決策的本質在於未來情況的不確定性，而良好的經濟決策有賴於充分適切的資訊，隨著證券市場環境的不斷變化，投資者對於資訊品質的要求日益提高，尤其是有助於投資者減少風險及不確定性之盈餘預測資訊，何以故？因為盈餘預測資訊攸關投資決策之制定。 盈餘預測之準確性為預測資訊有用性的先決條件。本研究首先比較管理當局與財務分析師盈餘預測之相對準確性，其次，探討影響管理當局揭露盈餘預測資訊之因素是否存有有系統性差異，俾供投資者制定投資決策時之參考，並希望對有關機關制定盈餘預測政策有所幫助。 本研究採用在管理當局盈餘預測發佈前最後一個財務分析師盈餘預測（前財務分析師盈餘預測），以及管理當局盈餘預測發佈後第一個財務分析師盈餘預測（後財務分析師盈餘預測）為樣本，分別與管理當局盈餘預測比較預測準確性；此外，更進一步探討兩組配對樣本之管理當局與財務分析師盈餘預測之相對準確性關係，是否因為年度別、預測揭露時機、企業規模大小及企業盈餘變異性高低之不同而有所差異。其次，有關影響管理當局揭露盈餘預測資訊之因素方面，係由企業盈餘變異性高低、管理當局盈餘預測揭露時機與揭露型態之兩兩關係加以探討。由於本研究之樣本資料非呈常態分配，故以無母數統計檢定方法從事資料之分析。 根據實證結果顯示：一、管理當局盈餘預測之準確性優於前財務分析師盈餘預測，而後財務分析師盈餘預測之準確性優於管理當局盈餘預測，二、管理當局與前財務分析師盈餘預測之相對準確性關係，除企業規模大小外，將因為年度別、預測揭露時機及仩業盈餘變異性高低之不同而有所差異，但管理當局與後財務分析師盈餘預測之相對準確性關係，並不因為年度別、預測揭露時機、企業規模大小，及企業盈餘變異性高低之不同而有所差異，三、盈餘變異性愈高之企業管理當局傾向於愈晚發佈盈餘預測資訊，四、盈餘變異性愈高之企業管理當局傾向於發佈好消息之盈餘預測資訊，五、企業管理當局傾向於愈早發佈好消息之盈餘預測資訊，而儘量延遲發佈壞消息之盈餘預測資訊。

現今，世界經濟脈動迅速，科技發展日新月異，如何在瞬息萬變的趨勢洪流中掠取先機，端賴自身競爭力強弱而定。然而管理當局短視行為的發生，卻易損及企業的競爭優勢，甚至對企業未來有不利影響。造成管理當局短視之因源於多方面，來自資本市場投資人的影響即為其一。而資本市場中，機構投資人往往是大家注目的焦點，因此本研究乃對機構投資人持股比例與管理當局短視行為的關係進行探討，並期望能對公司治理制度的擬定上有所助益。 本研究以民國八十四年至民國九十年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司研究其管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例間的關係，並探究在電子與非電子產業間兩者關係是否相同。此外，本研究亦比較機構投資人與個人投資者，各自持股比例與管理當局短視行為的相關情形，進以探尋真正能發揮監理機制的投資人類別。 實證結果顯示：(1)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例高低有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例間則有顯著的正向關係。(2)在非電子產業中，機構投資人持股與管理當局短視行為呈顯著負向關係，而電子產業中兩者則無顯著關係。(3)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例變動的幅度有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例變動則有顯著的正向關係。(4)在非電子股產業方面，機構投資人持股比例變動幅度與管理短視行為間無顯著關係；但在電子產業中，則兩者間呈現顯著之負向關係。 / Nowadays, the economy situation is changing so fast and the development of new technology has altered with each passing day. To be ahead of their competitors, firms must sharpen their competitive edge. However, management myopia often damage their competitive advantages and would do harm to the firms in the future. The phenomenon of management myopia is derived from many reason, one of them is the effect of the investors in the capital market. Furthermore, participants in the capital market always pay attention to the behavior of institution investors. Thus, this research explores the relationships between the ownership of institution investors and management myopic. We hope it would be beneficial to the enactment of the system of corporate governance. This research focuses on the relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors of the listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1995 to 2001. It also explores if the relationship is the same in both electronic industry and non-electronic industries. Besides, the study also compares the effect of the ownership of individual or institution investors on the management myopia in order to point out the type of investors that can provide monitory function clearly. The empirical study indicates that (1) there is a significant negative relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors. Conversely, there is a significant positive relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of individual investors. (2) In the electronic industry, the relationship between the ownership of institution investors and the myopic behavior of management is not significant. However, it is significant negative in other industries. (3) The change of percentage of ownership of institution investors has significant negative relationship with the management myopia. However, it is opposite to the individual investors. (4) No significant relationship between the institution investors and the management myopic in non-electronic industries. But in the electronic industry, it is significant negative.

