Ce mémoire de maîtrise tente de répondre à deux questions interreliées : l’État a-t-il, d’un point de vue philosophique, un droit d’exclure et quelle est la réponse que l’État devrait donner, d’un point de vue moral, au phénomène migratoire? Pour ce faire, nous nous livrons à l’analyse critique du débat philosophique sur les frontières et l’immigration entre les défenseur.e.s du droit d’exclure de l’État et les tenant.e.s de l’ouverture des frontières. Adoptant une approche non idéale égalitariste libérale cosmopolitique et nous concentrant principalement sur la migration économique non qualifiée en provenance des pays pauvres et à destination des riches démocraties libérales dans le monde d’aujourd’hui, nous critiquons successivement les arguments sécuritaire, socio-économique et démocratique en faveur du droit d’exclure de l’État. De manière générale, nous visons à montrer que ces trois arguments exagèrent la menace que représente l’immigration pour la sécurité, l’ordre public, les emplois, les salaires, l’État-providence, la culture et l’autodétermination politique, et qu’ils n’accordent pas assez de poids aux intérêts des migrant.e.s en provenance de pays pauvres. Nous en concluons que l’État n’a pas, d’un point de vue philosophique, un droit d’exclure, et qu’il serait moralement préférable d’ouvrir davantage les frontières, tout en redéfinissant les pouvoirs et les responsabilités des États et des institutions internationales afin de permettre une gouvernance internationale multilatérale de la migration et de mieux répondre aux principaux problèmes qui amplifient le phénomène migratoire, c’est-à-dire les conflits armés, les inégalités socio-économiques criantes au niveau international et les changements climatiques. / This master’s thesis tries to answer two interrelated questions: does the state have, from a philosophical point of view, a right to exclude, and what is the answer the state should give, from a moral point of view, to the migratory phenomenon? To do this, we engage in a critical analysis of the philosophical debate on borders and immigration between the defenders of the state’s right to exclude and the defenders of open borders. Adopting a non-ideal cosmopolitan liberal egalitarian approach and focusing mainly on unskilled economic migration from poor countries to rich liberal democracies in today's world, we successively criticize the security, socio-economic and democratic arguments for the state’s right to exclude. In general, we aim to show that these three arguments exaggerate the threat of immigration for security, public order, jobs, wages, the welfare state, culture and political self-determination, and that they do not give enough weight to the interests of migrants from poor countries. We conclude that the state does not, from a philosophical point of view, have a right to exclude, and that it would be morally preferable to open the borders further, while redefining the powers and responsibilities of states and international institutions to enable an international multilateral governance of migration, and to better respond to the main problems that amplify the migratory phenomenon, i.e. armed conflicts, glaring global socio-economic inequalities, and climate change.

