台灣自加入世界貿易組織（WTO）後，已對於服務業市場進行逐步開放，然面對全球服務貿易自由化之趨勢，以及我國產業結構面臨調整轉型之際，政府欲藉由服務業之發展，帶動經濟成長，使服務業成為我國經濟發展的新動能。由2004年行政院所提出「十二大服務業發展綱領及行動方案」至2009年推動的「服務業發展方案」，未來持續推動六大新興產業、十大重點服務業等細部措施，可看出政府近年來對於服務業的國內發展和對外拓展重視程度不斷增加，期望能將整體服務業的附加價值提升，創造就業機會，增進整體經濟與生活品質。 台灣於2002年加入世界貿易組織，服務業開放承諾項目共計119項，惟對中國大陸並未按照入會承諾履行開放義務，直到2010年6月29日，我國與中國大陸簽署兩岸經濟合作架構協議（Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement; 以下簡稱ECFA），開啟兩岸經貿自由化之契機，依兩岸經濟合作架構協議第4條規定，雙方後續將推動服務貿易協議，進一步開放服務業市場，未來我國將面臨服務業對中國大陸履行入會承諾之壓力。 本研究將分析兩岸服務業發展現況、相互開放情形及我國對中國大陸開放服務業之原則，探討未來ECFA服務貿易協議我國於協商時可能面臨之挑戰及市場開放議題可能涉及問題，並提出政策建議。 / Since Taiwan acceded to WTO, its services market has been stepping up the process of liberalization. However, confronting the trend of global liberalization of services trade and the change of industry structure, Taiwan government would like to boost its economic growth by developing services industry. The policies “A guiding plan for development of services (2004)” and “The program of services industry development (2009)” will keep promoting the six rising industries and the ten key services. Taiwan government focuses on not only its domestic but also foreign services markets in these years, hoping to increase the value added, employment opportunities and quality of life. Taiwan acceded to WTO in 2002 and opened 119 services sectors in GATS. But it didn’t fulfill its commitment of opening its services market to Mainland China. After, the signing of Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, ECFA on June 29, 2010,both governments have formally started the trade liberalization. According to ECFA Article 4, Both parties will enter into negotiation of an agreement on trade in services, for further liberalization of services market. By the time, Taiwan will encounter great difficulties in liberalizing its domestic market and the pressure of fulfilling its commitments in GATS. The study will try to analyze the liberalization status of cross-straits services market, the principle of Taiwan market liberalization to Mainland China, the difficulties of negotiation on trade in services, the issues regarding market access and suggestions.

企業要從競爭激烈的環境中脫穎而出，除了要有好的競爭策略與執行力外，擁有充足且低廉的資金、知名且廣受信賴的聲譽，以及優秀又肯為公司效力的經營團隊與員工，是企業領先競爭對手的必要條件。成功推動公司股票上市櫃，無疑是創造這些競爭優勢的重要關鍵。而如何為企業提供一個有效率而低成本的資本市場，同時提供投資人一個有保障又有成長率的投資平台，不但有利企業的後續發展，亦關係著該地資本市場的資金動能。 過去幾年大陸為避免經濟過熱及產生泡沫化之風險，故實施一連串的宏觀調控措施，使得台商在中國大陸籌資更形困難；另欲回台上市又遭遇政策及相關法令的限制，故部份大陸台商便計劃在大陸或香港上市，甚至為達香港上市要求之市值規模，而規劃台灣下市並以海外控股公司為掛牌主體在香港上市，這種連根拔起的舉動勢必影響台灣的資本市場及經濟發展。而自2008年5月馬政府上台執政以後，積極推動兩岸政策的鬆綁及若干的寬鬆優惠政策，重量級台商如旺旺、康師傅等紛紛回台發行TDR，且發行時投資人皆超額認購股票，供不應求下掛牌後漲幅不少。但鄰近的大陸及香港資本市場也在積極招商，鼓勵海外企業掛牌，而深圳創業板的成立，以吸引不少中小企業掛牌，加上上海國際板亦規劃在2011年成立，勢必也會衝擊鄰近的資本市場。因應大陸及香港資本市場的競爭，大陸宏觀調控政策、勞動合同法的實施、缺工及巨幅調薪現象，政府有無推出相關政策及措施來協助台商轉型並提升競爭力呢？冀望經由本研究，探討目前台商回台上市所面臨的問題與障礙，並提出相關建議以求解決之道，期盼能恢復資本市場動能及企業能擴大對台投資，使企業根留台灣，對台灣經濟永續發展。

政府開放赴大陸投資二十年，逐漸放寬對大陸投資限制，在大陸廣大市場商機誘因下，對大陸投資規模日益擴大，投資業別亦擴及服務業，對大陸投資形成新局面，究竟兩岸經貿政策對台商赴中國大陸投資影響如何，乃為本研究動機。 本研究採文獻分析與焦點座談暨深度訪談法，經由次級資料分析，兩岸經貿政策鬆綁對台灣競爭力、經濟成長、貿易、商港貨櫃裝卸量及來台旅客均呈現成長。另一方面，近年主要產品在海外生產比重增加，我國在美國、日本、大陸進口市場佔有率逐漸下滑，台商在台灣採購設備及零組件比率降低，且台商在海外研發當地化情形日益明顯。另一方面產學界專家認為政府輔導策略首先應強化在大陸之聯繫網絡；善用台商在大陸既有通路，以整體行銷台灣產品；引導創新研發及高階製程留在台灣；政府加速鬆綁產業交流所涉及之法規；強化智慧財產權之宣導與投資保護；透過台資銀行在大陸分行，提供台商融資管道。未來並應加強與台商產業鏈連結，將海外台商納入台灣產業發展一環，同時落實ECFA實施效益，創造國內經濟發展的正面效益。 / Since allowing investment in China 20 years ago, the government of Taiwan has gradually lifted restrictions on China-based investments by its citizens. Enticed by the expanded market opportunities in China, R.O.C. nationals are rapidly scaling up their investments on the mainland China by broadening their investments to many industries and the service sector, which has become a new development in investing in China. Whether the cross-strait economic and trade policies affect the investment of Taiwan businessmen in mainland China, is a motivation of this study. The literature review and focus groups & depth interviews were used in this study . Through the secondary data analysis, Cross-Strait trade policies have manifested in progress and growth in Taiwan’s competitiveness, economic growth, trade, container throughput by commercial ports, and the number of tourists visiting Taiwan. However, the government should pay close attention to the fact that during the last few years the proportion of major products produced overseas has increased, while the market share of Taiwanese imports in the United States, Japan, and China markets has gradually declined and procurements of machines/equipment and components/parts by Taiwanese businesses has dropped. Moreover, the localization of R&D overseas by Taiwanese businesses has noticeably increased. The government’s assistance strategy should first focus on the strengthening of contacts and networks in China. It should also leverage existing Taiwanese business channels in China to expand the sales of Taiwanese products in the China market through an integrated marketing campaign and facilitate innovative R&D while keeping high-end production processes in Taiwan. The government should also relax laws governing industry exchanges, strengthen the education of Taiwanese businesses with regard to intellectual property rights and investment protections, and provide financing channels for Taiwanese businesses through Taiwanese-invested banks with branch offices in China. In the future, the government should strengthen links with the supply chains of Taiwanese businesses and to include overseas Taiwanese businesses as part of Taiwan’s industrial development plans. At the same time, it should fully realize the benefits of the ECFA and create a positive effect on Taiwan’s domestic economic development.

The introduction of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed between China and Taiwan in 2010 has added a significantly important economic element to cross-strait relations. Little research has been done on cross-strait integration from an economic standpoint, and to analyze the potential for successful economic integration between the parties it is necessary to determine whether their political economies are compatible for integration. In this research comparative studies of the political economies of Taiwan and China are conducted with focuses on industrial orientation, market mechanisms, and the motivations driving major economic actors. This research focuses on Fujian and Guangdong, Taiwan’s closest economic partners on the mainland and the cornerstones of Beijing’s integration incentives, with a minor study conducted on Hong Kong-China integration due to similarities of economic integration mechanisms. This study uses models constructed by scholars on Chinese provincial protectionism and trade barriers to determine whether Taiwanese integration with the “Common China Market” will be mutually beneficial for the economies on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Economic indicators, trade trends, and economic policy incentives indicate that integration under ECFA is amplifying trade asymmetries and is stalling real economic growth in Taiwan. Findings also show that trade liberalization has allowed major trade barrier and protectionism-creating phenomena that were once limited to the mainland to contribute to cross-strait competition regime among the economies studied. This research contributes to the fledgling body of academic research on cross-strait economic integration and its impact on the parties directly impacted by it. Implications of this study show that it would be beneficial for the speed of ECFA integration to be reigned in, and for Taiwan to use the trade agreement as a counter to pursue bilateral regional trade that can ensure its competitiveness.

