本研究主要探討裁量性紅利對企業未來財務績效之激勵效果，而本研究係以2010年美國S&P500公司作為研究對象，研究期間為2006年至2010年。實證結果顯示：(1)依據主觀績效衡量所發放的裁量性紅利確實可以對企業未來財務績效產生激勵效果；(2)獎酬契約運用主觀與客觀績效衡量時，主觀績效衡量所發放的裁量性紅利佔總紅利比重愈高，對於企業未來財務績效激勵效果愈高；(3)裁量性紅利對於企業未來後續財務績效具有長期激勵效果；(4)績效較低之企業發予高階經理人主觀績效衡量之裁量性紅利，對於企業未來財務績效仍具有激勵效果。 / The study investigate the impact of discretionary bonus on the future firm financial performance. Based on a sample of 2010 S&P500 companies spanning from 2006 and 2010. I find : (1) Discretionary bonus, which was measured subjectively, can improve future firm financial performance. (2) The more proportion of discretionary bonus to total bonus can improve more future firm financial performance. (3) Discretionary bonus can improve the long-term future firm financial performance. (4) Using subjectively discretionary bonus to CEOs on low-profit-company can improve the future firm financial performance.

近年來，國際間政府推動資訊公開蔚為風潮，伴隨著資訊通信科技的發展，電子化政府和政府網站更普遍被各界視為一個低成本且高效率的透明化途徑。台灣的政府網站長期受到國際間高度評價，在發展中國家更是名列前茅。然而，既有的研究與調查大多數僅片面側重於政府供給面的探究，通常以化約且可標準化的指標來評鑑特定政府網站的介面資訊功能。相形之下，鮮少有關注民眾的需求認知、機關政策執行以及網站內容評估等較全面的研究成果供參。因而無法更深入地釐清政府網站、法制和政策執行績效不彰等困境與透明化治理之間的關聯。 在委託代理理論的運用之下，本研究兼顧政府治理中委託方民眾的認知以及代理方政府機關的經驗與成效。目的在於釐清網站資訊公開供給和需求的現況與問題，並更具體地檢證政府網站資訊公開對機關施政資訊揭露、績效衡量和政府課責的影響。爰此，研究者參與多項網站資訊公開相關研究，以蒐集多元化次級資料，包括：量化的網路民眾問卷調查，各級機關的跨年度問卷調查，機關網站內容評估比較，以及質性的個別訪談、焦點團體座談。藉由理論聚焦與多重研究方法的交叉檢證分析，以達研究綜效。 研究結果分為網站資訊公開對政府施政資訊揭露，施政績效衡量，以及政府課責的影響三個部分來討論。首先，相較於法制，網站資訊公開更有助於揭露政府施政資訊，特別是網站資訊公開實施過程可呈現出政府治理內、外部的多重代理關係及代理問題，甚至可緩和部分的代理問題。其次，網站資訊公開可具體地呈現並衡量施政績效，以因應傳統官僚體系內各層代理績效難以衡量的困境。但囿於目前整體制度缺乏績效誘因設計，而限制了此效益。最後，因整體資訊公開績效制度的匱乏，也使得網站資訊公開對政府課責的效益備受限制。 整體而言，本研究揭示了代理理論應用於政府治理的價值，並檢證政府資訊公開、績效和課責等三項治理要件的關聯。研究成果可彌補實務與研究的落差，並對相關文獻做出貢獻。 / In recent years, governments from around the world have adopted Freedom of Information Act to increase transparency in their governance. With advancements in information and communication technologies (ICTs), e-Government has been seen as a cost-effective and possible mean to promote openness and transparency. Taiwan’s efforts to develop e-Government services have been well-recognized; especially, have made remarkable advantages among developing countries. Nevertheless, most of the existing researches in evaluating e-Government service are based on supply-side indicators and often assess websites alone; as yet, little information is available on the demand aspect of e-Government. The paper aims to explore the potential and practice of government website information disclosure in terms of the perspective of end user and government agencies. The results show the significance of three aspects in information disclosure of Taiwanese government websites through the application of quantitative and qualitative methodology, including self-administered questionnaire, website evaluation, individual interview, and focus group interview. First, government website information disclosure benefits the revelation of government information, manifestation of multi-agent relationships in internal and external governance of government, and alleviation of partial ageny problems. Second, government website information disclosure enhances revealing and measuring the performance of government agencies; nevertheless, in which the effectiveness is limited due to the absence of institutional incentives. Third, under the circumstances of unsound institution, the effectiveness of accountability has difficulties to be thoroughly realized through government website information disclosure. In sum, the finding contributes to a valuable reference for other countries in implementing information transparency of e-Government, and has significant implications for policy makers, government agencies, and system designers.

