This thesis outlines the three phases of cognitivism, which emerged in the first half of the 20th century as a reaction to the anti-mentalist tradition of philosophical thinking (represented by Charles S. Peirce and Charles Morris), and which was made possible in particular by the so- called linguistic turn in science (especially within analytic philosophy), which replaced mental units, regarded as non-scientific, with linguistic units, conceived as reflecting mental states and, moreover, allowing for adequate investigation. The thesis is largely guided by Thomas C. Daddesio's On Minds and Symbols, which is considered to be one of the first explicit attempts to formulate a cognitive-semiotic perspective, and wherein the author traces the previous development of the cognitive paradigm. Thus, first the factors that made the emergence of cognitivism possible are described, followed by an account of its development, which can be divided into two phases, as per Daddesio's model. This paper, however, goes beyond Daddesio's book and establishes a third phase, where cognitivism emerges as a separate field of inquiry within semiotics, i.e., cognitive semiotics. Within this development, the work traces in particular the transformation of the conception of the relationship between language and mind, which is...

Cette thèse part d’une constatation troublante : une œuvre littéraire et sa traduction sont deux textes différents. Comment deux textes différents peuvent-ils s’annuler, être indiscernables en tant qu’œuvre ? Y a-t-il une œuvre, deux œuvres distinctes, ou plutôt, comme nous le proposerons provisoirement, une œuvre relationnelle, la traduction littéraire. Cette relation est en fait une dépendance que nous théorisons, avant de proposer une théorie procéduraliste institutionnelle de l’œuvre et de montrer que les traductions littéraires ne sont pas des œuvres, mais des compositions substitutives, « œuvre » étant un statut qui chapeaute toutes les compositions qui la font fonctionner. Nous montrons en outre qu’elles appartiennent aux pratiques artistiques, qui regroupent un certain nombre d’activités et d’artefacts essentiels au fonctionnement des œuvres d’art. « Œuvre » étant un statut, cela a comme conséquence qu’« auteur » en est un aussi. Nous tentons ensuite de déterminer si le traduire s’étend à toutes les activités de compréhension, ou s’il y a une spécificité du traduire interlinguistique littéraire. Par la suite, nous étudions les deux principales attitudes qui s’offrent au traducteur au moment de traduire : les approches sourciste et cibliste. Après quoi nous examinons qui est le lecteur d’une traduction littéraire et dans quelle mesure il se distingue du lecteur de la composition en langue première. Après un examen de la compréhension d’un point de vue empirique, nous en venons à la conclusion que le critère de réussite pour la lecture est la compréhension. Cela nous permet de proposer une étude du critère de fidélité en fonction de la compréhension, tout en précisant qu’une œuvre, étant un statut, n’est jamais traduite. Pour finir, après avoir appliqué notre théorie aux traductions de Shakespeare réalisée par Voltaire, nous montrons que la pensée de la traduction est travaillée par une méprise ontologique qui confond fidélité sémantique et fidélité ontologique. / This dissertation starts from a troubling observation: a literary work and its translation are two different texts. How can two different texts cancel each other out, be indiscernible? Is there one work, two distinct works, or rather, as we will provisionally propose, a relational work, the literary translation. This relation is in fact a dependence that we theorize, before proposing an institutional proceduralist theory of the work and showing that literary translations are not works, but substitute compositions, "work" being a status that encompasses all the compositions that make it work. We further show that literary translations belong to artistic practices, which bring together a number of activities and artefacts essential to the functioning of works of art. "Work" being a status, the consequence is that "author" is also one. We then attempt to determine whether translating extends to all the activities related to understanding, or whether there is a specificity to literary interlinguistic translating. Next, we study the two main attitudes available to the translator when translating: the sourceand target-oriented approaches. We then consider who the reader of a literary translation is and how he differs from the reader of the first-language composition. After studying understanding from an empirical point of view, we come to the conclusion that a successful reading is one through which the read work is understood. This allows us to unfold a study of faithfulness according to understanding, before concluding that a work, being a status, is never translated. Finally, having applied our theory to the Voltaire’s translations of Shakespeare, we show that the theory of translation is dominated by an ontological misunderstanding which confuses semantic and ontological faithfulness.

