臺灣公民團體監督立法院的行動並不罕見，早在1989年就有公民團體發起立委評鑑的活動，然而學界未曾對此做過系統性的研究。2007年公督盟正式成立後，自第七屆起，公督盟每會期結束後定期公布立委評鑑，引發民眾與不少朝野立委的重視，但也引起名列待觀察名單立委的反彈。本文有兩個層次的研究問題，首先，公督盟究竟如何做評鑑以及他們怎麼看立委評鑑這件事，本文除了分析公督盟的檔案資料外，也深度訪談其成員。公督盟做評鑑的目的希望為選民篩選出好立委，淘汰劣立委，也希望透過監督推動立法院更加透明開放。公督盟實際上在評鑑過程相當嚴謹，卻一直受到國民黨立委的抵制。然而，解決資源有限與強化質化評鑑是公督盟未來急迫的目標。 　　其次，什麼樣特質的立委較為關心立委評鑑？立委又是如何去看立委評鑑？為了解答本研究問題，本文使用質化的深入訪談以及量化的調查研究兩者混合的方法進行分析。在質化分析上，作者發現：國民黨立委普遍對公督盟持有敵意，民進黨立委則較為友善；此外，立委不分藍綠對評鑑指標過於量化表示不滿；同時，個人形象以及連任考量是影響立委關心評鑑的主因，因為選舉時可以加以宣傳政績；不過，立委評鑑看似使許多立委對立法問政較為積極認真，但不少立委卻是以做業績方式應付評鑑，諸如增加提案量、質詢次數以及高出席率等。而在量化分析上，統計模型顯示，區域立委、民進黨籍、重視立法問政、高教育程度以及女性的立委較為關心評鑑；而民進黨籍立委以及女性立委則較積極提供評鑑資料給公督盟；最後，立委關心評鑑的程度與其評鑑成績表現有正相關關係。總結來說，這些發現均說明了公督盟對立委的問政行為多少產生影響力，後續效應值得學界繼續追蹤研究。 / The NGO’s activities of supervision on the Legislative Yuan is not rare in Taiwan. As early as 1989, there were campaigns called “legislator-evaluation (hereafter ‘LE’)” held by a few NGOs. However, there are scarce systematic researches on it. In 2007, many NGOs allied into an alliance called “Citizen Congress Watch, CCW”. Since the 7th term, the reports of LE were regularly published by CCW after the end of each session. The reports of LE not only attracted the public and the legislators’ attentions, but also received serious criticism from legislators listed on the ‘watch-list’. This thesis has two levels of research questions: First level question is how the CCW conducts and treats the LE. I analyzed the archives and interviewed with the members of CCW to understand how and why they conducted the LE. The purposes of CCW are not only to filter out excellent legislators and to eliminate infamous legislators through LE for the electorate, but also to promote the transformation of Legislative Yuan to more transparency by supervision. Actually, the process of LE is rigorous, but the CCW still confronts the KMT legislators’ boycotts. However, under the situation of limited resource, it’s CCW’s urgent problem to solve and to reinforce the qualitative indicators. 　The second level questions intend to discern the characteristics of legislators more concerned about the LE, and how the legislators regard the LE. I combined the methods of in-depth interview and survey on legislators and their assistants. From the in-depth interview, I have several findings: First, because of suspicion on the CCW’s stand towards to the DPP, the KMT legislators are hostile to the CCW; in contrast, the DPP legislators are friendly to it. However, both the KMT and the DPP legislators are unsatisfied with the ways of conducting LE because it overly weights on quantitative indicators. In addition, the reasons legislators care about the LE is mainly due to their values on personal image and re-election considerations. Last, it seems that legislators had become more actively participating in the legislative process because of the LE. Actually many legislators purposefully cope with it by “upping grades”—the number of proposals, interrogations, and the attendance rates were magnified or boasted by the legislators. Also, my hypothses are verified. From the statistic model, it shows that district legislators, the DPP legislators, those who emphasize on legislative affairs rather than constituency service, and the females, are more concerned about the LE. Besides, the DPP and the female legislators are more willing to offer documents for LE to the CCW. In addition, there is a positive relationship between the degrees of legislators’ concern and their grades of LE. In conclusion, these findings imply that the CCW has more or less influence on legislators’ legislative behaviors. It worths conducting follow-up studies in the future.

