Chen et al.(2010)以中國審計市場為調查對象，研究會計師對簽證客戶的經濟依存度(以資產衡量)對審計品質的影響。他們發現在2001年以前經濟依存度會傷害審計品質；然而在2001年至2004年間，因中國法律規範的改善，而未發現經濟依存度的負面影響。基於近年中國資本市場的長足發展且審計公費成為公眾可取得之資訊，本文延伸他們的研究樣本期間(至2008年)並以實際的審計公費計算經濟依存度。實證結果發現，無論以整體事務所或合夥會計師來計算經濟依存度，Chen et al.(2010)的結論並未改變。 / Chen et al.(2010) examine how the legal and regulatory changes in China affect the relationship between client economic importance (measured by assets audited by audit firm ) and audit quality. They find that audit quality is negatively correlated with client importance from 1995 to 2000. Therefore, when the institutional environment became more investor friendly, started from 2001 to 2004, they do not find that audit quality negatively correlated with client importance anymore. Following Chen et al.(2010), this study extends the sample period to 2008 and I use ratio of client’s total audit fees to audit firm’s total revenue as proxies for client importance to examines whether the client importance affect audit quality in china. Based on the data for firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2004 to 2008, I do not find that audit partners compromise independence for economically important clients, no matter at the firm or the partner level.

本研究探討中國國務院國有資產監督管理委員會(國資委)，實施統一委託審計之規範對於中央國有企業審計品質及審計公費的影響。國資委於2004年發布有關統一委託審計的規定，要求中央國有企業的年度財務決算審計須由國資委統一委託會計師事務所進行，並規定會計師事務所的審計年限必須介於2~5年之間，本研究欲探討此規定對中央國有企業審計品質及審計公費的影響。具體而言，本研究以異常應計數作為審計品質的代理變數，並使用差異中的差異法檢驗統一委託審計的影響，研究樣本為2001~2009年中國滬深A股上市公司。實證結果顯示，就審計品質而言，實施統一委託審計後中央國有企業的審計品質有提升，但其中會計師事務所的審計年限規定並未對審計品質造成明顯影響；就審計公費而言，實施統一委託審計後中央國有企業的審計公費下降，且在市場發展程度愈低的地區效果愈明顯。 / This paper examines the effect of regulations on audit quality and audit fees in China. China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) issued some rules in 2004 to improve audit quality for state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government (CSOEs), such as SASAC Order No. 5 and SASAC Rule No. 173. Under these rules, SASAC mandatorily assign auditors for CSOEs, and CSOEs’ managers have to retain auditors for at least 2 years and at most 5 years. This paper investigates listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2009, and uses abnormal accruals as proxy for audit quality and a difference-in-differences design to examine the effect of these rules on audit quality and audit fees. The empirical results suggest that after the enactment of these rules, the audit quality for CSOEs relative to other companies improves and the audit fees for CSOEs relative to other companies reduce.

審計公費係影響審計品質之一大因素，且中國事務所家數眾多，更易產生低價攬客的惡性競爭行為，再者，中國上市公司重編狀況近來層出不窮，因此本文以2004-2008年中國大陸A股上市公司為研究對象，欲研究重編事件對中國企業審計公費之影響。財務報表重編事件可以分為三個時間點：財務報表錯誤年度、財務報表執行重編年度以及重編後的次一年度。就財務報表發生錯誤年度而言，本研究發現該事件會伴隨較高的審計公費，但是無論是執行重編年度或次一年度，均未發現顯著提高公費的證據。除此之外，本研究也未能獲得審計委員會之設立與審計公費有統計關聯性的證據。具體而言，除了傳統審計公費的解釋變數之外，本文未能發現財務報表重編及審計委員會與審計公費有關之證據。 / Audit fees is one of the major factors affecting quality, and there are many audit firms in China, so it is easier to produce vicious competition . Furthermore, the number of Chinese listed company which has restated financial report is increasing in recent years. So, with a sample of A-share listed corporations in China from 2004 to 2008 , this dissertation develops a conceptual model for studying the relationship between financial restatement and audit fees. Financial restatement can be divided into three time points: the year when an error occurred in the financial report , the year when the financial report is restated ,and the year after the financial report is restated .In terms of the year when an error occurred in the financial report , this dissertation find the event associated with higher audit fees ,but in other two time point , this dissertation doesn’ t find the evidence of significantly increased audit fees. Moreover ,there is no statistical significant relationship between setting up an audit committee and audit fees. Specifically, in addition to the traditional explanatory variables, this dissertation can’t find the evidence that financial restatement and setting up an audit committee are related to audit fees.

