La tesi si incentra sulle questioni legate alla distribuzione degli aiuti multilaterali allo sviluppo; in particolare due temi sono affrontati: la selettività degli aiuti e la qualità della governance. L’elaborato si basa sulla letteratura concernente l’efficacia e la distribuzione degli aiuti ed unisce quest’ultima alla letteratura sulla political economy delle organizzazioni internazionali e sulla good governance. Attraverso un’analisi econometrica si intende capire se le organizzazioni multilaterali hanno a cuore la qualità della governance del paese ricevente al momento dell’allocazione degli aiuti. Con un modello GMM-Diff che adopera sia strumenti interni che esterni, si evidenzia come l’interesse per la governance da parte delle istituzioni multilaterali non sia solo retorica, come invece appare da uno studio preliminare. Inoltre, attraverso l’analisi di un panel a tre dimensioni, la tesi monitora l’applicazione della selettività degli aiuti. Viene rigettata l’ipotesi di un aumento della selettività e si evidenziano margini per un miglioramento dell’efficacia allocativa degli aiuti. Le agenzie multilaterali devono cercare di distribuire gli aiuti con criteri diversi da quelli di natura geopolitica. / The thesis examines the allocation of multilateral aid flows with respect to two current issues of the development agenda: the selectivity of aid and the quality of governance. The dissertation brings together three strands of the relevant literature: firstly, the reference literature relating to aid effectiveness and aid allocation, which is then followed by the literature on good governance and, lastly, on the political economy of international organizations. We carry out an econometric study to understand whether international organizations care about the recipients’ performance on governance. With a GMM-Diff methodology using both internal and external instruments we show that the focus on governance by multilateral bodies is not only rhetoric, as it appears at first glance. Moreover, we explore how the selectivity of multilateral aid varies over time by employing a three-dimensional panel. Our analysis rejects the hypothesis of increasing selectivity and confirms that there is room to improve on the allocation of aid. Multilateral institutions need to strengthen their efforts to allocate aid on criteria other than political-strategic ones.

本研究旨在分析影響自住型預售屋客戶滿意度的關鍵因素及探討有效提高自住型預售屋客戶滿意度的作法。內容主要分成三個部份：第一、從過去的文獻中探討顧客滿意度的定義，並在房地產市場中找出能夠有效提升顧客滿意度的方式；第二、以需求為導向，藉由H建設公司的問卷調查資料中，分析出能夠有效影響自住型預售屋客戶滿意度的關鍵因素；第三、以策略行銷分析的觀點探討能夠有效提升上述關鍵因素的作法。 研究結果指出，經由因素分析萃取出的「重視外觀與設計」、「重視交易過程的觀感」、「重視基本設備的品質」、「重視事後相關服務承諾的兌現」以及「重視高檔周邊設備」等五個潛在因子中，交易過程的觀感對於四個評估客戶滿意度的影響最為顯著，其次則為事後服務承諾的兌現和外觀與設計。根據邱志聖 (2010)之策略行銷架構，業者若要有效提高現今顧客的滿意度，首先要注重的就是外顯單位效益成本以及道德危機成本的改善。 最後，本研究依據策略行銷分析架構所整理出的研究結論，提出了若干實務操作上之建議，以改善自住型預售屋客戶的外顯單位效益成本與道德危機成本，使得顧客滿意度能夠達到有效的提升。 / This study aims to analyze the impact of the key factors of self-used presale house customer satisfaction and to find out effective ways to improve self-used presale house customer satisfaction. The context would mainly be divided into three parts: first, to discuss the definition of customer satisfaction from the literature from the past, and to find out that the real estate market can effectively improve the way of customer satisfaction; Second, the demand-driven by one construction company in the questionnaire survey data, the analysis can effectively influence the key factors of self-used presale house customer satisfaction; third, use the analysis of strategic marketing point of view to discuss these key factors which can effectively enhance the practice. The study results indicate the following five potential factors which are "pay attention to the appearance and design" extracted by factor analysis, "pay attention to the feeling of the transaction process, "pay attention to the quality of basic equipment", "great importance after the related services promised to honor" and "emphasis on high-end peripherals.". The perception of the transaction process for the four assessment of the impact of customer satisfaction, the most significant, followed by subsequent pledge to honor, as well as appearance and design. According to Pro.Jyh-Shen Chiou (2010), strategic marketing framework, if the industry expects to improve current customer satisfaction, the most two important things are to pay attention to C1（buyer cost/buyer utility）and C3（the cost of moral hazard）. Finally, the basis of the research is to use strategic marketing analysis framework to sort out the conclusions of the study. Furthermore, it presents a number of practical operating recommendations to improve the effectiveness of self-used presale house customer's buyer cost/buyer utility and the cost of moral hazard, making customer satisfaction can achieve effective upgrade.

Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2008 Sammanfattning jämte 3 uppsatser

Asymmetric information is a large potential problem for insurance markets, especially for markets insuring health risk. Despite a large theoretical attention over the last 30 years, the empirical evidence of the extent of the problem is still limited. In part this is due to methodological problems. The fundamental problem being that the private information, on which agents' act, is generally not observable to the researcher. This thesis provides empirical evidence on selection and moral hazard, using a private dental insurance natural experiment that solves many of the methodological problems. The initial decision to select into the insurance is analyzed in the first paper. Interestingly, results indicate both adverse selection and its opposite, advantageous selection, in different parts of the sample. These results are captured in a theoretical model where agents differ in their degree of risk aversion. In the second paper the decision to opt out of insurance is related to new information on risk. Results indicate that updating is asymmetric. Agents do not take the insurer's information fully into account, even though it is public. Finally, the moral hazard effect of dental coverage is analyzed in the last paper. The treatment effect of insurance coverage is separated from self-selection, using propensity score matching, IV and difference-in-differences. The results give strong empirical evidence of moral hazard. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk., 2004 xii s., s. 3-12: sammanfattning, s. 13-104: 3 uppsatser

O aumento de gastos com a atenção à saúde apresenta-se como um fato econômico de merecida relevância no cenário internacional, sendo resultante da elevação progressiva de preços dos produtos e serviços deste mercado. Pela sua importância social e peculiaridades recebe um tratamento especial nos estudos econômicos. A economia da saúde avalia os fatores que influenciam demanda e oferta neste mercado, direcionando suas observações à interação entre seus agentes e atores, destacando seus comportamentos em relação às suas reações com o tratamento do risco de ficar doente. Possíveis falhas de mercado, envolvendo risco moral, assimetria de informação e seleção adversa, podem ser atribuídas como causas de uma demanda que foge às regras de equilíbrio econômico e favorece a elevação da oferta. Esses problemas remetem à discussão sobre como a mudança de incentivos pode acarretar aumento de gastos e perda de eficiência no provimento dos bens e serviços de saúde dos Estados Unidos da América (EUA) e no mercado de saúde suplementar brasileiro, levando em conta que a situação de elevação dos gastos com saúde, que se agrava no Brasil nos últimos dez anos, já vem sendo vivida há mais tempo em outros países e particularmente nos EUA, mostrando que o problema apresenta tendência de ser persistente. / The health care expenditure increase that presents itself as an economic fact of worldly relevance on the international scene, being the result of the gradual increase of prices of products and services in this market. Due to its social relevance and peculiarities it deserves a special treatment in economic studies. Health economics evaluates the factors influencing supply and demand in this market, directing its comments to the interaction between actors and their agents, highlighting their behaviors in relation to their reactions to the treatment of the risk of getting sick. Possible flaws in this market , involving moral hazard, information asymmetry and adverse selection can be attributed as causes of a demand that evades the rules of economic equilibrium and favors lifting the offer. These problems relate to discuss how changing incentives may lead to increased expenses and loss of efficiency in the provision of goods and services of health of United States of America (USA) and the Brazilian health plan market, taking into account the situation of rising health spending, which deepens in Brazil over the past ten years, as has been the longest lived in other countries and particularly the USA, showing that the problem shows a trend to be persistent.

