Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:30:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose Guilherme Di Rienzo Marrey.pdf: 979239 bytes, checksum: ee716eab3e949ebe5beef67a23a288a8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-04-23 / Assisted human reproduction that, on one hand, has promoted a huge advance in the field of Reproductive Medicine, on the other hand, has conveyed countless polemic questions, both in the ethical and juridical spheres, as for instance, the donation of gametes and the destination for exceeding embryos. The present work seeks to analyze some foreign legislation about assisted human reproduction, as well as the bills in process in Brazil, expounding afterwards the opinion of doctrine experts / A reprodução humana assistida, que de um lado possibilitou imenso avanço no campo da Medicina Reprodutiva, de outro trouxe consigo inúmeros questionamentos, tanto de ordem ética como jurídica, como, por exemplo, doações de gametas e o destino dos embriões excedentários. O presente trabalho busca analisar algumas das legislações estrangeiras sobre reprodução assistida, bem como os Projetos de Lei existentes no Brasil, expondo ainda a opinião da doutrina

A eqüidade é um termo polissêmico e comporta diversas definições. Nesta obra, estudam-se as decisões por eqüidade na arbitragem comercial internacional e não a eqüidade em todos seus aspectos. Trata-se da função substitutiva da eqüidade. A decisão por eqüidade na arbitragem apresenta-se como uma técnica: uma forma de decidir sem que haja remissão necessária ao direito positivo. Sua característica principal é a liberdade de método decisório. Seu principal efeito é a possibilidade de derrogar o direito positivo, dentro dos limites da ordem pública. Ela qualifica-se, do ponto de vista positivo, como uma técnica de decisão; do ponto de vista negativo, como uma abdicação do julgamento conforme regras de direito. Em termos históricos, a decisão por eqüidade na arbitragem existe desde pelo menos a Grécia antiga. Desde então, ela sobrevive na tradição jurídica ocidental. Nos dias atuais, ela é encontrada na imensa maioria dos ordenamentos. Boa parte de sua disciplina atual no mundo decorre do movimento de reforma das legislações nacionais ocorrido nas últimas décadas, que teve na Lei Modelo da CNUDCI uma importante fonte de inspiração. A arbitragem por eqüidade é uma espécie do gênero arbitragem. Embora possua diversas denominação no mundo, tais diferenças não encerram diversidade de conceitos. Em termos de qualificação da cláusula de arbitragem por eqüidade, existem divergências: pode-se relacioná-la à cláusula arbitral, ao procedimento ou ao mérito. Nesta obra, defendemos seu posicionamento nos domínios da cláusula arbitral, embora possua efeitos processuais. Nos dias de hoje, pode-se afirmar a existência de regras materiais transnacionais depreendidas do exame do direito comparado e jurisprudência arbitral, especificamente para a arbitragem por eqüidade. A cláusula de arbitragem por eqüidade produz efeitos tanto no direito material quanto no procedimento. No direito material, possibilita-se a derrogação do direito positivo. No direito processual, tanto pode causar alterações automáticas do procedimento como conferir maior liberdade aos árbitros na condução da arbitragem. Resta dúvidas se autoriza modificações no procedimento convencionado pelas partes. Também é controversa a possibilidade de se decidir por eqüidade questões prévias ao mérito, como a validade da cláusula arbitral. A decisão por eqüidade é limitada pela ordem pública e pelo princípio do devido processo. Com relação ao contrato, existem divergências sobre seu alcance. Todavia, pode-se verificar a sedimentação de um entendimento pelo qual os árbitros podem moderar certas disposições contratuais que produzam resultados injustos; todavia, não podem alterar substancialmente a economia do contrato. Do exame de direito comparado, existem três sistemas de arbitragem por eqüidade. Na imensa maioria dos casos, permitir-se-á desde que as partes assim convencionem. Presume-se, portanto, a arbitragem de direito. Um segundo sistema, utilizado por alguns países Latino-Americanos, presume que a arbitragem seja por eqüidade, salvo convenção das partes. Um terceiro sistema, adotado por poucos países, não permite a arbitragem por eqüidade. Os tratados internacionais em geral não tratam da arbitragem por eqüidade. Aqueles que o fazem, em geral apresentam uma regra material: permitem-na, desde que as partes convencionem. Nesta obra, realizou-se um exame da