立法委員因連任動機及選區壓力，使國會議場的立法參與成為選區服務的延伸。立委會將陳情民眾的意見轉化為法律提案，以便向選民宣稱功勞；為展現立法績效，並會以「搭便車」或「加碼」等方式，積極追逐立法數量。若立委選區的立場，與政黨政策方向不一致，立委可能以「切割」立場、表達異議的肢體語言，向選民表態。立委或政黨雙方各自堅持立場，甚至政黨以黨紀懲罰，仍是另一種形式的妥協，立委也藉此免於選民究責。原則上，雙方會權衡得失，在政黨包容立委選區的壓力下，避免完全撕裂關係。 　　本文以農業法案為例，用意在分析農業區與非農業區立委，於農業立法參與度的差異。觀察對象從立法院第一屆增額立委時期至第七屆，參與度的測量針對首提案、共同提案及發言次數累加，但考慮提案的付出相對較高，故予以加權計算。統計結果，農業區立委相對於非農業區、民進黨相較於其他政黨，在農業立法參與度比較高，國民黨則是黨際競爭激烈的農業區立委較積極。此外，第二屆的國會全面改選及第七屆選制改為單一選區，對立法參與度皆有顯著影響。 　　在方法的運用上，本研究測量農業立法參與度，以量化（立法紀錄編碼）為主，並藉質性資料（公報、報紙、訪談）輔助解釋。立委因選區考量促成的行為態樣，包括競逐立法績效及突顯異議立場的分析，則以質性資料的案例檢證為主，且以數據資料輔助佐證。 / Legislative participation in congress by legislators who want reelection and feel pressure from constituency is extension of servicing constituents. Legislators propose bills that transform from petitions of constituents in order to claim credit, and propose more bills to raise legislative performance by “free riding” and “raising the stakes.” Besides, legislators may “segment” position or express objection to conforming constituency if legislators and their party have different opinions. At this situation, legislators and their party maybe stand each position or party enforces punishment to maintain discipline that is another compromise, and legislators can avoid charge from constituency. In principle, party will tolerate legislators who feel pressure from constituency and each will avoid to tear both sides. 　　The dissertation applies case of agricultural bills aims to compare degree of legislative participation in agricultural and non-agricultural district. The range of observation is from First(additional members) to Seventh Legislative Yuan. The degree to measure include first and joint proposal, speaking. However, the proposals had weighted for more devotion than speaking. As a result of statistics, legislators’ degree in agricultural district was more high than non-agricultural, DPP’s degree was more high than other party, and KMT legislators in marginal agricultural district still actively participate in legislation. Furthermore, the Second’s democratization and the Seventh’s single member district had more influence on legislative participation. 　　In research methods, the degree to measure legislative participation in agricultural bills mainly applies quantitative analysis(to code legislative records). Further, legislative behavior of raising legislative performance and standing objection position mainly applies qualitative analysis(bulletin, newspaper, interview).

我國兵役制度從抗戰時期的「徵兵為主、募兵為輔」逐步走向「募兵為主、徵兵為輔」的募徵併行制，馬英九2008年當選總統，為落實競選政見，國防部規劃兵役制度轉型為募兵制，爰配合修正兵役法部分條文。 適逢立法院第七屆立法委員席次減半，由原本226席次減為113席次，委員自主性及影響力增強，執政黨組織行政院，亦掌握立院絕對多數席次，形成一致政府。 從公共政策過程理論來看，一個政策的推行，必須透過法律的制定、修正、廢止等方式，送請立機關完成政策合法化過程。本文從兵役法修法過程中，來探討國防部與立法委員互動關係，以提出加強其互動的具體建議。 基於以上的認知，本論文的發現如下： 一、法案草擬階段未讓立法委員有參與機會，使得政策規劃結果未能滿足立法委員的期許。 二、募兵制配套規劃尚未整合，法案先行送審，至國防部立論基礎薄弱，無法說服立法委員支持。 三、未公布政策影響評估，造成立法委員無法認同，讓立法委員對於募兵制無法成功產生的戰力空窗所造成的威脅感到質疑而無法認同法案。 四、與政策利害關係人的溝通不足，成為政策推動的阻力。 五、政策規劃評估不足，考量範圍不夠，形成爭議，造成立委抗拒。 六、立法委員對國防政策專業程度不足，需加強政策溝通。 七、挾持法案的議價協商，實際上係以其他利益交換為目的。 八、立法委員為貫徹黨紀，必要時，個人政治理念須妥協，國防部在政策溝通上，除了立法委員個人意見外，亦須積極遊說黨團。 / The military service system in Taiwan, or the Republic of China (R.O.C) Military Service System, has been gradually heading from a predominantly-conscription mode of recruitment, first adopted during the Period of the Second Sino-Japanese War, toward a predominantly-voluntary recruitment plan. To intiate such a transition and to keep the promises he gave before the 2008 presidential election, the president of the Taiwan (R.O.C.) Ma Ying-jeou urges that the Ministry of National Defense in Taiwan contrive a plan for the necessary modifications in the Taiwanese (R.O.C) law regarding the military service system. Also relating to this, it is to note that a 50% reduction of the number of the seats in the Legislative Yuan in the 7th general election of legislators, from 226 to 113 seats, granted each legislator more autonomy and opportunity to extend his/her personal influence than before, and that Taiwan was hence led by a government whose executive and legislative power came hand in hand becuase the ruling party not only able to organize the Executive Yuan but it also comprised the absolute majority in the Legislative Yuan, after the 2008 election. All taken into considertations, this dissertation aims to provide concrete suggestions as to the enhancement of the quality of the interactions between the Ministry of National Defense and legislators, from the analysis of such modifications. theoretically speaking, have to undergo the due processes to be implemented: the codification of law, a modification period, the abrogation of the inappropriate items of law, and a final evaluation by the Legislative Yuan. The findings are as follows: 1.The legislators' complaints about the unsatisfactory results of military policymaking may arise from a lack of opportunity for them to participate in the early processes. 2.Failure in establishing complementary measures for voluntary military recruitment before it reaches the Legislative Yuan, as well as a flimsy theoretical basis on which the Ministry of National Defense argues for it, make it difficult to persuade legislators that they should implement the new policies. 3.Legislators’ common worries about an imminent though transient threat, of a laspe of national armed force, which is deemed to be highly likely to result from such a change, have not been officially accounted for by the Ministry of National Defense. This prevents the legislators from agreeing to it. 4.The lack of effective communication among stakeholders of the policy impedes its implementation. 5.The lack of careful evaluations and an inclusive framework, make it controversial and legislators hate it. 6.Legislators are not proficient in the policymaking in terms of national defense, so the need more communication. 7.Negotiations are sometimes based on other commercial purposes. 8.Individual legislators, if necessary, are coerced to conform to the ideology upheld by their greater political party. The Ministry of National Defense has also to take into accounts the benefits of political parties.

本研究以台灣地區（包括台北市、高雄市與台灣省）為範圍，鄉鎮市區為基本單元，1989年到1995年的立法委員選舉為標的，使用人文區位研究途徑，來分析區域發展與政黨競爭之間的關係。在代表政黨競爭的自變項上，分別以各政黨在立法委員選舉中的得票率競爭程度，以及各政黨的得票率為變數。至於描述區域發展的自變項上，主要可分成兩個部分。橫斷面上由自然區位因素（包括都市化程度、工商業場所單位經營狀況、藍領階級比例、年輕人口比例、外省人口比例），以及政治區位因素（包括決算補助比例、縣市票源凝聚程度、鄉鎮市區票源凝聚程度、縣市地方派系強度虛擬變項、鄉鎮市區派系強度虛擬變項）作為自變項。在縱剖面上，則以時間的虛擬變項作為自變項，以反映長期的影響因素。在以各政黨當屆立委得票率為依變項時，則再加入當屆省市議員與上屆立法委員各政黨的得票率，來測量選舉慣性的影響力。 此外，並分別由區分為三個集群的集群面，以及整體面來進行迴歸分析。 研究結果發現，在各模型中較為重要而顯著的變數都與假設方向一致。其中都市化程度、工商業場所單位經營狀況、年輕人口比例，以及縣市票源凝聚程度會升高政黨競爭程度；而決算補助比、鄉鎮市區票源凝聚程度，以及縣市級地方派系則會減弱政黨競爭程度。都市化程度、工商業場所單位經營狀況，以及縣市票源凝聚程度對國民黨得票率不利，而外省人口比例則由1992年之前的有利，轉向為1995年的不利；但決算補助比例、縣市級地方派系強，以及鄉鎮市區票源凝聚程度都對國民黨得票率有利。都市化程度、工商業場所單位經營狀況以及縣市票源凝聚程度對民進黨得票率有利；而外省人口比例、決算補助比，以及鄉鎮市區票源凝聚程度則對民進黨得票率不利。都市化程度、工商業場所單位經營狀況、外省人口比例，以及年輕人口比例，均對新黨得票率有利；決算補助比、鄉鎮市區票源凝聚程度，以及各級地方派系不論強弱，均對新黨得票率不利。 在合併時間序列的分析上，隨著時間的推演，政黨得票率競爭程度也隨之升高，同時對國民黨得票率愈來愈不利，而對民進黨得票率愈來愈有利。