Asymmetric moral luck is the position of denying some types of moral luck, typically resultant moral luck, while accepting others. Robert Hartman’s Parallelism argument is meant to reject asymmetric moral luck and show that if circumstantial moral luck exists then we have good analogical evidence for the existence of resultant moral luck. Eduardo Rivera-López and Anna Nyman object against this argument. Rivera-López takes issue with the rejection of asymmetric moral luck in general while Nyman focuses on the parallelism argument in particular. In this paper, i will argue that while Nyman manages to show that the paralellism argument fails to give analogical evidence for resultant moral luck, both asymmetric moral luck and its rejection are still viable options owing to the fact that both positions appeal to fundamental intuitions. As such, substantive progress is hard to make out.

<p>The retail banking market in Sweden is highly concentrated and oligopolistic. This has been confirmed by numerous reports from different competition authorities within the EU, for example the Swedish competition authority. A considerably high number of different sorts of competition barriers has been pointed out in these reports. The competition barriers are mainly directed to the smaller banks and the potential competition. The retail banking market in Sweden is dominated by four major banks, which together has over 80 percent of all market shares. These four dominating banks more or less control the payment systems and have a great deal of influence within the payment systems. It is necessary for all banks to be able to take part of the payment systems. The control that the four dominants have over the payment systems has been more significant considering their cooperation in so called infrastructure clubs. It is these clubs that have formed the conditions in every contract between the infrastructure club members and other smaller banks, who wants to be able to provide their customers a diversity of banking services. The dominating banks purpose with this infrastructure cooperation is to lower the network-expenses for the owners and to provide a more effective network-system. According to my results, these infrastructure clubs could help create a harder market climate and higher entry barriers for non-members than what ought to be considered as normal for such a market climate. Smaller banks who want to provide a variety of services, so called full-service banks, meet the hardest obstacles to overcome. Therefore there has not started a new full-service bank since 1993. The almost only payment system which the four dominants do not control is Riksbankens payment system “RIX”. The European commission has many different criteria in their search for different violations of abuse and dominant position. I have used nine of these in my paper. Eight of these criteria were concordant with my results whether or not connections exist to abuse and dominant position. My results have pointed out some problems that could be in dispute with Swedish competition law, considering the market position and the key role the members in an infrastructure club possesses. Despite the fact that detailed decisions from the European court of Justice (ECJ) especially obliges dominants to protect and not to distort competition in any way exists, my opinion is that there could be some parallels to a distorted competition on the Swedish retail banking market. Furthermore, the three different steps within the payment system are represented through the dominants participation when they are members in the same infrastructure club. This gives the result that their cooperation is vertically integrated. The cooperation involves important information about the member’s financial strengths and their ability to compete as a market actor, but also information of great importance of the infrastructure and its development and further efficiency. According to my results, the economical cooperation that the members of the infrastructure clubs have, could not be referred to as an “economic entity” in the same way as the ECJ used it regarding their investigations of collective dominance. The dominants cooperation, according to me, is better described as a collective behavior. The dominants cooperation in these infrastructure clubs could also be of that character as referred to in 6 § konkurrenslagen. I do not consider the payment systems owned by the dominants to have the same character as “essential facilities”, since smaller niched banks have entered the market and thus have chosen other channels than the dominants payment systems to reach their customers. I also have the opinion that every effect caused by the cooperation between the dominants could not be defendable as acceptable objective grounds. Due to the above mentioned arguments, I find it sensible to investigate further whether or not the dominants purpose with their infrastructure club is concordant with its means.</p>

