L’objectif de cette thèse est d’élucider l’intention, la pertinence et la cohérence de l’appropriation par Heidegger des concepts principaux de la philosophie pratique aristotélicienne dans ses premiers cours. Notre analyse portera principalement sur les notions clefs d’energeia et de phronēsis. La première section de la thèse est préparatoire : elle est consacrée à une analyse étroite des textes pertinents de l’Éthique à Nicomaque, mais aussi de la Métaphysique, en discussion avec d’autres commentateurs modernes. Cette analyse jette les fondations philologiques nécessaires en vue d’aborder les audacieuses interprétations de Heidegger sur une base plus ferme. La deuxième et principale section consiste en une discussion de l’appropriation ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque que Heidegger entreprend de 1922 à 1924, à partir des textes publiés jusqu’à ce jour et en portant une attention spéciale à Métaphysique IX. Le résultat principal de la première section est un aperçu du caractère central de l’energeia pour le projet d’Aristote dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque et, plus spécifiquement, pour sa compréhension de la praxis, qui dans son sens original s’avère être un mode d’être des êtres humains. Notre analyse reconnaît trois traits essentiels de l’energeia et de la praxis, deux desquels provenant de l’élucidation aristotélicienne de l’energeia dans Métaphysique IX 6, à savoir son immédiateté et sa continuité : energeia exprime l’être comme un « accomplissement immédiat mais inachevé ». L’irréductibilité, troisième trait de l’energeia et de la praxis, résulte pour sa part de l’application de la structure de l’energeia à la caractérisation de la praxis dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque, et du contraste de la praxis avec la poiēsis et la theōria. Ces trois caractéristiques impliquent que la vérité pratique ― la vérité de la praxis, ce qui est l’ « objet » de la phronēsis ― ne peut être à proprement parler possédée et ainsi transmise : plus qu’un savoir, elle se révèle surtout comme quelque chose que nous sommes. C’est ce caractère unique de la vérité pratique qui a attiré Heidegger vers Aristote au début des années 1920. La deuxième section, consacrée aux textes de Heidegger, commence par la reconstruction de quelques-uns des pas qui l’ont conduit jusqu’à Aristote pour le développement de son propre projet philosophique, pour sa part caractérisé par une profonde, bien qu’énigmatique combinaison d’ontologie et de phénoménologie. La légitimité et la faisabilité de l’appropriation clairement ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque par Heidegger est aussi traitée, sur la base des résultats de la première section. L’analyse de ces textes met en lumière la pénétrante opposition établie par Heidegger entre la phronēsis et l’energeia dans son programmatique Natorp Bericht en 1922, une perspective qui diverge fortement des résultats de notre lecture philologique d’Aristote dans la première section. Cette opposition est maintenue dans nos deux sources principales ― le cours du semestre d’hiver 1924-25 Platon: Sophistes, et le cours du semestre d’été 1924 Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Le commentaire que Heidegger fait du texte d’Aristote est suivi de près dans cette section: des concepts tels que energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis ou hexis ― qui trouvent leur caractérisation ontologique dans la Métaphysique ou la Physique ― doivent être examinés afin de suivre l’argument de Heidegger et d’en évaluer la solidité. L’hypothèse de Heidegger depuis 1922 ― à savoir que l’ontologie aristotélicienne n’est pas à la hauteur des aperçus de ses plus pénétrantes descriptions phénoménologiques ― résulte en un conflit opposant phronēsis et sophia qui divise l’être en deux sphères irréconciliables qui auraient pour effet selon Heidegger de plonger les efforts ontologiques aristotéliciens dans une impasse. Or, cette conclusion de Heidegger est construite à partir d’une interprétation particulière de l’energeia qui laisse de côté d’une manière décisive son aspect performatif, pourtant l’un des traits essentiels de l’energeia telle qu’Aristote l’a conçue. Le fait que dans les années 1930 