本文文旨在探討不同委外模式對文創園區運作成效的影響。以財政資源流用與人事任用的運作架構為主要分析焦點，從合產(coproduction)分析委外運作的良窳。政府將廢棄國有工廠整建後，變更用途為文創園區再委託外部團體經營，是我國目前最常見的文創園區經營方式。選擇委外經營的主要考量在於人事任用的鬆綁以及減輕政府財政府負擔。隨著委外風潮日盛，政府委託民間參與公共服務的形式也更加細緻，類型也更加多元，不同類型的委外模式更因政府民間互動基礎相異或是委託團體性質的不同，而有不同的運作結果。 本研究選擇華山文創園區與松山文創園區為比較的案例，細究園區的委外經營模式，可以發現因為園區內各區塊因為使用功能不同，而有不同的的委外模式。本文以華山的ROT區，與松山的古蹟區作為比較研究的標的，二者分別由企業與公設財團法人經營。 研究結果發現，公設財團法人的運作，雖然有助於提供文創相關的扶持計畫，但因組織運作與架構與政府相當貼近，反而不利於政府與民間各自提供所長，共同提供公共服務而形成綜效。委託企業營運在公益性考量較受質疑，政府為解決爭議，除透過契約規定定期監督外，更透過強制企業成立基金會提供公共服務，取得公益與營利之間的平衡。委託企業經營後，政府對園區發展無須再投入預算，且可以獲得企業的回饋金。但是基金會的人事任命與預算撥用的過程由政府主導，使基金會難以脫離政府結構與政治力的影響。若以人事任用的鬆綁與減輕政府財政負擔兩個面向來看，企業經營更有助於和政府相互補合作、提高服務的產出。 / This study examines two types of outsourcing governance in promoting cultural and creative industry via rejuvenizing the abadended historic sites: by coutracting out to private company (in Huashan) versus setting up a government-sponsered foundation to run the business (in Songshan). Intensive interviews with key persons were conducted to find out the political backgrounds of the decisions. Effectiveness of two different institutional arrangements are compared to illustrate major concenrs of outsourcing decision and essential factors contributing to a successful management such cultural and creative parks. Policy implication is also mentioned in conclusion.

本研究利用 Colin Talbot (2008, 2010)提出的績效體系框架為基礎，以及利用蘇偉業（So, 2012）點出的個案比較成果，來進行研究對話，分析我國監理站在其所處之「績效體系」(performance regime)下會呈現出什麼樣的績效行為。本研究主要目的，希望能更準確的觀察內、外部的績效干預行為及其因果關係。並以績效體系為基準，將研究範圍區分為三個層次。首先，辨別出影響機關績效表現的外部組織或是利害關係人有哪些？第二，了解外部組織或是利害關係人是以何種方法來影響該機關？最後，是機關如何回應以及其產出的績效行為為何？本研究最重要的發現有二，監理站作為一整個行政體系的末梢單位，其實就是抱持「天高皇帝遠」的心態，任何制度對其的影響力都很低，原因是因為從上級開始將稽核權力下放，以及監理站本身又將其業務外包，將責任委外，也因此許多的業務對其失去考核作用。第二，本研究提出監理站的政策及服務輸送機制分析圖，上級機關負責制定政策目標，同時也設定量化的績效指標，但這種辨識政策需求並非單一方向的，也會有從社區市場出現要求的可能性。最後，在本研究所選擇的案例中，可發現在我國政府經常使用的績效管理機制因為「衡量衰竭」(measurement degradation)等作用，在實際上對監理站無法達成績效管理的目標，而使得績效管理機制淪為紀錄的功能，而最終失去管理的作用。 / This research is based on Colin Talbot (2008, 2010) who indicated the performance regime, and also based on the case study of So (2012),to analyze the performance in Taichung Motor Vehicles Office. The main purpose of this study is that hoping to accurately observe the performanceof internal and external intervention and causality. And based on the performance system, the scope of the study is divided into three levels. First, identify which external organizations or stakeholders affect the performance of this organization. Second, to understand what methods are used by those external organizations or stakeholders to influence the authorities? Finally, how the authorities respond and the performance of their output. The most important findings of this study are three. One is based on the performance framework that Colin Talbot (2008, 2010) proposed, combined with the finding from in-depth interviews, to propose the performance system diagram of our supervision station. Second, to propose the mechanism analysis chart that policy and service are delivered in the Supervision Station, in which, the higher authorities are responsible for setting policy goals, as well as to set quantified performance indicators. However, the need of identifying policy is not only one-way, there are possibilities that the needs are required by community market. Finally, according to the selected cases in this study, it is found that the performance management system used by most government departments often fail to reach the goal of performance management because of measurement effect (measurement degradation), etc., and makes the performance management mechanism only left record function, eventually lost the role of management.

