Cette thèse étudie les conditions de taxation indirecte optimale qui permettent d'améliorer l'adéquation de la ration alimentaire des ménages français aux recommandations nutritionnelles. L'approche adoptée exige d'estimer un système complet de demande alimentaire afin de mettre à jour les élasticités-prix. Les comportements de consommation alimentaire des ménages sont décrits par une forme fonctionnelle AI (Deaton et Muellbauer, 1980). Deux spécifications quadratique et dynamique autorisant, respectivement, de possibles non-linéarités des courbes d'Engel et la persistance d'habitudes de consommation sont testées. L'estimation se fait par les moindres carrés linéaires itérés (Blundell et Robin, 1999) sur données de pseudo-panel. Une base de données s'étalant sur 156 périodes de 4 semaines, de 1996 à 2007, a été constituée par l'aggrégation en 8 cohortes de ménages et le regroupement de coupes transversales issues de TNS Worldpanel. Dans la lignée des mécanismes théoriques de taxation optimale initiée par Ramsey (1927), un application à un objectif de politique nutritionnelle permet de dériver les variations de prix, ou taux de taxe, optimales. Chacune apparait comme une fonction des élasticités-prix, directes et croisées, de la demande et d'indicateurs d'adéquation aux recommandations. L'impact des variations de prix sur l'adéquation aux recommandations nutritionnelles du panier alimentaire, ainsi les taux de taxation de produits optimaux sont estimés. L'incidence de ces scénarios de politique sur le bien-être des ménages et les inégalités nutritionnelles est abordée dans un dernier chapitre. / This thesis aims at simulating optimal prices satisfying public health recommendations in terms of nutrient adequacy. This implies to estimate a complete food demand system in order to compute price elasticities. Food consumption behaviors are described by an AI functional form (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). The demand system is estimated using the Iterated Least Square Estimator developed by Blundell and Robin (1999). Augmented specifications to control for, respectively, non-linearities in expenditure patterns and habit persistence are tested. We use French household expenditure data drawn from TNS Worldpanel covering 156 periods of 4 weeks from 1996 to 2007. Given the nature of our data, households are split into 8 cohorts. Issues afferent to pseudo-panel data are presented. Nutrient adequacy is defined using three nutrient only-based indicators: the MAR (Mean Adequacy Ratio), the LIM (Score des Composés à Limiter) and the SAIN (Score d'Adéquation Individuel aux recommandations Nutritionnelles). Optimal prices are derived following Ramsey's approach to optimal taxation; Maximizing social welfare under nutritional constraints results in optimal price variations or tax rates, each defined as a function of all direct and cross price elasticities and the above mentioned indicator for all food groups. Further developments allow to estimate the impacts of price variations on nutrient adequacy. Incidence on social welfare and nutritional inequalities is assessed in a last chapter.

[pt] O trabalho consiste no desenvolvimento de um modelo para explicar a razão pela qual em algumas economias, especialmente a brasileira, se constata que, diante de choques à taxa de juros real, não se observa suavização da taxação, mas sim variações das alíquotas de impostos seguindo variações do ciclo econômico. Mostra-se assim formalmente a ligação entre a sustentabilidade fiscal e variações na carga tributária mais fortemente evidenciada em países em que houve a necessidade de passar por planos de ajustes fiscais - situação esta que pode sugerir a suscetibilidade à ocorrência de crise de confiança em relação ao cumprimento das obrigações de pagamento da dívida soberana, ou seja, probabilidade positiva de repúdio da dívida. A partir do modelo, é possível concluir que uma trajetória não fixa para a taxação pode se estabelecer como resultado ótimo diante de imperfeições no processo de estabilização fiscal. É um modelo que permite endogeneizar e escolher de forma ótima o superávit primário a cada período de tempo. / [en] This paper develops a model to explain why in some economies, and especially in the Brazilian economy, we see evidence that taxation is not smoothened when facing real interest rate shocks. Instead, tax rates vary following the economic cycle. We show through a formal model the connection between fiscal sustainability and the variation of the level of taxation, a pattern more often observed in countries that went through fiscal adjustment plans - a situation that might suggest the possibility of occurrence of confidence crisis regarding the payment of sovereign debt, or a positive probability of debt default. From the model, it is possible to conclude that a non-constant taxation path can be established as an optimal result in such economies. It is a model that allows choosing endogenously and optimally the necessary fiscal superavit in each period of time.