The purpose of my thesis is to explore and assess recent efforts by Direct Reference Theorists to explain the phenomenon of empty names. Direct Reference theory is, roughly, the theory that the meaning of a singular term (proper name, demonstrative, etc.) is simply its referent. Certain sentences, such as negative existentials ("Santa does not exist"), and sentences in contexts of fiction ("Holmes lived on Baker Street"), present the following challenge to DR Theory: Given that the semantic value of a name is simply its referent, how are we to explain the significance and truth-evaluability of such sentences? There have been various approaches DR Theorists have taken to address this problem, including the Pragmatic Strategy, Pretense Theory, Abstract Object Theory, and the Metalinguistic Strategy. All of these views are analyzed and assessed according to their various strengths and weaknesses. It is concluded that, overall, a Metalinguistic Strategy, supplemented by the notion of pretense, best deals with negative existentials and normal-subject predicate occurrences of empty names, Abstract Object Theory best deals with empty names in meta-fictional contexts, and Pretense Theory best deals with empty names in object-fictional contexts.

Abstract Literary criticism lost its connection with textual criticism as formalist theories gained ground after the 1950s. The formalist conceptions of the autonomy of the literary work, however, have been subsequently questioned while the relationship between literary and textual criticism has remained distant. The present study searches for the historical reasons for this, and with the help of literary philosophy strives to revive the vanished relationship by demonstrating the essential signification of textual criticism to literary criticism. In the Anglo-American context the literary critics’ disinterest in textual criticism has been explained away as a vestige of New Critical literary theory. The present study brings a new interdisciplinary viewpoint to this discussion by showing that Analytic Aesthetics has had a central role in maintaining the separation of textual criticism and literary criticism. By examining prominent theories of the ontology of the literary work the study reveals a tradition of a monolithic conception of the literary work within Analytic Aesthetics that considers the literary work to have only one stable text. In this tradition different phenomena of textual variation are marginalised as inessential to the identity of the work. By the same token, textual criticism is cast out from the field of literary criticism as being aesthetically insignificant. The study criticises the monolithic tradition for its historically limited conception of the work, one that is grounded in the invention of print and the modern conception of the author. This conception does not take into account the historically and constantly changing media of production, recording and transmitting that affects the relationship between the concepts of work and text. The monolithic conception is wholly unsuitable for the thinking of the works of oral literature, medieval manuscript culture and contemporary hypertexts. Neither does it work well with printed literature. This study demonstrates how this conception of the work supports a blind faith approach to the stability of the printed text that gives a completely false impression of the historical nature of the literary work. According to this study literary criticism should be based on an aesthetic of suspicion that approaches every text with a critical attitude. The literary critic should examine the history of textual transmission of the work under study and only then determine and justify from the viewpoint of the given research frame the selection of which text versions the work’s interpretation is based on. By examining unpublished as well as published versions of Aaro Hellaakoski’s Me kaksi, the present study demonstrates in practice how taking textual variation into account produces interpretations of the work that would not otherwise be possible when working only with a single text version. / Tiivistelmä Kirjallisuudentutkimus kadotti yhteyden tekstikritiikkiin formalististen teorioiden yleistyessä 1950-luvun jälkeen. Sittemmin formalistiset käsitykset teoksen historiattomuudesta ja autonomisuudesta on kyseenalaistettu, mutta suhde tekstikritiikkiin on jäänyt etäiseksi. Käsillä olevassa tutkimuksessa etsitään historiallisia syitä tähän ja pyritään elvyttämään näiden tutkimusalojen vuorovaikutusta osoittamalla kirjallisuuden filosofian keinoin tekstikritiikin olennainen merkitys kirjallisuudentutkimukselle. Angloamerikkalaisessa kontekstissa kirjallisuudentutkijoiden välinpitämättömyyden tekstikritiikkiä kohtaan on selitetty periytyvän uuskriittisestä kirjallisuusteoriasta. Tämä tutkimus tuo keskusteluun uuden poikkitieteellisen näkökulman osoittamalla, että analyyttinen estetiikka on ollut keskeinen tekijä tekstikritiikin ja kirjallisuudentutkimuksen välisen erottelun ylläpitämisessä. Tarkastelemalla keskeisiä kirjallisen teoksen ontologian teorioita tutkimus paljastaa analyyttisessa estetiikassa vallitsevan monoliittisen teoskäsityksen tradition, jossa teoksella ajatellaan olevan vain yksi muuttumaton teksti. Tässä traditiossa erilaiset tekstuaalisen variaation ilmiöt marginalisoidaan teoksen identiteetin kannalta epäolennaisina. Samalla tekstikriittinen tutkimus rajataan pois kirjallisuudentutkimuksen alueelta esteettisesti merkityksettömänä. Tutkimus kritisoi monoliittisen tradition historiallisesti rajoittunutta teoskäsitystä, joka pohjautuu kirjapainotekniikkaan ja moderniin tekijäkäsitykseen. Tämä teoskäsitys ei huomioi teoksen historiallisesti muuttuvien tuottamisen, tallentamisen ja välittämisen välineiden vaikutusta teoksen ja tekstin suhteeseen. Monoliittinen teoskäsitys ei sovellu esimerkiksi suullisen runouden, keskiajan käsikirjoituskulttuurin tai nykyajan hypertekstien tekstuaalisuuden ajattelemiseen, muttei myöskään painetun kirjallisuuden tekstuaalisuuteen. Tutkimus osoittaa, miten tämä teoskäsitys ylläpitää sokeaa luottamusta painettuun tekstiin, joka antaa virheellisen kuvan kirjallisen teoksen historiallisesta luonteesta. Tutkimuksen mukaan kirjallisuudentutkimuksen tulisi perustua epäilyksen estetiikkaan, jossa jokaiseen tekstiin suhtaudutaan kriittisesti. Kirjallisuudentutkijan olisi selvitettävä tutkimansa teoksen tekstuaalisen transmission historia sekä määritettävä ja perusteltava tutkimusongelmansa näkökulmasta mihin teoksen tekstiversioihin hän perustaa tulkintansa. Tarkastelemalla Aaro Hellaakosken Me kaksi -runoelman julkaisemattomia ja julkaistuja versioita tutkimuksessa osoitetaan käytännössä, miten tekstuaalisen variaation huomioiminen tuottaa tulkintoja teoksesta, jotka eivät olisi mahdollisia yksittäisen tekstiversion pohjalta.