Submitted by Caio Machado (caiohm@gmail.com) on 2017-05-18T18:01:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Machado2017.pdf: 1442885 bytes, checksum: 6de78cd6ea7228909465f19bc20ae0ce (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2017-05-18T19:16:58Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Machado2017.pdf: 1442885 bytes, checksum: 6de78cd6ea7228909465f19bc20ae0ce (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-18T20:24:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Machado2017.pdf: 1442885 bytes, checksum: 6de78cd6ea7228909465f19bc20ae0ce (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-11 / Coordination failures are often said to play an important role in business cycles. If agents’ incentives of taking a given action depend on the amount of other agents expected to take the same action, coordination failures can often arise. Firms may not invest because they do not expect others to invest, confirming their initial expectations. Similarly, banks may not lend because they do not expect others to lend. This dissertation analyzes different environments in which crises arise as a result of coordination failures. The first chapter analyzes an economy that is subject to a dynamic coordination problem. Because of aggregate demand externalities, firms’ incentives to increase their production depend on expected demand, which in turn depends on the amount produced by other firms. The problem is dynamic since firms do not take investment decisions at the same time, implying that a firm deciding today is trying to forecast what other firms will decide in the future. This opens the possibility of dynamic coordination traps: firms do not invest today because they do not believe others will invest tomorrow, generating lower incentives for firms to invest at future dates. This chapter focuses on the following questions: In economies subject to dynamic coordination traps, what is the optimal stimulus policies? Should policy makers provide higher incentives to production in times of low economic activity? The answer is that a constant subsidy implements the first-best in an economy where beliefs are endogenously determined. The reason is that, although it is harder to coordinate in times of low economic activity, agents are naturally more optimistic about the future in times of poor economic activity and reasonably good fundamentals. This optimism arise from the fact that in bad times negative shocks do not change the level of economic activity, while positive shocks may end a recession. The second chapter proposes a model to study unusually deep financial crises. Previous empirical work has found that financial crises are very deep and persistent on average, but there is a lot of heterogeneity across different episodes. Some financial crises feature a very distressed financial sector, but little distress on the real sector, while others are real macroeconomic disasters. In light of this evidence, I propose a model in which there is a highly non-linear feedback between the real and the financial sector. Disaster episodes arise from the dynamic interaction of two frictions: coordination frictions and financial frictions. When banks have weak balance sheets they do not intermediate much capital. This causes firms to get trapped in a self-reinforcing regime with low aggregate demand, which ends up provoking further damage to banks’ balance sheets. I use the model as a laboratory to study unusually deep financial crises and the effects of some policies. It is shown that the effects of disasters go far beyond what we observe during those episodes: they imply very low asset prices, economic growth and welfare, even in good times and when their probability is very small. Policies that protect the financial sector from those episodes can be very beneficial. Moreover, higher risk-taking in bad times may improve economic growth, welfare and financial stability. The third chapter studies the policy trade-off of a regulator that wants to avoid coordination failures, but at the same time does not want to generate distortions arising from moral hazard. Banks have investment opportunities with an expected return that depends positively on the amount of other banks undertaking similar investments, opening room for coordination failures. At the same time, banks may risk-shift to projects with smaller expected return but higher volatility. By providing guarantees in case of failures, a regulator can enhance coordination, but that leads banks to switch to worse projects. It is shown that in some states a