jurisprudência arbitral e uma pesquisa empírica com 92 profissionais que atuam na arbitragem comercial internacional em diversos países. De seu exame, podem-se identificar alguns elementos recorrentes na prática da arbitragem por eqüidade no mundo. Esses elementos ajudam a desvendar as formas e limites da arbitragem do instituo, bem como o que tem sido compreendido como equitativo no domínio da arbitragem comercial. Em outras palavras, o \"justo no comércio internacional\". / Equity is a polissemic term and comprises several definitions. This work focus on ex aequo et bono (sometimes referred to as in \"equity\") decisions rendered in international commercial arbitration, and not on the term \"equity\" as a whole. It is about the equity substitutive function. The equity decision rendered in arbitration procedures presents itself as a technique: A way to decide without reference to positive law. Its main characteristic is the freedom of the decision method. Its main effect is the possibility to repeal the positive law, within the public order/ordre public limits. It is qualified, from a positive point of view, as a decision technique; from a negative point of view, as an abdication of judgment according to the rules of law. In historical terms, ex aequo et bono decision in arbitration exists at least since Ancient Greece. Since then, it survives in the occidental legal tradition. Nowadays, it is found in most part of the legal systems. Good part of its current discipline in the World results from the national legislation reformulation movement occurring in the last decades, which was greatly inspired by the UNCITRAL Model Law. Arbitration ex aequo et bono (amiable composition) is a type of arbitration. Although it has several different legal frameworks in the world, such differences do not imply a diversity of concept or nature. In terms of qualification of the amiable composition c1ause, there are divergences: It may be related to the arbitration c1ause, to proceeding or to merits. This work submits its positioning in the arbitration c1ause, in spite of its procedural effects. Nowadays, it may be affirmed the existence of transnational material rules applicable to arbitration ex aequo et bono (amiable composition) arising out of comparative law and case law analysis. The ex aequo et bono (amiable composition) c1ause produces both substantive and procedural effects. In the substantive law, it is possible to repeal the positive law. In procedural law, it may cause automatic alterations in the proceeding, such as granting a greater freedom to the arbitrators in the conduction ofthe arbitration. It is still unc1ear if it authorizes modifications in the proceeding agreed by the parties. It is also controversial the possibility to render ex aequo et bono decisions in relation to those matters prior to the merit, such as the arbitration c1ause validity. The decision ex aequo et bono is limited by the public order/ordre public and due process. There are divergences regarding its effects in relation to the contracts (and parties\' will more generally). However, there seems to be an understanding according to which the arbitrators may mitigate certain contractual provisions producing unfair results; nevertheless, they may not substantially modify the contractual economy. According to a comparative law analysis, there are three \"systems\" for ex aequo et bono c1auses. In most of the cases, such kind of arbitration is permitted, provided that the parties so agree. It is therefore presumed the arbitration at law. A second system, used by some Latin-American countries, provides for ex aequo et bono decision as the default rule for arbitration, except as otherwise agreed by the parties. A third system, adopted by a few countries, does not allow this kind of arbitration. International treaties, in general, do not deal with arbitrations ex aequo et bono. Those which so deal with it, in general, present a material rule: decisions ex aequo et bono are permitted, if the parties so agree. This work analyzes the case law related to ex aequo e bono arbitration and performs a field research with 92 professionals acting in the international commercial arbitration field in several countries. From such analysis, it can be identified some common features in the worldwide arbitration practice. Such elements help c1arify the ways and limits of this kind of arbitration, as well as what has been understood as equitable within the commercial arbitration context. In other words, what is \"fair\" in international trade.

A Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos da América exige, para a configuração da sham litigation, exceção à imunidade antitruste do direito de petição prevista na doutrina Noerr-Pennington, que: (i) a ação ou petição objetivamente não tenha fundamentos, de maneira que nenhum litigante razoável possa esperar sucesso em seu mérito; e que (ii) o litigante possua motivação subjetiva que permita verificar se a ação ou petição camufla uma tentativa de interferir diretamente nas relações negociais de um concorrente. No Brasil, ao investigar e punir infrações anticoncorrenciais, o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica CADE vem aplicando tais critérios, o que, além de cientificamente inadequado, carece de fundamentação legal no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, em possível restrição injustificada dos princípios da livre iniciativa e livre concorrência. Propõe-se, neste trabalho, que o abuso do direito de ação e/ou de petição instituto consagrado no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro , poderá ser considerado uma infração à ordem econômica passível de punição pelo CADE, se produzir ou puder produzir os efeitos previstos no caput do artigo 36 da Lei nº 12.529/2011. / For the configuration of sham litigation an exception to the right of petition immunity created by the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine the Supreme Court of the United States of America established the following requirements: (i) objective baseless claim, so that no reasonable litigant might expect success on the merits; and (ii) subjective motivation of the litigant, which enables to verify whether the baseless suit conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor. In Brazil, in order to investigate and punish antitrust infringements, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense CADE has been applying the aforementioned criteria, which is scientifically inappropriate and baseless under the Brazilian legal system, and may result in an unjustified restriction of the principles of freedom of enterprise and freedom of competition. This thesis proposes that the abuse of the rights of action and petition institutions already enshrined in the Brazilian legal system may be considered infringements of the economic order punishable by CADE, if they produce or are able to produce the effects listed in Article 36, caput, of Law No. 12.529/2011.

O objetivo deste trabalho é demonstrar que intervenção regulatória para promoção do pluralismo nos meios de comunicação social é condizente com a ordem democrática instituída pela Constituição Brasileira de 1988, e tem papel fundamental na garantia do pleno exercício do direito à liberdade de expressão. Demonstraremos que a proposta está em harmonia com as concepções contemporâneas sobre o regime democrático, que emergiram na segunda metade do século XX. Serão explorados os preceitos constitucionais que incidem sobre a discussão, quais sejam, o pluralismo político, a liberdade de expressão e o dever de proporcionalidade, que vincula a atividade dos poderes públicos. Delinearemos os contornos do conceito de regulação, expondo a discussão sobre sua aplicabilidade ao setor de comunicação social, e os tipos de políticas públicas comuns nesse sentido, o que inclui a promoção de pluralismo. Listaremos os mecanismos de promoção de pluralismo interno e externo verificados no direito comparado. À luz dos entendimentos consignados no texto e das discussões em voga sobre a regulação do mercado de comunicação, iremos propor parâmetros de interpretação para futuras políticas públicas de promoção do pluralismo no mercado de comunicação social brasileiro. / The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that regulatory intervention aiming to promote pluralism in the media is consistent with the democratic order established by the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, and has a fundamental role in ensuring full exercise of the right to freedom of expression. We shall reveal hereinafter that the above proposal is in harmony with contemporary conceptions regarding the democratic regime, all of which arisen in the second half of the twentieth century. Thus we shall explore constitutional principles that focus on such discussion; namely, political pluralism, freedom of expression, and the duty of proportionality which binds public authorities actions. We shall outline regulation concept boundaries, depicting the discussion upon their applicability to the media sector and the types of public policies that are common in this sense, including the promotion of pluralism. Consequently we shall list the mechanisms to promote internal and external pluralism as verified in comparative law. In light of the understandings comprised in the text and of the discussions in vogue on the media market regulation, we shall hereby propose construal parameters concerning future public policies aimed to promote pluralism in the Brazilian media market.

A Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos da América exige, para a configuração da sham litigation, exceção à imunidade antitruste do direito de petição prevista na doutrina Noerr-Pennington, que: (i) a ação ou petição objetivamente não tenha fundamentos, de maneira que nenhum litigante razoável possa esperar sucesso em seu mérito; e que (ii) o litigante possua motivação subjetiva que permita verificar se a ação ou petição camufla uma tentativa de interferir diretamente nas relações negociais de um concorrente. No Brasil, ao investigar e punir infrações anticoncorrenciais, o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica CADE vem aplicando tais critérios, o que, além de cientificamente inadequado, carece de fundamentação legal no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, em possível restrição injustificada dos princípios da livre iniciativa e livre concorrência. Propõe-se, neste trabalho, que o abuso do direito de ação e/ou de petição instituto consagrado no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro , poderá ser considerado uma infração à ordem econômica passível de punição pelo CADE, se produzir ou puder produzir os efeitos previstos no caput do artigo 36 da Lei nº 12.529/2011. / For the configuration of sham litigation an exception to the right of petition immunity created by the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine the Supreme Court of the United States of America established the following requirements: (i) objective baseless claim, so that no reasonable litigant might expect success on the merits; and (ii) subjective motivation of the litigant, which enables to verify whether the baseless suit conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor. In Brazil, in order to investigate and punish antitrust infringements, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense CADE has been applying the aforementioned criteria, which is scientifically inappropriate and baseless under the Brazilian legal system, and may result in an unjustified restriction of the principles of freedom of enterprise and freedom of competition. This thesis proposes that the abuse of the rights of action and petition institutions already enshrined in the Brazilian legal system may be considered infringements of the economic order punishable by CADE, if they produce or are able to produce the effects listed in Article 36, caput, of Law No. 12.529/2011.

Cette thèse porte sur la pensée juridique des comparatistes euro-américains. Elle analyse les travaux d’un nombre important de comparatistes, qui ont eu une place significative au sein de la discipline en Europe et aux Etats-Unis entre les années 1860 et le début des années 2000. En examinant les représentations du monde non-occidental, elle met en avant les tensions entre l’inclusion et l’exclusion des spécificités non-occidentales, tout en insistant sur la nécessité de développer une pratique critique de résistance. En s’inspirant des théories postcoloniales, ce travail aborde les questions suivantes: comment le savoir sur les sociétés non-occidentales est-il construit dans la pensée juridique des comparatistes euro-américains ? Quelles sont les préconceptions qui facilitent la production de ce savoir ? Quel est le fondement théorique qui anime ces constructions et quelles sont leurs implications politiques ? Dans quelle mesure la pensée juridique comparative alimente-t-elle les attitudes de domination ou bien les remet-elle en question ? De quelle manière les réponses à ces questions sont-elles reproduites ou modifiées d’une époque à l’autre, d’un auteur à l’autre ? / This dissertation focuses on Euro-American comparative legal thought. It analyses the works of an important number of comparatists operating in Europe and in the United States, roughly from the 1860s to the early 2000s. Examining their representations of non-Western societies, it puts emphasis on the tensions between inclusion and exclusion of particularism and it argues in favor of a critical praxis of particularism. Inspired from postcolonial theories, it addresses the following questions: how are non-Western societies constructed in Euro-American comparative legal thought? What are the preconceptions that make the production of such knowledge possible? What is the theoretical framework that animates these constructions and what are their political implications? What elements internal to comparative legal knowledge fuel attitudes of domination or/and challenge them? How do they change and how are they reproduced from one epoch to another, from one author to another?