本論文以公司規模大小、公司成長率、盈餘變異程度、盈餘持續率、負債比率、系統風險、以及產業別為控制變數，探討管理當局持股比率與管理當局自願性（強制性）盈餘預測準確度、盈餘管理程度之關係。並進一步探討管理當局持股比率與七個控制變數之交互作用對管理當局自願性（強制性）盈餘預測準礁度及盈餘管理程度之影響。 　　本實證研究結果發現： 　　1、自願性盈餘預測方面： 　　(1)管理當局持股比率越高且盈餘變異程度越大之公司，盈餘預測誤差越高，盈餘預測準確度越低。 　　(2)管理當局持股比率越高且負債比率越高之公司，盈餘預測誤差越高，盈餘預測準確度越低。 　　(3)產業別會影響其預測準確度，而產業中以鋼鐵業之盈餘預測準確度，顯著較高。 　　(4)公司成長率越高、盈餘持續率越高，其盈餘管理程度越高。 　　(5)產業中以電子業有顯著較高之盈餘管理程度。 　　2、強制性盈餘預測力面： 　　(1)管理當局持股比率與盈餘預測準確度成正相關。 　　(2)公司規模與盈餘預測準確度成負相關。 　　(3)盈餘持續率與盈餘預測準確度成負相關。 　　(4)產業別確實與強制性盈餘預測準確度有關，其中以電子業之盈餘預測準確度顯著較低。 　　(5)管理當局持股比率越高之紡織業其盈餘預測準確度顯著較低。 　　(6)強制性盈餘預測並無顯著的盈餘管理情況產生。 　　3、綜合結論： 　　(1)自願性之盈餘預測準確度高於強制性之盈餘預測準確度。 　　(2)自願性之盈餘管理程度高於強制性之盈餘管理程度。 / This research hypothesizes that the level of managerial ownership that controlling for earnings growth、earnings variability、earnings persistence、company risk、 debt、industry、and size has effect on both the magnitude of forecast precise of voluntary(compelling) forecast and the magnitude of discretionary accounting accrual adjustment. 　　In addition，this study examines that there are interaction of ownership effects on both the magnitude of forecast precise of voluntary (compelling) forecast and the magnitude of discretionary accounting accrual adjustment. 　　The empirical results show as follow: 　　1、Voluntary forecast aspect: 　　(1) Managerial ownership is negatively associated with the magnitude of forecast precise. 　　(2) Managerial ownership of is positively associated with the magnitude of discretionary accounting accrual adjustment. 　　2、Compelling forecast aspect: 　　(1) Managerial ownership is positively associated with the magnitude of forecast precise. 　　(2) Managerial ownership is not associated with the magnitude of discretionary accounting accrual adjustment. 　　3、Conclusion explication: 　　(1) The magnitude of forecast precise of voluntary forecast is more than that of compelling forecast. 　　(2) The magnitude of discretionary accounting accrual adjustment of voluntary forecast is more than that of compelling forecast. 　　(3) Industry variable indeed affects both the magnitude of forecast precise and the magnitude of discretionary accounting accrual adjustment.