regulator will provide no guarantees, even if it that means allowing a coordination failure to happen. Moreover, the possibility of risk-shifting reduces the amount of guarantees needed to avoid a coordination failure. / Com frequência argumenta-se que falhas de coordenação têm um papel importante no ciclo de negócios. Se os incentivos dos agentes a realizar determinada ação depende da quantidade esperada de outros agentes que tomarão a mesma ação, falhas de coordenação podem acontecer. Empresas podem não investir porque não esperam que outras empresas irão investir, confirmando suas expectativas iniciais. De maneira similar, bancos podem não conceder empréstimos porque eles não esperam que outros bancos irão fazer o mesmo. Esta tese analisa diferentes ambientes onde crises surgem como o resultado de falhas de coordenação. O primeiro capítulo analisa uma economia que está sujeita a falhas de coordenação dinâmicas. Por causa de externalidades de demanda agregada, os incentivos para uma dada firma aumentar sua produção dependem da demanda esperada, que por sua vez depende da quantidade produzida por outras firmas. O problema é dinâmico porque as firmas não tomam decisões de investimento ao mesmo tempo, implicando que uma firma tomando decisões hoje está tentando prever o que outras firmas decidirão no futuro. Isso abre a possibilidade de falhas de coordenação dinâmicas: firmas não investem hoje porque elas não acreditam que outras firmas investirão amanhã, gerando incentivos menores para outras firmas investirem no futuro. Este capítulo foca nas seguintes questões: Em economias sujeitas a este problema de coordenação dinâmico, qual a política de estímulo ótima? O governo deveria prover mais estímulos em épocas de baixa atividade econômica? A resposta é que um subsídio constante implementa o ótimo nesta economia. O motivo é que, embora seja mais difícil coordenar em tempos de baixa atividade, os agentes estão naturalmente mais otimistas sobre o futuro em tempos de baixa atividade e fundamentos razoavelmente bons. Este otimismo surge do fato que em tempos ruins choques negativos não alteram o nível de atividade econômica, mas choques positivos podem acabar com uma recessão. O segundo capítulo desta tese propõe um modelo para estudar crises financeiras mais severas que o usual. Trabalhos empíricos prévios mostram que, em geral, crises financeiras são muito profundas e persistentes, mas também que há muita heterogeneidade entre diferentes episódios. Algumas crises financeiras causam enormes danos no sistema financeiro, mas pouco dano no setor real, enquanto outras são verdadeiros desastres macroeconômicos. À luz desta evidência, esta tese propõe um modelo onde há um feedback extremamente não linear entre o setor financeiro e o setor real. Desastres surgem através da interação dinâmica de duas fricções: fricções de coordenação e fricções financeiras. Quando os bancos estão com problemas em seus balanços, eles optam por intermediar menos capital. Isso leva as firmas a entrar em um regime com baixa demanda agregada, que causa ainda mais dano ao capital dos bancos. Este modelo é utilizado como um laboratório para estudar crises financeiras muito severas e o efeito de algumas políticas. É mostrado que os efeitos de desastres econômicos vão muito além do que observamos durante estes episódios. Eles levam à queda dos preços de ativos, baixo crescimento e perdas de bem-estar, mesmo que a probabilidade destes eventos seja muito pequena. Finalmente, quando os bancos tomam mais risco em tempos ruins, podemos ter um aumento de crescimento, bem-estar e estabilidade financeira. O terceiro capítulo estuda o trade-off enfrentado por um regulador que quer evitar falhas de coordenação, mas ao mesmo tempo não quer gerar distorções que surgem por conta de risco moral. Os bancos possuem oportunidades de investimento cujo retorno esperado depende positivamente da quantidade de outros bancos investindo em projetos similares, abrindo espaço para a possibilidade de falhas de coordenação. Ao mesmo tempo, bancos podem escolher investir em projetos com menor retorno esperado e maior volatilidade. Ao prover garantias em caso de falha de um banco, um regulador pode melhorar a habilidade que estes têm de coordenar, mas ao mesmo isto pode levar os bancos a tomarem risco excessivo. É mostrado que em alguns estados o regulador não proverá garantias, mesmo que isso implique permitir que uma falha de coordenação aconteça. Ainda, a possibilidade dos bancos tomarem risco excessivo reduz a quantidade de garantias necessárias para evitar uma falha de coordenação.