本論文探討台灣與大陸的金融合作發展。中國大陸本來實行計劃經濟體制，1978年開始進行改革開放。2001 年中國加入WTO之後，逐漸在金融、保險業、期貨業、銀行業對外開放。在這個過程中，台灣與大陸的金融合作日益緊密。2009年以來，台灣與大陸連續簽署了「海峽兩岸金融合作協議」、「兩岸金融監理備忘錄」（Memorandum of Understanding, MOU）、「兩岸經濟合作架構協議」（Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, ECFA）等。本論文依序分析了中國大陸的金融市場本質和改革狀況，以及目前中國大陸金融體系所存在的機會與缺點。此外，本論文也探討了兩岸金融合作的發展進程，特別是在簽署MOU和ECFA之後，將對台灣金融業所帶來的影響。 關鍵字：中國大陸金融市場、兩岸金融合作、兩岸金融監理備忘錄、兩岸經濟合作架構協議 / This dissertation discussed the financial cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China. After joining the WTO in 2001, the financial cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China is getting closer. Since 2009, Taiwan and mainland China signed “Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement” (ECFA) and “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU). Furthermore, the Chinese financial market is relatively slow industries, financial institutions stationed after the impact is inevitable. This research analyzed the trend of the efficiency change before and after signing MOU and ECFA. Keywords: China financial market; Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement; The financial cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China; Memorandum of Understanding

1990年代以來，區域貿易協定的數目呈現倍數成長，發展到今日，全世界已約有230個FTA。然而臺灣卻因政治因素被屏除在區域經濟整合之外，將為臺灣經濟帶來諸多挑戰，我國若欲走出困境、強化在國際間的競爭力，勢必要有所作為。因此馬英九總統在競選總統時就以「與世界連結，參與全球區域經濟整合」為經貿政策主軸，而充分利用中國大陸現有的資源與市場，與其簽署區域貿易協定更是最具關鍵性的一步。經過多次正式與非正式的溝通協調，2010年6月29日，兩岸正式在重慶簽署ECFA，並於同年9月12日正式實施。 但從ECFA議題拋出到簽署實施，各界的爭辯從未停止，究竟ECFA對臺灣是危機還是轉機？是幫助臺灣走向世界還是被鎖進中國？值得深入研究，因此本文藉由國內外相關文獻來探討簽署ECFA對我國政治、經濟社會以及國家安全層面的影響，以增加閱讀者對ECFA的了解，也能成為政府推動ECFA的參考。 / Since 1990s, the number of the region trade agreements has been doubling, and until now there has been a total of 230 FTAs around the world. However, due to political factors, Taiwan has been dismissed outside the regional economies conformity, which will bring many obstacles toward the economic development in Taiwan. If our country intends to walk away from the dilemma and raise our competiveness, some steps must be taken. Therefore, while running for the presidency, President Ma Yingjiu brought up, 〝Links with the world, participates in the whole world regional economies conformity〞 as his economics and trade policy. By fully making using at the mainland China’s existing resources and markets, it was a must for Taiwan to sign the region trade agreement with china. After several official and unofficial communication and coordinating, on June 29, 2010, the Cross-Strait ECFA was signed officially in Chongqing, and implemented in the same year on September 12. Nevertheless, since the ECFA was carried out and signed, the debates from all walks of life has never come to an end. Is ECFA a crisis or a turning point for Taiwan？ Does it the help Taiwan to move toward the world or to be locked within China？It is worthwhile to conduct a research to clear out the doubts. This article dims to take a deeper look at how ECFA is influenced on Taiwan n terms of politics, economy, and national security. So that not only can the readers have a better understanding of the ECFA but also the government refers to it while the implementation of policy.