推究民主政治的源頭來講，民主政治根源希臘兩個文字：demo及kratica，前者意味平民，後者代表統治，兩者合一便是平民統治的政府。而在代議政治之下，要實現主權在民的方式就是透過定期選舉來決定政治領袖的去留，此種決定政治人物去留的過程也是一個簡單的課責行為。既然民主政治的內涵包括實現人民主權以及強調領導者的責任時，政府理所當然應為其所表現負起責任，並透過選舉接受人民的檢驗，這也帶出了政治課責「political accountability」在民主運作過程中的必要性。 過去學界在討論臺灣選民是否有選舉課責之行為時，多在探討投票抉擇與施政表現或經濟表現之間的關聯性，忽略了制度的重要性，從選舉制度的觀點上，不同的選舉制度會形塑出不同的政治效果，選民對於投票的對象也受限於選制差異的影響，課責行為當然也會有不同程度的差異，本文探討臺灣選舉是否存在選舉課責？而影響選民進行課責的選制差異有何不同？透過過去十年來的選舉經驗，瞭解選舉課責在臺灣現有的立委選舉制度之下的發展狀況。 本研究透過「二元勝算對數模型」來理解不同的選制之下民眾的課責行為之差異，研究發現根據選舉課責之定義，三種不同的立委選制都有明顯選舉課責之行為，且以政黨作為課責連結的投票方式，PR選制比SMD的課責強度更是明顯，在2008及2012都可以得到驗證；SNTV雖較不強調政黨間的競爭，但仍有明顯之選舉課責行為，但礙於資料限制無法與其他選制進行比較。換句話說，選制因素在課責表現上所造成的差異並不是「有無之分」，而是「強弱之別」。一致政府責任歸屬問題雖較分立政府明顯，但因台灣並無共治之經驗，課責的區分依然不明顯。

近年來，各地不斷傳出企業無預警的經營危機，因此各產業均大力倡導公司治理的重要性，有效的公司管理，將可促進監督負責經營公司之管理階層更有效率的經營管理組織。 管理者與代理者之間的資訊不對稱，使得組織在監督與治理上產生問題。長久以來，「代理問題」存在於營利組織中，而政府組織，由於代理成本較高，代理問題更為嚴重，因此資訊對監督與治理地方政府，有其必要性。其中，應屬財務資訊最為重要，財務狀況不健全，縣市政府之建設亦不完善。 資訊之揭露為人民瞭解地方政府施政績效之管道，進而瞭解其課責程度。近來網際網路傳遞資訊的技術大幅進步，逐漸成為人民最快速且直接瞭解地方政府運作及瞭解施政績效的方式。資訊揭露之品質愈好，愈能充份表達出地方政府縣政狀況及營運績效，但目前尚無法源強制規定政府部門應於網站上公佈財務資訊，因此揭露程度之高低並不一致。 目前，台灣二十五個縣市政府網站中財務資訊揭露之情況，粗略可分為三種類型：第一種為揭露程度較高；第二種為揭露程度中等；第三種為揭露程度不足。首先，符合第一種揭露程度較高的縣市有：台中縣、南投縣、高雄縣、花蓮縣、新竹市、台中市及台北市；符合第三種揭露程度不足的縣市有：新竹縣、雲林縣及彰化縣；其餘為第二種揭露程度中等之縣市。因此可得知，台灣縣市政府網站所揭露之程度，仍有很大的改進空間。 由於縣市政府網站資訊揭露程度不同，因此，本研究探討地方政府網站揭露程度與地方政府的政治競爭活動、經濟概況、財政狀況、及新聞能見度之關係。縣市政府網站資訊揭露程度之衡量，本研究參考Perez et al.(2005)之架構，並依據國內地方政府網站內容進行資訊揭露狀況之評估，分為訊息揭露的類型、揭露特性及網站設計的可親近性三大類評估項目，分別進行計點，三項評估項目之總計即為縣市政府網站揭露之程度。 本研究分別以單變數檢定與迴歸分析探討地方政府網站資訊揭露程度與其相關因素的關聯性。首先，在單變數檢定採用t檢定與Wilcoxon檢定。分析方法為：按網站揭露程度所獲得之點數分組及按縣市所在層級分組。由結果可得知，縣市政府網站揭露程度的高低，會受到人民的教育程度、經費運用之效率所影響；層級劃分之不同的確會對縣市政府網站揭露程度造成影響，而網站設計可親近性程度與縣市所在層級之高低並非呈現正向關係；其次，分別以縣市政府網站揭露程度、網站設計的可親近性程度、網站訊息揭露的特性及訊息揭露的類型對政治因素、經濟因素、財務槓桿因素、市政財富因素及新聞能度等經濟政治因素進行迴歸分析。結果發現，縣市政府政治競爭效果、財務槓桿效果、市政財富效果及新聞能見度效果與縣市政府網站揭露程度之高低呈現負向關係，經濟變數與縣市政府網站揭露程度之高低呈現正向關係，且財務槓桿及市政財富對網站揭露程度不完全顯著，確實存在資訊不對稱、透明度不高的問題，因此縣市政府之資訊揭露機制尚有待進行改進；此外，本研究將樣本分成五個區域進行迴歸分析以驗證縣市政府所在區域對網站揭露程度之影響，由結果可得知，位於中區之縣市，整體而言較其他縣市表現好。綜上所述，地方政府經費運用之績效較低，應適度降低冗員的比例，積極培育人才，將組織內部人力資本之績效達到最高；另一方面，多數縣市政府其融資需求之值大於零，意指地方政府歲出大於歲入。地方政府應通盤考量，精確計算出縣市政府年度預算，且盡力創造政府稅收，使歲出歲入達到平衡。 關鍵詞：地方政府、透明度、課責性、網路揭露

公共設施的設立雖被視為公共利益的增進，但我國公共設施閒置的現象卻也十分普遍，因而引發許多關注、爭議與批評，使閒置公共設施活化的議題，成為近年行政管理的重要目標。對此，本文的研究目標有二:首先透過政策終結的理論觀點，探討我國閒置公共設施進行活化的決定因素；其次，在確保活化目標的基礎上，更進一步探討活化過程的課責機制，以行政、法律、政治、專業等四種面向進行分析。試圖對未來的活化策略以及課責機制的精進，提供實務上之政策建議。 依據上述目標，本研究以行政院公共工程委員會104年第三季的113個列管案件為分析對象，透過系統性的文獻分析與整理，以及利害關係人的深度訪談進行實證研究。由研究結果可知，法律障礙、經濟成本與心理抗拒等三項因素，是誘發我國閒置公共設施選擇進行全面活化的主要因素；而若從活化執行過程的課責機制面向來看，行政課責與政治課責是亟待改進之處。 最後，依據研究成果，本文提出之研究建議包含：（一）強化機關的政策評估能力：在公共建設計畫的編審作業階段嚴格要求成本效益分析、環境影響評估的執行，以強化計畫與人民需求之間的連結；（二）納入公民參與機制：透過公聽會、座談會的舉行，瞭解人民需求，確保政府決策的公開透明，並強化政府與人民間的信任關係；（三）建立適當的退場機制：針對區位不佳或活化成本過高的列管案件，給予適度的法規鬆綁，以避免閒置公共設施的再次閒置。 / Although public facilities are built to promote public interest, idle public facilities are everywhere in Taiwan. This so-called “mosquito houses” phenomena have gotten public attention to cast doubts on government effectiveness. In response, government activates a new program to reinventing idle public facilities. This research is design to explore the factors through which government implements the reinventing program. Under the guidance of policy termination and accountability theories, this study explores the mechanism of accountability behind the reinventing program in four dimensions, included political accountability, bureaucratic accountability, legal accountability and professional accountability. This research is expected to provide theoretical answers and practical suggestion to enhance the reinventing program as well as the mechanism of accountability behind public facilities construction decisions. This research utilizes government documents to analyze 113 “mosquito house” cases monitored by Public Construction Commission, Executive Yuan as well as literature review and in-depth interviews. The results indicate that, the legal obstacles, economic costs and the psychological reluctance, were the decisive factors to lead to the activation of reinventing program. As for the accountability, it would be urgent to improve the mechanism of administrative accountability and political accountability. Lastly, this study could provide three main practical suggestions as follows: (1) Strengthening the capacity of policy assessment in government, (2) bringing in the citizen participation (3) Building a mechanism of public facility termination.

本研究之討論重心源於2008年底爆發之公共電視預算遭凍結爭議，其所導引出我國公視以政府預算為財源模式之設計及行政、立法機關對財務之監督權限，以及財源監督實際運作與公視「獨立性」的目的出現衝突之問題。另一方面，2009年公視基金會董監事第四屆增聘過程一連串爭議事件，也使該屆董事會組成員額增補之正當性、選任程序公開性等爭點浮出檯面。此外，現行公共電視董監事選任制度設計及其運作能否充分發揮公視應有的獨立與專業治理之功能等問題均成為本研究關注之重點。 本研究透過文獻檢閱及深度訪談探討國內外公共電視董監事選任制度之設計，檢視我國公視基金會董監事近來選任過程之爭議。研究發現，我國公視董監事選任過程受國會政黨與執政者執行偏差之影響甚大，也顯示公視董監事選任程序規定的缺漏以致政黨與行政權有操弄提審過程的空間。並對維持現制下如何透過修法改善董監事的選任程序提出看法，以及建議未來公視基金會董監事選任制度可朝專業多元與責任政治之方向改革。 其次，透過文獻及訪談分析我國公視以政府預算捐贈為主之財源模式設計及其所衍生的外部監督機制，在實務運作上可能造成政治力藉由預算監督權限和程序以干預公視獨立性與節目自主之情形。研究發現，公共電視之財源模式影響外部監督之規範密度，現行以政府預算為財源所衍生之外部監督機制，其實際運作與財源模式當初設計為保障公視獨立於政治力量之外之目的有所扞格；並探討立法院在財源監督過程對公視獨立性保障之影響。此外，對於我國公視需維持政府預算為財源模式，其外部監督機制如何再規範，以在公視的獨立自主與運用公共財源的績效課責之間尋求平衡提出政策建議。 / In this study, the focus of discussion is on the disputes that the budget of Public Television Service Foundation(PTS Foundation) was frozen breaking out at the end of 2008.It presents the conflicts among the model that PTS relies on the government budgets for financial resource,the surveillance jurisdiction of government for financial affairs,and the purpose to protect independence of public television by external oversight on actual operation.On the other hand,the series of controversial incidents during the 4th board of directors and supervisors recruitment of PTS Foundation in 2009,made the disputes to surface,such like the legitimacy of the board of directors and election procedures not sufficiently open.In addition,the present system of elected directors and supervisors of PTS,whether its operation brings the function of public television’s independence or not,and other issues have become the points in this study. Through literature reviewing and interviews,this study confers the design for election system of Board of directors in domestic and foreign public television,reviews the disputes in the process of the recently elected directors and supervisors of PTS.This study finds that the election process of directors and supervisors in PTS are deeply influenced by the congress party and ruling authority’s deviation of implementation,also shows that the gaps of the election process of PTS board of directors and supervisors let the parties and executive power have the space to manipulate the elected process.Moreover,this study provides the suggestion how to amend the law and improve the shortage of the election procedure of the directors and supervisors in order to maintain the current system, and suggests the future election system can be reformed toward to the direction of professional diversity and responsibility politics. Next,on the model design that PTS takes the government budgets as financial resources and the external oversight mechanisms derived,in practice,the operation may result in the situation that the politic power by the authority and the budget monitoring procedures could interfere with the public television’s independence and its programs.The study finds that the model of public television's financial resources affect the standard density of the external oversight.The current external oversight mechanisms taking government budget as financial resources breaks the purpose of protecting public television from the political power.This study discusses the impact that the Legislative Yuan’s monitors the procedure of financial resources to the independence of public television.In addition,regarding that PTS maintains to take government budgets as financial resources and how to re-regulate the external supervision mechanisms,this study provides the policy recommendations to find balance among the public television’s independence,and the public resources application and its performance accountability.

