Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-01T18:12:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 alexandre_jesus_prazeres.pdf: 992223 bytes, checksum: e8a843f6733992c80af985281b95beb4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-04-26 / This work is a study of the body-soul relationship in the Hebrew Bible and its implications for today's culture body, guided by the following general objective: to understand the biblical concept of man-Semitic, through the study of Hebrew terms semantic vp,n< /n#P#v/ and rf'B' /B*c*r/, and its implications for the somatic culture today. That in turn breaks down into three specific objectives. The first, noted how issues of body-soul relationship were answered throughout history by theologians and philosophers, and their influence in relation to the formation of Western culture. This objective will guide the first chapter that will present an overview of the body-soul relationship. The second, extracting, examining meaning of the terms vp,n< /n#P#v/ and rf'B' /B*c*r/ in passages where the same were employed, implications related to a perception of ideational and conceptual Semitic assumptions regarding human being. This objective will be pursued throughout the second chapter which is an anthropological approach to the Hebrew Bible. And the third, confront the notion of biblical-Semitic man with symptoms of somatic culture today. This objective will guide the third chapter presents the implications of the terms vp,n< /n#P#v/ and rf'B' /B*c*r/ for somatic culture today. In terms of structure and methodology, this work will follow a logical order, it will start exposing the debate on the body-soul relationship through the panorama presented in the first chapter, which is the philosophical axis; followed by analysis of exegetical texts Hebrew Bible, this is the axis anthropological; and eventually end up confronting the extracted contents of the Hebrew Bible exegetically with the symptoms of somatic culture today, this will be the axis theological and sociological. / Este trabalho consiste numa pesquisa sobre a relação corpo-alma na Bíblia Hebraica e suas implicações para cultura corporal hodierna, orientando-se pelo seguinte objetivo geral: compreender a noção semítico-bíblica de homem, por meio do estudo semântico dos termos hebraicos vp,n< /n#P#v/ e rf'B' /B*c*r/, e suas implicações para a cultura somática hodierna. Que por sua vez desdobra-se em três objetivos específicos. O primeiro, assinalar a forma como questões referentes à relação corpo-alma foram respondidas ao longo da história por teólogos e filósofos, e sua influência em relação à formação da cultura ocidental . Este objetivo orientará o primeiro capítulo que apresentará um panorama sobre a relação corpo-alma; o segundo, extrair, do exame de sentido dos termos vp,n< /n#P#v/ e rf'B' /B*c*r/ nas passagens bíblicas onde os mesmo foram empregados, implicações relacionadas a uma percepção dos pressupostos ideativos e conceptuais semíticos referentes ao ser humano . Este objetivo será perseguido ao longo do segundo capítulo que consiste numa abordagem antropológica à Bíblia Hebraica; e o terceiro, confrontar a noção semítico-bíblica de ser humano com os sintomas da cultura somática hodierna . Este objetivo norteará o terceiro capítulo que apresenta as implicações dos termos vp,n< /n#P#v/ e rf'B' /B*c*r/ para a cultura somática hodierna. Em termos de estrutura e metodologia, este trabalho seguirá uma ordem de raciocínio lógico, pois iniciará expondo o debate sobre a relação corpo-alma através do panorama apresentado no primeiro capítulo, sendo este o seu eixo filosófico; seguirá através da análise exegética de textos da Bíblia Hebraica, este é o eixo antropológico; e por fim, terminará por confrontar o conteúdo extraído exegeticamente da Bíblia Hebraica com os sintomas da cultura somática atual, este será o eixo teológico e sociológico.