En droit colombien, face à une inexécution contractuelle, règne la règle, issue du droit français, de la résolution judiciaire. Ses conditions d’exercice ont été précisées par la doctrine et la jurisprudence, non sans de nombreuses ambiguïtés qui résultent de la difficulté de comprendre et de mettre en pratique ce procédé. Face à cette vision traditionnelle, l’unilatéralisme a fait irruption dans le monde contractuel contemporain et, plus concrètement, la possibilité de mettre fin à un contrat de manière unilatérale en cas d’inexécution. Cette tendance, qui trouve ses origines dans le droit anglo-saxon avant d’avoir pénétré le droit des pays de tradition romano-germanique, prétend revitaliser cette phase critique du contrat en évitant le recours au juge, au moins dans un premier moment, permettant que le créancier remédie à l’inexécution en mettant rapidement fin au contrat afin de rechercher sur le marché des solutions efficaces. Cette règle pourrait-elle être retenue en droit colombien ? En dépit de l’apparent monopole qu’y détient la résolution judiciaire, tant le Code civil que le Code de commerce colombiens, prévoient des hypothèses qui reconnaissent cette possibilité. Par ailleurs, plus récemment, a été acceptée la possibilité de convenir de clauses résolutoires. Ainsi, nous considérons qu’il est possible d’accepter la généralisation d’une règle de rupture unilatérale pour inexécution. À cet égard, l’étude du droit comparé s’agissant de l’inexécution ouvrant la voie à une rupture du contrat, d’une part, et de la manière dont elle s’exerce une rupture en cas d’inexécution, d’autre part, est d’un grand intérêt. Une telle analyse nourrit une proposition qui non seulement fournit des éléments en vue de l’admission de la rupture unilatérale du contrat pour inexécution en droit colombien, mais aussi cherche à éclairer la lecture qui a, jusqu’à présent, prévalu en matière d’inexécution résolutoire. / Under the Colombian law, the general rule in case of breach of contract is that of termination as a consequence of a court order. Its conditions of exercise have been the object of development by the doctrine and case law, not without several issues that make difficult to understand and put into practice such category. In contrast with this traditional vision, unilateralism breaks in the contemporary contractual world and more specifically, the possibility of termination of contract in such a unilateral way in case of a breach. This trend has its roots in Common law and has been permeating the countries of Roman-Germanic law tradition; and it aims to grant vitality to that critical contractual phase, thus avoiding the intervention of the judge, at least as a first measure, allowing the creditor to remedy the consequences of the breach of contract by an early termination in order to seek effective solutions in the marketplace. Could this rule have a place in Colombian law? Despite the seemingly apparent monopoly of judicial termination of contract, both the civil code and the code of commerce acknowledge this as a possibility. Similarly, more recently the possibility of including termination clauses has been accepted. However, we hold that it is possible to accept a generalization of the rule of unilateral termination of contract in case of breach. A study of comparative law regarding the breach that results in contract termination and the analysis on the way this prerogative should be exercised are of great importance; it does not only enriches a proposal providing the parameters for the unilateral termination of a contract when a breach arises in Colombian Law, but also clarifies the understanding that until now exists in the matter of termination for non-performance.

No description available.

Dans plusieurs Etats membres de lUnion européenne, des dispositions particulières ont été adoptées, en marge du droit de la construction et de la promotion immobilière, pour assurer une protection particulière au consommateur dans le secteur du logement. Pour un juriste européen, cette observation conduit à sinterroger sur les perspectives dharmonisation du droit de la construction et de la promotion immobilière, puisque la politique de protection des consommateurs constitue désormais une compétence législative autonome de lUnion européenne. Dans cet ouvrage, lauteur, après avoir rappelé le contexte de lharmonisation du droit privé dans le secteur de la construction, exprime sa préférence pour une harmonisation spécifique, limitée du moins dans un premier temps au seul secteur résidentiel. Aussi procède-t-il à la comparaison des mesures de protections dont bénéficie le consommateur, en droit de la construction et de la promotion immobilière, dans différents Etats membres de lUnion européenne ; une attention particulière est portée aux mécanismes dautorégulation, qui, dans certains pays, résident au cur de lorganisation de la protection du consommateur de la construction. Lauteur analyse limpact de ces mesures ainsi que leur intégration dans lacquis communautaire, de manière à pouvoir dégager des principes communs en matière de protection du consommateur européen et à formuler, de lege ferenda, des propositions dharmonisation. La faisabilité dune telle harmonisation par le recours à la méthode de corégulation est également analysée et certaines pistes nouvelles sont tracées dans cette perspective. Louvrage, prochainement publié aux éditions Bruylant (Bruxelles) et L.G.D.J. (Paris) est issu de la thèse de doctorat en sciences juridiques que lauteur a soutenue à la Faculté de Droit de lUniversité de Liège en 2008.