Heidegger ait lui-même retrouvé cet aspect de l’energeia nous fournit des raisons plus fortes de mettre en doute le supposé conflit entre ontologie et phénoménologie chez Aristote, ce qui peut aboutir à une nouvelle formulation du projet heideggérien. / The purpose of this thesis is to sort out the intent, the philosophical relevance and the consistency of Heidegger’s appropriation of the basic tenets of Aristotle’s practical philosophy in his early lecture courses. Our analysis will focus mainly on the key notions of energeia and phronēsis. The first preparatory section of the thesis is devoted to a close analysis of Aristotle’s relevant texts of the Nicomachean Ethics, but also of the Metaphysics, in discussion with other modern commentators. This lays the philological groundwork which will enable us to engage Heidegger’s challenging interpretations on a more secure footing. The second and main section discusses Heidegger’s ontological appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics from 1922 to 1924 on the basis of the texts so far published, and with a special attention to Metaphysics IX. The main result of section I is an insight into the central character of energeia for Aristotle’s project in the Nicomachean Ethics and, more specifically, for his understanding of praxis, which in its genuinely original sense turns out to be a way of being of human beings. Our analysis recognizes three essential traits to energeia and praxis, two of which stemming from the analysis of Aristotle’s own elucidation of energeia in Metaphysics IX 6, namely immediacy and continuity: energeia expresses being as an ‘immediate unfinished fulfillment’. Irreducibility, the third trait of energeia and praxis, results from applying the structure of energeia to the characterization of praxis in the Nicomachean Ethics, and from contrasting it with poiēsis and theōria. These three features entail that practical truth―the truth of praxis, the ‘object’ of phronēsis―cannot be properly possessed and thus transferred: more than something we know, it is something we are. It is this special character of practical truth that primarily attracted Heidegger to Aristotle in the early 1920s. Section II, devoted to Heidegger’s texts, starts by reconstructing some of the intellectual steps that led him to resort to Aristotle for the development of his own philosophical project, characterized by a profound, yet intriguing intermingling of ontology and phenomenology. The legitimacy and feasibility of Heidegger’s pointedly ontological appropriation of the Nicomachean Ethics is also discussed, on the basis of the results of section I. The analysis of these texts is characterized by the sharp opposition set by Heidegger between phronēsis and energeia in his 1922 programmatic Natorp Bericht, a perspective that strongly diverges from the results of our philological reading of Aristotle in section I. The assessment of this opposition is maintained throughout the discussion of the two main sources―the 1924-25 winter course Platon: Sophistes, and the 1924 summer course Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Heidegger’s direct commentary of Aristotle’s text is followed closely in this section: concepts such as energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis and hexis―which find their ontological characterization in the Metaphysics or Physics―need to be scrutinized in order to follow Heidegger’s argument and to assess its soundness. Heidegger’s hypothesis from 1922―namely, that Aristotle’s ontology does not fit the insights of his more penetrating phenomenological descriptions―eventually culminates in a clash between phronēsis and sophia which divides being into two irreconcilable spheres and brings Aristotle’s ontological efforts to a dead end. Yet, this conclusion of Heidegger is built upon a specific interpretation of energeia that critically leaves in the shade its performative side, one of its essential traits as Aristotle conceived it. The fact that in the 30s Heidegger himself comes to see this side of energeia provides us with stronger grounds to question the supposed conflict between ontology and phenomenology in Aristotle, which can result in a new formulation of the Heideggerian project.