This thesis aims at formulating a human rights justification based on the assumption that disbelief in human rights is found in communicative grounds, rather than some sort of unreasonable evil. I first identify what I believe to be a flaw in the communicative strength of existing human rights justifications in explaining why rights should be. I suggest that there is a gap between the justifications of human rights that contain metaphysical narrative, and the justifications that rely on subjective experience of rights as good. I further explain how this is a gap that political consensus and the idea of Kantian moral reason cannot seem to fill. I subsequently boil this gap down to the concept of value, since the foundation for each justification is based on a type of value. These are categorized as either given value – which applies to all attributes of value that is “given” to us independently of our actions or opinions, or created value – which applies to all attributes of value that stem from social interaction (thus action) and experience. As justifications are funneled into either of these two categories of value, it begins to look like no other type of value exist, and as a result no one looks for it. To respond to this problem, I formulate a philosophical explanation, in Robert Nozicks terms. This explanation shows that there may be other routes to apply to value than sticking to simply given or created value. My explanation utilizes the three theories of philosophical anthropology, internal metaphysical realism and Wittgensteins philosophy of language, and it is based on the result of an analysis of material consisting of human rights justification arguments by Nicholas Wolterstorff, Alasdaire MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty. The actual philosophical explanation I formulate utilizes the metaphysics of Helen Steward to provide a given-value foundation for the primitive reactions of Stefan Eriksson, which creates value through social organization. Overall, I find that there are untried possibilities which may allow for a different type of value to act as the foundation for a human rights justification. My contribution to the field rests in the novelty of the theories used in my explanation, and the angle of the problem formulation.

Autour d'une question fondamentale comme celle de la présence, nous mobilisons une littérature interdisciplinaire grâce à laquelle les contributions de l'anthropologie et de la géographie sociale, de la théorie du théâtre et du cinéma, des performance studies, de la psychanalyse et de la sociologie, sont articulées dans la perspective de la phénoménologie et des sciences de l'information et de la communication. Notre façon d'habiter le monde a changé : l'être-en-ligne se révèle alors comme étant la nouvelle condition existentielle. La connexion au réseau, le web, les applications, dans leur ensemble, disposent les choses et les personnes selon des relations opérationnelles de proximité spatio-temporelle. Notre espace est un espace performatif, car il se produit à partir de nos actions, nos postures et nos gestes, gestes photo-graphiques, éminemment réflexifs, qui créent la mise en scène numérique. En allant au-delà du modèle de « l'interface », cette mise en scène est devenue la spatialité de raccordement de tous nos espaces d'action. Nous identifions alors la performativité du direct et de l’enregistrement, la performativité de l’être en train de…, de l’attention présentielle et du « suspens gestuel », la performativité des algorithmes et des notifications, la performativité des emoji et de tout ce qui «fait visage»; et encore, la performativité des questions et des messages automatiques derrière lesquels parfois il y quelqu’un et d’autres fois il n’y a personne (comme lorsqu’on sonne à la porte dans une scène de La cantatrice chauve). A la lumière d'une analyse socio-sémiotique de la gestuelle numérique, des écrans, du graphisme propre aux réseaux sociaux et aux applications de messagerie instantanée tout comme des « protocoles de la vie quotidienne », nous décrivons la présence comme étant toujours l'effet d'une médiation. Cette médiation est, à la fois, disjonction et fiction, car elle se manifeste dans l'écart et dans la différence aussi bien que dans la fiction de l'hypermédiatété. Il y a de la présence, en somme, s'il y a du jeu, au sens spatiale de l'expression « il y a du jeu » mais aussi au sens fictionnel et ludique du jouer à.…. Comme le garçon du café décrit par Sartre, nous jouons, fictionnons et de-fictionnons le réel, en faisant « comme si » était vrai ce qui, par ailleurs, l'est vraiment. / Around the fundamental question of presence, I draw on interdisciplinary literature whose contributions from the fields of anthropology and social geography, theatre and cinema theory, performance studies, psychoanalysis and sociology are articulated from the perspective of phenomenology and information and communication sciences. Our way of inhabiting the world has changed: online-being is the new fundamental existential condition. Our space is a performative space, because it is produced through our actions, our gestures, eminently reflexive photographic gestures, which create our digital mise en scène. This space has become the space which links together all of our active and social spaces. Here, I single out live and recorded performativity, the performativity of do-ing, the performativity of algorithms and of questions, of emojis and of all that which “fait visage”. After a socio-semiotic analysis of digital gestures, screens, the graphics of social networks and presence protocols, I describe presence as always being a mediation effect. This mediation is at once disjunction and fiction, beacause it works as a difference and as the fiction of hypermediality. Presence exists where there is play (jeu) as in the french expression “il y a du jeu”, refering to space, and in its fictional sense of play-acting. As with Sartre's café waiter, we play act in order to create reality and consciousness through fiction.

