本論文係以「十一屆三中全會」後時序，依次檢驗中共總書記胡耀邦、趙紫陽、江澤民、胡錦濤等領導人之政治繼承中制度面與非制度面，希冀達到三項目的：第一，擺脫兩岸意識型態對峙格局，還原中共政治繼承之真實面貌；第二，宏觀地對中共政治繼承之原則與概念有所解釋，並進一步微觀對其政治繼承之具體措施進行說明。 本文分為五章，茲就主要內容分述如次 一、第一章概述本文研究動機、目的、方法、範圍等。第二章則探討胡耀邦與趙紫陽甄拔與罷黜之情形，期間鄧小平雖有意使政治繼承制度化，然當國內發生危及共黨政權與損及其權力，制度化推行已成次要。 二、第三章分別分析江澤民與胡錦濤接班模式，江澤民任內相繼推出人事制度化改革方案、制定人事法案、落實「幹部四化原則」等。胡錦濤人事佈局並無明顯拉拔親信跡象，係考量權力基礎尚未鞏固，然未來隨權力逐日穩固後，勢將加大人事掌控權。 三、第四章則探討政治繼承與制度化之關係，並比較領導人在拔擢中制度性與非制度性關聯性；正式途徑方面，第二、三、四代領導菁英，大都在地方起步若要進入權力核心則須擠入中央，以十五屆委員為例，黨領導機構係以民主推薦方式而成。非正式途徑方面，諸如來自同宗族、省份、學校等，倘建立良好關係，受庇者在仕途上就具有優勢。 四、第五章檢驗制度化在十六大執行情形；第六章結論則總結研究結果與發現，得出十一屆三中全會後，最高領導人仍有欽定繼承者之權力，人治色彩仍存，惟奉行幹部「四化」原則，並制定人事制度化規定，雖幹部晉升或調職不可避免地受到走後門、拉關係等非制度因素影響，然幹部任職年限或退休年齡已對人事變遷產生一定拘束力。 / This thesis examines PRC’s Political Succession on their institutization and un-institutization based on the Chronicle order of PRC Chairmen from Hu Yaobang to Hu Jintao. Hopefully, this paper can achieve three objectives: first, this paper will put aside the cross-straight ideological confrontation and present a reality of PRC’s political succession. Second, the article will explain the concept and principle of PRC’s political succession in broader sense. Also, I will further describe the concrete measures of succession in detail. This thesis is divided into five chapters as follows: 1.Chapter one briefly introduces the motive, objective, methodology and scope of this thesis. Chapter two explores the reasons why Deng Xiaoping chosed and abandoned Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. In Deng’s period, he intended to make succession institutionalized, however, when a crisis occurred and endangered regime’s stabilities, the implementation of institutionalization became second importance. 2.Chapter three assesses power succession from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao respectively. During Jiang in power, he executed the program of personnel institutionalization and promulgated the act of personnel. Hu Jintao doesn’t obviously choose his own men due to his unsolidified power basis. However, when his power is solidified he might enhance his grasp of personnel arrangement. 3.Chapter four explores the relationship between personnel’s institutionalization & non-institutionalization. In the aspect of formal approach, the second, third, fourth generation elites were mostly promoted from the local areas. If they intended to enter the core of power, political elites have to enter PRC’s Center Committee. At the same time, membership can only be made possible by the democratic recommendation and endorsement from party’s member. In the aspect of informal approach, those who have enjoyed certain connections, such as from the same families, province, and schools, might have better opportunities to get promoted. 4.The Chapter five examines the implenation of personnel institutionalization in the 16th CCP Congress. Chapter six concludes results and findings. I finalizes that the reshuffle of PRC’s paramount leaders still remained “strong personal influence”. In other words, PRC officials’ promotion or transfer cannot avoid the influence of personal connections. However, the limits of service tenure and the retiring age still play an important part to the PRC’s personnels’institutionalization.

