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The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers
to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is
provided by the
Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
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Showing 1 to 4 of 4 (0.024 seconds)Spelling suggestions: "subject:"über"" "subject:"bel""
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Rundbrief / Lehrstuhl für Religionsphilosophie und Vergleichende Religionswissenschaft19 October 2011 (has links) (PDF)
No description available.
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Rundbrief / Lehrstuhl für Religionsphilosophie und Vergleichende Religionswissenschaft19 October 2011 (has links)
No description available.
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Mortality and DeathParmer, Berit 19 April 2022 (has links)
Der Tod einer Person (ein Ereignis) und ihre Sterblichkeit (eine Eigenschaft) sind nicht dasselbe, hängen aber klarerweise zusammen. Angenommen der Tod einer Person ist schlecht für diese – was bedeutet dies dann für die Bewertung ihrer Sterblichkeit? Um diese Frage zu beantworten muss unterschieden werden zwischen zwei verschiedenen Arten von Sterblichkeit: Die kontingente Sterblichkeit („sterben können“) ist die dispositionale Eigenschaft eines Lebewesens unter bestimmten Umständen zu sterben. Der Tod des Lebewesens ist die Manifestation dieser Disposition. Die notwendige Sterblichkeit andererseits („sterben müssen“) ist die (Meta-)Eigenschaft eines Lebwesens eine begrenzte Lebenserwartung zu haben – das heißt, eine Disposition zu sterben zu haben, die notwendigerweise irgendwann manifestiert wird. Der werttheoretische Zusammenhang zwischen Tod und Sterblichkeit ergibt sich plausiblerweise aus den Rollen, die kontingente und notwendige Sterblichkeit beim Zustandekommen des Todes einer Person spielen: Es zeigt sich, dass die Disposition zu sterben den Tod der Person ermöglicht. Dadurch macht sie einen kausal relevanten Unterschied im Auftreten eines für diese Person schlechten Ereignisses und beeinflusst so ihr Wohlergehen. Deshalb ist die kontingente Sterblichkeit schlecht für die Person – und diese Schlechtigkeit erbt sie von dem Ereignis des Todes. Steht dieses Ereignis allerdings noch nicht fest, erbt die kontingente Sterblichkeit stattdessen einen Teil des erwarteten Unwerts des Todes. Die notwendige Sterblichkeit andererseits erbt einen Teil des generellen Unwerts des Todes (verstanden als Ereignistyp), weil sie das Eintreten eines solchen Ereignisses vorwegnimmt, indem sie garantiert, dass ein Ereignis dieses Typs eintreten muss. Gleichzeitig scheint die notwendige Sterblichkeit ihrerseits die Evaluation des Todes (und somit auch der kontingenten Sterblichkeit) zu beeinflussen: Der Tod einer Person wirkt weniger tragisch, wenn sie notwendig sterblich ist. / The death of a person (an event) and her mortality (a property) are not the same but nevertheless clearly related. Assuming that a person’s death is bad for her, one may ask what this would mean for the evaluation of her mortality. To answer this question, one must distinguish between two different kinds of mortality: Contingent mortality (“being able to die”) is the dispositional property of a living being to die under certain circumstances. The death of the being is the manifestation of this disposition. Necessary mortality on the other hand (“having to die”) is the (meta-)property of a living being to have a limited life-expectancy, that is, to have a disposition to die that is necessarily manifested eventually. The evaluative connection between death and mortality can plausibly be derived from the roles that a person’s contingent and necessary mortality play in the occurrence of her death: It turns out that the disposition to die is an enabling condition for the person’s death. This means that it makes a causally relevant difference in the occurrence of an event that is bad for the person and thereby genuinely and negatively affects her wellbeing. Therefore, her contingent mortality is bad for the person – and this badness is derived from the badness of the event of her death. If this event is not yet settled, the contingent mortality inherits a part of the expected disvalue of the person’s death instead. Her necessary mortality on the other hand inherits part of the general disvalue of the person’s death (understood as a type of event) because it anticipates the occurrence of such an event by guaranteeing that an event of this type must occur. At the same time, the presence of a person’s necessary mortality seems to affect the evaluation of her death (and thereby also her contingent mortality): A person’s death appears less tragic if she is necessarily mortal.
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...And Reconcile Us With Evil : A Critical Investigation of the Imagery of Good and Evil in Western Religion, Film and PoliticsGellrich, Arne L January 2016 (has links)
With an eye on the current social and political situation in Europe, and with regards to the so-termed refugee crisis, this study aims to map the discourse on assumed good and evil shared among Western cultures, as represented by Sweden, Germany and the United States. The thesis takes its point of departure from essayistic reflections of the philosophical tradition and theological and religious analytical positions respectively. These are then followed by two investigative main chapters, designed along the lines of Norman Fairclough’s approach to critical discourse analysis (CDA). The first of these chapters studies the narratives of good and evil employed in the mainstream cinema of the past ten years in the mentioned countries. The second analysis is made up of three case studies, in turn looking at similar narratives in the campaigns of the two main competitors in the 2016 presidential race, a German protest movement against free trade agreements, and the everyday political communication of Swedish Facebook users. In a final chapter, findings from all four preceding chapters are brought together in an attempt to sketch an image of the congruences and discrepancies of narratives on good and evil in the overall discursive field. The thesis finds that the discursive field shared by the three investigated societies is largely homogenous, with certain imagery permeating all analysed orders of discourse. Many of the reoccurring images are however likely rooted in the human psyche and therefore less dependent on discourse practice. Furthermore, certain principles are agreed upon in theory while not reproduced in social practice. Themes assigned to either good or evil often seem to take on secondary functions next to assumed fixed identities of in- and out-groups. Being a qualitative study, this thesis aims at giving an overview and delivering a base for further investigations rather than providing definitive answers.
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