本研究旨在探討管理當局自願性盈餘預測與權益資金成本之關聯性，檢視管理當局發布盈餘預測頻率之影響是否反應於權益資金成本上，並進一步檢視管理當局之聲譽是否為影響權益資金成本的因素之一。 在本研究的實證分析結果中，發現管理當局發布自願性盈餘預測之頻率與權益資金成本呈顯著負相關，表示管理當局發布盈餘預測的次數越多時，權益資金成本越低。 在管理當局聲譽對於權益資金成本的影響，本研究實證分析結果發現，管理當局之聲譽與權益資金成本亦呈顯著負相關，管理當局聲譽以管理當局預測誤差和分析師預測誤差來衡量，當管理當局的盈餘預測誤差小於分析師盈餘預測誤差時，投資人認為管理當局對盈餘的預測有效且值得信賴，此時管理當局聲譽提高，投資人認為取得有用的資訊，進而降低企業權益資金成本。 / The primary objective of this thesis is to explore whether the frequency of management forecasts is related to the cost of equity capital. In addition, I further examine whether the association is stronger when management has better reputation. Basing on a sample of S&P 500 listed firms during 2000-2009, I find that, consistent with my prediction, cost of firm’s equity capital decreases with the frequency of management earning forecasts after controlling for other determinants well-documented to be related to cost of equity capital. Second, I find that cost of equity capital is negatively related to the reputation of management; however, I do not find that the association between cost of equity capital and the frequency of management systematically vary with the reputation of management.

本研究以中國2007年至2012年的A股上市公司為研究對象，探討管理當局能力與分析師盈餘預測行為的關係，預測行為迴歸模型以分析師追蹤人數、分析師盈餘預測準確性及預測離散程度三種特性進行分析。 研究結果發現，管理當局能力與分析師追蹤人數、盈餘預測精確度皆呈現顯著正相關，與預測離散程度則為負相關，但并不顯著。這表示經理人能力較好，則分析師對該公司之追蹤意願較高，且盈餘預測誤差與預測離散度較低。本研究藉此結果推論，管理當局能力愈佳之企業，經理人愈會提供品質良好、具可靠性的財務報導，故分析師將愈信賴該公司所提供之資訊，並可幫助分析師做出更精確之盈餘預測，並降低彼此間之預測誤差。 / This study examines the relation between managerial ability and financial analysts’ earnings forecast behaviors in China from 2007 to 2012. We use several analysts’ attributes: number of analysts following, forecasts error, and forecasts dispersion. According to the empirical results, in general, analysts tend to follow firms with more ability of managers, and managers with superior ability might decrease analysts’ forecast errors and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts.

本研究旨在探討管理當局發佈自願性盈餘預測意願、預測精確度、預測型態與管理當局能力之關聯性，並進一步檢測能力較佳之管理當局所發佈之盈餘預測對投資人是否具增額資訊內涵。 實證分析結果顯示管理當局能力與管理當局發佈盈餘預測之機率呈顯著正相關，亦即管理當局能力愈好，發佈盈餘預測之機率愈高；再者，本研究發現能力愈佳之管理當局，其盈餘預測之精確度亦會較高；而實證結果亦顯示當管理當局能力較好時，較願意以資訊量較多之完整式財務預測型態發佈財務預測。增額測試結果則顯示市場對於能力較佳之管理當局發佈之自願性盈餘預測反應程度較高。 / The primary objective of this thesis is to explore whether the managerial ability is related to management earnings forecast, earnings forecast accuracy , and disclosure format. Additionally, this thesis investigates whether managerial ability increases the informativeness of management earnings forecast for (potential) investors. Empirical results show that managers with superior ability tend to announce management earnings forecast and when managers have better ability, they shall announce more precise management earnings forecast. About disclosure format, this thesis finds that managers with superior ability prefer to announce complete earnings forecasts than simple ones. Additionally, market reaction will be more to the informativeness of management earnings forecast which made by managers with better ability.

本研究之目的在探討，上期對本期所做之盈餘預測與本期實際盈餘間誤差所產生之未預期盈餘，對於管理階層在本期預測下期盈餘以及財務分析師針對該預測所作之預測修正，即對於該兩者的攸關性是否會隨著34號公報之實施而提高，也就是說，在34號公報實施之後，未預期盈餘對於管理當局盈餘預測以及分析師預測修正之影響，是否會更加顯著相關。 實證結果顯示，不論34號公報適用前後，管理當局盈餘預測與未預期盈餘之間皆具有攸關性，但在34號公報適用之後，兩者之間的顯著性並未增強；而另一方面，在34號公報適用前後，財務分析師盈餘預測修正與未預期盈餘之間皆具有攸關性，且在34號公報適用之後，兩者之間的顯著性有增強。 / This thesis examines whether the issuance of SFAS No.34 can heighten the association between the unexpected earnings for current period and the management earnings forecast for the next period. This research also examines if the issuance of SFAS No.34 will heighten the relationship between the unexpected earnings for current period and the analysts’ revision of the management earnings forecast for the next period. The unexpected earnings mean the difference between the earnings forecast for current period and the actual earnings in current period This thesis finds that there is a negative association between management earnings forecast and the error of the expected earnings whether SFAS No.34 has been issued or not, but the issuance of SFAS No.34 doesn’t heighten the association between the management earnings forecast and the error of the expected earnings. Besides, the result of the research shows that there is a positive relationship between the analyst’s revision of the management earnings forecast and the error of the expected earnings. Furthermore, the relationship is heightened by the issuance of SFAS No.34.

