The thesis reviews and assesses the role and impact of the United Nations (UN) in the fight against the recent wave of international terrorism, understood as global jihadism, with a view to developing an understanding and awareness of the Organization&#039 / s relevance and distinct position in the global counter-terrorism campaign, while at the same time, providing insight as to how to best combat the phenomenon, through an analysis of the threat posed by al-Qaida and weighing the threat against the real and potential capabilities available at the disposal of the world body. The analysis reveals that while considerable progress has been made with respect to diminishing the organizational and operational capabilities of al-Qaida through the collective mobilization of hard or &lsquo / protective&rsquo / policy instruments in the wake of 9/11, progress has been fairly unsatisfactory in addressing the softer or &lsquo / preventive&rsquo / aspects of counter-terrorism aimed at reducing the conditions conducive to terrorism. Furthermore, while the UN offers unique capabilities in the fields of technical assistance provision and cooperation and coherence building, its efforts are severely undermined by the lack of consensus and commitment on the part of the UN member states, and to a lesser extent, by its own organizational shortcomings. Overall, the analysis of policy responses of the UN and the international community in the context of terrorism is expected to bring perspective to the future of the world organization and its evolution to assume a potentially more proactive and preventive role in dealing with the most pressing and interconnected threats to international peace and security in the early 21st century, one of which is the global jihadist movement.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, March 2010.

Rapporteringen av terroristattentat har fördubblats globalt sedan år 2011. För att motverka terrorismen i världen sägs det krävas en fördjupad kunskap om terroristnätverkens struktur och organisation, vilket kan uppnås genom en social nätverksanalys. Idag återfinns det ett internationellt behov av att jämföra olika typer av terroristnätverk genom social nätverksanalys. En sådan jämförelse kan skapa verktyg för myndigheters brottspreventiva arbete mot terrorismen samt bidra med ny och efterfrågad kunskap om att jämföra olika terroristorganisationer.Studiens syfte har varit att visualisera och undersöka nätverksförändringar över tid rörande nätverksstruktur för både islamistiska och vänsterextremistiska terroristnätverk vid genomförda terroristattentat. I denna sociala nätverksanalys har sex stycken terroristattentat utförda av den vänsterextremistiska terroristgruppen November 17 och den islamistiska terroristgruppen al-Qaida undersökts. Resultaten visade att både visualisering och nätverksstruktur för de enskilda terroristgrupperna har förändrats över tid. Studien har funnit ett flertal likheter mellan November 17 och al-Qaida rörande nätverksstruktur och sammansättning. Skillnaderna mellan terroristgrupperna är att al-Qaida består av fler antal noder och har en lägre densitet än November 17. Visualiseringen av nätverken visade även att November 17 efterliknar en clique. / The reporting of terrorist attacks has doubled globally since 2011. To counter and understand terrorism in the world, there is a need for an in-depth knowledge of the structure of terrorist networks and organizations, which can be achieved through social network analysis. Today there is an international necessity to compare different types of terrorist networks through social network analysis. Such a comparison can create tools for the authorities' crime prevention against terrorism and contribute with new and requested knowledge about comparing different terrorist organizations.The aim of the study has been to visualize and investigate network changes over time regarding network structure for both Islamic and left-wing terrorist networks during terrorist attacks. In this social network analysis, six terrorist attacks by a left-wing extremist terrorist group, November 17 and an Islamic terrorist group, al-Qaeda have been studied. The results showed that both visualization and network structure for the individual terrorist groups have changed over time. The study has found numerous similarities between November 17 and al-Qaeda regarding network structure and composition. The differences between the terrorist groups is that al-Qaeda consists of more numbers of nodes and has a lower density than November 17. The visualization of the networks also showed that November 17 mimics a clique.