近年來，隨著台灣政治民主化、經濟自由化和社會多元化的快速變遷，政府所要處理的事務，愈趨複雜化、分殊化與專業化。公共政策本身就是以價值為基礎，如果政治被界定為社會性價值的權威性分配，那麼公共政策代表配置及分配那些價值的手段。分配價值的主事者即為行政機關，而行政機關所分配的依歸必須合乎公務倫理，再者價值分配的過程中必定與利害關係人有極密切的互動，其中之一即為地方派系，地方派系影響地方政治甚鉅台灣地方派系在戒嚴時期威權統治及開放自由走向民主化的轉型過程中，扮演著極為關鍵性的角色。它，操控著地方選舉，影響了地方政治，甚至與黑金結合，藉以要求政府政策。 本研究主要透過台南市海安路個案中，運用質性研究方法，以四者連環關係行動者作表示，主要架構是建立在利害關係人的理論上，透過文獻歸納的政策三要素，以及地方派系在地方政策系統的作用下，使擁有公權力的行政人員如何在各種連鎖利益的夾擊衝突下因應，已達多方面的兼顧與自身地位與利益的保全。

在管理主義的趨勢下，公部門利用公設財團法人來增加行政彈性和效率，使得這類組織被廣泛使用。然而，這類組織除了具有前述的優點，在實務運作上卻出現躲避現行規範，權責不清的問題。因此，讓人好奇這類組織是否存在規範機制， 如何讓這類組織被課責，並且受到應有的規範成為本文研究的重點。 本文藉由研究個案公設財團法人－蘭陽文教基金會，發現這類組織是可以被課責的。從研究中觀察到基金會在協助縣政府承辦童玩節時，從開辦到停辦以及復辦，基金會經歷過不同程度的課責，尤其在議會審議的影響，讓基金會越來越趨向於公部門課責機制。另外，在深度訪談中得知議會的府會關係在課責機制裡扮演關鍵因素，藉由府會關係發揮政治課責的效果，讓基金會進入到課責體系。 研究發現，即便公設財團法人一開始成立目的是為了避免過多的政治干擾，達到行政彈性。然而，從個案研究發現，基金會面對不同時期的課責時，這些課責的背後仍存在著政治因素的影響。課責系統中的政治力量足以讓這類組織面對課責，接受應有的規範，並且讓這類組織進入到課責體系裡。 / Under the trend of managerialism, government-sponsored non-governmental organizations have been widely used to take advantage of their flexibility and efficiency. Many, however, have concerned with the accountability of these organizations. Since they were created to escape regulatory control of existing governing system, a legitimate question to ask is the governability of such governing device. This research uses Lanyang Cultural and Educational Foundation as a case to examine how such organization actually can be held accountable. After several years of undertaking the contract of such the big event as Yilan International Children’s Folklore & Folklore Game Festival (YICFFF), the organization evolved over years to internalize into the political system and thus was more scrutinized by the governmental agencies. Details about institutional evolution and the political factors behind such change are revealed through in-depth interviews in field studies.While the original purpose of such device is to avoid excess politics, politics was eventually brought back in to meet the need of holding the system more accountable.