此外不論是對哪一個政黨的得票率來說，選舉慣性因素的影響力都相當顯著。不過不同選舉還是有所不同，以同類型的選舉影響較大。 另一方面，經由對R 值的觀察，我們也發現政治區位因素在多數的情況下，其解釋力會大於自然區位因素。同時區位因素最適合用以解釋新黨的得票率，不過整體而言多數模型都有解釋力愈來愈高的趨勢，顯示近年來區域發展因素對於政黨競爭的解釋力較過去提升不少。 最後，透過區分集群的方式，有助於突顯出特定區域類型，以表現出其中更為強烈或更為微弱的，區域發展與政黨競爭之間的關係。可避免僅就整體面進行分析，使這些集群的特性消失，反倒不易瞭解區域發展與政黨競爭之間的真正關係的缺失。 第一章　緒論 壹、政黨競爭與選舉 貳、台灣的選舉競爭：國民黨的控制與反對黨的興起 參、選舉研究：個體或總體 肆、區域與區域發展 伍、台灣的區域發展：進步但不均衡 陸、區域發展與政黨競爭 第二章 文獻檢閱 壹、區域發展與人文區位指標 貳、選舉競爭與總體資料研究 參、整合性研究的需要 第三章 理論架構與研究方法 壹、研究範圍與內容 貳、研究架構與假設 參、變數建構與資料來源 肆、統計方法 第四章 變數的典型相關與鄉鎮市區的集群分析 壹、典型相關分析 貳、集群分析 參、依變項在整體面與集群面上之觀察 肆、討論與小結 第五章 區域發展因素對政黨競爭的影響－集群面的觀察 壹、第一集群的分析結果 貳、第二集群的分析結果 參、第三集群的分析結果 肆、討論與小結 第六章 區域發展因素對政黨競爭的影響－整體面的觀察 壹、影響政黨得票率競爭程度的區域發展因素研究 貳、影響政黨得票率的區域發展因素研究 參、整體面與集群面的比較 參、討論與小結 第七章 結論 壹、研究回顧與成果 貳、檢討與建議 參考書目 附錄一 國內以人文區位指標進行區域發展研究的相關論文列表 附錄二 國內以人文區位途徑進行選舉研究的相關論文列表 附錄三 各變數之相關係數、平均數與標準差 附錄四 各迴歸分析詳細列表 附錄五 各變數資料 / The thesis is an ecological analysis of competition between major parties (the KMT, DPP, and NP) in the 1989, 1992, and 1995 elections for Taiwan's Legislative Yuan. The unit of analysis is the "Hsiang" (rural township), "Chen" (urban township), "Shih" (county city), or "Ch'u" (precict), and we separate all of the local area units into three clusters to obtain the ecological determinants of the degree of competition between major parties. We explore the relative influence of ecological conditions of local units on the election returns over the six year period. The results of regression analysis indicate that major significant variables are in accordance with theoretical assumptions. Urbanization, development of industry and commerce, high percentage of youth in the population, and high degree of voting consistency in a county can raise the degree of competition between major parties, but a high percentage of the budget from subsidies, law degree of voting consistency in a township, and strong county factions can reduce it. Urbanization, development of industry and commerce, and degree of voting consistency in a county have influence on the percentage of the vote lost by the KMT's candidates, and percentage of the budget from subsidies and strong local county factions influence the percentage of the vote won by the KMT's candidates. A high percentage of mainlanders contributes to the KMT's vote share before 1992, but becomes disadvantageous in 1995. Urbanization, development of industry and commerce, and degree of voting consistency in a county are beneficial to the DPP, but a high percentage of mainlanders, a high percentage of the budget from subsidies, and a high degree of voting consistency in a township are harmful to it. Urbanization, development of industry and commerce, a high percentage of mainlanders, and a high percentage of youth in the population have a positive influence on the NP's vote, but a high percentage of the budget from subsidies, a high degree of voting consistency in a township, and strong local factions have a negative influence towards it. Longitudinal analyses find that the time factor intensifies the degree of competition between major parties in favor of the DPP. Electoral inertia, or the retrospective effects of the last election, has a powerful influence on the vote share of the KMT, DPP, and NP. Also the same type of elections has more influence than different types. Finally, through clusters analyses we can identify various types of groups which reveal various relationships between development of regions and competition between major parties.