自2008年以來，兩岸實質交流與政府政策的開放下，金融產業在多年的紅海競爭下，出現新契機。尤以2010年兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ECFA）的簽署，將金融服務業列為早收清單，使臺灣銀行業者能縮短等待期提早進入中國大陸市場開展業務。 本文以臺灣31家本國銀行（不含專業銀行及外資銀行）為研究對象，自2007至2013年為研究期間，以中介法選擇「利息支出」、「營業費用」、「存款」等3項投入變數；「利息收入」、「非利息收入」、「放款及貼現」、「投資」等4項產出變數。運用資料包絡分析法（DEA）及Tobit迴歸模型，由全體銀行、金控子銀行與非金控銀行的角度，探討兩岸簽訂ECFA對其經營績效的影響。 實證結果發現：1.銀行經營績效深受外在金融環境及規模大小影響。2.全體樣本銀行於簽訂ECFA後之平均效率不如簽訂ECFA前，惟部分銀行效率值提高。3.簽訂ECFA前非金控銀行純技術效率優於金控子銀行；簽訂ECFA後金控子銀行整體效率、純技術效率及規模效率皆優於非金控銀行。4.簽訂ECFA前後公股銀行之整體效率、純技術效率及規模效率皆優於民營銀行。 / The financial industries led to a red ocean market due to high and intensive competition many years ago. However, the relaxation of government policy of substantial cross-strait economic interactions has brought the turning point since 2008. Especially, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between Taiwan and China was signed in 2010 and the financial service industry is covered under the Early Harvest list which can make Taiwanese bank sectors shorten the time and enter the Mainland China market early. This study is to research 31 domestic banks (exclude professional bank and foreign banks) and choose interest expense, operation expense and deposit as the three input variables and interest revenue, non-interest revenue, loan and discount and investment as output variables from 2007 to 2013. With the use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Tobit regression mode, it explores the effect of operating performance for the banks, the financial holding banks and the Independent Banks under the ECFA. Finding: After the signing of the ECFA，the sample banks' efficiency is not as good as before the signing, but some banks to improve the efficiency. Before the signing ECFA, the pure technical efficiency of non-bank financial holding is superior than financial holding banks ; however, efficiency of financial holding banks ,including technical efficiency pure technical efficiency scale efficiency,is superior than non-financial holding banks. Overall, the performance of public financial holding banks is superior than the private banks. However, the performance of banks is impact by financial environment and the size.

2015年3 月，IHS市場調查公司預估由於太陽能光伏企業繼續整合併購有利於市場擴大佔有的連動關係，使得大者恆大，而且平均售價快速下降，驅動市場需求更加高速增長，2020年全球太陽能光伏電站累計安裝量將達到500GW，比較2005年的5.3GW有如天壤之別，同時說明往後五年每年平均安裝64GW，也代表全球投資在太陽能光伏產業的資金每年高達1500億美元，依次中、美、日三國為領先主要投資在新能源建設。再查看平均售價（太陽板光伏模組）2005年價格約為3.5USD/W，隨著市場逐漸增大，預估價格也在2014年降至0.6USD/W。2015-2019年全球總產值將達到5120億美金（以太陽能光伏電站為基礎，系統價格160萬USD/1MW）。 雖然兩岸太陽能光伏產業共同面對一個極具規模及潛力的全球市場，但由於2010-2012年間供需失衡，產能過剩，急速下降的市場平均售價，歐美許多公司工廠因此關廠倒閉，進而對兩岸進行兩次所謂“雙反”–反傾銷Anti Dumping Duty及反補貼Counter Vailing Duty調查，最後判定對矽晶太陽能光伏產品加以處罰性進口關稅。依照WTO世界貿易組織規定會員國在面臨外國進口產品進行不公平競爭，並損害其國內產業時，可以採取救濟措施保護其國內產業，“雙反”就是措施手段之一。2014年大陸也針對美國多晶矽料實施53-57% Anti-Dumping Duty作為反制，目前中美雙方仍處在對峙中，但可預見隨著市場條件改變，將可能達成某種雙方可接受的妥協。 本研究把兩岸太陽能光伏產業競合策略放在上面兩個最大的標題之間及緊迫的時間軸上面，針對兩岸各自產業都已掉入虧損情況（第四章大陸與台灣個案研究），期待從競合策略的積極面（合作是為了創造新生價值，找出潛藏利益，甚至創新價值、價值整合，再爭取自己所創造的價值），加上絲毫不能忽視國家政府在文化、歷史、民族的角度及ECFA大框架協議的前提進行分析得到結論，並且做出建議。當兩岸太陽能光伏產業共同面對普遍存在的“雙反”又同時面向全球市場，台灣在思考競合策略的時候，必須認清在經濟層面上與韓國進行幾乎全面各產業競爭。特別關於時間緊迫，本研究認為無論從面板產業、IC設計產業，都已經說明台灣的技術優勢在快速流失，而大陸方面正傾全國之力加速超前，形成自主（紅色）供應鏈。