The manner in which public servants are held to account and the purposes of accountability at the bureaucratic level is a relatively unexplored field. This dissertation is comprised of three separate studies investigating hierarchical accountability, the accounting officer system in Canada, and accountability among public servants. Together, they address critical questions: i) how can existing theory on accountability be reconciled with hierarchy and the delegation of authority; ii) the principles and practices of the accounting officer system; and iii) internal public service accountability mechanisms. This dissertation explores whether we can develop — and implement — a systematic approach to empirically investigating how accountability is practiced, as a means of advancing our theoretical and practical understanding of accountability. The three studies draw on evidence collected over a four-year period, including interviews with public servants conducted in Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands. Some of the key theoretical perspectives evaluated include an adapted version of Aucoin and Heintzman’s (2000) framework on accountability and performance management and, Bovens, Schillemans and ’t Hart’s (2008) practices and purposes of accountability framework. The conclusions of the dissertation are threefold: first, that while overall the normative purposes of accountability as described in the frameworks (democratic control, assurance, learning and results) are, to a substantial degree, observed in practice, there are nonetheless some serious deficiencies in our understanding of the purposes of accountability; second, there is considerable variation in practices from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and, within each specific jurisdiction, specific practices are shaped to a considerable degree by the institutionalized context in which these practices are carried out; and third, an empirical approach to studying accountability practices offers a promising way to address the lack of empirical knowledge, and a way to bolster both our theoretical and practical understanding of actual accountability practices. / Graduate / 0617 / 0615

A central paradox in neorealism is that the absence of world government is assumed to imply a dangerous security dilemma, and yet few realists have argued in favor of world government while great powers have historically resisted delegation of military force to supranational institutions. If international anarchy causes costly security competition and war, powerful states should have a strong incentive to unify and neorealist explanations for why states resist peaceful unification are either underdeveloped or implicit. This paper develops a rational choice realist model which suggests that anarchy is not a structural constraint which forces states to compete intensely for power, but a rational choice that state leaders make to avoid the costs of world government. The model assumes that state leaders face a delegation constraint which implies a tradeoff between eliminating the military burden necessary to deter attacks in anarchy, and abstain from world government to avoid forced redistribution of material resources pushed by poorer states or risk that the world government might turn tyrannical and coerce the subjects it has been mandated to protect. The paper uses deductive method to deduce actor preferences and illustrate the plausibility of the central predictions of the model. The model predicts that income equality, democratization, nationalism and military defensive advantage makes anarchy stable, a condition under which states have little reason to unify. On the other hand, high income inequality, lack of democratic accountability, territorial revisionism, and military offensive advantage make anarchy costly, but unification more difficult to achieve given the underlying conflicting preferences. Hence, states rather take the risk of fighting in hopes of eliminating future military competition than to agree on a world government where redistribution and cultural conflicts are likely to make wealthy great powers with modest population sizes worse off than they would be in anarchy. The paper concludes that anarchy is not a tragedy that makes world government impossible, but world government is a potential tragedy that makes anarchy rational.

The delegation of powers by the Legislature in carrying out school laws has always been a function of that body. In 1929 Justice Walker, in the case of Richardson v. Liberty Independent School District, stated that all powers possessed by school districts have been delegated by the Legislature. The same is true in respect to the powers possessed by the State Board of Education and the county boards of education. All these divisions have been created by law and all their powers delegated by the Legislature.By this study the writer will try to show what trend the Legislature has taken in the delegation of powers concerning,schools. In this study the solution of the following questions will be sought: 1. Is there a tendency toward more delegation of power to the state level of administration? 2. Is there a tendency in the Legislature to give more power to county and local units in the school system? 3. Is the Legislature inclining toward exercising more power on its own initiative? By the study of laws passed by the Legislature delegating powers and retaining powers, these problems can be answered and a definite trend shown.

