This paper is a discussion of the relation between ethics and politics in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas. Generally speaking, I will examine how justice emerges out of a prior relation of infinite responsibility. Levinas points to a tension that arises between ethics and politics. We are always in a paradoxical situation where we are pulled in two opposing directions. On the one hand, we are drawn toward a responsibility for each unique individual. On the other hand, we are always compelled to act justly, to treat everyone equally. Instead of trying to ease this tension, it is my belief that Levinas attempts to heighten it. While a perfect balance between responsibility and politics can never be attained, justice can only arise where there is recognition of, and engagement with the tension that is unavoidable. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

[pt] Da Existência ao Infinito: a redução ética no pensamento de Emmanuel Lévinas visa a apresentar o pensamento de Emmanuel Lévinas em sua fundamental característica, qual seja, como uma redução ética. Tal hipótese localiza o pensamento levinasiano como o terceiro estágio da Fenomenologia, a partir dos diversos aspectos que o distinguem das precedentes filosofias do fenômeno. Dentre estes aspectos, ressalta-se, sobretudo, a mudança no eixo da filosofia que Lévinas pretende realizar, partindo da Ontologia rumo à Ética, como também a inauguração de um novo modo de filosofia decorrente dos conseqüentes deslocamentos que esta redução opera (da Existência aos existentes, do Mesmo ao Outro, do Masculino ao Feminino etc.). Deste modo, o objetivo desta pesquisa concentra-se em, a partir de um diálogo com a tradição filosófica (com destaque para o debate com o pensamento do Ser), precisar a especificidade do discurso filosófico de Lévinas, tendo como motes as questões relativas à Existência, ao Humanismo, à morte, ao amor e à justiça. / [en] From Existence to Infinity: the ethical reduction in the thought of Emmanuel intends to present the thought of Emmanuel Lévinas in its fundamental characteristic, that is like an ethical reduction. This hypothesis places the levinasian thought as the third stage of the Phenomenology based on the several features that distinguish it from the precedent philosophies of the phenomenon. Among this features, it is especially emphasized the change in the axis of philosophy that Lévinas intends to achieve, from Ontology to Ethics, as well as the inauguration of a new way of philosophy resulting from the consequent dislocations that this reduction performs (from Existence to the existents, from the Same to the Other, from Masculine to Feminine etc.). Therefore, the aim of this research is concentrated on indicating the specificity of the philosophical discourse of Lévinas, starting from a dialogue with the philosophical tradition (and above all the debate with the thought of Being) and motivated by the questions concerning to Existence, Humanism, death, love and justice.

Cette thèse s’inscrit au sein de la littérature des théories modernes et contemporaines de la justice sociale, en s’intéressant plus particulièrement à la question de l’égalité et à la manière dont elle s’est affirmée en tant que préoccupation fondamentale pour ces théories. En s’appuyant essentiellement sur les travaux d’Amartya Sen, d’Emmanuel Levinas et de G.W.F. Hegel, il est suggéré que l’égalité constitue la condition de possibilité de la justice, et ainsi de la liberté, cette dernière étant affirmée comme l’objet de la justice. Ce travail tend également à envisager les limites d’une telle conception : le premier chapitre permet d’affirmer la relation d’interdépendance des valeurs de liberté et d’égalité au regard de la justice sociale en démontrant la nécessité d’un principe d’égalité par l’argument de la raison humaine. Le second chapitre approfondit l’argument de l’impartialité, tel que développé par Sen. De là, le troisième chapitre déploie la nécessité d’une médiation institutionnelle dans la lutte pour la reconnaissance, centrale aux questions de liberté, tout en montrant les insuffisances de l’égalité. Enfin, le dernier chapitre montre, à l’aide de Levinas les dérives totalisantes de l’égalité, malgré sa nécessité pratique, insistant par là même sur la nécessité d’une méthode dialectique pour penser la justice. Finalement, l’idée principale est d’investiguer la tension qui caractérise la justice sociale : la justice ne peut être réduite à l’égalité, bien que cette dernière soit supposée l’une de ses conditions nécessaires. / This thesis comes within the scope of the literature of modern and contemporary social justice theories, while focusing on the question of equality and the way it became a fundamental concern for these theories. Essentially relying on Amartya Sen’s, Emmanuel Levinas’ and GW.F. Hegel’s works, it suggests a conception of equality as the condition of possibility of justice, and thus of freedom, this one being assumed as the object of social justice. It also aims at foreseeing the limits of such a conception: the first chapter asserts the relation of interdependency that exists between the values of freedom and equality regarding distributive issues, by showing the necessity of a principle of equality through the argument of human reason. The second chapter deepens the argument of impartiality, as developed by Sen. From there, the third chapter deploys the necessity of an institutional mediation in the struggle for recognition, central to freedom issues, while showing the limits of the principle of equality. Finally, the last chapter, based on Levinas’ thought, displays the totalitarian drifts of equality, despite its practical necessity, thus insisting on the need of aVersion juillet 2016 3 / 2dialectical method to think of justice. Eventually, the main idea is to investigate the tension that seems to characterize social justice: justice cannot be reduced to equality, although it is assumed as one of its necessary conditions.

