Enligt infosoc-direktivets artikel 3 har upphovsmän en ensamrätt att överföra sina verk till allmänheten. EU-domstolen har i en rad mål nått slutsatsen att publiceringen av länkar som leder till ett verk utgör en överföring av verket till allmänheten. När en länk leder till ett lag­ligen uppladdat verk, som tillgängliggjorts gratis, är den emellertid att betrakta som tillåten och kräver inte upphovsmannens samtycke. Detta beror på att länken under dessa omständig­heter inte anses ha tillgängliggjort verket för en ny publik. Kravet på att en överföring, för att höra till ensamrätten, måste ske till en ny publik framgår inte av infosoc-direktivets lydelse. Rekvisitet har utvecklats i praxis, med åberopande av framförallt internationell rätt. Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka hur länkar hanteras av EU-domstolen, samt om domstolens praxis till sin metod respektive till sina resultat är lämplig. Min slutsats är att ny publik-rekvisitet saknar stöd i såväl infosoc-direktivet som inter­nationell rätt, och att det till och med i vissa delar framstår som svårförenligt med dessa rättskällor. Genom en praxisgenomgång når jag slutsatsen att ny publik-rekvisitet har tillämpats på ett anmärkningsvärt inkonsekvent sätt, och att detta antagligen kan förklaras med en ändamålshänsyn som inte uttalats i domskälen. Generellt framstår ny publik-rekvisitet som ett verktyg EU-domstolen använt då de velat nå slutsatsen att ett visst agerande antingen ska vara tillåtet eller ej, och stöd för detta saknats i rättskällorna. När det kommer till länkar har alltså ny publik-rekvisitet använts för att motivera att dessa ska vara tillåtna. Utifrån en avvägning mellan upphovsmannens intressen och intresset av informations- och yttrandefrihet anser jag att EU-domstolens inställning som huvudregel är befogad. Jag anser dock att det finns vissa omständigheter som i det specifika fallet skulle kunna motivera att en viss länkningsåtgärd bör betraktas som ett intrång. Särskilt ser jag att sådana situationer skulle kunna komma att uppstå då material inbäddas i vinstsyfte på ett sätt som konkurrerar med upphovsmannens tillgängliggörande av verket. Utifrån EU-domstolens hittills avlagda praxis framstår det som svårt att beakta dessa omständigheter inom ramen för ny publik-rekvisitets tillämpning. Sammantaget når jag slutsatsen att ny publik-rekvisitet inte utgör ett effektivt och lämpligt verktyg för att dra gränsen mellan tillåtna och otillåtna överföringar till allmänheten. Länkar hade kunnat hanteras på ett nyanserat sätt där majoriteten, men inte alla, tillåts även utan ny publik-rekvisitet. Om inte annat bör ny publik-rekvisitet omdefinieras så att det kan leda till lämpliga resultat även med en konsekvent tillämpning, och så det går att förena med övrig upphovsrättslig reglering. / According to Article 3 in the InfoSoc Directive, the creator of a creative work owns the exclusive right to communicate his work to the public. The CJEU has made it clear that the act of hyperlinking to a webpage where a work has been uploaded constitutes communication to the public. However, when a link leads to a creative work that has been uploaded freely and legally, the act of linking does not constitute a copyright infringement. This is motivated by the notion that a link under those circumstances does not communicate the work to a new public. The perception that a communication, to constitute an infringement, must be made to a new public is not based on the writings in the InfoSoc Directive. The criterion is developed by the CJEU, referring primarily to international law. This essay is an investigation of whether and under which circumstances linking constitutes a copyright infringement according to the CJEU. The approach chosen by the court is evaluated, considering both the suitability of its methods and its results. My conclusion is that the new public criterion lacks support in superior legal sources. To some degree, the criterion even appears discordant with both union and international law. Looking at the CJEU rulings, I reach the conclusion that the new public criterion has been used and defined in a remarkably inconsistent manner, and that this is probably due to an application of the criterion in accordance with a desired outcome. The new public criterion is, inter alia, used to support that the act of linking does not constitute an infringement. With consideration for both the interests of the rightsholder and the freedom of expression, I deem it suitable to let most links fall without the scope of the creator’s exclusive right. There are, however, circumstances under which I think it could be suitable to let a specific link fall within the rights of the creator. Such a situation could be at hand when imbedded links are used for profit by an actor in direct competition with the rightsholder. The rulings by the CJEU do not, as of yet, open up for such circumstances to be taken into consideration when applying the new public criterion. In conclusion, I believe that the new public criterion does not constitute an effective or suitable tool for drawing the line between lawful and unlawful communications to the public. Links can be handled in a nuanced way where the majority, but not all, are allowed – without the new public criterion. If nothing else, the new public criterion should be redefined so that it can lead to suitable results with a consistent definition, and to make it reconcilable with international and union copyright law.