Ce travail est consacré à la conception de l’être humain qui se dessine discrètement dans les deux premiers ouvrages du philosophe français Maurice Merleau-Ponty, à savoir La Structure du comportement (1942) et Phénoménologie de la perception (1945). Le premier ouvrage, qui adopte la perspective des sciences empiriques de l’homme (psychologie, biologie, psychopathologie) et le second ouvrage, qui revendique un point de vue phénoménologique, visent conjointement à mettre en échec les paramètres métaphysiques et épistémologiques hérités de la tradition cartésienne et à révéler l’irréductibilité de notre être-au-monde. L’anthropologie philosophique qui en découle en est une de l’« ambiguïté », laquelle se perçoit le mieux dans une perspective temporelle. / This work is dedicated to the conception of the human being that is discreetly outlined in the first two works of French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, namely "The Structure of Behavior" (1942) and "Phenomenology of Perception" (1945). The first work, which adopts the perspective of empirical sciences of man (psychology, biology, psychopathology), and the second work, which claims a phenomenological point of view, both aim to challenge the metaphysical and epistemological parameters inherited from the Cartesian tradition, and to reveal the irreducibility of our being-in-the-world. The resulting philosophical anthropology is one of "ambiguity," which is best perceived from a temporal perspective.

This philosophical, anthropological study within a fundamental agogic perspective, employed an existential phenomenological approach to find out what adulthood is, fundamentally. Adulthood as being-ethical, is a more adequate description than chronological, biological, psychological and sociological descriptions of adulthood. Finding out what being-ethical is, required investigating what it means to be human. Only humans exist, and must participate effectively in agogic-dialogic relationships to alleviate existential yearning and experience dignifiedness. A code of effective agogy is presented. This code is the basis for a universal, fundamental code of ethics which transcends particular moral codes and professional codes of ethics. The words "ethicals", "ethicalness" and "ethicality" are employed to name, respectively, individual requirements in the code; acting according to the code; and the inescapable interrelatedness of experiencing dignifiedness and adhering to ethicals. Detailed explanations are given of what it means to respond fundamentally ethically. Adultness, humanness and ethicalness are different perceptions of the same continuum. All humans, whether aware of it or not, have an unattainable ideal of perfect humanness, to which they must perennially progress in order to experience dignifiedness, and humanness entails perennially becoming more human. Since no human can become perfectly human, the ideal of perfect humanness can be called "God". This means that the code of humanness is also the code of Godliness and the word "spiritual" is used to distinguish fundamental God from religious Gods. Spiritual responsibility is the interrelatedness of being-questioning and being-questioned. Ultimately, a person's humanness is assessed against the ideal of perfect humanness, by his or her own spiritual conscience. Humanity is the interrelatedness of the realities of existentiality, agogicality, ethicality, and spirituality and humanness is the inseparability of the continua of existentialness, ethicalness, agogicalness and spiritualness. A detailed existential-ethical description of education is given. The thesis ends with a post-scientific view of what essentially agogic orientated (educative) teaching is, and four recommendations are offered to enhance the effectiveness of agogy in teaching and learning institutions. Despite an extensive and radical study, it is acknowledged that the mystery that is humanity, can never be totally revealed. / Educational Studies / D. Ed. (Philosophy of Education)

Revelation is God's Word addressed to the human being and so speaks of God in relation to the person and the world. Revelation can therefore only be fully understood, proclaimed and lived through an encounter with the world and its conceptions. To understand the evolution of human consciousness and the creation of the soul, we look to the sources of revelation (scripture and tradition) in dialogue with secular anthropology. The latter's paradigm of development and growth is not foreign to the former's understanding of conversion and growth in grace . The image of God, which characterises the human person, is shown to be an emergent likeness, which is created and drawn to its fullness by God. This accounts for Pius XII' s insistence that the soul is created immediately by God, who is responsible for the physical dynamics that bring forth consciousness and the personal dynamics that empower the human soul to develop. / Philosophy Practical &Systematic Theology / M.Th (Systematic Theology)