自從十五大以來人事佈局，中共已形成政治局常委屆齡不尋求連任的慣例，退休年齡也從十五大的70歲降到十七大的68歲，此將對派系政治產生深遠的影響。此外，中共亦透過「梯隊接班」模式來長期培養中青年幹部的方法，避免現任領導人死亡或解職後出現權力真空的狀態，並有效降低派系使用暴力手段解決政治繼承問題，有助於政局穩定。 因此，本文主要目的在探討1990年以後政治局常委之政治繼承，並就其年齡限制、任期制、梯隊接班與集體領導等制度面向觀察，以及分析影響中共政治繼承制度化之因素，來評估中共政治繼承是否進一步深化與制度化，並希望透過本論文的探討，據以窺測中共領導階層之政治繼承未來可能之走向與發展趨勢。 / Since the big 15th personnel arrangement , the CPC has been the formation of the Politburo Standing Committee member age is not seeking re-election practices.In addition, the CPC through the "echelon succession" model to long-term culture method of middle-aged cadres,to avoid death or dismissal of the current leader of the state of the power vacuum, and effectively reduce the factions to use violent means to solve the problem of political succession,contribute to political stability. Therefore, the main purpose of this study in 1990 after the Politburo Standing Committee Political inheritance and the age limit, the tenure system, echelon succession and collective leadership system-oriented observation, and analysis influenced the CPC's political inheritance of the institutional factors, to assess The Chinese Communist political succession whether to further deepen and institutionalize .And hope that through the discussions in this thesis, to look into the depths of the political inheritance of the Chinese Communist leadership possible in the future direction and development of trends.

第一章為導論，說明研究動機、方法和關於「政治繼承」之定義。 第二章討論決定最高權力繼承人的比較固定的因素，以及這許多因素的組合與取捨。 第三章論及影響繼承過程的偶然因素。 第四章剖析所謂「繼承危機」和「合法性」以及「繼承的制度化」問題。 第五章擴大範圍研究蘇聯領導階層和政治精英汰換的事實。 第六章討論領導階層流動中的世代替換。 第七章為結論，重點在於把前數章的研究成果，導向對於未來蘇聯最高領導人大領導 階層權力轉移，權力結構和政策走向之預測。

第一章：導論。（一）說明研究對象與問題的性質。（二）研究方法及名詞界定。 第二章：一黨優勢的案例─墨西哥。（一）概說。（二）自一九一○年大革命以來的 政治繼承。（三）PRI 與政治繼承的關係。（四）社會變遷對政治繼承的影響。 第三章：兩黨政治的案例─哥倫比亞。（一）概說。（二）本世紀以來的政治繼承， 包括國家陣線時期。（三）政黨、益團體對政治繼承的影響。（四）政治繼承的趨勢 。 第四章：多黨政治的案例─以色列。（一）歷史背景。（二）獨立後的政治繼承概況 。（三）影響政治繼承的因素，包括精英、宗教、軍事。（四）政治繼承的趨勢。 第五章：克力司馬領袖的案例。（一）定義與概念。（二）印度。探討甘地─尼赫魯 ─至甘地夫人。（三）印尼。（四）埃及之納塞與利比亞的格達費。 第六章：中國國民黨的政治繼承。（一）大陸階段。包括軍事行動、意識型態之規劃 。（二）台灣地區的政治繼承。（三）影響繼承的因素：中共、美國、經濟發展等因 素。（四）社會變遷所可能導致的影響。 第七章：結論與建議。 共約八萬字。七章。

第一章為緒論，界定繼承概念。 第二章探討毛澤東指定繼承人的構想。由他對繼人的要求，可以瞭解到毛的指定繼承 人，最主要的是基於權力的考慮。 第三章敘述毛澤東對指定繼承人的安排。毛澤東對其指定繼承人的一再整肅，使得繼 承問題對中共構成嚴重的困難。 第四章探討毛澤東死後的繼承門爭，說明指定繼承人並未能解決中共的繼承問題。 第五章分析中共繼承問題的困難所在。從人物、制度、觀念、思想、政治現象，指出 繼承必然伴隨著權力門爭。 第六章為結論，對中共政治繼承的制度化，提出評估。