In Sweden, camera surveillance in places where the public own access is regulated by a permit. This entails a lack of permit requirement for camera surveillance in places where the public does not own access. Such places can consist of a privacy- sensitive character. Surveillance constitutes processing of personal data where- upon the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) must be complied with.Article 6 of the GDPR stipulates various legal bases that must be met in the processing of personal data. The ones who conduct surveillance in places where the public does not own access often fails to make correct legal assessments of Article 6(1)(e) and 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, as displayed by various supervisory de- cisions issued by the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection. In this light, the purpose of the thesis is to examine and analyze how the ones who conduct sur- veillance and the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection consider the personal integrity of the camera monitored individual in the assessments of Article 6(1)(e) and 6(1)(f) of the GDPR during camera surveillance without permit requirement in places where the public does not own access. Because of the differences be- tween the legal assessments made by the ones who conduct camera surveillance and the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection, the thesis also intends to shed light on the consequences that arise for the camera monitored individual by the fact that their personal integrity is assessed in different ways.The thesis also aims to evaluate the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protec- tions’ supervisory work in relation to both personal integrity and the compliance with Article 6(1)(e) and 6(1)(f) of the GDPR during camera surveillance without permit requirement in places where the public does not own access. The Swedish Authority for Privacy Protections’ supervisory work is important as most of the camera surveillance takes place without a permit requirement and the fact that there is a lack of knowledge prevailing to the number of cameras in use. It is important that the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protections’ supervisory work is well-functioning since the ones who conduct surveillance carry out the legal assessments incorrectly. The risk with insufficient supervisory work is that per- sonal integrity is violated and that the GDPR is ineffectual in the long run.In general, it can be said that the legal assessments of Article 6(1)(e) and 6(1)(f) of the GDPR are poorly carried out by both the ones who conduct surveillance and the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection. This primarily affects the cam- era monitored individuals’ personal integrity. Because of the indications of short- comings in the supervisory work, there are several improvement measures that can be taken to maintain personal integrity and ensure that the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection continue to constitute an important function.

Syftet med studien var att med kvalitativ forskningsmetod undersöka vilka tankar och känslor allmänheten som brukar poddar och dokumentärer som behandlar mord- och rättegångar har kring själva tittar/lyssnarupplevelsen och hur deras förtroende för rättsväsendet påverkas efter denna konsumtion, samt undersöka hur allmänheten och polisen påverkas av negativ media om rättsväsendet/polisen ur allmänhetens synpunkt. Elva personer intervjuades och intervjudatan analyserades med tematisk analys. Resultatet visade att allmänheten påverkas av att lyssna/titta på poddar och dokumentärer om mord och/eller rättegångar på ett eller annat sätt. En del menade att förtroendet för rättsväsendet sjönk. Alla respondenterna ansåg att dessa typer av medier väckte känslor, dock var dessa känslor relativt individuella. Respondenterna hade liknande åsikter om hur polis och allmänheten påverkas av negativ media. De var överens om att de påverkar förtroendet för polisen och skadar deras arbete samt att allmänheten påverkas mer negativt än vad polisen gör.  Slutsatsen är att konsumtionen av poddar och dokumentärer som behandlar mord- och rättsfall kan spela en viktig roll för att forma individers attityd och uppfattningar om rättsväsendet.

In Sweden, camera surveillance in places where the public own access is regulated by a permit. This entails a lack of permit requirement for camera surveillance in places where the public does not own access. Such places can consist of a privacy-sensitive character. Surveillance constitutes processing of personal data whereupon the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) must be complied with.  Article 6 of the GDPR stipulates various legal bases that must be met in the processing of personal data. The ones who conduct surveillance in places where the public does not own access often fails to make correct legal assessments of Article 6(1)(e) and 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, as displayed by various supervisory decisions issued by the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection. In this light, the purpose of the thesis is to examine and analyze how the ones who conduct surveillance and the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection consider the personal integrity of the camera monitored individual in the assessments of Article 6(1)(e) and 6(1)(f) of the GDPR during camera surveillance without permit requirement in places where the public does not own access. Because of the differences between the legal assessments made by the ones who conduct camera surveillance and the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection, the thesis also intends to shed light on the consequences that arise for the camera monitored individual by the fact that their personal integrity is assessed in different ways. The thesis also aims to evaluate the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protections’ supervisory work in relation to both personal integrity and the compliance with Article 6(1)(e) and 6(1)(f) of the GDPR during camera surveillance without permit requirement in places where the public does not own access. The Swedish Authority for Privacy Protections’ supervisory work is important as most of the camera surveillance takes place without a permit requirement and the fact that there is a lack of knowledge prevailing to the number of cameras in use. It is important that the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protections’ supervisory work is well-functioning since the ones who conduct surveillance carry out the legal assessments incorrectly. The risk with insufficient supervisory work is that personal integrity is violated and that the GDPR is ineffectual in the long run. In general, it can be said that the legal assessments of Article 6(1)(e) and 6(1)(f) of the GDPR are poorly carried out by both the ones who conduct surveillance and the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection. This primarily affects the camera monitored individuals’ personal integrity. Because of the indications of shortcomings in the supervisory work, there are several improvement measures that can be taken to maintain personal integrity and ensure that the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection continue to constitute an important function.