During the later half of the 20th century standard form contracts began to be used more frequently in contract situations. This trend has been consistent and in today’s world numerous commercial parties employ such contracts in their business transactions. The reasons for the extended use of standard form contracts are the benefits that can be obtained for the parties such as time efficiency, effectiveness and price advantages. Standardised contracts often regulate certain issues of the contract for example the way of delivery, remedies and complaints. The definition of such contracts is corresponding in Sweden and England as contracts containing in advance standardised terms with an aim to be used similarly in contract situations with most clients or customers. As the usage of standard form contracts increased, the number of unfair contract terms also enhanced. Therefore, the legislative powers in Sweden and England realised that the rules concerning the freedom of contract had to be restricted and governed. As a result, the legislative powers introduced an open control device through statutory control. This was done in Sweden in 1976 with the enforcement of Section 36 of the Contracts Act, and in England the year after when UCTA came into force. The statutory control in both Sweden and England makes it possible to appraise the fairness of exemption clauses. The statutory control is not identical in the two states. UCTA only concerns exclusion clauses and limitation clauses regarding contract terms and non-contractual notices. In Sweden, on the other hand, there is a general doctrine of unfairness and Section 36 of the Contracts Act can set aside all kinds of agreements. The statutory control is complemented by indirect means of controlling the content of a contract through non statutory methods. The non statutory methods are concerned with the incorporation, interpretation and construction of clauses in a contract. To be valid and for a party to be able to rely on a term it must have been incorporated into the contract. The rules concerning the interpretation of standard form contracts and exclusion clauses are also of great importance. In both states the approach held is that the statutory control should be used preferably over the indirect control means, though the indirect means still has a prominent role in England through common law. Both England and Sweden agree on that the weaker party in a contract situation is in a greater need of protection by the rules of law in unfair contract situations. However unfairness can only arise if the superior party has wrongfully used the exclusion clause. Our study shows the differences between Swedish and English contract law that can result in difficulties in the harmonisation process. These differences concern the test of reasonableness of exemption clauses, the doctrine of good faith, the legal effects and to what extent the indirect means of control should be applied. The Swedish test of reasonableness may include all relevant circumstances irrespective of the time of their occurrence, before or after the entry of the contract. The courts in England are limited to circumstances that have occurred before the closure of the contract. Section 36 of the Swedish Contracts Act includes a general rule of unfairness applicable to all kinds of contract terms. The rule of unfairness in the UCTA on the other hand, is only applicable to exemption clauses and indemnity clauses and there is no general rule of unfairness in English contract law. Instead the courts rely on indirect means of control, which therefore is of greater importance in English contract law. Finally, adjustments of unfair exemption clauses has a significant role in Swedish contract law, in contrast to English contract law where any adjustment is regarded as an intrusion of the freedom of contract. To endorse one of the most important aims of the EU; a well working inner market, discussions commenced in 2001. The discussions concerned the harmonisation of the contract law within the union. The questions that arose were whether or not it was possible at all to form a European common contract law and if so, what the effects would be. An action plan was developed by the Commission and today both the EU Parliament and the Council are positive in regard to the continuing work with a reference frame. The Commission aims to pass the reference frame in 2009. Since the EU member states are diverse and have different legal systems a harmonisation of the contract law could cause difficulties. There are differences concerning legal traditions and legal values, hence the legal expertise in Europe is divided in the harmonisation question. The following study aims to analyse the existing rules of law in Sweden and England representing two diverse legal systems existing in Europe; civil law and common law. The focus of this study regards the control of exclusion clauses in standard form contracts in both legal systems. The comparison will then be used to analyse the fundamental question if the harmonisation of contract law in the EU is feasible. Specific areas within the contract law have already been harmonised, which shows a possibility to coordinate common law and civil law. Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts is one example of harmonised contract law in the EU and the principles in PECL is another example which shows that it is possible to coordinate common law and civil law. A harmonisation of the contract law will probably promote the commerce within the union and be the next step towards one of the most prominent goals of the EU, namely a well functioning common market. However, our study shows that the differences between national legislation and the differences between the legal traditions within the EU are not insignificant and a harmonisation will probably not be enforced without difficulties.