This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four papers, which relate to environmental policy in the presence of transboundary environmental damage. Paper [I] concerns public policy in a multi-jurisdiction framework with transboundary environmental damage. Each jurisdiction is assumed large in the sense that its government is able to infuence the world-market producer price of the externality-generating good. This gives rise to additional incentives of relevance for national public policy in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. With the uncoordinated equilibrium as the reference case, the welfare effects from coordinated changes in public policy variables are analyzed. Paper [II] analyses welfare effects of coordinated changes in environmental and capital taxation in the presence of transboundary environmental externalities and wage bargaining externalities. In the wage bargaining between frms and labor unions, firms use the threat of moving abroad to moderate wage claims, which means that domestic policy infuences wage formation abroad. The specific framework implies welfare effects of policy coordination that correspond to each of the respective international interaction mentioned above. In paper [III], national governments face political pressure from environmental and industrial lobby groups, while pollution taxes are determined in an international negotiation. It is shown that a general increase in the environmental concern and the weight the governments attach to social welfare both tend to increase the pollution tax. However, allowing for asymmetries between the countries means that a general increase in the environmental concern has the potential to reduce the pollution tax. Paper [IV] studies national environmental policies in an economic federation characterized by decentralized leadership. The federal government sets emission targets for each member country, which are implemented by the national governments. Although all national governments have commitment power vis-à-vis the federal government, one of them also has commitment power vis-à-vis the other member countries. This creates incentives to act strategically toward the federal government, as well as toward other members.

This thesis comprises three chapters which share an emphasis on the importance of agent heterogeneity in different areas of macroeconomics. The first chapter shows that the introduction of heterogeneous risk aversion into a consumption based asset pricing model with Epstein-Zin preferences allows to replicate several features of stock markets such as the counter-cyclical variation in the equity premium and its predictability from the price dividend ratio. The second chapter complements a Mortensen-Pissarides matching model with individual savings for precautionary reasons in order to analyze the welfare effects of reforming unemployment insurance. Our fully dynamic analysis reveals significant transition costs that static comparisons miss. The third chapter is concerned with optimal capital and labor taxation when agents differ in their wage-wealth ratio. We find that if all agents are to benefit from a reform (vis-à-vis the status quo) capital taxes are abolished only after a long period. / Esta tesis se compone de tres capítulos que enfatizan en la importancia de la heterogeneidad de agentes económicos en distintas áreas de la macroeconomía. El primer capítulo demuestra que la introducción de heterogeneidad en la aversión al riesgo en un modelo de consumption based asset pricing con utilidad de tipo Epstein-Zin permite reproducir algunas regularidades empíricas de los mercados financieros como por ejemplo la variación anticíclica de la prima de riesgo y su previsibilidad a través del cociente precio-dividendos. El segundo capítulo introduce en un modelo de matching tipo Mortensen-Pissarides ahorros precaucionarios con el objetivo de analizar los efectos sobre el bienestar de reformas del seguro de desempleo. Nuestro análisis dinámico revela costes significativos de transición no presentes en comparaciones estáticas. El tercer capítulo investiga la imposición óptima de capital y trabajo cuando los agentes son heterogéneos con respecto a su cociente sueldo-patrimonio. Encontramos que, para que todos los agentes se beneficien de la reforma (respecto al status quo), el impuesto del capital debería eliminarse sólo después de un periodo largo.

