L’intérêt que porte ce mémoire à la méthodologie de la recherche aristotélicienne de la vérité le confine à un examen précis des étapes préliminaires de cette recherche, dans l’objectif de surmonter une conception trop simplifiée de l’opposition entre la science et l’opinion chez Aristote. S’ancrant dans une présentation des fonctions de la dialectique, telles que décrites par le philosophe dans les Topiques, cette enquête entend fournir une comparaison étroite entre les méthodes dialectique et apodictique. Plus précisément, elle est le lieu d’une déconstruction des préjugés qui sous-tendent une lecture traditionnelle des Seconds analytiques, selon laquelle (1) la méthode apodictique doit guider la recherche scientifique et (2) l’épistémologie d’Aristote est radicalement fondationnaliste. La lecture, alternative, de ce traité que propose ce mémoire lui permet d’assouplir les conditions imposées par Aristote aux prémisses du syllogisme apodictique, de manière à exploiter les nuances qui s’inscrivent dans la distinction qu’il opère entre le mieux connu par nature et le mieux connu pour nous. Ce faisant, la frontière entre la dialectique, qui part des idées accréditées, et l’apodictique, qui part de prémisses vraies, se révèle moins franche et la notion d’epistēmē, moins « scientifique » au sens moderne du terme. Enfin, cette lecture alternative des Seconds analytiques est mise à contribution pour l’examen de l’hypothèse, inspirée d’un essai d’Owen (1961), selon laquelle le chapitre II, 19 de ce traité fournirait les pistes de réflexion permettant d’élucider, en même temps que le rôle de l’induction, celui de la dialectique dans le cheminement vers les premiers principes. / The attention this master’s thesis gives to the aristotelian method towards truth confines it to a precise examination of the preliminary steps of this method, in order to distance itself from an over-simplified opposition between science and opinion in Aristotle. Starting from a presentation of the functions of dialectic, as described by the philosopher in the Topics, this inquiry intends to provide a close comparison between the methods of dialectic and demonstration. More precisely, it aims to deconstruct the presuppositions underlining a traditional reading of the Posterior analytics, according to which (1) demonstrative method should provide a guide for scientific research and (2) Aristotle’s epistemology is radically foundationalist. The alternative reading this study suggests to adopt allows it to ease the conditions imposed by Aristotle on the premises of apodictic syllogism, as ways to exploit the distinction he makes between what is better known by nature and what is better known for us. In doing so, the frontier between dialectic, which starts from accredited ideas, and demonstration, which starts from true premises, appears to be less opaque and the concept of epistēmē, less “scientific” in the modern sense. Finally, this alternative reading of the Posterior analytics is put to contribution in examining the hypothesis, inspired by an essay from Owen (1961), regarding the possibility for the last chapter (II, 19) of this treatise to help us elucidate, both at the same time, the role of induction and that of dialectic in the path towards truth.

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At the end of the fourteenth century Jean d’Arras rewrote a popular folktale. The tale told how Mélusine, a fairy who was serpent from the navel down every Saturday, married a knight and founded the fortress of Lusignan. In his introduction to the tale Jean d’Arras presents the ideas of four authority figures to convince the reader that fantastical things are possible and that his work should be taken seriously. These authority figures are David, Aristotle, Paul and Gervaise de Tilbury. It is the contention of this thesis that Jean d’Arras presents these figures in his introduction to provide context and serve as doubles for characters in the narration as well as convince the reader to take the work seriously. Through his allusion to Tilbury, Jean d’Arras establishes a context and a doubling for the story-line which he so repetitiously tells. Through his allusion to David we see a doubling for Raymondin, who in fact bears the name of earthly king, a position which David held in archetype. Through his allusion to Paul we see a doubling for Geoffrey à la grande dent, enfant terrible who becomes a responsible leader. And finally we suggest that Aristotle is a type for Jean d’Arras himself, who is presenting to his reader a methodical study of the telos of earthly kings. The thesis contains a discussion of these four individuals, how they were viewed in the late fourteenth-century and what the implications are for reading the text with them in mind. When viewed in the light of these comparisons the text can be seen, not only as a fantastical story, but as political commentary. Jean d’Arras glorifies the Duke of Berry, his patron, by connecting him to a supernatural being, but he also suggests throughout the narration, that the true justification for nobility and political power is not a supernatural connection, but a practical ability to deal with earthly affairs.

L’équité est un concept large dont la signification et la richesse conceptuelle ont évolué temporellement au sein de la théorie du droit et de la théorie politique. Au travers d’une histoire de l’équité, partant de la conception d’Aristote jusqu’aux juristes réalistes américains, ce mémoire analyse et explique la transformation graduelle de ce concept dans le droit, dont la place fut tantôt au centre des réflexions autour de la justice, tantôt minimisée, voire écartée, mais jamais complètement supprimée. Nous fondant sur cette riche histoire de l’équité, nous reconnectons ce concept phare de la théorie du droit à une réception de celui-ci au sein de la théorie politique. Pour ce faire, nous mobilisons la théorie de la liberté comme non-domination de Philip Pettit comme le cadre d’une pratique contemporaine de l’équité, au travers de la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada sur l’équité procédurale. / The concept of “equity” is vast, and its meaning and depth have dramatically evolved over time within the political and legal theory fields. This thesis offers a history of the concept of equity, starting from Aristotle’s conception of justice and equity to the American legal realist movement. On that basis, this thesis analyzes and explains the reasons why such a gradual transformation of this concept happened and, therefore, how the role of equity changed from being at the centre of theories of justice and law to being minimized, almost excluded from the sphere of legal theory, but never completely suppressed. Drawing on this rich history of equity, we reconnect this key concept of legal theory with its reception in political theory. In that regard, we offer an account of Philip Pettit’s theory of freedom as non-domination understood as the framework for the contemporary practice of equity, notably through the example of the case law of the Supreme Court of Canada on procedural fairness.

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