Au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale, avec le retour à la souveraineté, le Japon commença aussitôt à planifier la reconstruction de son économie et la création de nouveaux liens en Asie. C'est ainsi qu'il déclencha son « avancée vers le sud », à la recherche de matières premières et de marchés pour ses produits. Cependant le processus de pénétration de l'Asie du Sud-est ne fut pas seulement de nature économique mais aussi politique, et la valeur de la région dans la recherche d'une nouvelle position stratégique fut claire dans l'approche au problème indochinois, surtout après l'intensification de la guerre du Vietnam. Le Japon, désireux de contribuer de manière significative à une reconstruction régionale « après-­Vietnam », à la fin des années soixante lança une première série d'initiatives diplomatiques et de coopération dans la région entière. Ensuite les « tournants » de l'ordre bipolaire des années soixante-dix, surtout le « Nixon choc » et la chute de Saigon, ainsi qu'une majeure sensibilité vers le pays de la région, amenèrent de Tokyo à la systématisation de son approche et donc à la planification de la doctrine Fukuda. Cette première codification de la politique japonaise vers l'Asie du Sud-est est basée sur la fonction intra-régionale du Japon visant à lutter contre les tentatives hégémoniques de Pékin et Moscou et à profiter du désengagement militaire occidentale, afin de remodeler les relations avec les grandes puissances et assumer un rôle international de premier plan. / In the aftermath of World War II, after Japan had regained its sovereignty, the government started immediately planning the economic recovery and the creation of new ties in Asia. Thus it launched its "southern expansion", focused on the search of raw materials and markets for Japanese products. However, the penetration in Southeast Asia was not only an economic process, but also a political one. In the search of a new strategic role, the importance of the region became evident for Tokyo when facing the Indochinese problem, especially after the intensification of the Vietnam War. With the aim to provide a significant contribution to the regional reconstruction, even more important in the perspective of a "post-Vietnam", in the late l960s Japan launched a first set of diplomatic and economic initiatives in the whole region. The "turning points" of the Cold War in the 1970s, i.e. the "Nixon shock" and the fall of Saigon, combined to a closer attention to the expectations of Southeast Asian countries, eventually led Tokyo to the systematization of its regional approach and to the definition of the Fukuda Doctrine. In this first attempt to codify its policy towards Southeast Asia, Japan conceived its intra-regional role in opposition to the hegemonic moves of Beijing and Moscow and in connection to the Western military withdraw from the region, with the ambition to reshape its relations with the Great Powers and enhance its political standing in world affairs.

There is a constant trend in the European Union for heightened pride, desire of extended autonomy and even national independence of regions. The master thesis intends to investigate the relations of selected regions in the EU member states with the European policy level. The general research question to answer is "Which regions are more successful in representing their interests vis-à-vis the European policy level?" The investigation is undertaken in a form of a comparative case study combining qualitative and quantitative research; the examined regions are - following the research hypotheses and intention to provide a multi-perspective analysis of the problem - Scotland (United Kingdom), Hessen (Germany), Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol (Italy) and Středočeský kraj (Czech Republic). Based on the comparative analysis the thesis concludes that "regions with wide scope of powers on the national level (usually coming from federal or regionalized member states) with strong economic background are generally more successful in representing their interests vis-à-vis the European policy level."

Strategic narrative is a communicative tool for political elites to construct a shared meaning to the international politics, to articulate state's interests, to change the discursive environment, and to shape the behaviour of other actors. It has three different dynamics, which proceed simultaneously and reinforce each other: formation of the narrative within the given state, its projection in the international arena, and its reception in other states. Theory of strategic narratives fits well into the framework of new regionalism, which tries to analyse relations between the processes of globalization, globalism, regionalization, and regionalism. Until recently, such analyses were conducted from state-level and positivist perspective. As a result, the dimension of reception remained understudied. The presented thesis is an attempt to fill this gap. It analyses global political economy from the interpretivist constructivist perspective: it uses the leading local newspaper as a data sources and analyses media (news) discourse as one form of a broad societal discourse. Such an analysis can help us to analyse how local society assesses and reacts to strategic narratives and their internalization or rejection by local elites. In my thesis, I focus on narratives of the three superpowers (the US, the EU,...

This diploma thesis examines the Norwegian policy of cooperation in Education and Research as a soft-power tool for Norway's foreign policy. Within a European context, three levels of Norway's participation in Education and Research programmes will be analyzed. The first level is Norway's cooperation policy toward the EU, though as a weaker actor. The second is Norway's value of cooperation as an equal partner, which is typical in the Nordic region. And the third is cooperation via EEA Grants and Norway Grants, in which Norway is a dominant player. This thesis combines a theory of international cooperation and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's theory of soft-power, complex interdependence and asymmetry of relations between the participants. In the research, a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods are used. This thesis reveals that Norway decreases the financial spending to the areas where it has more influence and can utilize more of its soft power, while it also invests into areas where it plays the role of substandard actor. An explanation is found in the theory of international cooperation and the game of Chicken, where the longstanding and successful corporation strives to achieve a compromise rather than a win, i.e. to moderate any power fluctuation and strive for an equilibrium state.