No description available.

No description available.

Современная аналитическая философия может применять семантику возможных миров для анализа философских проблем. В диссертации определяется онтологический базис для семантики возможных миров так, чтобы она была в полной мере применима к анализу проблем философия сознания, включая проблему тождества сознания и тела. Проводится анализ объектного и релятивного способов определения онтологии для семантики возможных миров для объектов и функций, при этом рассматривается возможность определения объектного способа как частного случая релятивного. Отношение достижимости в качестве способа задания «релятивных» переходов между возможными мирами является ключевым для релятивного подхода к онтологии семантики возможных миров. В диссертации сформулирована логическая система на основе допущения неполного сопоставления индивидных областей для отношения достижимости. / Modern analytic philosophy can apply the possible-worlds semantics for the analysis of philosophical problems. The dissertation determines ontological basis for the possible-worlds semantics, so that it is fully applicable to the analysis of problems of the philosophy of consciousness, including the issue of the identity of consciousness and body. The analysis of relational and object methods for determining the ontology of possible-worlds semantics for objects and functions takes place, while the possibility consideres of determining the object method as a special case of relative method. The attitude of the reachability as a means of model of «relative» transitions between the possible worlds is the key to relational approach to the ontology of possible-worlds semantics. The dissertation formulates the logical system based on the assumption of incomplete comparison individual areas for the attitude of the reachability.

Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of free will within a naturalistic framework. Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory effort in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist understanding of the human person and a full-blooded theory of agent-causal libertarian free will is considered. I conclude that Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory model cannot be maintained and I reference several conceptual difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of agent-causal libertarian properties with physical properties that haunt the naturalistic libertarian.