Submitted by Pedro Carvalho (pedrooliveiracarvalho@gmail.com) on 2017-12-28T19:41:58Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Pedro_de_Oliveira_Carvalho_final.pdf: 2841114 bytes, checksum: 89d0bc290363e2040745d0bce5031e4c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rafaela Moraes (rafaela.moraes@fgv.br) on 2018-01-04T12:48:08Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Pedro_de_Oliveira_Carvalho_final.pdf: 2841114 bytes, checksum: 89d0bc290363e2040745d0bce5031e4c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-01-17T11:38:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Pedro_de_Oliveira_Carvalho_final.pdf: 2841114 bytes, checksum: 89d0bc290363e2040745d0bce5031e4c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-01 / The purpose of this dissertation is to study the role of the Brazilian Deposit InsuranceFund (Fundo Garantidor de Créditos – FGC), evidencing the benefits that an explicit guaranteestructure causes in the banking system. The focus is the last increase in the coverage limit fordepositors, in 2013. In addition, this paper discusses FGC's bailout capacity towards the financial system in order to minimize potential moments of market stress. Next, distortions the guarantee limit ofFGC increase may cause in the financial system will be discussed, highlighting the possibility of moral hazard. This paper also intends to measure the changes in the funding structure of the banking system, highlighting the relative reduction of the risks of refinancing liabilities, the effect of the diversification of funding products and number of investors and the trend of funding costs reduction. It assumes that liquidity have increased and refinancing risk, decreased, leading to funding diversification, with positive effect and declining costs. / A proposta deste trabalho é estudar o papel do Fundo Garantidor de Créditos (FGC),evidenciando os benefícios que uma estrutura de garantias explícita causa no sistema bancário,principalmente nas instituições de menor porte. Esta dissertação focará na última elevação dos limites de cobertura a depositantes, realizada em 2013.Além disso, discute a capacidade de socorro do FGC ao sistema financeiro, a fim de minimizar possíveis momentos de estresse de mercado. Em seguida, analisa distorções que o aumento do limite de garantia do FGC pode causar no mercado, destacando a possibilidade de risco moral.Este trabalho também mensura a mudança da estrutura de captação do sistema bancário,destacando a relativa redução do risco de refinanciamento de passivos, o efeito da pulverização da captação no número de investidores e a tendência de redução dos custos de captação. Parte se da hipótese de que a liquidez aumentou e o risco de refinanciamento diminuiu, fazendo com que a pulverização tivesse efeito positivo sobre a captação e os custos apresentassem tendência de redução.

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T21:00:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 4 Andre Alvares Leite Bucione - Turma 2006.pdf.jpg: 2508 bytes, checksum: a2f65c5af5b23551a4dc0fe1c3abcbd3 (MD5) Andre Alvares Leite Bucione - Turma 2006.pdf.txt: 52096 bytes, checksum: 449900717082efece5863c8e2fe88909 (MD5) license.txt: 4712 bytes, checksum: 4dea6f7333914d9740702a2deb2db217 (MD5) Andre Alvares Leite Bucione - Turma 2006.pdf: 168087 bytes, checksum: a635f49727d9a7e37d08060c75001c86 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-02-11T00:00:00Z / Top management from retail bank industry (PRINCIPAL) needs to delegate authority to lower level managers (AGENTS) under the existence of conflicting interests, asymmetric information and limited monitoring. A system of performance targets and incentives is adopted in order to induct those agents into principal’s interests. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the existence of a casual relationship between the so called “contract of guaranteed variable wage” and the performance of the lower level managers. It means, to investigate how the appliances of this implicit contract, which promote a substantial change in the direct incentive scheme, affect the performance delivered by those agents. We analyze, econometrically, data from jan.2007 to jun.2009 got from one of the largest Brazilian retail bank through an estimator of fixed effects for an unbalanced panel data. The results indicate that the agents subject to the contract of guaranteed variable wage have delivered an inferior performance compared to the agents subject to variable payment. We conclude, therefore, that problem of moral hazard can be observed on the behavior of the agents subject to this contract. / A alta gerência do banco de varejo (PRINCIPAL) necessita delegar autoridade a gerentes de níveis inferiores (AGENTES) sob a existência de interesses conflitantes, informações assimétricas e a impossibilidade de monitoração completa. Um sistema de metas e incentivos é adotado de modo a induzir estes agentes na direção dos interesses do principal. O objetivo deste trabalho é avaliar a relação causal existente entre o chamado 'contrato de salário variável garantido' e o desempenho dos agentes. Isto é, investigar de que forma a aplicação deste contrato implícito, que promove uma substancial mudança no sistema de incentivos diretos, afeta o desempenho destes agentes. Analisamos econometricamente dados de jan.2007 a jun.2009 obtidos junto a um grande banco de varejo nacional através de um estimador de efeitos fixos para um painel de dados não balanceado. Os resultados indicam que os agentes sujeitos ao contrato de salário variável garantido têm um desempenho inferior aos agentes sujeitos a remuneração variável. Concluímos que não podemos descartar existência do problema de risco moral no comportamento dos agentes sujeitos a este contrato.