<p>The aim of this study is to examine if Kenneth, a character in the novel Nyår by Stig Larsson, takes his ethical responsibility for one of the characters that appears in one section of the book, Ann. Nyår has often been related to morality. This study shows that Levinas philosophy of ethics is a supplement to the discussion of morality. According to Levinas, a person that acts in a non-moral way still can act in a righteous ethical way. With this starting point, it is possible to be close to the text and to bring out new perspectives on the novel. Kenneth is a nihilist, but has got the possibility to take his ethical responsibility for Ann. The ethical responsibility for another person, according to Levinas, always comes first. Kenneth, like everybody else, is obligated to this responsibility.</p>

The aim of this study is to examine if Kenneth, a character in the novel Nyår by Stig Larsson, takes his ethical responsibility for one of the characters that appears in one section of the book, Ann. Nyår has often been related to morality. This study shows that Levinas philosophy of ethics is a supplement to the discussion of morality. According to Levinas, a person that acts in a non-moral way still can act in a righteous ethical way. With this starting point, it is possible to be close to the text and to bring out new perspectives on the novel. Kenneth is a nihilist, but has got the possibility to take his ethical responsibility for Ann. The ethical responsibility for another person, according to Levinas, always comes first. Kenneth, like everybody else, is obligated to this responsibility.

本研究從對理性主體教育學之質疑出發，透過與Emmanuel Levinas他者哲學之對話，嘗試從責任、對話與正義三個與教育相關之議題切入，闡述Levinas他者哲學對存有論、知識論與政治學之批判，藉此，豐富教育學在主體觀、知識論與政治學三個面向上之倫理性意涵。因此，本研究關於Levinas他者哲學與教育學之連結，所採取的不是將Levinas他者哲學應用在教育學實踐之取徑，而是在理論層面上，透過Levinas他者哲學對西方傳統哲學之反思，重新返回教育學原初的倫理處境，挖掘更豐富的教育學意涵。最後，本研究之主要結論為：一、教育主體必先是為他人負責的責任主體，才可以是自由的主體；二、與他者的關係必先是一種言說關係，知識才可以有其客觀性，互為主體的認識關係方可以運作；三、在為他負責的主體性及不對稱關係作為教育正義之前提下，教育的多元性才可以不只是多樣性，才可以是平等的，而正義方可以是比較的。 / Based on “ethics as first philosophy”, Levinas criticized the western philosophy in ontology, epistemology, and politics. Along with Levinas’ thought, this research discusses the educational implications of responsibility, dialogue, and justice. As for the connection between Levinas’ thought and pedagogy, this research is not intended to apply the former to the latter. The author believes that Levinas’ ethical thought (about ontology, epistemology, and politics) can enrich the meanings of pedagogy theoretically. Finally, this research findings conclude: (1) the responsibility for the other is prior to the freedom of the subject; (2) the saying with the other is prior to the comprehension of the inter-subjectivity; (3) the dissymmetrical relation is prior to the equality.

