences if these embedded a false proposition, children from 3;9 years on were proficient in processing complement sentences if the truth value of the embedded proposition could not be evaluated. This pattern of results suggests that (1) the linguistic expression of a person’s FB does not elicit implicit FB understanding and that (2) the assessment of the purely syntactic understanding of complement sentences is affected by competing reality information. In conclusion, this dissertation found no evidence that the implicit ToM is related to the comprehension of sentential complementation. The findings suggest that implicit ToM might be based on nonlinguistic processes. Results are discussed in the light of recently proposed dual-process models that assume two cognitive mechanisms that account for different levels of ToM task performance. / Zahlreiche Studien legen nahe, dass der Erwerb finiter Komplementsatzstrukturen eine Voraussetzung für die Entwicklung einer Theory of Mind (ToM) ist. Kinder beginnen in circa der zweiten Hälfte ihres 4. Lebensjahres Komplementsatzverständnisaufgaben zu lösen, die eine Wiedergabe des Komplementsatzes erfordern. Die ToM wird klassischerweise als erworben bezeichnet, wenn ein Kind korrekt vorhersagen kann, dass eine Person, die eine falsche Überzeugung hat, entsprechend "falsch" handeln wird. Es ist bekannt, dass sich diese Fähigkeit bei Kindern mit circa 4 Jahren entwickelt. Gemäß der Hypothese des linguistischen Determinismus liefert die syntaktische Komplexität von Komplementsatzstrukturen das Format, um falsche Überzeugungen mental zu repräsentieren. In ToM Aufgaben, die erfassen, wo Kinder eine zukünfige Handlung einer fehlinformierten Person antizipieren, konnte allerdings bereits schon bei 2-Jährigen das Verstehen falscher Überzeugungen nachgewiesen werden. Diese frühe Fähigkeit wird auch implizite ToM genannt, da diese Art der Aufgabe keine bewusste Entscheidung verlangt. Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht erstmalig im Deutschen, ob der Zusammenhang zwischen dem Verstehen von Komplementsatzstrukturen und ToM auch für diese implizite Fähigkeit gilt. Zwei Studien wurden durchgeführt. In Studie 1 wurden die Leistungen von 3-Jährigen in einer klassischen (expliziten) ToM Aufgabe, einer impliziten ToM Aufgabe und in Komplementsatzverständnisaufgaben erhoben und auf korrelative Zusammenhänge hin getestet. Dabei wurde mittels eines Eye-Trackers das antizipative Blickverhalten gemessen und somit auf das Vorhandensein einer impliziten ToM geschlossen. Die Leistungen in den Sprachaufgaben korrelierten nicht mit den Blickdaten, obwohl beide Maße mit den Leistungen in der expliziten ToM Aufgabe in Beziehung standen. Unerwarteterweise konnte jedoch generell kein implizites Verstehen falscher Überzeugungen bei 3-jährigen nachgewiesen werden. Da die implizite ToM Aufgabe nichtsprachlich war, wird der Einfluss von Aufgabeneigenschaften auf die Elizitierung von impliziter ToM diskutiert. Studie 2 untersuchte, ob 3-Jährige ein früheres, implizites Verstehen von Komplementsatzstrukturen in Aufgaben zeigen, in denen antizipatorische Blicke anstelle von expliziten Antworten gemessen werden und damit das gleiche Maß verwendet wird wie in impliziten ToM Aufgaben. Zwei Experimente wurden durchgeführt. Der präsentierte Komplementsatz drückte entweder eine falsche Überzeugung des Protagonisten aus (Exp. 1) oder eine Überzeugung, deren Wahrheitsgehalt nicht bestimmt wurde (Exp. 2). Während bei 3-Jährigen kein Verstehen von Komplementsatzstrukturen, die eine falsche Proposition enthielten, nachgewiesen werden konnte, zeigten Kinder ab einem Alter von 3;9 Jahren, dass sie den komplexen Satz verarbeiten, wenn dieser keine falsche Proposition beinhaltet. Dieses Ergebnismuster spricht dafür, dass (1) der sprachliche Ausdruck einer falschen Überzeugung die implizite ToM nicht elizitieren kann und dass (2) das Erfassen des rein syntaktischen Verstehens durch zusätzliche Realitätsinformation beeinträchtigt wird. Zusammenfassend konnte in der vorliegenden Arbeit kein Hinweis dafür gefunden werden, dass die implizite ToM in gleicher Weise wie die explizite ToM mit dem Verstehen von Komplementsatzstrukturen einhergeht. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass vielmehr nonlinguistische Faktoren bei der Entwicklung einer impliziten ToM eine Rolle spielen könnten. Die Resultate werden mit Blick auf aktuelle Zwei-Prozess-Modelle diskutiert.