The main goal of this dissertation was to obtain an understanding as to the true economic nature of employee share options and the problems surrounding the accounting thereof. The main conclusion of this study is that employee share options should be expensed in the income statement as and when the employee's services are performed. The reason is that employee share options are valuable financial instruments which the employer has used to compensate the employee for his services. It was also concluded that exercise date accounting and classification of outstanding employee share options as liabilities on the balance sheet is the most appropriate accounting treatment. Such accounting treatment trues up the accounting of employee share options with that of cash-settled share appreciation rights, which are economically equivalent transactions. The measurement of employee share options should be based on their fair value using an option-pricing model adapted for the specific features of employee share options. / Accounting / Thesis (M. Com. (Accounting Science))

Dans cette thèse, nous donnerons tout d'abord des conditions sur les paramètres d’une EDSR à générateur lipschitzien ou à croissance quadratique telles que les processus solutions de l’EDSR admettent des densités par rapport à la mesure de Lebesgue. Puis, nous donnerons des conditions sur les paramètres d’une EDSR non-markovienne à générateur lipschitzien ou quadratique telles que les processus solutions de l’EDSR admettent une dérivée de Malliavin, à l’aide d’une nouvelle caractérisation de cette dérivée. Ce résultat nous fournira une nouvelle structure interne des espaces de Malliavin que nous étudierons. Nous donnerons ensuite des conditions nous assurant que des solutions d’EDSR non-markoviennes à générateurs lipschitziens stochastiques sont différentiables au sens de Malliavin en utilisant cette caractérisation. Nous ferons ensuite une analyse de densités pour les lois des solutions de telles EDSR et nous appliquerons nos résultats à la biologie. Enfin, nous étudierons deux exemples d’utilisations des EDSR en finance. On s’intéressera tout d’abord à un problème de maximisation d’utilité avec un horizon aléatoire que nous réduirons à l’analyse d’un nouveau type d’EDSR à coefficients singuliers et nous illustrerons nos résultats par des simulations numériques. Puis, nous résoudrons un problème de type Principal/Agent sous volatilité incertaine. / In the first part of this PhD thesis, we give conditions on the parameters of Lipschitz and quadratic growth BSDEs such that the laws of the components Y and Z of the solutions to such BSDEs admit densities with respect to the Lebesgue measure. We then provide conditions on the parameters of non-Markovian Lipschitz or quadratic growth BSDEs such that the components Y and Z of their solutions are Malliavin differentiable. We obtain these conditions by applying a new characterization of the Malliavin differentiability, as an Lp convergence criterion of difference quotients. This result provide also a new characterization of the Malliavin-Sobolev spaces that we study in detail. To finish this first theoretical part, we provide conditions ensuring that solutions of non-Markovian stochastic-Lipschitz BSDEs are Malliavin differentiable by applying the characterization of the Malliavin differentiability obtained. We then analyse the existence of densities for the laws of the components of solutions to such BSDEs and we apply our result to a model of gene expression. In the second part of this thesis, we investigate financial problems dealing with BSDEs. We first solve a utility maximization problem with a random horizon, characterized by an exogenous default time. We reduce it to the analysis of a specific BSDE, which we call BSDE with singular coefficients, when the default time is assumed to be bounded. We give conditions ensuring the existence and the uniqueness of solutions to such BSDE and we illustrate our results by numerical simulations. Then, we solve a Principal/Agent problem with ambiguity, in which the "Nature" impacts both the utilities of the Agent and the Principal, charaterized by sets of probability measures which modify the volatility.