A partir de un estudio de la teoría levinasiana de la metáfora, se formula en este artículo la noción de quiasmo metafórico con el objetivo de articular, en un espacio de exposición semántica dinámica, un movimiento de más allá (au-delà) —desplazamiento hacia otros significados— y una direcciónde más acá (en-deçà) —conservación de los rasgos sensoriales, imaginativos y afectivos asociados a las palabras. Esta herramienta filológica conduce a la siguiente tesis: la exposición ética a la vulnerabilidad del rostro surge metafóricamente en las huellas sensibles e histórico-culturales del extranjero, la viuda, el huérfano y el judío. La simultaneidad de lo Dicho estético(atención al detalle de estilo) y del Decir ético (respuesta al llamado del Otro) da lugar a una fenomenología de la vulnerabilidad social: las huellas de los rostros de los pobres convocan a compartir el pan y la palabra a partir de la manera como su fragilidad concreta habita y cuestiona los relatos abiertos de la literatura y las imágenes inacabadas del arte.Palabras clave: metáfora – ética y estética – fenomenología de la vulnerabilidad – Emmanuel Levinas AbstractIn this article, Emmanuel Levinas’ theory of metaphor derives into the notion of “metaphorical chiasm”. This idea articulates, in a semantically dynamical manner, a double-way movement: one that goes “beyond”(au-delà) —the displacement to other meanings— and another that stays “here” (en-deça) —the retention of the sensuous, imaginative and affectivetraits of words. This philological tool is functional to the following thesis: the ethical exposition to the other’s vulnerability (and, specifically, to theother’s face) expresses itself metaphorically in the sensuous, the historical and the cultural traces of the stranger, the widow, the orphan and the Jew. The simultaneity of the esthetical “Said” (the attention to stylistic detail) and the ethical “Saying” (the attention to the other’s calling) gives way to a Phenomenology of social vulnerability: the traces of the faces of the poor call for the sharing of bread and word that derives from the way in which their concrete frailty hosts and questions the open narratives of Literature and the unfinished images of Art.Keywords: metaphor – ethics and aesthetics – Phenomenology of vulnerability– Emmanuel Levinas.

Levinas s’intéresse à la notion du concret de la phénoménologie de Husserl. En 1930, Levinas montre que la notion de l’être a son origine dans l’expérience concrète de l’être qui est l’intuition immanente philosophique. Dans les années 1940, d’une part, Levinas met en relief que la phénoménologie consiste à rechercher dans les vécus concrets l’origine du phénoménologue et de sa vie ; et d’autre part, il détermine l’esprit humain par sa puissance de coïncider avec l’origine de sa vie et de lui-même. À l’époque de Totalité et infini, Levinas clarifie que la description phénoménologique de l’expérience concrète d’une entité est à la fois l’événement même de la révélation de l’être concret de cette entité et l’événement même de l’effectuation de cette entité. D’où Levinas met en évidence, d’une part, la méthode de concrétisation qui lie les expériences concrètes les unes aux autres et, d’autre part, le perspectivisme qui décrit l’expérience concrète telle qu’elle est vécue maintenant. Dans Totalité et infini, Levinas effectue la description phénoménologique comprise par lui. En décrivant les expériences concrètes du moi, il les distribue en deux séries : celle du besoin (vie naïve) et celle du désir (critique de soi). Dans la série du besoin, sur la base de l’habitation se fondent les expériences du moi naïf : le travail, la possession et la représentation. Et dans la série du désir se distribuent les expériences avec autrui : la parole, l’amour avec la femme et la fécondité. Ces deux séries d’expériences constituent la forme originaire de l’expérience du moi personnel. Totalité et infini est en ce sens la description phénoménologique du moi personnel par excellence. / Levinas brings out the notion of the concrete from Husserl’s phenomenology. In his 1930 book, Levinas shows that the notion of the being has its origin in the concrete experience of the being that is philosophical immanent intuition. In two articles published in the 1940s, Levinas reveals that the phenomenology searches in concrete experiences the origin of the phenomenologist himself and his life. On the other hand, he determines the human spirit by its power to coincide with the origin of his life and himself. In four articles published around 1960, Levinas clarifies the phenomenological description of the concrete experience of an entity is the very event of revelation of the concrete being of this entity and the very event of the effectuation of the entity. Hence, Levinas brings out the method of concretization which connects together concrete experiences as well as the perspective which describes concrete experience as it is now experienced. In Totality and infinity, Levinas practices the phenomenological description understood by himself. By describing concrete experiences of the “I”, Levinas categorizes them into two series of experience: that of need (naive life) and that of desire (self-criticism). In the series of need, the experiences of the naive “I” relies on the dwelling : labor, possession and representation. And in the series of desire, experiences with the other are distributed: speech, love with woman and fecundity. These two series of experiences constitute the proto-form of the experience of the personal “I”. Totality and infinity is in this sense the phenomenological description of the personal “I” par excellence.