Why is it that we humans have a tendency to construct transcendental entities? That is one of the big questions the scientific discipline Cognitive Science of Religion is trying to answer. In order to gain validation for the concepts used by this discipline neural correlates are needed. The aim of the present work is to investigate the concepts Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device ((H)ADD) and Theory of Mind (ToM) both in psychological, cognitive and neural aspects to see if those concepts are enough to explain the human tendencies to construct transcendental entities. This work is developed as philosophical a literature study and uses literature from the scientific disciplines of cognitive neuroscience, cognitive science of religion, cognitive science, neurotheology, psychology of religion and philosophy of religion. This means that the present work is interdisciplinary and stands on a bridge between the theoretical and empirical sciences. A word of caution: Regardless the findings this work presents, the explanatory value is limited as it is a theoretical study in an empirical scientific field. It is when the findings in this work are tested empirically that the findings sustainability are decided.              What this work shows is that neural correlates for ToM already exist in the form of the Mirror Neuron-Theory (MNT), but it is problematic because it can not show how higher orders of representations are possible. No scientific data about neural correlates to (H)ADD has been found for this study, but here the amygdala may play a prominent role. Furthermore this work shows that (H)ADD and ToM is not enough to explain why humans have a tendency to construct transcendental entities. We are in need of peripheral cognitive mechanisms such as intuitive knowledge modules, ontological categories, teleological thinking, our drive to seek causal connections and our ability for pattern recognition.

The present thesis belongs to the research area disability research and deal with specific aspects of cognition in individuals with Usher syndrome type 1 and 2. The subject has been investigated and is discussed within an interdisciplinary framework, though the theories applied and described are derived from the area of cognitive psychology. Usher syndrome is a rare genetic condition causing a combination of visual and hearing impairment: deafblindness. There is a congenital hearing loss that is profound in type 1 and moderate to severe in type 2. During mid-childhood symptoms of visual impairment, e.g. light sensitivity, emerge and a progressive loss of visual field follows as a result of the genetically caused eye disease Retinitis Pigmentosa. The syndrome has previously been well described with respect to the genetical and medical aspects, but there has been very little research with a cognitive perspective on the population. Studies 1 and 2 in the present thesis focused on children with Usher syndrome type 1 with cochlear implants and investigated phonological skills, lexical access, working memory and reading skill in the group. Studies 3 & 4 investigated the same cognitive abilities and theory of mind in adults with Usher syndrome type 2. In study 4 the performance on theory of mind in the adults with Usher syndrome type 2 was also compared to that of another group with genetically caused deafblindness: individuals with Alström syndrome. The results were that both the children and adults with Usher syndrome had significantly poorer phonological processing than the control groups with normal hearing. There was a large variation on performance on lexical access, especially in the group of children, however several individuals performed at the same level as the control group. Reading skill was found to be at level with the control groups’. There was also great variation in performance on ToM, however the majority of individuals performed similar to the control group with normal hearing and vision. The present project has resulted in some new knowledge on cognitive performance in  individuals with Usher syndrome type 1 and type 2. Performance in the participants with Usher syndrome can to a large extent can be understood by application of the models developed in previous research on populations with hearing impairment or deafness for understanding the impact of hearing with a hearing aid or cochlear implant. However, individuals with Usher syndrome experience additional difficulties in accessing information due to the progressive visual loss and the impact this has on performance is still largely unknown. Hence, the present project would recommend that interventions and support would be designed specifically to each