Nous nous pencherons sur les travaux du jeune Heidegger afin de montrer que, s’il affirme dans Être et temps que les animaux ne sont ni chose, ni Dasein, mais participent d’un énigmatique mode d’être propre – le « simplement vivant », ce qui ne fait « rien de plus que vivre » – cela constitue un revirement dans la pensée heideggérienne. Dans les travaux qui préparent la rédaction de Sein und Zeit, l'animal avait toujours été considéré comme un être qui a un monde, comme un être auquel nous devons reconnaître le mode d'être du Dasein. En s’appuyant sur l’interprétation phénoménologique d’Aristote qu’il présente dans ses cours de 1919 à 1926, nous montrerons que les structures fondamentales de l'être-au-monde ont été élaborées sur le fond des capacités propres à la vie animale que sont l’affection (pathos), la perception (aisthēsis), la discrimination (krinein), la mobilité (kinesis kata topon) et le désir (orexis). / Our investigation of young Heidegger’s work aims at showing that, if Being and Time states that animals are neither mere things, neither Dasein, but have their own puzzling mode of being – “mere life”, which does not exist, but simply lives – this constitutes a reversal in Heidegger’s way of thinking. In the works that prepared the way towards Sein und Zeit, animal life was always presented as being-in-a-world, as a being to which we must ascribe Dasein’s way of being. With the help of Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle presented between 1919 and 1926, we will show that the basic features of being-in-the-world that will become Being and Time's existential structures were developed on the basis of capacities belonging to animal life : affection (pathos), perception (aisthēsis), discrimination (krinein), mobility (kinesis kata topon) and desire (orexis).

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal / Pour respecter les droits d'auteur, la version électronique de cette thèse ou ce mémoire a été dépouillée, le cas échéant, de ses documents visuels et audio-visuels. La version intégrale de la thèse ou du mémoire a été déposée au Service de la gestion des documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Because of critical neglect, there is no established terminology to describe techniques of suspense. Borrowing from Aristotle, Koestler, and others, a new body of concepts is suggested and importantly, a distinction of tense is established, between types of suspense which relate to the narrative past, present, and future. The classical world's intuition of a connection between mental uncertainty and the physical state of hanging has conditioned Western man's notion of narrative suspense until a comparatively recent date. Eighteenth-century theories of the sublime helped to create an understanding that suspense was not necessarily painful. Through an analysis of novels by Jane Austen, George Eliot, Dickens, Hardy, and Conrad, an attempt is made to identify and evaluate the most common suspense strategies in the period's popular genres, notably the Austenian romance, mystery, and tragedy. The Austenian romance is compared to the detective story in that narrative presentation is determined by the need to control the reader's expectations, and to achieve an ending which is both satisfactory and surprising. The latter requirement may have contributed to the gradual disappearance of the authorial "voice" in the course of the nineteenth century, and a consequent reduction in the pleasures of irony and comedy. During the Victorian period, many genres are combined in the long novel, but mystery gradually advances in popularity and sophistication, to the point where narrative events are often inappropriately exploited as secrets. Tragedy involves a creative conflict between the reader's hopes and expectations, so he is permitted to glimpse the overall tragic process, and suspense is generated on the levels of theme and causaliy. The problems incurred by an inability or unwillingness to conclude structures of theme suspense are considered finally.

Le but de ce mémoire est d’expliciter en détail et de voir la portée d'un passage bien précis du traité des Topiques, ouvrage où Aristote tente d'élaborer une méthode qui permettra de raisonner de manière dialectique. Dans le deuxième chapitre du premier livre (I, 2), il énonce de manière succincte trois utilités que le traité en question peut procurer à celui qui possède et maîtrise adéquatement cette méthode. En premier lieu, la dialectique servirait de gymnastique intellectuelle pour former l'esprit et lui donner plus de souplesse dans ses raisonnements. Dans un second temps, elle serait utile dans les rencontres de tous les jours avec autrui parce qu’elle permettrait de discuter et d'argumenter sur un sujet donné avec le premier venu. Enfin, il semble également que la dialectique soit utile pour les «connaissances de caractère philosophique», en ce sens qu'elle permettrait de développer les apories et ultimement, d'établir les principes ou les notions premières de chaque science. Dans ce travail, je me propose donc d’examiner chacune de ces prétendues utilités afin de voir comment, et dans quelle mesure, nous pouvons réellement affirmer que la dialectique s’avère profitable pour chacun des services énumérés en Topiques I, 2. / The purpose of this dissertation is to explain in detail the importance of a very precise passage of the Topics, treatise where Aristotle tries to find a method which will allow to reason in a dialectical way. In the second chapter of the first book (I, 2), he expresses in a brief way three utilities that the treatise in question can provide to those who own and control this method properly. First of all, the dialectic would serve as a mental gymnastic to train the mind and give it more flexibility in its reasoning. Secondly, it would be useful in the everyday encounters with others, because it would allow to discuss and argue on any given subject with the first person we could meet. Finally, it also seems that the dialectic would be useful for the "philosophical knowledge ", in the sense that it would go through the puzzles and ultimately, would establish the first principles of each science. In this work, I thus suggest examining each of its claimed utilities to see how, and in which measures, we can really assert that the dialectic turns out profitable for each of the services enumerated in Topics I, 2.