This study investigates how the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas might shape practice in music education. In a climate of accountability and performativity within wider educational policy-making, the drive for ever-increasing efficiency has overtaken notions of professional judgement and ethical practice. This study opens by introducing current strands of international meta-policy priorities in education, and explores moves to redress the emphasis on standardisation and accountability through the rediscovery of notions of responsibility in the work of Biesta drawing on Bauman (1993), who in turn finds a way forwards in Levinas’ ‘ethics as first philosophy’. Emmanuel Levinas is introduced as a major thinker of the twentieth century whose influence is increasing throughout social science disciplines and who, writing firstly as a teacher, provides valuable philosophical tools with which to investigate current practices in education. Over the past three decades competing paradigms for music education have tended to polarise rather than ground thinking in music education research. More recent notions of music-making as ethical encounter (Bowman, 2000) and as the practice of hospitality (Higgins, 2007) have taken forwards Small’s relationship-oriented conceptualisation of ‘musicking’ (1998), and these provide the starting point for this study’s search for an ethical underpinning for music education. Levinas’ first major work (1969) provides two key strands of thought – the polarities of totality and infinity, and the exhortation to ‘look into the face of the Other’. These tools open up explorations of how pupils encounter difference, the unfamiliar, and of how narrow conceptions of learning in the music classroom may be understood as an ethical problem. At the heart of this study is the report of ethnographically-informed fieldwork undertaken in a Scottish secondary school, following a group of 13-year-olds through an academic year of class music lessons. Participant observation and semi-structured interviews were methods employed alongside participant self-documentation in order to gather pupils’ experiences and perspectives on how they encounter the Other through their music-making at school and in their everyday lives. A critical realist theoretical framework enabled the experiences and perspectives of pupils to be set within a deep, layered conception of social reality, uncovering the dynamic interplay of structural forces and pupil agency. Through the lens of Levinas’ philosophy pupils’ ‘practices of facing’ were brought to light and conceptualised as agential. ii From these ‘practices of facing’ the study’s conclusions are drawn. Music-making is conceptualised through terms in which Levinas spoke of language, as having as its first impetus a reaching out to the Other, ‘putting a world in common’. This grounds, and is generative of, an epistemological diversity within which aesthetic and praxial approaches are anchored in one underlying, ethical orientation, where the attentiveness and openness of aesthetic sensitivity are as significant as the developing of skills and competencies in enabling an ever-deeper entering-into ‘infinity in the face of the Other’. This study offers a critique of the present educational environment which prioritises predetermined outcomes and narrow models of knowing, thereby, according to a Levinasian view, legitimising practices of violence and domination, and sets out an alternative orientation, where richly contextualised learning in the music classroom and a radical openness might allow for an infinity of possibility to break in.

Among the works of theater of the Spanish Golden Age which feature a mujer varonil, Luis Vélez de Guevara's play, La serrana de la Vera (1613), is particularly provocative. The intensity and ambiguity of the dual nature of its female protagonist, Gila, has been the subject of much recent scholarly investigation. The staging of the play lends itself to a Levinian reading, a new approach to this particular text and theater of the Golden Age in general. Emmanuel Levinas moves beyond metaphysics, phenomenology and intentionality to posit ethics as first philosophy. Levinas explains that the face of the Other is a revelation before which my own presence is an epiphany and summons me into an ethical relationship before I am aware of my own being. A correct ethical relationship is maintained only when the Other is allowed her absolute alterity, otherwise the Other is subsumed into the matrix of the Self and the result is suffering. A Levinian reading of La serrana de la Vera moves beyond exploring systems of class and gender and discovers that the suffering in the play can be traced to face-to-face encounters in which individuals are unable or unwilling to truly see the face of the Other.