Thesis (DPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / The purpose of this thesis twofold: first, to develop an account of modernity as a “loss of the world” which also entails the “death” of the human as a meaningful philosophical, political or moral category, and second, to explore the possibility of recovering a sense of the world in us and with it, a sense of what it means to be human. This argument is developed by way of a sustained engagement with the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt, whose analogous critiques of modernity centre on the problem of the connection between humanity and worldliness. My argument consists of three parts, each of which spans two chapters. Part one of the thesis sets out the most important aspects of Nietzsche’s and Arendt’s respective critiques of modernity. Chapter one focuses on modernity as a rupture of a philosophical, political and religious tradition within which existence in the world could be experienced as unquestionably meaningful. Following arguments developed by Nietzsche and Arendt, chapter two establishes that the loss of this tradition results in a general crisis of meaning, evaluation and authority that can be designated as “modern nihilism”. The second part of the thesis deals with what may be called the “anthropological grounds” of the critique of modernity developed in part one. To this end, chapter three focuses on Nietzsche’s portrayal of the human as “the as-yet undetermined animal” who is neither the manifestation of a subjective essence nor the product of his own hands, but who only exists in the unresolved tension between indeterminacy and determination. This is followed in chapter four by an inquiry into Arendt’s conception of “the human condition”, which in turn points to the conditionality of being human. What is clearly demonstrated in both cases is that, in so far as the predicament of modernity is incarnate in modern human beings themselves, any attempt at overcoming this predicament would somehow have to involve re-thinking or transcending our present-day humanity. The third part of the thesis examines the way in which the reconceptualisation of the human as advocated by Nietzsche and Arendt transforms our understanding of “world”. The more specific aim here is to demonstrate that both thinkers conceive of a reconciliation between self and world as a form of redemption. In chapter five I explore their respective attempts to resurrect the capacity for judgement in the aftermath of the death of God as the first step in this redemptive project, before turning to a more in-depth inquiry into the “soteriology” at work in Nietzsche’s and Arendt’s thinking in chapter six. This inquiry ultimately makes clear that there is a conflict between the Nietzschean conception of redemption as amor fati (love of fate) and Arendt’s notion of redemption as amor mundi (love of the world). I conclude the thesis by arguing that what is at stake here are two conflicting notions of reconciliation: a worldly – or political – notion of reconciliation (Arendt), and a much more radical, philosophical notion of reconciliation (Nietzsche), which ultimately does away with any boundary between self and world. However, my final conclusion is not that we face an inevitable choice between these two alternatives, but rather that the struggle between these two dispositions is necessary for an understanding of what it means to be human as well as for the world in which our humanity is formed.

Permission from the author to digitize this work is pending. Please contact the ICS library if you would like to view this work.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Comment les êtres, humains ou plus-qu’humains, en viennent-ils à partager leurs mouvements ? Qu’est-ce qui exauce, soutient ou empêche la confluence de leurs gestes ? Ces questions sont des questions métaphysiques (question de la comobilité des êtres), anthropologiques (question du vivre-ensemble) ou biologiques (question de la symbiose) : pour y répondre, il est de bonne méthode de lire des philosophes, des anthropologues, des biologistes. Nous avons décidé de les adresser à une pratique chorégraphique : le Contact Improvisation, une forme de danse initiée par le chorégraphe américain Steve Paxton en 1972, et où danseurs et danseuses se sautent les un-es sur les autres, entrent en contact les un-es avec les autres, roulent par terre et tombent dans les airs, considérant que la philosophie avait tout intérêt à reconnaître que danseurs et danseuses non seulement savent bouger ensemble, mais, plus important, savent s’apprendre et penser la manière dont ils bougent ensemble. / How do human and more-than-human beings come to share movements? What supports, hinders or ignites the confluence of their gestures? These questions are metaphysical (how do things coexist?), anthropological (how to live together?), and biological (how do we merge and exist symbiotically?): to answer them, our anthropo-phenomenological “philosophy of gestures” offers a reading of contemporary philosophers, anthropologists and biologists. But next to those field specialists, the investigations also led us to ask our questions to dancers and to a dance practice—Contact Improvisation, a movement form that was initiated by North American choreographer in 1972, where dancers jump at each other, enter in contact, roll on the ground and fall in the air. Our hypothesis was simple: we are in urgent need to renew our understanding of movement and specifically of our ways of moving together (with other, humans or more-than-humans), who better than dancers to lead the inquiry with?