Submitted by Alexandre Sollaci (alexandre.sollaci@fgvmail.br) on 2014-06-18T14:03:31Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao_final.pdf: 924084 bytes, checksum: 00f8add6beec4e203ec650725f2a33bb (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2014-06-27T19:17:28Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao_final.pdf: 924084 bytes, checksum: 00f8add6beec4e203ec650725f2a33bb (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2014-06-27T19:18:28Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao_final.pdf: 924084 bytes, checksum: 00f8add6beec4e203ec650725f2a33bb (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-08-04T12:08:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao_final.pdf: 924084 bytes, checksum: 00f8add6beec4e203ec650725f2a33bb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-05-26 / In this paper, we try to rationalize the existence of one of the most common affirmative action policies: educational quotas. We model a two period economy with asymmetric information and endogenous human capital formation. Individuals may be from two different groups in the population, where each group is defined by an observable and exogenous characteristic. The distribution of skills differ across groups. We introduce educational quotas into the model by letting the planner reduce the effort cost that a student from one of the groups has to endure in order to be accepted into a university. Affirmative action policies can be interpreted as a form of ``tagging' since group characteristics are used as proxies for productivity. We find that although educational quotas are usually efficient, they need not subsidize the education of the low skill group. / Neste artigo, procuramos racionalizar a existência de uma das formas mais comuns de políticas de ação afirmativa: cotas educacionais. Nós modelamos uma economia com dois períodos, assimetria de informação e formação endógena de capital humano, Os indivíduos dessa economia podem vir de dois grupos diferentes, cada grupo definido por uma característica exógena e observável. A distribuição de habilidades difere entre os dois grupos. Nós introduzimos cotas educacionais no modelo ao deixar o planejador social reduzir o custo, em termos de esforço, necessário para que um estudante de um desses grupos seja aceito numa universidade. Nesse contexto, uma política de ação afirmativa pode ser interpretada como uma forma de tagging, já que as características de cada grupo podem ser usadas como proxies para produtividade. Concluímos que, embora políticas de cotas educacionais geralmente sejam eficientes, elas não necessariamente subsidiam a educação do grupo 'menos'habilidoso.