Regional political parties and the European Union: Case study of Spain Abstract The diploma thesis "Regional political parties and the European Union: Case study of Spain" focuses on the area of the regional parties on the stage of the European Parliament, a subject which has not been analysed thoroughly in the past. Special emphasis is placed on the analysis of this phenomenon on the case of the Spanish historical regions (Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia) which are a recognizable proof of the remarkable institutional strengthening in the framework of a regionalized unitary state. The methodology of triangulation was used for the analysis of this issue as the data of the diverse type (i.e. electoral results, party's material etc.) have been put together through different methods (as a qualitative and quantitative content analysis, deductive and comparative approaches) with the aim to reveal the complete character of the issue and to reach the objective results as possible. The study focuses on the analysis of the regional parties on the European level through their cooperation in the European federations of the political parties as well as the framework of the political groups in the European Parliament. The emphasis is also placed on the analysis of the own work of the members of the European Parliament...

European Union faced several external challenges in the beginning of the 21st century. Its enlargement to 24 member states led to a state of dissimilar and not well interconnected economies in need of a new model of external competitiveness. Finding the model and, more importantly, delivering it on community level, was a new task of the European Commission, especially after re-launch of the Lisbon strategy in 2005. Yet, there was another challenge for EU that was not so easy to address by the Commission: the relative weakening of EU's external economic action comparing to new increasingly assertive policies of other international players, especially BRICs. Was it possible for the Commission focus only on supporting EU competitiveness without any external action, as was expected by articles of the Treaty of Nice? As the thesis argues, indeed there was an external action of the Commission before the Lisbon treaty, through its public support of SME internationalization within the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP). A neoinstitutional analysis of the issues on two levels is carried out: Firstly on the level of European institutions (motives, relevant contexts and institutional rules), secondly, on the level of secondary actors (SMEs, NGOs, CIP executive agency EACI), where the...

Questa ricerca si propone di individuare ed esaminare il contributo del Governo americano al processo di integrazione economica, politica e culturale tra gli Stati non-comunisti della regione dell'Asia sud-orientale, prendendo le mosse dalla creazione della primigenia forma di cooperazione regionale nel febbraio 1959 – il Southeast Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET) – fino ad arrivare alla fondazione dell'Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), l'8 agosto 1967. L'impegno in prima linea degli Stati Uniti sarà analizzato sotto due aspetti in particolare: storico e diplomatico. Partendo proprio dalla documentazione consultata negli archivi americani di College Park e in quelli britannici di Kew Gardens, l'analisi percorre i principali avvenimenti della Guerra Fredda nel Sud-est asiatico che contraddistinsero l'ultima parte degli anni Cinquanta e tutti gli anni Sessanta: il periodo immediatamente successivo alla lunga e, per certi versi sanguinosa, fase della decolonizzazione; la crisi vietnamita e il Secondo conflitto indocinese (1954-1973); lo scisma sino-sovietico all'interno del campo comunista (1960); la Konfrontasi indo-malese (1962-1966); il disimpegno britannico dai territori “a est di Suez” (annunciato nel 1966 dal Governo Wilson). Nel contesto di questi eventi che cambiarono in un decennio la fisionomia politica ed economica del Sud-est asiatico, Washington favorì la formazione di una organizzazione regionale in funzione anti-comunista e, in particolare, anti-cinese che coinvolse gli Stati dell'Asia sud-orientale intenti a fronteggiare all'interno dei propri confini movimenti di ispirazione marxista che facevano riferimento – con diverse sfaccettature – chi a Mosca e chi a Pechino. Le nazioni chiamate in causa da questa ricerca sono cinque: Thailandia, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia e Filippine, i Paesi fondatori dell'ASEAN. Il Sud-est asiatico rappresentò per gli Stati Uniti il bastione del “Free World” nel continente asiatico, dove peraltro fioccavano gli investimenti delle compagnie americane dell'industria estrattiva. Era pertanto motivo ulteriore per Washington evitare che l'influenza comunista soggiogasse i Paesi della regione che stavano gradualmente percorrendo la via della democrazia e dello sviluppo. Anche sulla scorta di quanto mostrato in Europa, gli americani si affidarono alla carta del regionalismo: in primo luogo, per facilitare il riavvicinamento tra i Paesi del cosiddetto “lower arc” le cui relazioni erano tese per varie questioni territoriali e politiche. In secondo luogo, per favorire il processo di nascita di un “nuovo spirito asiatico” – guidato principalmente dalla Thailandia – finalizzato a trovare soluzioni locali a problemi locali nel pieno spirito di cooperazione. / This study examines the U.S. contribution to the creation of ASEAN, by analysing the origins – since the foundation of the Southeast Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET) in February 1959 – and the ultimate evolution of Southeast Asian regionalism on 8 August 1967. Throughout the 1960s the United States was interested in the promotion of an ʻindependent nations zoneʼ in Southeast Asia as a means of accelerating the economic co-operation and social progress. The Department of State believed regionalism embodied a necessary element of ʻcontainment doctrineʼ, that should have pursued two main objectives: first, to preserve and strengthen the will of the peoples of the area to resist Communist threat; second, to assist these governments in copying with the major problems of development. Since historians have tended to concentrate on military issue, this proposal draws attention to U.S. plans taking into account two main aspects: diplomatic and economic. Washington had no territorial ambitions and, to some extent, the desire to secure the markets and raw materials of Southeast Asia for U.S. industry could offer an adequate explanation for the American commitment to the region. Regionalism in Southeast Asia during the Cold War is still an understudied field, partly due to the uneven attention given to the Second Indochina conflict. This research project is based on a vast array of textual records gathering from U.S., U.K., and Australian National Archives, as well as memoirs of the then Southeast Asian leaders. This study seeks to provide the U.S. point of view to understand the process of regional co-operation, hoping to bring a broader contribution to the field of both diplomatic history and ASEAN studies. This study concludes that United States has long worked actively to encourage regional cohesion among the nations of Southeast Asia and, albeit territorial disputes, Southeast Asian states were committed to establish a truly co-operative association that provided Asian solutions to Asian problems.