This thesis focuses on the work of charge nurses in intensive care units (ICUs) as first-line managers. The practical part of the thesis aims at assessing the experience with nursing management in day-to-day routine, especially with the management of change introduction, conflict resolution and motivation of employees. It further compares different charge nurses' career beginnings. The second part of the research deals with personal typology of charge nurses. Twenty six ICU charge nurses were included into the study. The results indicate that charge nurses are not being specifically prepared for their job and that they particularly lack any special education in management. They usually solve conflicts either by compromise or via a directive. Most charge nurses intend to introduce changes into daily practice and they perceive changes as positive. Conversely, they describe the attitude of their subordinates towards changes as negative. Charge nurses generally know the motivators of their employees; however, they excessively and inappropriately use praising as motivation tool. Although not standardized and not used generally, a formal evaluation of employees is considered by charge nurses as a possible way to improve motivation. Allover, the study shows the need for a more thorough management training...

Les contrats internationaux de délégation de service public s'inscrivent dans un ensemble de techniques connues de longue date, les affermages ayant plus de trois siècles d'existence et les concessions étant apparues aux XIXe siècles. Les partenariats public privés constituent la dernière forme en date des relations complexes entre les collectivités publiques et des opérateurs industriels ou de services. La technique de délégation de service public est largement utilisé dans le monde et les états adaptés suivent leurs propres législations internes sous différentes approches de la délégation. A noter que l'amplitude du sujet constitue un défit. Une apprche systématique permettra de réduire les difficultés. Plusieurs éléments sont à prendre en considération. Le premier porte sur l'activité délégable, le deuxième porte sur les formes contractuelles de la délégation et le troisième porte sur les transpositions internationales des contrats de délégation. Dans notre recherche, nous étudierons les contrats de délégation de service public dans le sens large du terme et d'un point de vue internationale sans entrer dans la classification interne de ces contrats dans chaque pays en se basant sur le modèle francais de la "concession" et le modèle Anglo-Saxon le "BOT" qui sont les deux modèles de base les plus répandus et ceci en suivant toutes les étapes du contrat de déégation : Passation, vie et fin du contrat ainsi que son contenu. Nous allons aussi essayer de mettre en relief des réponses aux problèmes émanant de cette expérience et ses applications répandus dans presque tout les pays et dont la réussite varie selon les dimensions géographiques et démographiques du pays / International contracts of public service delegation is part of a set of known longstanding techniques, long-terme leases with more than three centuries of existence and the concessions being emerged is the nineteenth century. Public-private partnerships are the latest form dated complex relations between public authorities and industry operators or services. The technique of delegation of public service is widely used in the world and adapted states follow there own internal laws in different approaches of the delegation. Notes that the amplitude of the subject is a challenge. A systematic approach will reduce difficulties. Several factors most be taken into consideration. The first concerns the delegable activity, the second door on the contractual forms of delegation and the third focuses on international transposition delegation contracts. In our research, we will study contracts delegation of public service in the broadest sense and from an international point of view without going into the internal classification of those contracts in each country. Based on the French model of th "concession" and the Anglo-Saxon model "BOT" which are the two basic models of the most common we will follow all the steps of delegation contract : Procurement, life and termination of the contract and its contents. We will also try to highlight the answers to the problems arising from this experience and widespread in almost all countries and applications whose success depends on the geographical area and population of the country.

This dissertation addresses the question of effective delegation, exploring it through the concept of managerial discretion (i.e., a latitude of managerial actions, which lie in the zone of shareholders’ acceptance). While the corporate governance perspective on managerial discretion focuses mainly on the costs associated with delegation, the strategic management perspective emphasizes its benefits in creating value for the firm. Building on research in corporate governance and strategic management, this dissertation develops and empirically tests a theoretical framework that explains how the two distinct dimensions of managerial discretion jointly influence organizational outcomes. The proposed framework illuminates the importance of balance between the restraining and enabling decisions undertaken by professional managers. This dissertation makes a two-fold contribution to the field of corporate governance. First, it identifies and explains organizational and environmental forces that jointly shape strategic and governance dimensions of managerial discretion, redefining the concept. Second, it conceptually and empirically explores an integrative model of managerial discretion within the broader corporate governance framework, providing evidence of the joint effects of governance and strategic dimensions of discretion on organizational outcomes. The results suggest that the effect of governance dimension of managerial discretion on a firm’s performance is contingent on the strategic dimension of discretion. This draws attention to potential strategic implications of board monitoring over managerial decision making. While the majority of studies emphasize the benefits of increased control over managerial decision making, particularly stressing board monitoring, this dissertation also considers the benefits of delegation for firms’ strategic development. By reversing the polarity of the current emphasis on disciplining managers, this dissertation provides a more balanced view of the notion of corporate governance. The value of this approach derives from the integrated model, which highlights the benefits and the costs of delegation.