第一章 緒論：第一節、研究的動機、方法和目的。第二節、組織控制的緣起。第三 節、組織控制的概念發展。一、傳統概念，二、傳統概念的批判，三、現代的意義。 第四節、組織控制的基本程序。 第二章 組織控制的類型分析：第一節、分析基礎：系統的策略資訊。第二節、事後 控制。第三節、事前控制。第四節、事中控制。第五節、分析結語。一、成員對各控 制類型的可能反應，二、綜合類型。 第三章 組織控制的實務：第一節、生產作業控制。一、投入項的事前控制，二、作 業的事中控制，三、輸出的事後控制。第二節、財務控制。一、財務資源的事前控制 ，二、財務資源的事中控制，三、財務資源的事後控制。第三節、組織行為的控制。 一、政策及程序途徑，二、績效衡量－－反饋途徑，三、激勵途徑，四、行為改變術 ，五、參與管理途徑。 第四章 組織控制的功能檢視：第一節、組織控制的正功能。一、適應方面，二、目 標達成方面，三、模式維持方面，四、整合方面。第二節、組織控制的負功能。一、 負功能產生原因，二、官僚行為，三、策略行為，四、不實報告，五、抗拒行為，六 、疏離感。 第五章 結論：第一節、組織控制負功能的消融。第二節、有效組織控制的設計。一 、哲學基礎的選擇。二、誰來控制，三、控制與工作性質配合，四、通則歸納。

台灣發行量加權股價指數在編製時並未調整現金股利的影響，不僅會低估實際的投資報酬率，以其作為標竿指標，在評估共同基金績效時，亦會產生標竿錯誤的問題。因此，本文將現金股利的再投資報酬納入，重新編製加權股價指數。實證結果發現，若自民國75年起調整現金股利之影響，則在民國89年10月31日時，股價指數由5544.18點調整為6419.83點，約增加1.16倍。以新指數重新衡量基金績效的結果，發現績效排名並無大幅度的改變，而且基金績效是否擊敗大盤的情形，受新指標的影響亦不大，此乃因近年來上市公司配息少，而且基金績效非常極端。但基於理論上的正確性，在計算投資報酬率及評估共同基金績效時，仍應以納入現金股利之加權股價指數為基礎，以降低因標竿指標錯誤所造成研究結果的偏誤，否則未來我國股票配息的情況及基金報酬率的特性若改變之後，以過去的方式評估績效將可能造成極大之偏差。 / The Taiwan Stock Exchange Market Weighted Index (TAIEX) is not adjusted for cash dividend. Since the TAIEX is commonly used for calculating the investment return of the Taiwan’s market and as the benchmark index for mutual fund performance evaluation, the investment return in Taiwan is underestimated and there is benchmark error in the evaluation of mutual fund performance. This paper adjusts the TAIEX by incorporating the effect of the reinvestment of cash dividend in the TAIEX. The beginning date of our adjustment is January 4, 1986. Since then until the end of October 2000, the adjusted TAIEX grew to 1.16 times of the unadjusted index. However, The mutual fund performance evaluated based on the adjusted index is insignificantly different from that based on the un-adjusted index. This is because mutual funds have extreme performance. Due to the small cash dividend paid out by the listed firms on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, the adjustment effect is not enough to overturn the evaluation of

全權委託投資業務(俗稱代客操作),在證券市場中提供專業投資管理服務。我國證期會於民國81年，政策性地決定將開放此項業務。雖然整個規範體系已在民國87年建立，但它忽略掉經濟層面之考量，勢必造成全權委託投資契約無效率。 目前規範體系所允許之委託報酬的計算方法，稱之為「固定佣金制度」，由於此制度無法對業者提供經濟誘因，它會引發業者有嚴重之道德危險發生。因此，為解決誘因問題，應該使用「績效佣金制度」，不過在目前股市環境下，此一制度則引入過高之風險。因此，為解決兩種制度所帶來之問題，本文提出「改良式績效佣金制度」，在此制度下，委託報酬除基於傳統財務績效衡量值外，並基於非財務性績效衡量值，本文稱之為前瞻性績效衡量值（簡稱F-LPM）。 本文使用兩期之「主理人-代理人」模型，推導出最適委託報酬制度以及相關之比較靜態。在基本模式之下，本文進一步探討F-LPM之相關屬性及功能。所得結果與相關文獻一致，首先是，在最適委託報酬制度下，納入F-LPM可降低業者過度地重視短期，因而犧牲了委任人之報酬，這表示F-LPM具有增額資訊內涵。其次，無成本地提高F-LPM之精確度，可增加委任人之報酬。最後，改良式績效佣金制度優於固定佣金制度與績效佣金制度，因為它可降低風險，因而帶給委任人之報酬增加。 第壹章 緒論 第一節 / Discretion account business provides professional investment management service in the securities market. The Securities and Futures Commission decides in policy to approve the business in 1992. Althrough the regulation system of the discretion account business has been established, it will make the advisory contract inefficient with the negligence of economic consideration. The form of advisory fees permitted by the regulation system is 'constant fee system'. Under the system, advisory contract provides no incentive and serious moral harazd will occur. In order to solve the motivation problem, 'performance fee system' should be used. Under the circumstance of Taipei securities market, however, the performance fee system will bring in high risk. Hence, this paper suggests the 'improved performance fee system' to overcome the dilemma born by the performance fee system. In the improved system, advisory fees are based on the traditional performance measure and the fordward-looking performance measure (hereafter F-LPM). With a two-period principal-agent model, this paper develops the optimal reward system and related comparative static. Following the basic model, the paper examines the attributes and function of F-LPM. The findings are consistent with the related literature. First, the inclusion of a F-LPM in reward system can mitigate the potential for the advisor to focus excessively on the short-term at the expense of the investor. That is, F-LPM is incremental informative. Second, costless increases in precision of F-LPM will lead to increase in payoffs for the inveator. Finally, the improved performance fee system is superior to the constant fee system and the performance fee system in that it can reduce risk and results in higher payoffs to the investor.