L’espoir, ce résidu du vase (πίθος) de Pandore, a été soumis aux jugements ambivalents de la philosophie. Bien que l’espoir puisse être considéré comme une forme de voeu pieux qui nous trompe ou comme une attitude qui contribue à l’action morale, le verdict concernant son affiliation avec les malheurs et les épreuves qui frappent l’humanité est toujours en attente. La question, au préalable de tout jugements, qui continue de faciliter ce procès ne peut être formulée de manière plus simple : qu’est-ce que l’espoir? Søren Kierkegaard et Ernst Bloch ont consacré une partie importante de leurs écrits pour aider à clarifier une telle question. Or, que peut apporter la comparaison entre un existentialiste chrétien et un matérialiste spéculatif sur le sujet de l’espoir? Loin de déboucher sur une plaisanterie, une comparaison de leurs concepts révèle comment l’espoir contribue à la critique, à l’action, et ultimement, à la rédemption. Malgré les différences substantielles entre ce qu’ils soutiennent comme l’objet de l’espoir, ils partagent certaines caractérisations de l’espoir qui sont philosophiquement saillantes. Contre l’affirmation selon laquelle l’espoir nous induit en erreur, ils soutiennent que l’espoir nous donne la chance de rompre avec les idées dominantes du statu quo. Cette distance nous offre une expérience nouvelle et critique des problèmes auxquels nous sommes confrontés, tout en pointant vers la possibilité de leur rectification. Contrairement aux émotions édifiantes ou aux humeurs comme la joie et l’optimisme naïf, Kierkegaard et Bloch soutiennent que l’espoir doit être décidé quant à ses attentes. L’espoir implique alors notre résolution d’anticiper et de contribuer à la possibilité de la rédemption. Enfin, l’espoir est considéré comme rédempteur en soi sous forme d’une lutte pour la possibilité - car sans possible, pour ainsi dire on ne respire pas. / Hope, that residue of Pandora’s jar (πίθος), has been the subject of ambivalent philosophical judgments. Pit against being considered a form of wishful thinking that is misleading or an attitude that contributes to moral action, the verdict concerning hope’s affiliation with the illnesses and hardships that befall humanity is still pending. The question, preceding any judgment, that continues to facilitate this trial can be formulated in no simpler way: what is hope? Søren Kierkegaard and Ernst Bloch dedicated a significant portion of their authorship to help clarify such a question. Yet, what can a comparison between a Christian existentialist and a speculative materialist deliver on the topic of hope? Far from leading to the butt of a joke, a comparison of their work reveals how hope may contribute to critique, action, and ultimately, redemption. Despite the substantial differences between their objects of hope, they share certain characterizations of hope that remain philosophically salient. Against the claim that hope is misguided, they argue that hope affords us the chance to break away from the dominant ideas of the status quo. The distance affords us a new and critical experience of the issues we face, while anticipatively pointing towards what may redeem them. Distinguished from uplifting emotions or moods like joy and naïve optimism, Kierkegaard and Bloch argue that hope must be resolute about its expectation. Hope then involves our decision to anticipate and contribute to the possibility of our redemption. Lastly, hope is argued to be redemptive in itself as a struggle for possibility–for without possibility, a person seems unable to breathe.

The diploma thesis deals with the analysis of the best and highest use of the property (HABU). The theoretical part describes the basic principles of this method and its cruical parts: legal admissibility, physical possibility, financial merits and maximum profitability. This method is applied to a specific area called brown fields in the practical part of this thesis. The result of this method is the evaluation of the highest and best use of the property.

The diploma thesis deals with the analysis of the highest and best use (HABU) of the property, which is applied to a specific example in the practical part of this work. The theoretical part describes and explains the four basic hypotheses of which the analysis consists (legal admissibility, physical possibility, financial merits and maximum profitability). The analysis is performed on the building of the former dining of Military Academy in Brno, which is currently unused.