ŠUPOVÁ, Kateřina. Reflection of structural and political conditions in the ideology and practice of Islamic groups - the so-called Islamic State and al-Qaeda (Master's thesis). Charles University in Prague. Faculty of Arts. Department of Political Science. Tutor: Zora Hesová, M.A., Ph.D. 2019. p. 84. In this thesis the author's main goal is to analyze the strategy and propaganda of the Islamic state in relation to the strategy of Al Qaeda. Emphasis is on studying the intentions and capabilities of each group by examining the ideology, goals, warfare, tactics, propaganda etc. What was the reason for the split? Martha Crenshaw's instrumental and organizational perspectives were very useful for analysis. As well as a concept of Michael Arena and Bruce Arriga deals with identity and propaganda in collaboration with Ervin Goffman, who deals with the theory of self-presentation, By analyzing various documents, declarations by the Islamic state and al-Qaeda there is outlined an ideological, apocalyptic and strategic movement shift. Keywords: ideology, propaganda, strategy, Islamic state, al-Qaeda, terrorism, identity

By 2001, the al-Qaida movement had evolved into a transnational revolutionary movement with an eschatological dimension, facilitating the 9/11 attacks to gain religious support and incite a strong reaction. The Bush administration was particularly tough in its response, terminating the Taliban regime and then declaring the right of pre-emption against a wider axis of evil, which led on to regime termination in Iraq and the intended constraining of Iran. In the event, regime termination in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in protracted wars that were intensely costly in human and resource terms, and Iranian influence actually increased. The al-Qaida movement was dispersed while being transformed into a potent idea with little in the way of an organised structure, yet was effective in catalysing movements from South Asia through the Middle East to sub-Saharan Africa. Analyses of events in Iraq and Afghanistan point to deep misconceptions over the potential for the use of military force and of imposed state building. After more than a decade after 9/11, there has been a re-orientation away from large-scale occupations towards more remote means of maintaining control, with an emphasis on armed drones, special forces and privatised military companies. This approach appears initially appropriate and attractive but may be as counterproductive as the previous approach.

Al-Shabaab et Al Qaida au Maghreb Islamique illustrent le fonctionnement du djihad contemporain. Nés dans des contextes de guerre civile, issus de la dislocation de mouvements djihadistes d'envergure nationale, ces deux groupes sont aujourd'hui les seuls en Afrique dont l'allégeance a été acceptée par à Al Qaida. Forgés dans le terreau de luttes nationales, les deux groupes ont exploité les clivages et les revendications sociales, économiques et politiques des populations dans leur quête de puissance. Confrontés à des difficultés d'ordre sécuritaire et politique, ils se sont tournés vers Al Qaida, dans l'espoir d'acquérir une stature internationale, et d'attirer ainsi les recrues et financements qui leur faisaient défaut. De son côté, affaiblie par la guerre contre le terrorisme, l'Organisation d'Oussama Ben Laden a accepté les allégeances africaines par opportunisme, accordant à ces groupes le statut de franchises. De l'autre côté de l'échiquier, les stratégies déployées par les États et des organisations internationales peinent à porter leurs fruits. En cause, des divergences idéologiques, et les interférences des intérêts particuliers des acteurs qui minent les efforts de lutte contre les extrémistes mais font finalement le jeu de la propagande terroriste. / Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and Al-Shabaab perfectly illustrate the functioning of contemporary jihad. Born into a context of civil war, from the fall out of national jihadist movements, these two groups are, today, the only ones in Africa whose allegiance have been acknowledged by Al Qaida. Seizing on domestic political and economic struggles, the two groups rose to prominence through social fault lines and equality claims. Facing security and political stalemates, they made allegiance to Al Qaida hoping that international recognition would provide them with the wherewithal and recruits they lacked. The allegiances were opportunistically acknowledged by Al Qaida when Bin Laden's organization was severely weakened by years of war on terror.On the other side of the game, due to a set of divergent ideologies and particular interests, States and international organizations are deploying cacophonous strategies, that not only have poor effect on the ground, but also fit well with the jihadist propaganda. The tale of a foretold fiasco.

<p>Den amerikanske flygvapenöversten John A Warden III har lagt fram en teori om att man kan se på fienden som ett system av system för att hitta hans svagheter. Teorin bygger på att skapa en bild av fienden genom en fördefinierad indelning i subsystem bestående av fem ringar. Denna bild skall därefter kunna brytas ner i ytterligare subsystem bestående av samma fem ringar som till slut avslöjar fiendens tyngdpunkter. Uppsatsen prövar om Wardens teori går att applicera på Al-Qaida.</p> / <p>The U.S. Air Force Colonel John A. Warden III, has presented a theory that one can see the enemy as a system of systems to find his weaknesses. The theory is based on creating an image of the enemy through a predefined subdivision into subsystems consisting of five rings. This image must then be broken down into further sub-system consisting of the same five rings that eventually reveals the enemy's centers of gravity. This essay examines whether the Warden theory can apply to Al Qaeda</p>