換句話說，時間完全不在台灣這一邊，如果再對比韓國可以配合大陸的合作條件，台灣更沒有猶豫片刻，佇足不前的理由和本錢了！在非經濟層面上又擁有最好的文化、歷史、民族背景跟大陸進行合作，另外在更高的政治層面的考慮，如臺灣之小，大陸之大，夾存在中日美三個強國之間，臺灣的選擇應該是非常清晰可分辨，並且在極度的時間壓力下應該積極運用國家政府有效作為，盡快在ECFA大框架協議下推進各項服貿、投保、金融協議、導引兩岸太陽能光伏從企業、產業到國家組合全面互利互惠合作達到面向全球市場雙贏局面。 / 2015 March, IHS market survey company forecasts Average Selling Price (ASP) will decrease rapidly and drive much higher demand growth rate, due to the Photovoltaic industries continue merger and acquisition. The forecast also indicates global accumulated installation capacity will reach 500GW in 2020, compared with 5.3GW in the year of 2005 which displays promising growth, meanwhile averages yearly installation capacity of 64GW in next five years and yearly investment of 150B USD globally. When looking into price details that PV module selling price of 3.5USD/W in 2005 has dropped to 0.6USD/W of 2014 which translates gross product value of 512B USD, with price reference of 1.6M USD/1MW solar power system. Both sides of the Taiwan Straits are facing a huge potential but challenging global market of Photovoltaic industries. The period of 2010-2012 not only generated the peak of demand, also induced problematic over-supply and selling price free-fall. Factories in Europe and North America are forced to become insolvent, then claimed for the restricting of import with Anti Dumping Duty (ADD) and Counter Vailing Duty (CVD) against mainland China and Taiwan, according to WTO regulations. In the year of 2014, mainland China also initiated a reactive measures of ADD against polysilicon imported from USA. Currently mainland China and USA are still struggling the head-on situation, but are believed to reach a compromise solutions under the Photovoltaic market development. We study the issue of Anti Dumping Duty (ADD) and Counter Vailing Duty (CVD) for the example of Photovoltaic industries, covering both sides of Cross-Strait. We focus Co-opetition in terms of time pressure, each side reporting business loss and propose a very constructive and active strategy as the essence from Co-opetition (Creating Value that You Can Capture is the Central Theme in Co-opetition). Of course, we should never ignore government playing a critically influential role based on culture, history, Chinese nation and forward-moving ECFA positive impact. When generally evaluating Co-opetition strategy, we clearly see the competition every corner between Taiwan and Korea. Specifically about time pressue we realized the reversal happened in the industries LCD flat panel and IC design which mainland China assures to catch up and surmount Taiwan in short future. Taiwan can not afford any hesitation and miss the narrow window of creating and capturing our own value in Co-opetition with mainland China. We worry as well Taiwan’s dilemma situation between USA, Japan and mainland China and strongly believe that the best strategy, in addition to the essence of Co-opetition is to harmonize the relationship with mainland China in all the possible areas. So that when facing global market, a win-win result can be expected, through Co-opetition central theme.