This thesis consists of four independent essays grouped in two parts. The first part analyzes the possibility and duration of a Pareto-improving pension reform. The second part considers some economic issues related to the tax avoidance activities. The possibility and duration of a Pareto-improving pension reform.Many countries face large problems in supporting current pay-as-you-go pension systems arising from demographic changes leading to the situation when returns on capital exceed population growth. Inefficiency arises from implicit taxation on pension contributions. In a closed economy, it is even more destructive due to its negative impact on savings and capital accumulation. Although the transition to a fully funded system is a great improvement of the economy, its implementation entails several difficulties if Pareto-efficiency is required. The first essay, “The Possibility of a Pareto Improving Pension Reform in a Heterogeneous Economy”, demonstrates that Pareto-improving transitions from pay-as-you-go to fully funded pension systems nearly always exist. To demonstrate this, I classify existing theoretical results according to the type of reformed economy, the form of pension benefits, and the policy instruments used during the transition. Then, I show that intergenerational heterogeneity should no longer be considered as an obstacle when implementing Pareto-improving pension reforms. To maintain redistributive or insurance mechanisms supported by pay-as-you-go systems, I propose to replace inefficient social security with redistributive tax and transfer payments inside one generation. This would save the economy from the inefficiency related to the implicit taxes on pension contributions imposed by pay-as-you-go systems. The second essay, “Designing Optimal Pareto Improving Pension Reforms: A More Distorted Economy Can be Reformed Faster”, investigates the optimal Pareto-improving debt-financed transition from pay-as-you-go to fully funded pension systems. In particular, I examine the relationship between key parameter values characterizing the preferences, the technology and the size of the initial system, and the necessary time for a Pareto-improving transition. My finding is that a more distorted economy can be reformed faster. This result gives an additional explanation to the success of the Chilean reform, where an initial pay-as-you-go system was the largest and, at the same time, the most distorting.An Economy with Clever Tax Avoidance Providers.In the third essay “The Importance of Income Distribution for the Price of the Tax Avoidance Service”, I design a model with a clever tax avoidance provider, who maximizes a profit by setting the price for the tax avoidance services. Therefore, the price for the tax avoidance service is endogenously defined. In that setup, the change in income distribution is not less important than changes in the tax code, which together are responsible for the tax avoidance demand. The model has a wide range of applications. In particular, I analyze the relation between inequality and the collection of tax revenue. The paper shows that tax revenue as a percentage of GDP might grow with inequality when the tax code is not significantly changed. Moreover, higher inequality implies lower marginal cost of additional revenue. This assay also considers tax base broadening, providing examples where this leads to a reduction in tax revenue.In the fourth essay, “ Tax Avoidance as a Reason for Secession”, I provide an additional explanation for the intentions to secede related to expected changes in the tax codes after the ''break down of a nation''. To demonstrate my points, I use a tax avoidance model designed in the third essay, where active tax avoidance providers make a decision about the price and quantity of their services. Secession gives the avoidance provider the option of setting different prices in separate regions.  As a consequence, the price for the tax avoidance service may fall in the poorer region and the elite of this region would be able to avoid the tax, which is impossible in union. Moreover, regional separation may lead to tremendous changes in the shape of income distribution, forcing new governments to change the tax codes. Thus, the government of the richer region may reduce tax rates in order to enlarge the tax revenue collection. To avoid a breakdown of the state, the government should reduce inefficient spending and tax duties. Promoting democracy or increasing the political influence of poor households may reduce the tendency to separate. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2002

This thesis studies tax competition from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. In chapter 1 we develop a dynamic two-country optimal taxation model to study tax competition. We find that tax competition is costly and that the equilibrium with tax competition differs remarkably from the first-best outcome in a fiscal union, both during transition and in the long run. In chapter 2 we empirically test the relationship between taxation and agglomeration economies. In the presence of agglomeration economies firms are less sensitive to changes in tax rates, and therefore capital tax competition has a smaller effect on investment. We find some evidence that municipalities in large agglomerations set higher tax rates than municipalities in smaller ones. / Esta tesis estudia la competencia impositiva tanto desde el punto de vista teórico como empírico. En el capítulo 1, desarrollamos un modelo dinámico de imposición óptima en dos países con el objetivo de estudiar la competencia impositiva. Encontramos que la competencia impositiva es costosa y que el equilibrio con competencia impositiva difiere significativamente del mejor resultado en una unión fiscal, tanto durante la transición como en el largo plazo. En el capítulo 2, analizamos empíricamente la relación entre imposición y economías de aglomeración. En presencia de economías de aglomeración, las empresas son menos sensibles a cambios en los tipos impositivos y, por tanto, la competencia impositiva para atraer capital tiene efectos menores en la inversión. Encontramos evidencia a favor de que los municipios en grandes aglomeraciones establecen tipos impositivos más altos que los que están en pequeñas aglomeraciones.

Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2002.