Hannah Arendt argues that political action is only meaningful through the disclosure of who the actor uniquely is, and that this disclosure is the basis of human dignity. Arendt’s notion of performative disclosure helps us to rethink the individuated actor, not as a sovereign and self-transparent subject whose action expresses an authentic individual essence or constative what, but rather as a decentered and ecstatic who whose action reveals meaningful dimensions of the world and of the actor’s unique situation in history, through the performance of acts and speech before public spectators. The idea that no actor can stand in a position of control with respect to his life story extends to a critical displacement of the notion of freedom understood as sovereignty and of political projects that attempt to make history. Action, as praxis and not poiesis, is best understood through Arendt’s metaphor of performance, rather than productive art. There are new interpretive possibilities for Arendt’s theory of action, especially if we trace appearances of the ancient Greek daimon in Arendt’s publications and lecture notes, and among works that Arendt confronted: Plato’s Socratic dialogues and the myth of Er, Heidegger’s notion of aletheia as Dasein’s disclosure of Being, Jaspers’ valid personality, and Kant’s notion of aesthetic genius. The daimon implies that the public realm is a spiritual realm, that action is a form of connection to the divine, and that the actor is a decentered discloser of transcendent meanings and new possibilities within the world. The daimon also shows moral deliberation to be more vital to meaningful action than Arendt suggests prior to The Life of the Mind, so that the distinctions usually read in Arendt between actor and spectator, as well as those between acting, thinking, and judging, may be productively occluded. Arendt’s struggle to re-invigorate action’s disclosive capacity is at the center of her entire project. It sheds light on her critique of the world-alienating aspects of Marx, her insistent protection of a distinct political sphere from the private and the social spheres, and her rejection of Hegel’s philosophy of history in favor of a fragmentary historiography inspired by Kafka and Benjamin.

Η παρούσα εργασία επισημαίνοντας την ηθική κρίση, την απαξίωση των ιστορικά και πολιτιστικά επικυρωμένων αξιών, με επίπτωση κυρίαρχα στον τομέα της εκπαίδευσης, φιλοδοξεί να παρουσιάσει προτάσεις - λύσεις, καταφεύγοντας σε μια κορυφαία προσωπικότητα του αρχαιοελληνικού κόσμου, τον Αριστοτέλη. Αναπτύσσει τις απόψεις του περί παιδείας, περί των ηθικών και διανοητικών αρετών και περί φιλίας, προσδίδοντας στο περιεχόμενό τους ευρύτατες διαστάσεις. Αν μεταφέρουμε στο εκπαιδευτικό σύστημα τις προτάσεις του περί παιδείας, θα διατυπώνουμε λόγο για μια αγωγή που δεν υποτάσσεται σε σκοπιμότητες. Αν ο διδάσκων ακολουθήσει τις ανωτέρω αρετές και τις αφομοιώσει ο διδασκόμενος, τότε και οι δυο θα έχουν ένα στέρεο πεδίο ικανοτήτων, για να βρίσκονται σ’ έναν συνεχή αναστοχασμό και αυτοστοχασμό. Η έννοια της φιλίας μπορεί να μεταμορφώσει θετικά το κοινωνικό - πολιτικό - οικονομικό και εκπαιδευτικό σύστημα. Στο τελευταίο κεφάλαιο της εργασίας παρουσιάζεται η καταγγελτική κριτική από σύγχρονους στοχαστές (Μαρκούζε, Λυοτάρ) για τις συνέπειες του παθογενούς συστήματος που επηρεάζει και τον τομέα της εκπαίδευσης. Υπάρχει ένα κρίσιμο ερώτημα αναφορικά με το αν η εκπαίδευση συγκροτεί ώριμα πολιτικά υποκείμενα, ή αν έρχεται να διαμορφώσει ανταγωνιστικά οικονομικά όντα. / The present work by highlighting the crisis of moral values, the depreciation of the historically and culturally validated values, with an impact mainly on Education, intends to present proposals - solutions, resorting to a leading personality of the Ancient-Greek world, Aristotle. It develops his views on Education, the moral and intellectual virtues and friendship, adding broad dimensions to their content. If we pass his proposals