Cette étude examine comment l’argument de la pente glissante est employé dans les débats sur l’avortement et sur l’euthanasie. L’hypothèse est la suivante : l’argument de la pente glissante peut être utilisé de manière fallacieuse dans certains cas, mais il peut également s’avérer raisonnable dans d’autres. L’objectif de cette étude est d’étudier certains arguments récurrents du discours bioéthique afin de tester leur pertinence, leur validité et leurs conséquences sur le plan philosophique. Cette étude se divise en deux parties. La première partie s’intéresse à l’usage de la pente glissante de type « sorite » dans le débat sur l’avortement. La deuxième partie se penche sur l’argument de la pente glissante complète telle qu’il est employé dans le débat sur l’euthanasie. / This study examines how the slippery slope argument is used in debates on abortion and euthanasia. The hypothesis is that the slippery slope argument can be used wrongfully in some cases, but it may also be reasonable in others. The objective of this study is to investigate some of the recurring arguments in bioethics in order to test their relevance, validity and their impact on the philosophical level. This study is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the use of the “sorites” slippery slope argument in the abortion debate. The second part focuses on the “full slippery slope argument” as used in the debate on euthanasia.

The retail banking market in Sweden is highly concentrated and oligopolistic. This has been confirmed by numerous reports from different competition authorities within the EU, for example the Swedish competition authority. A considerably high number of different sorts of competition barriers has been pointed out in these reports. The competition barriers are mainly directed to the smaller banks and the potential competition. The retail banking market in Sweden is dominated by four major banks, which together has over 80 percent of all market shares. These four dominating banks more or less control the payment systems and have a great deal of influence within the payment systems. It is necessary for all banks to be able to take part of the payment systems. The control that the four dominants have over the payment systems has been more significant considering their cooperation in so called infrastructure clubs. It is these clubs that have formed the conditions in every contract between the infrastructure club members and other smaller banks, who wants to be able to provide their customers a diversity of banking services. The dominating banks purpose with this infrastructure cooperation is to lower the network-expenses for the owners and to provide a more effective network-system. According to my results, these infrastructure clubs could help create a harder market climate and higher entry barriers for non-members than what ought to be considered as normal for such a market climate. Smaller banks who want to provide a variety of services, so called full-service banks, meet the hardest obstacles to overcome. Therefore there has not started a new full-service bank since 1993. The almost only payment system which the four dominants do not control is Riksbankens payment system “RIX”. The European commission has many different criteria in their search for different violations of abuse and dominant position. I have used nine of these in my paper. Eight of these criteria were concordant with my results whether or not connections exist to abuse and dominant position. My results have pointed out some problems that could be in dispute with Swedish competition law, considering the market position and the key role the members in an infrastructure club possesses. Despite the fact that detailed decisions from the European court of Justice (ECJ) especially obliges dominants to protect and not to distort competition in any way exists, my opinion is that there could be some parallels to a distorted competition on the Swedish retail banking market. Furthermore, the three different steps within the payment system are represented through the dominants participation when they are members in the same infrastructure club. This gives the result that their cooperation is vertically integrated. The cooperation involves important information about the member’s financial strengths and their ability to compete as a market actor, but also information of great importance of the infrastructure and its development and further efficiency. According to my results, the economical cooperation that the members of the infrastructure clubs have, could not be referred to as an “economic entity” in the same way as the ECJ used it regarding their investigations of collective dominance. The dominants cooperation, according to me, is better described as a collective behavior. The dominants cooperation in these infrastructure clubs could also be of that character as referred to in 6 § konkurrenslagen. I do not consider the payment systems owned by the dominants to have the same character as “essential facilities”, since smaller niched banks have entered the market and thus have chosen other channels than the dominants payment systems to reach their customers. I also have the opinion that every effect caused by the cooperation between the dominants could not be defendable as acceptable objective grounds. Due to the above mentioned arguments, I find it sensible to investigate further whether or not the dominants purpose with their infrastructure club is concordant with its means.