Risker är något som ständigt finns närvarande i IT-projekt, både positiva och negativa risker. Syftet med denna studie är därav att undersöka hur projektledare i IT-branschen arbetar med risker och möjligheter samt hur arbetet upplevs. Studien genomfördes efter en kvalitativ ansats och med hjälp av en tematisk analys utformades fyra huvudteman: (1) Ta risker på allvar, (2) Förståelsens innebörd: förstår du mig nu?, (3) Oanade möjligheter och (4) Tio nyanser av lärdomar. Tidigare forskning och studiens resultat visar på att riskarbete ska göras noggrant och regelbundet. Då risker är en stor del av ett projekt bör detta arbete tas på allvar. Till skillnad från risker är möjligheter något som endast ett fåtal arbetar aktivt med. Störst fokus ligger på att analysera och hantera risker, inte möjligheter. En av slutsatserna som denna studie därav resulterat i är att riskarbete är ett viktigt arbete som behöver noggrannhet, tid, kommunikation, transparens, reflektion och kontinuitet för att bli så bra som möjligt. Arbetet med möjligheter kan däremot utvecklas avsevärt. Studiens deltagare blev även ombedda att dela med sig av en viktig lärdom vid arbetet med risker. Detta resulterade förvånande nog i tio olika svar vilket visar på att den enade synen som först antogs finnas, gällande arbetet med risker i IT-projekt, inte är helt enad. Det finns liknande nyanser i lärdomarna men själva lärdomarna i sig är olika. En slutsats som kan dras av detta är att arbetet med risker är liknande, både i teorin och i praktiken, men att erfarenheter och olika synsätt påverkar vad respektive projektledare anser vara den viktigaste lärdomen inom riskarbete. / The work with risk and risk factors are something that must be taken seriously in IT-projects. The work must be done carefully and regularly throughout the whole project, otherwise the consequences will affect the project in a negative way. But a project risk doesn´t always have to be something negative. Possibilities in IT-projects are still an unknown way of work. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine how project managers in IT work with risks and possibilities and how their experiences where with this work. The study was conducted using a qualitative approach and with the help of thematic analysis, four themes were created; (1) Take risks seroiusly, (2) The meaning of understanding: do you understand me now?, (3) Unimagined possibilities och (4) Ten nuances of lessons leatned. Working with risks where something that all project managers did. They thought that their work with project risks is the key to implementing a successful project. But the result of this study also shows that working with possibilities where something that just a minority of the participants did. Both research and the result of this study highlights that some of the keys to a successful work with project risks are; precision, time, communication, transparency, reflection and continuity. Even though this was something every participant agreed on, the idea on what was the most important thing to do in the work with project risk where different among them all. That result shows that the work with project risks might, at the first sight, be equal but when you dig deeper there are differences. The project manager must therefore find a way to communicate and identify the project risks so everyone working in the project have a united way of identifying the project and the project risks.

Depression is a severe mental illness estimated to affect around 300 million people worldwide and is currently the leading cause of disability in the world (WHO, 2017). It is classified as a disorder of affect and is diagnosed on the basis of specific criteria stipulated in manuals such as the DSM V and ICD 10. It has been repeatedly argued that psychiatric classification in its present form fails to offer the appropriate framework for understanding and explaining the subjective experience of depression resulting from its focus on operationalized criteria for diagnosis and assessment and the absence of appropriate theoretical and methodological framework for the study of consciousness and how changes in its essential aspects (such as embodiment, temporality, and intersubjectivity) are related to reflective manifestations and signs of mental illness (e.g. Parnas and Zahavi 2002; Fuchs 2010; Parnas et al. 2012). In line with these considerations, I engage in a phenomenologically inspired examination of the experience of depression in particular as it is described in two formats of first-person testimonies, namely published autobiographical accounts and anonymous responses to an online survey conducted in the United Kingdom and Bulgaria. The testimonies of depression consistently describe a radically different way of being, which, I propose can be explained and understood as originating from changes in three major structures of subjective experience – the pre-reflective experience of what it is possible to do, the pre-reflective experience of what one is able to do, and the pre-reflective experience of sharing a world with others, which encompass the essential aspects of subjectivity. I examine how the alterations in the main structures are related both to changes in embodiment, temporality, and intersubjectivity and to the various reflective manifestations in affective experience, thought, and action such as specific emotions, moods, bodily sensations and feeling, cognitive styles, and action patterns. The latter in particular can occur in various combinations and are shaped and coloured by the complex social and cultural context surrounding mental illness in general and depression in particular. With respect to the influence of the cultural and social meaning on the individual manifestations and variations in the experience of depression, I examine the impact of socially shared culturally specific conceptions of depression by contrasting such reported by participants in an anonymous survey from Great Britain and Bulgaria. While in both cultural groups depression is understood as either a pathological psychological reaction or an illness characterized by changes in brain function, in Bulgaria the former understanding is both more prevalent and associated with higher degrees of social stigmatization and subsequently less recognition of subjective suffering and attribution of responsibility. This can result in experiences akin to those commonly established by disturbances in the pre-reflective experience of intersubjective disconnectedness and accentuate already present feelings of shame and guilt. I draw attention to the fact that social stigmatization, in particular its structure and subjective experience, can also be studied within a broadly phenomenological framework on the basis of different first-person account in order to develop practical measures for the prevention of the social stigmatization of mental illness.