individuals’ needs, with consideration of both the visual impairment and the hearing impairment. / Föreliggande avhandling tillhör ämnet handikappvetenskap och beskriver specifika kognitiva förmågor hos personer med Ushers syndrom typ 1 och 2. Avhandlingens ämne har undersökts utifrån ett tvärvetenskapligt perspektiv, även om de teorier som tillämpas och beskrivs huvudsakligen härrör inom området kognitiv psykologi. Ushers syndrom är en ovanlig genetisk åkomma som leder till kombinationen av syn- och hörselnedsättning: dövblindhet. Individer med typ 1 av syndromet har medfödd dövhet medan individer med typ 2 har en medfödd måttlig till grav hörselnedsättning. Någon gång i åldrarna 6-10 år börjar de första symptomen, till exempel nedsatt mörkerseende, på den genetiskt betingade progressiva synnedsättningen Retinitis Pigmentosa att framträda. Syndromet är väl beskrivet i forskningen med avseende på genetiska och medicinska aspekter, men det finns extremt lite tidigare forskning med kognitivt perspektiv om populationen. Studierna 1 och 2 i föreliggande avhandling fokuserade på barn med Ushers syndrom typ 1 och cochleaimplantat. Dessa studier undersökte fonologisk förmåga, lexikal access, arbetsminne och läsning i gruppen. Studie 3 undersökte samma kognitiva förmågor hos vuxna med typ 2 av syndromet. I studie 4 undersöktes även den sammansatta förmågan Theory of Mind hos de vuxna med typ 2 och deras prestation jämfördes både mot en kontroll grupp med normal hörsel och syn och en kontrollgrupp med annan typ av dövblindhet; Alström syndrom. Resultaten visade att både barnen och de vuxna med Ushers syndrom hade signifikant sämre fonologisk förmåga än kontrollgruppen med normal hörsel. Nivån på prestation varierade stort inom grupperna, särskilt mellan barnen med typ 1, och flera av individerna (barn och vuxna) presterade trots hörselnedsättningen på samma nivå som de normalhörande. Läsfärdigheten befanns vara i nivå med kontrollgrupperna. I den vuxna gruppen var det stor variation i prestation även på Theory of Mind, men de flesta av individerna presterade liknande som kontrollgruppen med normal hörsel och syn. Föreliggande projekt har resulterat i lite mer kunskap om kognitiva färdigheter hos individer med Ushers syndrom typ 1 och 2. De resultat som individerna med Ushers syndrome presterade kan till stor del förstås och tolkas genom tillämpning av teorier och modeller utvecklade för att den inverkan på kognitiva förmågor det har att ha nedsatt hörsel och höra med hjälp av hörselapparat eller cochleaimplantat. Dock tyder fynden i detta projekt även på att individer med Ushers syndrom på grund av den allvarliga synnedsättningen har ytterligare svårigheter att få tillgodogöra sig information, men i vilken utsträckning och på vilket sätt är ännu inte beskrivet. Utifrån fynden i föreliggande studie blev rekommendation att interventioner och stöd till personer med Ushers syndrom utformas specifikt till varje individ, med hänsyn taget både till hens grad av synnedsättning och hörselnedsättning.

Denna rapport beskriver utvecklingen av ett grafiskt gränssnitt för utvärderingsverktygetHanabi Challenge Benchmark. Utvärderingsverktyget grundar sig på det populärakortspelet Hanabi och presenterar sig själv som en ny riktlinje för forskningav artificiell intelligens med fokus på multi-agentbaserade kooperativa utmaningar.Syftet och målet med projektet är att analysera, tolka och visualisera datat frånverktyget för att skapa en bättre förståelse av verktyget.Ett grafiskt gränssnitt utvecklas sedan genom att använda kunskaper inom theoryof mind i kombination med teorier inom människa-datorinteraktion. Resultatenav detta projekt utvärderas genom ett småskaligt användarbarhetstest. Användareav olika åldrar, kön och nivåer av datorkunskap testade applikationen och ficksedan svara på en enkät. Resultatet av enkäten gjorde grund för utvärderingen avkvaliteten för det grafiska gränsnittet. / This report will describe the development of the Graphical User Interface (GUI) forthe Hanabi Challenge Benchmark. The benchmark is based on the popular cardgame Hanabi and presents itself as a new research frontier in artificial intelligencefor cooperative multi-agent challenges. The project’s intentions and goals are tointerpret and visualize the data output from the benchmark to give us a better understandingof it.A GUI was then developed by using knowledge within theory of mind in combinationwith theories within human-computer interaction. The results of this project wereevaluated through a small-scale usability test. Users of different ages, gender andlevels of computer knowledge tested the application and through a questionnaire,the quality of the GUI was assessed.