個人資料保護係屬隱私權的範疇之一， 現代化政府不斷面臨內外在施政環境變遷的衝擊與挑戰，其中資訊科技的快速發展與廣泛運用，更直接衝擊著政府施政定位、服務範圍、運作模式及治理原則。現代化國家在思考打破施政的常規和舊制，面對資訊公開與行政效率要求下，走向電子化政府的道路，也就成為勢之所趨。但另一方面，資訊革命所帶來對隱私與個人資料保護的衝擊，亦較以往更為強烈而深刻。從許多文獻可得知為何民眾可能不信任政府的原因是多方面的，這些原因與他們個人資料安全、隱私權保護及完整性維護是息息相關連的。在政府努力發展電子化政府以便民眾享受其便利性的同時，如何建構政府機關及政府企業間之個人資料隱私保護電子治理機制及協同作業，以強化我國公共治理指標之政府效能、回應力及課責能力，確保個資的合理流通，並能兼顧隱私保護，提昇整體政府信任度，實為電子化政府對人民基本權利之保障及實踐「隱私保護」之重要課題。 新版《個人資料保護法》已於民國九十九年四月在立法院三讀通過，在新法實施後，將因擴大適用個資法之主體範圍，規範個人資料蒐集與處理程序，加重持有個資業者的保管責任，並調整資料外洩求償上限至二億元，預計將加重企業蒐集與利用個人資料的成本與相關責任。本研究之目的在於探討政府機關如何透過持續隱私保護IT治理框架及系統，設計有效的「行政程序控制」(administrative procedural control)、課責(Accountability)及透明(Transparency)機制進的定期公開與積極散佈。透過個人控制自己資訊應該如何被處理與使用的資訊自我控制（local control）權利，一方面提高了政府的施政透明度及政府課責，另一方面也增強隱私保護及人民信任度；同時並以金融監理體系為例，如何因應新版個資法的衝擊，有效的調整內部資料蒐集與資安控管流程，試圖以銀行業透過監理機制建構雛型，監督管理金融業之營運，以期能提供客戶最佳之服務，有效避免新個資法為金融機構帶來的營運風險，進而建議政府機關隱私保護之IT架構，冀能提供主動積極安全又便利之服務，以贏取國民對政府之信任與向心力。 / Personal data protection is one of the categories in privacy. Modern governments constantly face impacts and challenges of political environment changes internally and externally, which rapid developments and extensive applications of information technologies affect the government policy positioning, service ranges, operation modes, and governance principles directly. Modern countries are always thinking over to break routines and aged systems of administration. Under requirements of facing the information disclosure and the administration efficiency, it has become a potential of the trend towards the road of e-government. However, on the other hand, compares to impacts of privacy and personal data protection which have been brought about by the revolution of information, currently, it becomes more intense and profound than before. Many literatures reveal why civilians may not trust the government for reasons in multiple aspects which is related closely with their personal data security, privacy protection, and integrity maintenance. In the meantime, in order to strengthen our government performances of public governance indicators, responsiveness, and accountability for ensuring a reasonable flow of private data, taking into account of privacy protection, and enhancing the overall trust into government, government is striving to develop e-government for civilians’ ease to enjoy its convenience, and this is truly the important subject for e-government of how to construct e-governance mechanisms of personal data privacy and collaboration operations between government organizations internally and between government vs. business enterprises externally on the protection of civilians’ basic rights and the practice of "privacy protection”. The new version of “Personal Data Protection Act” has been passed after third reading by Legislative Yuan on April, 2010. After taking effective of this new law, due to the applicable main scope enlargement of Personal Data Protection Act, it regulates personal data collections and processing procedures, expends the custodial responsibility to dealers who own the personal data, and adjusts the limitation of penalty up to NTD$200 millions for data leakage, which expects to enlarge the cost and relative responsibilities to enterprises for collecting and using personal data. The object of this analysis is going to explore how government organizations go through IT government frameworks and systems of the consistent privacy protection to design effective “Administrative Procedural Control”, “Accountability”, and “Transparency” mechanisms for proceeding periodic disclosure and positive broadcast. Not only to increase the transparency of government administration and the government accountability, but also to enhance the privacy protection and the trust to civilians, through the right of information “Local Control”, individual controls over self own information which should be dealt with and used. Meanwhile, for example of governance system in financial industry, how to respond to the impact of the new version in Personal Data Protection Act to adjust internal data collections and information security control processes effectively, and try to build up the prototype through governance mechanisms in banking for supervising and managing operations of financial industry. Furthermore attempt providing clients with the best service to avoid operation risks effectively for financial institutions which are caused by the new version of Personal Data Protection Act, and then suggest the IT infrastructure of privacy protection for government organizations. Hope to be able to provide active, positive, safe, and convenient services for winning upon trust and cohesion from civilians to the government.