Submitted by Marcelo Bego (marcelo.bego@gmail.com) on 2017-03-21T14:14:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Three Essays on Agricultural Markets - Marcelo S. Bego.pdf: 1207964 bytes, checksum: 33f8f4a9215ea6404b2dcbd5c0538a0e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2017-03-21T14:58:27Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Three Essays on Agricultural Markets - Marcelo S. Bego.pdf: 1207964 bytes, checksum: 33f8f4a9215ea6404b2dcbd5c0538a0e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-21T16:13:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Three Essays on Agricultural Markets - Marcelo S. Bego.pdf: 1207964 bytes, checksum: 33f8f4a9215ea6404b2dcbd5c0538a0e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-22 / Esta tese apresenta três ensaios que investigam três questões relevantes sobre mercados agrícolas: escolha de hedge dos agricultores; imposto ótimo do governo; e reações do governo à volatilidade dos preços. O primeiro ensaio preenche uma lacuna teórica provando que agricultores mais ricos fazem mais hedge que agricultores menos ricos. O segundo ensaio examina imposto ótimo do governo e mostra como políticas do governo de Ramsey competem com o mercado financeiro. O terceiro ensaio mostra o efeito da casualidade da volatilidade dos preços nos subsídios do governo utilizando dados do mercado de trigo dos Estados Unidos. Ele também mostra que o governo reage a volatilidade dos preços, principalmente, quando preços estão baixos o suficiente, e as reações acontecem independente do plano agrícola. / This dissertation presents three essays that investigate three relevant issues about agricultural markets: farmers’ choice of hedge; government optimal taxation; and government farm program reactions to price volatility. First essay fills a theoretical gap showing that high profitable farmers hedge more than low profitable farmers. Second essay examines government optimal taxation and shows how Ramsey government policies compete with financial markets. The third essay shows the causality from price volatility to government subsidies using US wheat market data. It also shows that government reacts to price volatility, mainly, when prices are low enough, despite the farm program design.

Cette recherche s'intéresse à la modélisation des éco-industries et aux propriétés qui leurs sont généralement attribuées. Précisément, mettre l'accent sur les éco-industries requiert de faire des suppositions dont les conséquences ne sont pas triviales. Ce travail détaille ces conséquences ainsi que la pertinence de certaines. Le premier chapitre considère des éco-industries polluantes, alors que l'analyse économique sur ce sujet assume généralement que les biens et services environnementaux suppriment les polluants. Ce chapitre montre le mécanisme par lequel le marché distribue une activité aux éco-industries en fonction de leur technologie. Le deuxième chapitre enquête sur les limites à supposer une allocation de pollution positive à la solution optimale alors qu'une élimination complète serait possible. L'exemple de l'amiante montre qu'il existe des situations où la pollution-zéro est préférable à un niveau positif. Ce chapitre montre sous quelles conditions ce postulat est vrai. Le troisième travail se concentre sur la notion de services environnementaux. Ce chapitre montre que ceux-ci sont parfaitement substituables aux autorisations de polluer. L'Etat peut donc sélectionner le prix des services environnementaux et il devient possible d'établir une allocation optimale des ressources même en présence de compétition imparfaite. Enfin, le dernier chapitre détaille une supposée fusion entre un pollueur et son fournisseur de biens et services environnementaux. Il montre les répercussions de la fusion sur une firme non-intégrée et amène une discussion sur la différence entre réduction de la pollution en procédé-intégré ou en bout-de-chaîne. / This research focuses on the modeling of ecoindustries and the properties commonly assigned to them. Precisely, highlighting ecoindustries requires the making of some assumptions with nontrivial consequences. This work uncovers these consequences as well as the adequacy of some of them.The first chapter considers polluting ecoindustries, although economic analysis on the subject generally assumes that environmental goods and services suppress the pollutants. This chapter shows mechanisms through which the market distributes economic activity to ecoindustries according to their technology.The second chapter investigates the limits of supposing a positive pollution allocation at the optimal solution although complete suppression is feasible. The example of asbestos shows that there are situations in which zero-pollution is preferred to a positive amount. The chapter shows the conditions under which this hypothesis is true.The third work focuses on the concept of environmental services. This chapter shows that environmental services and pollution allowances are perfect substitutes, then the government can decide on their prices so that it is possible to decentralize a first-best allocation of resources even in the presence of imperfect competition.Finally, the last chapter details a fictional fusion between a polluter and its environmental goods and services supplier. It shows the consequences of such fusion on an unintegrated firm and opens a discussion on the difference between process-integrated and end-of-pipepollution abatement.