Delegating responsibilities for ensuring data quality to employees close to operations is generally regarded as beneficial according to academia, rather than allowing the IT department full authority. The business employees are suitable for this task, as they have both a practical understanding for the business and a role that often is regarded as data-driven. However, delegation of responsibilities is argued to be one of the biggest barriers concerning data quality. This study examines this phenomenon by connecting delegation of responsibilities for ensuring data quality to research on the motivational aspects of controlling data, which lays the foundation for the empirical investigation.  This single case study was conducted qualitatively using semi-structured interviews. The data sample consisted of a business department, including six business controllers and their manager, at a large Swedish manufacturing company. Further, the data collection was complemented by conducting an interview with a representative at the IT department.  The study shows how business controllers are dependent on the quality of data, and due to their awareness of the benefits in avoiding data errors they are autonomously motivated to ensure good data quality. This strengthen the argument of delegating control of data quality to the business department, which gives the study practical significance.

Artificiell intelligens är digitala tekniker som har utvecklats snabbt de senaste åren. Allt fler uppgifter som tidigare krävt mänsklig färdighet och intelligens kan numera utföras autonomt av artificiell intelligens. Till följd av dess förmågor att på ett effektivt sätt behandla stora mängder information, lära sig nya saker, göra förutsägelser och föreslå handlingsalternativ samt i varierande grad handla efter egna uppfattningar, kan artificiell intelligens utgöra ett viktigt stöd vid beslutsfattande. Artificiell intelligens kan i teorin till och med ersätta människor. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka under vilka förutsättningar artificiell intelligens kan användas för beslutsfattande i aktiebolag och att utvärdera hur svensk aktiebolagsrätt förhåller sig till den tekniska utveckling som sker på området. Frågor som uppstår är om artificiell intelligens kan ersätta aktieägare respektive styrelsen, i vilken utsträckning styrelsen kan delegera beslutsfattande till artificiell intelligens samt i vilken utsträckning styrelsen kan ta hjälp av artificiell intelligens vid sitt beslutsfattande. Även om vissa frågor med självklarhet kan besvaras, visar studien att det någonstans på vägen kommer en punkt där det inte går att avgöra hur artificiell intelligens ska behandlas. Undersökningen visar att artificiell intelligens varken kan ersätta aktieägare eller styrelsen i ett aktiebolag. Vad gäller styrelsens möjlighet att delegera beslutsfattande till artificiell intelligens samt om styrelsen kan ta hjälp av artificiell intelligens vid beslutsfattande, uppstår frågan om det kan anses oaktsamt av en styrelseledamot att använda artificiell intelligens på nämnt sätt och i sådant fall under vilka förutsättningar. En sådan aktsamhetsbedömning kan leda till att styrelseledamöter sanktioneras genom skadestånd. Rättsläget är oklart avseende om de uppgifter som styrelsen kan delegera till fysiska personer eller organ inom bolaget med ansvarsreducerande verkan, även kan delegeras till AI. Slutligen har styrelsen ett mycket stort handlingsutrymme att fatta beslut i aktiebolaget, under förutsättning att styrelsen iakttar bolagets intresse med omsorg. Det torde vara upp till styrelsen att avgöra om ett ärende kan beredas på ett tillfredsställande sätt med hjälp av AI.