根據Morgan Stanley 「The Mobile Internet Report 2009」 提及於2000年開始的Desktop internet世代(以下統一稱為PC Internet），擁有10億以上的單位，將會進展到2010年的Mobile internet世代，並快速成長到 100億以上的單位；同時在行動裝置中最重要的智慧型手機出貨量可能在2011年於北美地區超越功能性手機，達到9,300萬支，亦可能在2012年於全球地區超越個人電腦出貨量，達到5億支。根據Pew研究中心日前公開的調查顯示，目前美國已經有超過40％的成人已開始使用智慧型手機上網來瀏覽網路、收發電子郵件、使用即時訊息等服務。 智慧型手機使用者具備Anytime、Anywhere、Always Online的特性，而且啟動GPS功能，因此可以精準掌握到使用者的個人化資料及地理位置及生活習慣，將會改變人與人之間互動模式，進而影響行銷及品牌溝通的方式。而在智慧型手機上的行動廣告，已成為新焦點。預估在未來2至5年間，將看到行動廣告佔整體廣告比例越來越增加，甚至將取代個人電腦，成為最大的行銷通路。 Google 及Apple 當然都看到這樣的趨勢，二大陣營都不約而同積極展開在行動廣告的布局。本研究將會探討並預測：在全球PC端高達69.7%（Strategy Analytics 2010 Q2）搜尋引擎占有率，而且在全球關鍵字廣告總量占65%的Google，以完全「開放而分享」的態度持續推動Android作業系統，逐漸提高在智慧型手機的市占率，進而達成「Android Everywhere」的目的，並購併最大的行動廣告平台AdMob，將以何種模式來引領行動廣告的發展。 另一方面，在全球已經擁有將近一億支行動終端裝置（含iPod Touch，iPhone，iPad），22萬個應用程式，累積40億次的下載次數的Apple，如何以「only for Apple」而採封閉式模式的iOS作業系統，但已發展出獨樹一格的Apple app經濟體系，以及非常高忠誠度的品牌認同，並於最近推出將Google AdSense、AdMob排除在外的iAd平台，又將會以何種模式來爭奪這一塊日漸成長的行動廣告大餅。 本研究歸納出以下結論：開放式經營模式有不同程度的型態，以及不同的外部合作架構，企業將根據本身的短期策略或是長期的策略，而選擇不同程度的開放式/封閉式經營模式，而達到最大效益。並將會從開放式、封閉式創新、經營模式、合作架構及行動廣告產業眾多構面來探討Google 及Apple二大陣營的差異性，而在這差異性上將以不同的策略而發展出不同的行動廣告經營模式。

中國大陸自西元1979年開始實行經濟改革政策，銀行體系同時經歷了三十年的改革發展，依據中國加入世界貿易組織之承諾，其必須於2006年12月11日全面開放外資銀行登陸投資。為了面對外資銀行業可能帶來的激烈競爭與挑戰，中國政府大力支持與協助國有商業銀行進行一連串的體制改造及上市計畫，近年來中國銀行業整體的表現十分亮眼。 兩岸政府於2010年6月29日簽署之兩岸經濟合作架構協議(ECFA)，正式地為台灣的銀行業開啟通往大陸投資的一扇門，此篇論文藉由全面的研究分析中國銀行業的發展，並透過比較中國、美國及台灣具代表性的銀行在獲利能力、資產品質、流動性風險管理及新巴賽爾資本協議規定指標遵循情形等四個面向的表現，以期提供有意赴中國大陸投資之銀行業者對於當地情況有更多的概念與了解。 / After thirty years of economic and financial reforms, banking system in China has transformed from rigidly controlled to marketization nowadays with a variety of banking institutions coexist in the financial market. Among different kinds of banking institutions, large state-owned commercial banks dominate over half of total banking assets, their huge scale allow themselves to have leading positions and monopoly power in China’s banking industry. Under WTO regulations China must fully open markets for foreign banks’ investment started on December 11, 2006, before that most large state-owned commercial banks have restructured into joint-stock companies and went public sequentially in order to enhance competition for fierce challenges brought from foreign banks. Attributing to China government’s effort and support, the overall domestic banking performance has made a lot of progress in the past few years. By comparing banking performance with USA and Taiwan in four aspects of profitability, assets quality, liquidity risk management and capital adequacy ability, the study results demonstrate that general performance of banking sector and large state-owned commercial banks in China have improved greatly and even better than advanced countries in some respects. The signing of ECFA between cross-strait governments on June 29, 2010 starts a new page of Taiwan banks’ development in China, the study suggests that in the initial stage banks from Taiwan can explore markets of corporate banking by using their expertise in loans for small and medium enterprises which are always neglected by banks in China, and by providing services to Taiwan business people in China to explore markets of consumer banking, and then gradually expand market share.