Hervé de Nédellec o.p. joua un rôle de premier plan dans la défense du patrimoine doctrinal de Thomas d’Aquin contre les effets des condamnations de la fin du XIIIe siècle et du début du XIVe siècle. Il a néanmoins défendu une position sur la distinction entre l’être et l’essence divergeant sensiblement de la distinction thomasienne, alors que cet élément se présente comme central à la pensée de l’illustre dominicain. Cette étude vérifie cette divergence et en rend compte, considérant le contexte historique et le rôle assumé par Hervé dans la défense de la pensée de son confrère. Allen (1958) caractérise la perspective hervéenne par son essentialisme et son approche sémantique, ainsi que par le rejet de la distinction réelle (Gilles de Rome et Thomas d’Aquin) et de la distinction intentionnelle (Henri de Gand). Il évoque par ailleurs l’influence de Godefroid de Fontaines, de Siger de Brabant et d’Averroès au regard de la distinction entre l’être et l’essence selon le mode de signifier retenue par Hervé. Ces observations se voient ici confirmées par l’exposé et la comparaison des principes ontologiques assumés par les différentes positions. Il est par le fait même rendu manifeste que Siger de Brabant, Godefroid de Fontaines, Hervé de Nédellec et encore Dietrich de Freiberg, tenants de la distinction sémantique, rejettent les positions adverses en raison de mêmes éléments qu’ils critiquent de celles-ci. La communauté doctrinale entre la distinction selon le mode de signifier et la théorie modiste ainsi que leur source commune dans le Commentaire à la Métaphysique d’Averroès sont par ailleurs mises au jour. Les modistes distinguent le signifié principal et les propriétés concernant (circa) le signifié principal. Dans la perspective sémantique, l’essence, l’étant et l’être sont conçus comme des propriétés concernant le signifié principal à la manière des propriétés circa de la grammaire spéculative. À l’instar des propriétés circa, « essence », « étant » et « être » diffèrent non parce qu’ils signifient différentes déterminations, mais au sens où ils signifient une même chose de différentes façons. L’analyse des objections soulevées par les tenants de la distinction sémantique et des éléments constitutifs de leur position fournit des outils nouveaux pour apprécier la distinction entre l’être et l’essence chez Thomas d’Aquin. Celle-ci se révèle procéder d’un cadre théorique inconciliable avec celui adopté par Hervé de Nédellec. Nous faisons ici valoir que cette liberté doctrinale d’Hervé de Nédellec s’explique par cela que la distinction entre l’être et l’essence n’était pas constitutive du fonds thomasien concerné par les ordonnances d’enseignement dominicaines de la fin du XIIIe siècle et du début du XIVe siècle, notamment puisqu’elle n’a pas été ciblée par les condamnations doctrinales ecclésiales ni par le correctoire de Guillaume de la Mare. / Hervaeus Natalis o.p. played a leading role in defending the doctrinal heritage of Thomas Aquinas against the effects of the condemnations of the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th centuries. Nevertheless, he would have supported a position on the distinction between being and essence which is irreconcilable with the Thomasian distinction, even though this element is central to the thought of the illustrious Dominican. The present study verifies this discrepancy and give an account of it, considering the historical context and the role assumed by Hervaeus in the defence of the thought of his confrere. Allen (1958) characterizes the Hervean perspective by its essentialism and its semantic approach, as well as by the rejection of the real distinction (Giles of Rome and Aquinas) and the intentional distinction (Henri of Ghent). He also evokes the influence of Godfrey of Fontaines, Siger of Brabant and Averroes with regard to the distinction between being (esse) and essence according to the mode of signifying adopted by Hervaeus. These claims are here confirmed by the exposition and comparison of the ontological principles assumed by the different stances. By the same token, it is made clear that Siger of Brabant, Godefroid of Fontaines, Hervaeus Natalis and also Dietrich of Freiberg, the proponents of the semantic distinction, reject the opposing positions on the basis of the same elements that they criticize in them. The doctrinal community between the distinction according to the mode of signifying and the Modist theory, as well as their common source in the Commentary on the Metaphysics of Averroes are also brought to light. The Modists distinguish between the object signified and the properties concerning (circa) the object signified. In the semantic perspective, essence, ens and esse are conceived as properties concerning the object signified in the manner of the circa properties of speculative grammar. Like the circa properties, “essence”, “ens” and “esse” do not differ because they signify different determinations, but they differ in the sense that they signify the same thing in different ways. The analysis of the objections raised by the proponents of the semantic distinction and of the constitutive elements of their position provides new tools for appreciating the distinction between being (esse) and essence in Aquinas. It proves to proceed from a theoretical framework that is irreconcilable with that adopted by Hervaeus. We argue here that this doctrinal freedom of Hervaeus is explained by the fact that the distinction between being (esse) and essence was not constitutive of the Thomasian fund concerned by the Dominican teaching ordinances of the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th centuries, especially since it was not targeted by the ecclesial doctrinal condemnations nor by the correctory of William de la Mare.