L’objectif de cette recherche est de découvrir la nature de l’appui au Bloc québécois lors des élections canadiennes de 2019. Dans le contexte de la diminution de l’appui à la souveraineté au Québec, cette recherche s’appuie sur l’hypothèse suivante : la résurgence du Bloc en 2019 peut être attribuée à la capacité du parti à transcender le clivage souverainiste-fédéraliste en réussissant à capturer l’électeur francophone moyen dans la province. En lien avec cette hypothèse, cette recherche se pose deux questions centrales : dans un premier temps, quels sont les sous-groupes d’électeurs que l’on retrouve au sein de cette coalition bloquiste et quel est le lien avec l’appartenance partisane provinciale, et dans un deuxième temps, quels facteurs et enjeux ont permis de rallier ces électeurs sous la bannière bloquiste? Cette recherche répond à ces questions en utilisant les données québécoises d’un sondage post-électoral national mené en 2019 par les professeurs Erick Lachapelle et Richard Nadeau de l’Université de Montréal et administré par la firme Léger Marketing. Les résultats de l’analyse de sondage confirment l’hypothèse de la coalition, les résultats montrant que le soutien au Bloc en 2019 était constitué de 47,1% d’adhérents du Parti Québécois et de 45,5% d’adhérents de la Coalition Avenir Québec. En outre, cette recherche révèle que si 75,5 % des péquistes ont voté Bloc en 2019, seulement 43,0% des caquistes en ont fait de même, suggérant que le Bloc a réussi à rallier une catégorie spécifique de caquistes. En somme, cette recherche révèle que ce sont les partisans nationalistes modérés de la CAQ qui ont permis la résurgence du BQ en 2019, et que l’appui au projet de loi 21 a été un facteur déterminant dans leur vote pour le BQ, alors que les partisans du PQ étaient plus fortement en appui à la souveraineté. / The goal of this research is to uncover the nature of Bloc Québécois support in the 2019 Canadian election. In the context of dwindling support for sovereignty in Quebec, this research theorizes that the resurgence of the Bloc in the 2019 election can be attributed to the party’s ability to cut across the sovereigntist-federalist divide and capture the median Francophone voter in the province. Following this, this research seeks to answer two central questions: Based on provincial party affiliation, what are the different sub-groups of voters that can be found within the 2019 BQ coalition, and what issues and factors have rallied these voters behind the Bloc? This research answers these questions using Quebec data from a nationwide post-electoral survey conducted by Professors Erick Lachapelle and Richard Nadeau from Université de Montréal in 2019 and carried out by Leger Marketing. The survey analysis results confirm the coalition hypothesis, with findings showing that 2019 Bloc Québécois support is constituted of 47,1 % of Parti Québécois adherents and 45,5 % of Coalition Avenir Québec adherents. Furthermore, this research finds that whereas 75,5% of péquistes voted for the BQ in 2019, only 43,0% of caquistes did so, showing that the party was able to capture a specific category of CAQ adherents. In sum, this research finds that it was the moderate nationalist CAQ adherents that gave the Bloc Québécois a boost in 2019, and that support for Bill 21 was a determining factor behind their vote for the BQ, whereas Parti Québécois adherents felt more strongly about sovereignty.

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