Les systèmes de gestion de workflow font maintenant partie de l'environnement classique des grandes organisations. Ces systèmes sont cependant aujourd'hui considérés comme trop rigides et de nombreux travaux ont pour but d'introduire de la flexibilité dans la modélisation et l'exécution de leurs procédés. Dans cette problématique, la prise en compte de la flexibilité organisationnelle est une étape importante. C'est à cette dernière que nous allons nous intéresser à travers un mécanisme particulier : la délégation de tâches. En effet, la délégation est un mécanisme qui permet d'obtenir une certaine flexibilité organisationnelle dans un système de gestion de workflow. Elle permet également d'assurer une forme de délégation des autorisations dans un système de contrôle d'accès. Dans ce contexte, une délégation sécurisée de tâches implique la présence d'un ensemble d'évènements de délégation et de règles définissant les possibles délégations d'autorisation ainsi que les moyens de contrôler les politiques associées.Dans ce mémoire, nous définissons une approche sécurisée pour la délégation dynamique de tâches dans les systèmes de gestion de workflow. Pour ce faire, nous identifions les évènements spécifiques du modèle de tâches correspondant à la délégation qui entrainent des changements dynamiques de la politique d'autorisation. Puis, nous montrons comment notre approche permet de contrôler dynamiquement les autorisations liées à la délégation et comment elle peut être intégrée dans les systèmes de contrôle d'accès existants. Afin de contrôler le comportement de délégation et de spécifier ses politiques d'autorisation, nous recueillons les événements pertinents qui définissent le chemin d'exécution des tâches ainsi que les politiques générées pour la délégation. Finalement, nous proposons une technique qui automatise les politiques de délégation et qui permet d'accroître la conformité des changements dus à la délégation dans la politique d'autorisation existante / Task delegation presents one of the business process security leitmotifs. We currently observe a move away from predefined strict workflow modelling towards dynamic approaches supporting flexibility on the organisational level and dynamic authorisation on the security level. One specific approach is that of task delegation. Delegation defines a mechanism that bridges the gap between both workflow and access control systems. There are two important issues relating to delegation, namely allowing task delegation to complete, and having a secure delegation within a workflow. Delegation completion and authorisation enforcement are specified under specific constraints. Constraints are defined from the delegation context implying the presence of a fixed set of delegation events to control the delegation execution. In this dissertation, we aim to reason about delegation events to model task delegation and to specify delegation policies dynamically. To that end, we present an event-based task delegation model to monitor the delegation process. We then identify relevant events for authorisation enforcement to specify delegation policies. Subsequently, we propose a task-oriented access control model to address these requirements. Using our access control model, we analyse and specify delegation constraints into authorisation policies. Moreover, we propose a technique that automates delegation policies using event calculus to control the delegation execution and to increase the compliance of all delegation changes in the existing policy of the workflow

La bureaucratie joue un rôle-clé dans l'arène politique. Le pouvoir de l'administration publique a néanmoins souvent été sous-estimé, tandis que sa structure comme sa croissance constante restent mal compris. Cette thèse est consacrée à l'étude approfondie des principales caractéristiques de l'administration publique et plus particulièrement à son avantage informationnel dans la prise de décisions politiques. Dans une perspective normative, la thèse explore les questions de délégation dans une hiérarchie à trois niveaux, et de répartition de rente informationnelle en 'common agency' avec plusieurs mandataires politiques. Ceci me permet d'entrevoir ce que renferme la boîte noire de la structure organisationnelle composite du gouvernement. D'un point de vue positif, l'approche comparative me permet d'analyser et d'expliquer la croissance des administrations publiques dans les démocraties sur le plan de l'emploi de fonctionnaires d'État. / Bureaucracy is a key player in political game. However, its power has been often underestimated as well as the questions of its structure and constant growth remain not properly understood. This thesis represents a detailed study of the major features of the government bureaucracy by focusing on its information leverage in policy making. Normatively, the thesis explores the issues of delegation in a three-tier hierarchy and information rent distribution in common agency with several political principals, and thus contributes to opening a black box of the composite organizational structure of government. Positively, the comparative approach helps to explain the growth of government bureaucracies in democracies in terms of government administration employment.