Thèse écrite en cotutelle (Université de Montréal ; Université Paris 1 - Panthéon Sorbonne) / Afin de mieux saisir le rôle de certains phénomènes affectifs au sein des rapports dits de reconnaissance - tels que les émotions de l’estime mais aussi la colère ou le sentiment d’injustice -, ce travail cherche à cerner la nature des actes recognitifs à partir de l’analyse conceptuelle d’énoncés idéal-typiques de reconnaissance. Qu’est-ce que représente un énoncé de reconnaissance ? Que se produit-il lors d’un énoncé de reconnaissance ? Ou, en d’autres termes, que dis-je et que fais-je lorsque j’énonce reconnaître x comme p ? De cette analyse, il ressort que les actes recognitifs correspondent à des actes communicationnels particuliers, en termes habermassiens, des actes régulateurs. Plus spécifiquement, elle permet de mettre en lumière que la reconnaissance fonctionne, au plan normatif, comme un concept régulateur des interactions humaines et, au niveau pratique, qu’elle représente une obligation éthique au sens développé par Hegel dans les Principes de la Philosophie du droit. Comprendre les actes de reconnaissance comme des processus d’attribution de statuts - via l’octroi logiquement antérieur d’une valeur - visant à instaurer un certain type d’interaction entre agents libres présente un double avantage. Le premier, de proposer une unification des différents sens attachés au concept de reconnaissance autour des notions de valeur et de statut. Le second, de permettre des hypothèses explicatives quant à la présence de phénomènes affectifs lors de ces processus. Ces derniers semblent découler, d’une part, du type de processus que sont les actes recognitifs et, d’autre part, de la double fonction que paraissent exercer ces émotions, entendues comme des « perceptions de valeur ». / In order to understand better the role of certain affective phenomena within the so-called relations of recognition - such as the emotions of esteem but also anger or the sense of injustice -, this work seeks to discern the nature of acts of recognition as of the conceptual analysis of the ideal-typical statements. What represents a statement of recognition? What is produced during a statement of recognition? Or, in other words, what do I say and what do I do as I state: “I recognize or acknowledge x as p”? It results from this analysis that the acts of recognition correspond to particular communicational acts, in habermassian terms, of regulatory acts. More specifically, at a normative level, it reveals that, recognition functions as a regulatory concept of human interactions, and at a practical level, it represents an ethical obligation in the sense developed by Hegel in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Understanding the acts of recognition as the process of attribution of status - through a prior logical bestowal of a value - aiming at establishing a certain type of interaction between free agents, features a double advantage. The first is to propose a unification of different meanings attached to the concept of recognition around the notions of value and status. The second is to allow some explicative hypotheses regarding the presence of the affective phenomena during those processes. The latter seem to stem, on the one hand, from a type of process that are acts of recognition, and on the other, from the double function that these emotions seem to be practiced, understood as “perceptions of values”.

In this dissertation, I articulate what I call a personal-is-political ethics, suggesting that the realm of human affairs long called ethics is inseparable from that which is today normatively called psychology. Further, I suggest that these names for this shared realm are situated in different discursive traditions which, therefore, provide different parameters for possible action and understanding. In my exploration of what it is to be human, I strategically centre ethical transgressions, particularly those that are mappable onto systemic forms of oppression. I explore personal-is-political enactments of sexism, ableism, racism, colonization, classism, ageism, and geopolitics, including situations in which several of these intersect with one another and those in which therapeutic, pedagogical, or parenting hierarchies also intersect with them. Without suggesting this is ‘the whole story,’ I closely read people’s narrations of ethical transgressions that they – that we – commit. I claim that such narrations shape our possibilities for harming others, for taking responsibility, and for intervening in others’ lives in an attempt to have them take responsibility (e.g., therapy with abuse perpetrators and critical pedagogy). I work to demonstrate the ethical and political importance of: the impossibility of exhaustive knowledge, the illimitable and contingent power relations that are ever-present and give shape to what we can know, and the ways our possibilities in life are constituted through particular contact with others. I explore ethical transgressions I have committed, interrogating these events in conversation with explorations of resonant situations in published texts, as well as with research conversations with friends about their ethical transgressions and how they make sense of them. I tentatively advocate for, and attempt to demonstrate, ways of governing ourselves when we are positioned ‘on top’ of social hierarchies – in order to align our responses and relationships more closely with radical political commitments.

In this dissertation, I articulate what I call a personal-is-political ethics, suggesting that the realm of human affairs long called ethics is inseparable from that which is today normatively called psychology. Further, I suggest that these names for this shared realm are situated in different discursive traditions which, therefore, provide different parameters for possible action and understanding. In my exploration of what it is to be human, I strategically centre ethical transgressions, particularly those that are mappable onto systemic forms of oppression. I explore personal-is-political enactments of sexism, ableism, racism, colonization, classism, ageism, and geopolitics, including situations in which several of these intersect with one another and those in which therapeutic, pedagogical, or parenting hierarchies also intersect with them. Without suggesting this is ‘the whole story,’ I closely read people’s narrations of ethical transgressions that they – that we – commit. I claim that such narrations shape our possibilities for harming others, for taking responsibility, and for intervening in others’ lives in an attempt to have them take responsibility (e.g., therapy with abuse perpetrators and critical pedagogy). I work to demonstrate the ethical and political importance of: the impossibility of exhaustive knowledge, the illimitable and contingent power relations that are ever-present and give shape to what we can know, and the ways our possibilities in life are constituted through particular contact with others. I explore ethical transgressions I have committed, interrogating these events in conversation with explorations of resonant situations in published texts, as well as with research conversations with friends about their ethical transgressions and how they make sense of them. I tentatively advocate for, and attempt to demonstrate, ways of governing ourselves when we are positioned ‘on top’ of social hierarchies – in order to align our responses and relationships more closely with radical political commitments.

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