Jensen(1998)認為，當公司有過多的自由現金流量時，經理人基於自利動機，較有可能從事非最大化主理人的行為，加劇代理問題的產生。Jensen也認為，發行長期負債可以降低公司多餘的自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題的產生。因此，本研究即由此一觀點出發，探討是否可藉由長期負債的發行，減緩代理問題的產生？以及當經理人持股比例低，代理問題較嚴重時，負債可否做為監督機制，以減緩代理問題？ 本研究以審計公費做為衡量代理問題之替代變數。當代理問題愈嚴重，即意味著公司有較高的固有風險，因此將增加查核努力，進而收取較高的審計公費。換句話說，當代理問題愈嚴重，審計公費將愈高。實證結果發現，低成長高自由現金流量的公司，發行長期負債可以降低自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題。而在經理人低持股比例時，長期負債可做為替代的監督機制，以減緩代理問題的產生。故本研究認為，負債確實可做為減緩代理問題之機制。 / Jensen(1986)argued that when company own more free cash flow, based on the self-serving motivation, managers will tend to pursue his benefit rather than principal’s. In such situation, agency problem will become more serious. Jensen also point out that issuing long-term debt can reduce the free cash flow in the company, therefore, ease the agency problem. This study is based on the free cash flow theory, examining whether issuing long-term debt can reducing the free cash flow, therefore reducing the agency problem? Besides, we will examine when managers hold fewer stocks, whether issuing long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism or not? Using audit fee as a variable to measure the agency problem. In auditing, serious agency problem means higher inherent risk and, in turn, audit fees. In other words, more serious agency problem means higher audit fee. The result finds that in low growth firm with higher free cash flow, issuing long-term debt can reduce free cash flow and, in turn, mitigate agency problem. Besides, when managers hold fewer stocks, long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism. As a conclusion, debt can be a mechanism to mitigate agency problem.

本研究利用問卷調查內部稽核人員與外部審計人員兩者對於內部稽核功能之認知、雙方互動之情形、以及內部稽核功能與審計公費之關係。研究結果發現外部審計人員對於國內內部稽核功能能否有效發揮，仍有所保留，特別是在獨立性的部分，但對於內部稽核人員的專業能力則表示肯定。另外，大多數的填答者皆有與對方互動之經驗，但互動的程度並不高，以「偶而會」及「偶而詢問」為主。縱使互動程度不高，但是雙方皆認為互動對於外部查核工作或內部稽核工作是有助益的。此外，大多數的外部審計人員認為，內部稽核功能的好壞與審計公費有一定的關係存在，但其影響的比例以5%以下居多，這可能也是間接造成雙方互動不密切的重要因素之一。 / This thesis uses questionnaires to examine the external auditors’ perceptions of the internal auditing function, the level of co-operation between the internal and external auditors, and the relationship between internal audit function and external audit fees. The empirical findings indicate that external auditors expressed concern about the internal auditing function, independence especially. And the questionnaire responses show the lack of a close relationship between the internal and external auditors. They just occasionally co-operate with each other, but they consider that it is helpful to them. In addition, most external auditors are convinced of the existence of a direct link between internal audit function and external audit fees. But the percentage of external audit fee affected by internal audit function is below 5 percent, this may be one of the reasons why they lack a close relationship between each other.