本研究以中國2007年至2013年盈餘預測的A股上市公司為主體。探討管理當局發佈強制性盈餘預測的預測形態、預測誤差以及市場反應與管理當局能力之關聯性，並進一步檢測管理當局能力是否影響到其對於強制性盈餘預告門檻的規避以及對於來年發佈自願性業績預測的意願。 實證的結果顯示管理當局能力越好其提供的強制性盈餘預測的形式越精準其預告資訊含量越多；再者，管理當局能力越好，其盈餘預測的誤差越低；實證結果也證明了市場對於能力較佳之管理當局所發佈的強制性盈餘預測的反應程度也較高。增額測試的結果顯示管理當局能力佳者盈餘品質較佳，具體表現為：相較於能力差的管理者，管理當局能力較好時不會通過盈餘管理去避免導因於產生增長50%或是下降50%而強制發佈盈餘預告的門檻。另外，管理當局能力越好，其在隔年度發佈自願性盈餘預測的幾率也越高。 關鍵詞：管理當局能力、強制性盈餘預測、預測形態、盈餘預測誤差、市場反應 / This thesis focuses on mandatory forecast issued from 2007 to 2013 in China and investigate whether managerial ability is related to mandatory forecasts types, forecast error and market reaction. Additionally, this thesis also examines whether managerial ability decrease the likelihood to avoid mandatory forecast thresholds. Finally, whether the managerial ability will increase the probability of issuing voluntary forecasts in the following year is an interesting but unsolved issue; I will fill the gap. Empirical results show that managers with superior ability tend to issue mandatory forecasts in the more precise type. As for the accuracy, the mandatory forecasts issued by better managers tend to have less error. I also find that managerial ability can promotes the informativeness of management earnings forecasts for the public. Additionally, high ability managers are less likely to avoid the thresholds of mandatory forecasts. Furthermore, better managers are more likely to issue voluntary forecasts in the following year of mandatory forecasts. Key Words: Managerial Ability, Mandatory Earnings Forecast, Forecast Format, Forecast Error, Market Reaction.

事業部制組織型態，係一種集權管制、分權管理的組織型態。將組織的利潤責任（P- rofit Responsibility）劃分給若干獨立自主的事業部門（Divisions ），各事業部 門分別擁有獨自的產品與市場，而將其經營活動所產生的盈虧損益向企業最高管理當 局（Top management）負責；最高管理當局得以客觀的立場，根據各事業部門的營運 損益，衡量並評估其經營績效與成果，同時，加強各事業部門之間的協調與聯繫，掌 握對各事業部門的指揮、監督與控制之權，使企業本身得以維持並鞏固其完整性與統 一性。 本論文計十萬字，共分六章，第一章為緒論，說明撰寫本論文之動機與目的、方法與 範圍。第二章為事業部制的組織型態，說明事業部制的概念與組織型態的界定，並結 合組織的基本型態，以探討事業部制的組織型態。第三章為事業部制組織型態的採行 與設計，從﹁分化﹂的觀點，探討採行的原因與條件，從而檢討其分化設計。第四章 為事業部制組織型態的管理與運作，從﹁整合﹂的觀點，探討集權管制的措施。從理 論轉為整合制度。第五章為個案分析，以美國通用汽車公司（GM）與台塑關係企業例 ，說明其所採之事業部制的實際運作情形，並以之與理論上的探討作一對照的分析。 第六章為結論，指出事業部制組織型態所面臨的問題及改進的建議。