about education into the established system, we will be talking about education which is not subordinated to expediency. If the teacher followed the above virtues and the learner assimilated them, then they would both acquire a solid skill basis so that they would be in a continuous reflection and self-reflection. The notion of friendship could positively transform the socio-political, economic and educational system. The final chapter of the work presents the denunciatory criticism by modern scholars (Marcuse, Lyotar) about the consequences of the pathogenic system affecting the field of education. There is one critical question concerning whether education constitutes mature political subjects or if it comes to formulate competitive economic beings.

[pt] Partindo da relação entre Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) e Franz Brentano (1838-1911), respectivamente aluno e professor durante o intervalo que se estendeu de 1874 a 1876, o presente trabalho trata dos possíveis frutos teóricos decorrentes deste encontro, visíveis na obra posterior do inventor da psicanálise. A articulação conceitual se constrói por meio dos conceitos freudianos de concomitância dependente, representação e pulsão, não se limitando à obra pessoal do filósofo, mas procurando abarcar, sempre que possível, o contato com toda uma tradição filosófica, por sua vez permitido pelos ensinamentos do neoescolástico. / [en] From the relationship between Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and Franz Brentano (1838-1917), respectively student and professor during the interval that extended from 1874 to 1876, the present work deals with the possible theoretical fruits resulting from this encounter, visible in the later work of the inventor of psychoanalysis. The conceptual articulation is constructed through the Freudian concepts of dependent concomitance, representation and drive, not limiting itself to the personal work of the philosopher, but seeking to cover, whenever possible, the contact with an entire philosophical tradition, in turn allowed by the teachings of the neo-scholastic.

This dissertation investigates Aristotle’s theory of phantasia as a cognitive ability, in terms of which mental content is available to the mind of rational beings. The focus is on Catherine Osborne’s extension of phantasia to nonhuman animals in order to allow for and explain non-human animal behaviour in terms of a rational paradigm, which de-emphasises, and does not rely on, linguistic ability. This paradigm for understanding animal behaviour as rational supports, and is supported by, modern theories of cognitive ethology, and argues for the ability of animals to share in conceptual thought. The recognition of rationality in animals by means of this paradigm bears ethical consequences for the treatment of animals. / Classics and Modern European Languages / M.A. (Classical Studies)

This thesis provides an historical and intellectual summary of the role of the concepts of 'substance,' and 'participation,' in the making of the doctrine of the Trinity. In the concluding chapter, a study is made of the assumptions of deconstruction, which are somewhat hostile to a substance paradigm. We argue for an appreciation of the importance of both substance and participation for the Trinity, and philosophy generally. Chapters are dedicated to individuals who have in some way contributed to perceptions of these two terms, as they pertain to the Christian notion of the Trinity. Additionally, we seek to define some philosophical problems that accompany a Trinitarian metaphysics of 'substance,' and 'participation.' The problems include those of deconstruction: issues such as 'Logocentrism,' and 'Presence.' Finally, we investigate how Trinitarian ontology can provide answers to many of the questions Derrida raises conceming the problematic future of metaphysical thinking. / Philosophy and Systematic Theology / M.Th. (Systematic Theology)