Cette étude examine comment l’argument de la pente glissante est employé dans les débats sur l’avortement et sur l’euthanasie. L’hypothèse est la suivante : l’argument de la pente glissante peut être utilisé de manière fallacieuse dans certains cas, mais il peut également s’avérer raisonnable dans d’autres. L’objectif de cette étude est d’étudier certains arguments récurrents du discours bioéthique afin de tester leur pertinence, leur validité et leurs conséquences sur le plan philosophique. Cette étude se divise en deux parties. La première partie s’intéresse à l’usage de la pente glissante de type « sorite » dans le débat sur l’avortement. La deuxième partie se penche sur l’argument de la pente glissante complète telle qu’il est employé dans le débat sur l’euthanasie. / This study examines how the slippery slope argument is used in debates on abortion and euthanasia. The hypothesis is that the slippery slope argument can be used wrongfully in some cases, but it may also be reasonable in others. The objective of this study is to investigate some of the recurring arguments in bioethics in order to test their relevance, validity and their impact on the philosophical level. This study is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the use of the “sorites” slippery slope argument in the abortion debate. The second part focuses on the “full slippery slope argument” as used in the debate on euthanasia.

No description available.

<p>This thesis is mainly a critical examination of Professor Mark C. Murphy’s theory of defectiveness. In his view, being backed by decisive reasons for action is a standard internal to legality, to the property of being law, such that a law or a legal system that is not backed by decisive reasons for action fails to measure up and thus, is <em>defective</em> qua law or legal system. Following a short introduction, I will devote chapter I to presenting Professor Murphy’s theory of defectiveness in the context of his defence of the natural law tradition. In the remaining two chapters, I shall state and assess two types of argument in support of this main thesis. Chapter II is concerned with the functional argument, which holds that law’s characteristic activity, thus law’s function, is to provide dictates backed by decisive reasons for action. I criticize Murphy’s account claiming that his explanation is bereft of a causal mechanism that links certain characteristic activities with certain effects, which is the main element of non-agentive functional explanations. The different type of argument that attempts to present the presence of decisive reasons as a non-defectiveness condition of illocutionary acts in general, and thus for legal illocutionary acts, is considered in chapter III. Here, I argue that Murphy’s position is not supported by the orthodox theory of illocutionary acts. From this I conclude that we have reason to doubt Professor Murphy’s success in providing an appropriate theory of legal defectiveness.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

yes / The present article proposes to re-examine the parity-of-reasoning or double-standard fallacy argument, which favours a time-symmetric Gold universe model over a cosmological arrow of time. There are two reasons for this re-examination. One is empirical: 1) the recent discovery of an expanding and accelerating universe questions the symmetry assumption of the Gold universe on empirical grounds; 2) the other is theoretical: the argument from t-symmetry fails to take into account some important aspects of the topology of phase space and recently developed typicality arguments. If the parity-of-reasoning argument, which depends on the t-symmetry of probability, is reconsidered in terms of the topology of phase space and typicality arguments, the double-standard fallacy argument loses much of its appeal. The Gold universe model itself suffers from unexplained dynamic asymmetries. The upshot of this paper is that the Gold universe model is implausible or far less plausible than asymmetric models.

La question d’un monde créé sans commencement ou, comme on le dit souvent, le problème de « l’éternité du monde », a été l’occasion d’une vive controverse entre les penseurs latins du XIIIe siècle, dont saint Thomas d’Aquin. Nonobstant sa foi avérée en une création avec un commencement, Thomas, théologien et philosophe catholique, s’est interrogé tout au long de sa carrière : « Aurait-il été possible que Dieu créât un monde sans commencement ? » Cette persévérance est suffisamment paradoxale pour attirer l’attention, d’autant que Thomas, en sa réponse, s’opposait à la grande majorité de ses contemporains.Après une courte partie introductive qui brosse à grands traits et sans prétention le contexte historique, sont donc présentés les onze textes thomasiens traitant de la durée du monde, et spécialement de la possibilité d’un monde créé sans commencement, en leur langue latine ainsi qu’en une traduction française originale. Puis sont analysés les arguments présentés par Thomas, et les questions qu’ils peuvent soulever. Si les rapports entre la philosophie et la foi, comme entre la philosophie et la science, entrent en ligne de compte, les notions de causalité naturelle et de causalité volontaire, de fini et d’infini, de création divine et d’action humaine, de temps et d’éternité, de démonstration rationnelle et d’argument de convenance, constituent le cœur de cette élucidation philosophique.Au terme de la démarche, il apparaît que, pour saint Thomas d’Aquin, si le monde, en fait, a été créé avec un commencement (c’est pour lui une certitude de foi), en droit il aurait pu être créé sans aucun commencement (et c’est pour lui une affirmation légitime de la raison). / The question of a world created without beginning or, as is often said, the problem of « the eternity of the world », was the occasion of a controversy between the latin thinkers of the thirteenth century, including St. Thomas Aquinas. Despite his unquestionable faith in a creation with a beginning, Thomas, catholic theologian and philosopher, wondered throughout his life : « Would it have been possible that God created a world without beginning ? » This perseverance is paradoxical enough to attract attention, especially as Thomas, in his reply, was opposed to the vast majority of his contemporaries.After a short and unpretentious introduction that describes historical context, eleven thomasians texts dealing with the duration of the world are presented, and especially the possibility of a world created without beginning, in the original latin and in a new french translation. Then the arguments given by Thomas are analyzed, as well as the issues they may raise. If the relationship between philosophy and faith, and between philosophy and science, are taken into account, the concepts of natural causality and voluntary causality, finite and infinite, divine creation and human action, time and eternity, rational demonstration and argument of convenience, are the heart of this philosophical elucidation.At the end of the process, it appears that, for Aquinas, if the world, in fact, was created with a beginning (this is for him a certainty of faith), nevertheless it could have been created without a beginning (and this is for him a legitimate statement of reason).