本研究以1980年至2015年美國及加拿大上市公司為研究對象，探討具有會計專長之執行長（CEO）與外界反應的關係。在探討外界反應之前，本文先檢視具有會計專長之CEO對於盈餘品質的影響，透過此結果，推論專業人士（包含會計師與分析師）與市場投資人之反應。本研究預期，當CEO具有會計專長時，會使盈餘品質降低，故審計風險隨之提高，導致審計公費增加，且分析師的追隨意願降低，同時也將影響市場投資人的反應。 研究結果發現，具會計專長CEO與盈餘管理、審計公費、公司累積異常報酬呈現顯著正相關，與分析師追隨數則為顯著負相關，顯示當CEO具有會計專長時，因有盈餘操控的情況，所以審計公費提高、分析師追隨數減少；但市場投資人或許無法體認盈餘操控的事實，故仍相信具有會計專長之CEO，有可能為公司帶來正面的影響。 / This study investigates the relationship between CEOs with accounting expertise and external reactions of investors, auditors and analysts. The sample firms used in this study are all the stock-listed companies in America and Canada during 1980-2015. Before examining such external reactions, this paper explores the association between CEOs with accounting expertise and earnings quality, which help us to obtain an explanation why auditors, analysts and investors have such reactions. The empirical results show that CEOs with accounting expertise manage earnings more aggressively than CEOs without such expertise. As a consequence, the firms with such CEOs will be charged higher audit fees and have less analyst following. However, investors might not recognize this fact; they still believe that CEOs with accounting expertise will have a positive influence on firms. Our findings could offer a reference for a company looking for a CEO that could bring accounting quality.

非審計服務究竟是否會影響會計師獨立性，長久以來即為各界關注焦點。本研究第一部分將驗證非審計服務對會計師獨立性的影響。此外，有別於美國要求全面揭露審計、非審計公費資訊，我國規定公開發行公司若符合一定門檻應揭露支付給會計師的各項公費資訊，本研究第二部份將探討我國採門檻制的公費揭露政策下，刻意隱藏公費資訊的公司，其會計師的獨立性是否會不同於無需揭露公司。最後一部份則為市場反應測試，探討市場是否能對公費資訊進行判斷，判斷公司刻意隱藏的情形並給予負面的評價。 實證果發現非審計服務的提供對會計師獨立性產生負面影響，而在我國採門檻制公費揭露政策下，刻意隱藏公費資訊公司進行盈餘管理的可能性越大，若我國之公費揭露政策若能改為全面性揭露將對會計師獨立產生正面影響。此外，市場反應部份結果顯示投資人並未考慮公費資訊的內涵。 關鍵詞：非審計服務、門檻制公費揭露、會計師獨立性、裁量性應計 / Whether or not the purchase of non audit services (NAS) impairs audit independence is the focus of a growing body of accounting research in the U.S. Using the data of Taiwanese list firms, this paper examines whether the association holds in environment other than that of the United States. In addition, compared to that in the U.S., Taiwanese Securities and Futures Bureau requires firm to disclose information on the audit and nonaudit fees under some circumstances. The second objective of this paper, therefore, is to explore whether some firms meeting the disclosure threshold have an incentive to avoid the disclosure requirement by concealing audit fee from external investors and regulators, and whether there is difference in the independence between firms which should have met the disclosure threshold otherwise and firms disclosing nonaudit fees. Finally, I investigate whether premium given by market participants varies among these two groups. We find that the purchase of NAS impairs audit independence, consistent with prior studies. We also document that firms which should have met the disclosure threshold otherwise are more likely to conduct earnings management relative to other firms, as predicted. Finally, our empirical results show that market participants are not able to distinguish these two groups. Key words: non-audit services, disclosure threshold, audit independence, discretionary accruals