Den amerikanske flygvapenöversten John A Warden III har lagt fram en teori om att man kan se på fienden som ett system av system för att hitta hans svagheter. Teorin bygger på att skapa en bild av fienden genom en fördefinierad indelning i subsystem bestående av fem ringar. Denna bild skall därefter kunna brytas ner i ytterligare subsystem bestående av samma fem ringar som till slut avslöjar fiendens tyngdpunkter. Uppsatsen prövar om Wardens teori går att applicera på Al-Qaida. / The U.S. Air Force Colonel John A. Warden III, has presented a theory that one can see the enemy as a system of systems to find his weaknesses. The theory is based on creating an image of the enemy through a predefined subdivision into subsystems consisting of five rings. This image must then be broken down into further sub-system consisting of the same five rings that eventually reveals the enemy's centers of gravity. This essay examines whether the Warden theory can apply to Al Qaeda

Syftet med denna uppsats har varit att undersöka på vilket sätt attacker utförda av al-Qaida kanhänföras till begreppet asymmetri och på vilket sätt man kan tolka den amerikanska administrationensrespons på dessa som uttryck för ett linjärt tänkande. Vidare vill jag undersöka vilka svårigheter somkan uppstå i relationen mellan en linjär omvärldsuppfattning och asymmetriska metoder. För attuppfylla syftet med uppsatsen kommer tre av al-Qaidas attacker att studeras. Dessa är: attacken mot deamerikanska ambassaderna i Afrika, 1998, attacken mot USS Cole, 2000 och attacken 11 september,2001. Rapporterna från den amerikanska administrationen efter respektive attack kommer att utgöragrunden i mitt empiriska material. Teorianknytningen grundar sig i Linda Beckermans teori om thenon-linear dynamics of war samt Steven Metz och Douglas Johnsons definitioner på asymmetri. En avuppsatsens slutsatser avseende USA och dess krig mot al-Qaida är att USA bör utveckla sinanpassningsförmåga, och för att göra detta måste deras omvärldsuppfattning och förståelsehorisontvidgas. Detta skulle sammantaget medföra en större beredskap för oväntade händelseutvecklingar samtmedföra en ökad möjlighet att ta rätta beslut, både på lång och kort sikt. / The aim of this essay has been to investigate in what way attacks made by alqaidaare assignable to what is called asymmetric warfare, and in what way youcan interpret the American administration´s response and actions to thoseattacks as a result of linear thinking. Furthermore I want to analyse whatdifficulties that may appear in the relationship between linear thinking andasymmetric methods. To support and fulfil this aim I shall investigate threeattacks committed by al-Qaida, these are: the bombing of the Americanembassies in Africa in 1998, the attack on USS Cole in 2000 and the attacks on11 September 2001, and the subsequent reports made from institutions in theAmerican administration. To interpret and fulfil the purpose of the essay I useLinda Beckerman´s theory about the non linear dynamics of war, and StevenMetz´s and Douglas Johnson´s definition and theory of asymmetric forms anddimensions. One conclusion is that the United States must improve their abilityto identify the world around them and consequently improve their adaptability.In order to do this they have to broaden their horizon of comprehension andthus be better prepared for unexpected developments of events which wouldimprove the possibility of taking the right action in both short and long termperspectives. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 00-02

Thesis approaches terrorism as a form of communication. An attack or other terrorist activities are ways of message coding. Its purpose is generally to spread fear among target public. For effective spreading of fear terrorists use media both indirectly, if a message is publicized in the news, or directly via new media mostly internet and its features, that enable cheap fabrication of widely accessible content. There is a symbiosis between media and terrorism. Terrorists create engaging events that are taken over by media which make an attractive part of their news coverage. Because of specific elements of reporting a distorted perception of reality is introduced. News coverage can never create a precise image of reality. There are many social and psychological phenomenons connected to the process of communication. It is usually terrorists who benefit from them, but some are working against their purposes. Thesis introduces an analysis of communicational strategy of militant Islamizes and concentrates mostly on global terrorism and Al-Qaida and its branches.