L'approccio argomentativo alla definizione permette di aprire una nuova prospettiva su questo tema. La definizione può essere infatti analizzata dialetticamente come un endoxon, una conoscenza comunemente accettata che ha come oggetto la struttura semantico-ontologica condivisa. La definizione dialettica può costituire lo standpoint di un'argomentazione ed essere fondata su argomenti, oppure fungere da premessa in un sillogismo retorico ed essere quindi uno strumento argomentativo e persuasivo. Le caratteristiche della definizione dialettica possono essere delineate a partire dalle sue origini nella Topica di Aristotele. Da un'interpretazione in chiave predicativo-argomentale di quest'opera emerge come la definizione per genere e specie sia uno strumento di analisi semantica fondamentale per comprendere il nesso di ragionevolezza negli entimemi ed al tempo stesso origine di inferenze argomentative. La tradizione aristotelica è ripresa nella tradizione latina e medievale, in cui viene evidenziato il rapporto tra i differenti tipi di definizione e la loro funzione argomentativa e persuasiva. Nella riflessione moderna e contemporanea il concetto di definizione dialettica è alla base dell'analisi della definizione persuasiva, cioè una strategia argomentativa fondata sulla ridefinizione e sulle inferenze valoriali che derivano dal “significato emotivo” del definito. Le categorie di definizione dialettica e di definizione persuasiva permettono di analizzare le funzioni argomentative della definizione nel contesto comunicativo scientifico, giuridico e politico. / A new perspective on the problem of definition can be opened by an argumentative approach to this subject. Definition can be dialectically analyzed as an endoxon, namely as an aspect of common knowledge regarding the shared semantic-ontological structure. The dialectical definition can be the standpoint of an argumentation and be supported by arguments, or the premise of a rhetorical syllogism. In this case, the dialectical definition can be used argumentatively and persuasively. The characteristics of dialectical definition can be found inquiring into its origins, namely Aristotle's Topics. By interpreting this work in a predicate-argument perspective, it is possible to notice how genus-species definition is a instrument of semantic analysis, which is fundamental to understand the relation between logic and reasonableness in enthymemes and how definitions can be source of inferences. The Aristotelian tradition has been revived in the Latin and Medieval tradition by analyzing the relationship between different types of definition and their argumentative and persuasive function. In the framework of modern and contemporary argumentation theories, the dialectical definition can be considered the foundation for a new interpretation of a particular argumentative and persuasive strategy grounded on definition: the persuasive definition. Persuasive definition can be seen as a redefinition aimed at altering the inferences from values (or judgments of value) which can be drawn from the definiendum. The concepts of dialectical definition and persuasive definition allow one to examine the argumentative functions of definitions in the scientific, legal, and political communicative context.