No description available.

Monistic substantivalists believe that material objects and regions of space-time are not two distinct kinds of fundamental of entities. For the monist, objects either are identical with regions or are somehow derivative from them. Dualistic substantivalists view regions and objects as distinct kinds of fundamental entities. One virtue monists claim over dualists is that their view is more ideologically parsimonious than dualism because monists can do without a primitive notion of location. In this paper I provide an argument that undercuts some of the theoretical edge that monists claim over dualists. The assumption that the monist can provide a reduction of location unique to her position rests on a false assumption about the possible structures spacetime can have. If it is metaphysically possible for two distinct regions to coincide with respect to all their significant spatiotemporal properties and relations (call these 'coincident regions'), then analyses of location unique to monism will turn out to be inadequate. / Master of Arts

Hur har vi kunskap om vad som är möjligt? Enligt vad som kan betraktas som det traditionella svaret till den frågan, har vi kunskap om modalitet via föreställningsbarhet. Vi föreställer oss ting och tar sedan detta som bevis för möjlighet. Denna uppsats kommer att undersöka tre invändningar till detta svar angående hur vi har kunskap om möjlighet. Vi kommer sedan att överväga Williamsons förmodan: att vår kognitiva kapacitet för att hantera kontrafaktiska konditionaler bär med sig den kognitiva kapaciteten för oss att även hantera metafysisk modalitet (2007, 136), och undersöka om denna förmodan undviker dessa invändningar. Det kommer här att argumenteras att Williamson’s förmodan undviker två av invändningarna och att den inte tycks kunna svara på den sista invändningen. Det kommer även att argumenteras att en invändning mot Williamson’s förmodan ser ut att vara särskilt problematisk, och att det inte är klart att Williamson’s förmodan är i någon bättre position än den negativa föreställningsbarhets vyn. / How do we have knowledge of what is possible? On what could be considered as the traditional response to this question, we have knowledge of modality by conceivability. We conceive of things and on the basis take this as evidence for possibility. This thesis will consider three objections to this response of how we have knowledge of possibility. We will then consider Williamson’s conjecture: that our cognitive capacity to handle counterfactual conditionals carries the cognitive capacity for us to also handle metaphysical modality (2007, 136), and see if this conjecture avoids these objections. It will be argued that Williamson’s conjecture avoids two of the objections and that it does not seem to have a response to the last objection. It will also be argued that one objection to Williamson’s conjecture seems particularly problematic, and that it is not so clear that Williamson’s conjecture is any better off than the negative conceivability view.

No description available.

Many concrete problems, ranging from Portfolio selection to Water resource management, may be cast into a multiobjective programming framework. The simplistic way of superseding blindly conflictual goals by one objective function let no chance to the model but to churn out meaningless outcomes. Hence interest of discussing ways for tackling Multiobjective Programming Problems. More than this, in many real-life situations, uncertainty and imprecision are in the state of affairs. In this dissertation we discuss ways for solving Multiobjective Programming Problems with fixed and fuzzy coefficients. No preference, a priori, a posteriori, interactive and metaheuristic methods are discussed for the deterministic case. As far as the fuzzy case is concerned, two approaches based respectively on possibility measures and on Embedding Theorem for fuzzy numbers are described. A case study is also carried out for the sake of illustration. We end up with some concluding remarks along with lines for further development, in this field. / Operations Research / M. Sc. (Operations Research)