在市場競爭不斷加劇之環境下，會計師事務所究竟要如何因應？削價競爭固然為一種經營策略，但並非長久之計。過去文獻指出，會計師事務所可藉由發展產業專業化以因應市場競爭，且會計師產業專精對審計公費有正向之影響。然而，過去文獻亦指出客戶產業特性對審計公費訂價有一定之影響力，故本研究目的乃在探討會計師產業專精對審計公費影響力之大小，及是否會計師產業專精對審計公費之影響力會大於客戶產業特性對審計公費之效果。實證結果顯示會計師產業專精與客戶產業特性兩者對審計公費皆有相當之影響力，但客戶產業特性對審計公費訂價之影響較大。另外，在將樣本區分為高科技產業與傳統產業後可發現，會計師在高科技產業之專長對客戶而言較具有價值，產業專精會計師在高科技產業對審計公費訂價之影響力較大、能夠收取較高之審計公費。 / How can accounting firms build up competitive advantages when they face increased competition? One way is to cut costs and decrease prices, but this may not be the best strategy in the long run. Casterella et al.(2004) suggest that product differentiation based on industry expertise may be a more sustainable solution because auditor specialization shows a significantly positive association with audit fees. Prior researches also indicate that client industry characteristics influence audit fees. Therefore, the main objective of this study is to examine whether auditor specialization and client industry characteristics influence audit fees and which one has greater effect. We find evidence that auditor specialization and client industry characteristics both have an influence on audit fees, while client industry characteristics exhibit even greater impacts. Furthermore relative to conventional industries, auditor specialization in high technology industries demonstrates greater value, and contributes to higher audit fees.

本研究探討台灣會計師公費揭露的市場反應，並以累計異常報酬（CAR）來衡量市場反應。第一階段針對是否揭露會計師公費研究其不同的反應；第二階段再將有揭露會計師公費的公司區分為主動揭露與被動揭露，並探討是否會造成不同的影響；第三階段更進一步將被動揭露的公司依其所符合的法規揭露原因再做細分，特別探討因為非審計公費過高而揭露公費者之市場反應。 研究結果發現，相較於不揭露會計師公費的公司，市場對於有揭露會計師公費資訊的公司會給予較正面的反應；其中，有揭露會計師公費的公司，若屬於主動揭露，市場更是會給予正面的肯定；相反的，有揭露會計師公費的公司，若是因非審計公費達審計公費之四分之一以上者而被動揭露者，市場會對此公司之會計師之獨立性有所懷疑，故給予負面的反應。可見會計師公費的資訊對投資大眾而言確實是一項有意義且重要的資訊。本研究並加入公司治理的相關變數，研究結果發現，若公司之治理程度較差，但「有揭露」會計師公費資訊者，投資大眾會給予正面的反應，此外，相對於被動揭露者，市場對於「主動揭露」之公司會給予更正面的肯定。另一方面，若公司之治理程度較佳，但其揭露原因是屬於非審計公費達審計公費四分之一以上而被動揭露者，市場會對會計師獨立性有所質疑，故對於此種公司仍給予負面的反應。 / This study attempts to examine audit fee disclosure and market reactions. We use Cumulative Abnormal Returns to measure market reactions. First, we analyze whether audit fee disclosure has any market reactions at all. Second, we divide the samples into voluntary disclosure and forced disclosure groups. Third, we make further segmentation from the forced disclosure group according to their disclosure reasons, and specially focus on the disclosure reason of high non-audit fees. We find that market reactions are significantly more positive for firms with audit fee disclosures than for firms without fee disclosure. Market reactions are also significantly better for firms with voluntary disclosure than the forced disclosure group. In contrast, market reactions are significantly lower for firms which disclose audit fees due to high levels of non-audit fees. Our evidence supports that audit fee is a piece of useful and important information to investors. Additionally, we include corporate governance variables in the analysis. We find that when firms’ corporate governance is not good, if they choose to disclose audit fee voluntarily, the market responds with positive reactions. In contrast, if a firm’s corporate governance is quite good but discloses audit fees due to high levels of non-audit fee, the market then reacts with negative returns.

本文主要研究支付給審計委員會較多的權益薪酬會不會影響到審計委員會的獨立性，從而支付較低的審計公費，選擇非產業專家的會計師。以2007至2015年間美國的上市公司為樣本，本研究發現審計委員會獲得的權益薪酬與審計公費，產業專家的會計師選擇呈負相關。此結果與預期一致，權益薪酬會誘導審計委員會妥協獨立性，從而買較少，品質較低的審計服務。