本文旨在研究政治人物或政黨的表現如何影響選民對立法委員進行選舉課責。課責是民主政治運作的重要基石，而選舉機制則是體現政治課責最直接的制度設計。現有選舉課責研究多數聚焦於行政首長的表現如何影響選民的投票選擇，以立法委員選舉為對象的選舉課責研究相對顯得不足，且這些研究或者是在舊選制的架構內進行分析，或是旨在探索選民的分裂投票行為，未見新選制下的選舉課責研究。 本研究以2016年新北市與臺中市的立法委員選舉為例，分析選民對總統、市長、政黨、政黨立委與區域立委五種層面的表現評價如何影響其立委投票對象。企圖了解選民是否真的會因為現任者表現不佳而投給在野黨、或因滿意現任者表現而投給執政黨？而當不同層面的表現評價發生衝突時，哪一項的表現評價影響力更大？並藉由兩個不同黨籍的直轄市長，來解析過去研究未曾在立委選舉研究中觸及的地方首長施政表現因素會如何影響選民的投票抉擇。 本研究發現，選民在區域與不分區立委選舉中均會以市長與區域立委的表現作為課責依據，而政黨立委表現評價僅對區域立委選舉有影響，政黨表現評價及不分區名單印象則影響不分區立委選舉，至於過去研究認為會影響立委選舉結果的總統施政表現評價，反而在統計模型中未達顯著水準。這樣的結果，除了立委與政黨本身表現在各自選票上的影響力外，更凸顯了地方首長的施政表現對於立委選舉的重要性，當總統與立委選舉合併舉辦後，立委選舉不再是總統的期中成績單，而是地方首長的期中成績單與現任者的期末成績單，被課責的對象包含了現任者本身（立委與政黨）與地方首長。這些研究發現與既有的研究提供一個重要的對照與補充，也希望這些發現能提供未來選舉課責與地方治理研究的助益。 / Accountability is the cornerstone for the operation of democracy, and election is the mechanism realizing political accountability. Most studies on electoral accountability focused on the influence of presidential performance at the national level while the influences of legislators themselves and local governments are less concerned.This essay explores how the performance of the president, the legislators, the local governments, and the political parties influence electorate’s vote choice in the 2016 legislative elections in New Taipei City and Taichung City in Taiwan. Political accountability is operationalized as voter’s performance assessments of the president, the legislator, the city mayors, and the two major political parties. It is assumed that an electorate will be more likely to vote for the legislative candidate based on favorable assessments of her party’s president, legislators, city mayors, list of at-large candidates and overall party performance. The study finds that the performance of city mayors and the performance of (district as well at–large party list) legislators have exercised significant impact on voter’s choice. Meanwhile, voters’ assessment of political parties and impression of party list candidate will influence voter’s choice in the at-large legislative election. As for the evaluation of presidential performance which has been widely discussed in the literature, this essay finds only limited impact. As the elections for legislator and president are held concurrently, the impact of the presidential performance is overshadowed by the performance of local executives. These findings provide crucial comparison and supplementation with the previous studies of political accountability and offer valuable references for the future study of electoral accountability and local governance.