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Le présent mémoire entend étudier le concept de l’anhypothétique dans l’oeuvre de Platon et d’Aristote. Plus exactement, nous examinons le Bien intelligible chez Platon ainsi que le principe de non-contradiction chez Aristote. Bien que ce sont des principes qui adoptent la même conceptualisation, ils ont chacun un contexte et des facteurs qui leur sont spécifiques. Cela s’explique notamment par le fait que les philosophes ont des divergences doctrinales par rapport à l’être, la théorie des formes, la dialectique, et cetera. Un tour d’horizon des philosophies respectives ainsi qu’une comparaison systématique des principes nous aideront à y voir plus clair. De plus, nous examinerons en quoi Aristote est redevable à Platon pour l’adoption du principe de non-contradiction. Cela dit, les deux principes à l’étude ont comme caractéristique fondamentale de ne pas être des hypothèses, c’est-à-dire qu’ils ne peuvent souffrir du statut de contingence qui est typique de l’hypothèse. En effet, l’anhypothétique cherche à neutraliser son alternative afin de s’ériger en tant que nécessité catégorique. Les raisons d’une telle nécessité s’expliquent entre autres parce que l’anhypothétique est condition de possibilité pour la connaissance des êtres. La potentialité de sa négation est donc nettement problématique sur le plan scientifique et ontologique, d’où son statut particulièrement éminent pour les philosophes. / This dissertation examines the concept of the anhypothetical in the works of Plato and Aristotle. More precisely, we examine the Intelligible Good in Plato and the principle of non-contradiction in Aristotle. Although these principles adopt the same conceptualization, they each have their own specific context and factors. This is because the philosophers have doctrinal differences with regard to being, the theory of forms, dialectics, etcetera. An overview of the respective philosophies, together with a systematic comparison of principles, will help us to get a clearer picture. We'll also examine how Aristotle is indebted to Plato for the adoption of the principle of non-contradiction. That said, the two principles under consideration have the fundamental characteristic of not being hypotheses, i.e. they cannot suffer from the status of contingency that is typical of hypothesis. Indeed, the anhypothetical seeks to neutralize its alternative in order to set itself up as a categorical necessity. The reasons for such a necessity include the fact that the anhypothetic is a condition of possibility for the knowledge of beings. The potentiality of its negation is therefore clearly problematic on a scientific and ontological level, hence its particularly eminent status for philosophers.

Rembrandt's use of light in his self-portraits has received an abundance of scholarly attention throughout the centuries--and for good reason. His light delights the eye and captivates the mind with its textural quality and dramatic presence. At a time of scientific inquiry and religious reformation that was reshaping the way individuals understood themselves and their relationship to God, Rembrandt's light may carry more intellectual significance than has previously been thought. Looking at Rembrandt's oeuvre of self-portraits chronologically, it is apparent that something happened in his life or in his understanding that caused him to change how he used light. A distinct and consistent shift can be observed in the location and intensity of light to the crown of the forehead. This change indicates that light held particular significance for Rembrandt and that its connection to the head was a signifier with intentional meaning. This meaning could have developed as a result of Rembrandt's exposure to and interest in the contemporary theological and philosophical debates of the seventeenth-century Netherlands, particularly those relating to the physical and eternal nature of the soul stemming from the writings of René Descartes. The relative religious and intellectual freedom of the Dutch Republic provided a safe place for Descartes to publish and defend his metaphysical ideas relating to the nature of the soul and know-ability of God through personal intellectual inquiry. The widespread disturbance to established thought caused by his ideas and methods sped their dissemination into the early seventeenth-century discourse. Rembrandt's associations with the educated elite, particularly Constantijn Huygens and Jan Six, increases the probability that he knew of this new philosophy and had the opportunity to consider its relevance to his own quest for self-knowledge. With his particular emphasis on self-exploration and expression, demonstrated through his prolific oeuvre of self-portraits, and his inclination toward emotive, complex, and interdenominational religious works, it follows that Rembrandt would be eager to embrace Descartes' metaphysics and demonstrate his awareness through his self-portraits. Light on the forehead becomes a metaphor for enlightenment and is the key to reading Rembrandt's late self-portraits through the lens of Cartesian influence.

My dissertation draws upon ancient political philosophy (Plato and Aristotle) and 20th century hermeneutic thought (Heidegger and Gadamer) to argue that our judgment and understanding is always “situated” within a world, or horizon, shaped by the projects, practices, and traditions in which we are engaged. This means that judgment never starts from scratch. The exercise of judgment, in evaluating competing arguments in politics or law, in trying to understand a philosophical text, in deliberating about how to act in this or that circumstance, is always informed by preconceptions and commitments that we have not justified in advance. In this sense, our judgment is always “prejudiced.” But contrary to a familiar way of thinking, the prejudicial aspect of judgment is not some regrettable limitation. Certain prejudices, I argue, can actually enable good judgment rather than hinder it. The primary goal of the dissertation is to clarify the concept of prejudice and to draw out its implications for politics, ethics, and philosophy. What does it mean to reason from within the world? What room does such reasoning allow for human agency and political reform? By drawing upon Heidegger’s notion of “Being-in-the-World” and Gadamer’s notion of “horizon,” I develop the idea that our life circumstance is an intelligible perspective that informs our deliberation and judgment. Moreover, our life perspective provides the basis for a kind of situated agency. After elaborating the situated conception of understanding, I show that it is implicit in Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom (phronesis) and in Plato’s notion of dialectic. My goal is to bring out a link that is often overlooked between their philosophy and 20th century hermeneutic thought. By reading each in light of the other, we gain a deeper understanding of what it means to reason from within the perspective of our lives.

This thesis is a context-sensitive study of key epistemological commitments and concerns presented in Philo’s two series of exegetical writings. The major conclusion advanced in this thesis is that two theological epistemologies, distinct yet related, can be detected among these writings. The first epistemology is specific to the Allegorical Commentary. The second epistemology is specific to the ‘Exposition of the Law.’ The epistemology of the Allegorical Commentary reflects a threefold conviction: the sovereignty of God, the creaturely contingency of the human mind and its inescapable limitations. In conversation with key epistemological notions of his day, Philo develops this threefold conviction in exegetical discourses that are grounded in Pentateuchal texts portraying the God of Moses as both possessing epistemic authority and aiding the aspiring mind to gain purification and perfection in the knowledge of God. Guided by this threefold conviction, Philo enlists key metaphors of his day – initiation into divine mysteries and divine inspiration, among others –in order to capture something of the essence of Moses’ twofold way of ascending to the divine, an approach which requires at times the enhancement of human reason and at other times the eviction of human reason. The epistemology of the ‘Exposition’ reflects Philo’s understanding of the Pentateuch as a perfect whole partitioned into three distinct yet inseverable parts. Philo’s knowledge discourses in the ‘creation’ part of the ‘Exposition’ reflect two primary movements of thought. The first is heavily invested with a Platonic reading of Genesis 1.27 while the second invests Genesis 2.7 with a mixture of Platonic and Stoic notions of human transformation and well-being. Philo’s discourses in the ‘patriarchs’ segment reflect an interest in portraying the three great patriarchs as exemplars of the virtues of instruction (Abraham), nature (Isaac), and practice (Jacob) which featured prominently in Greek models of education. In the ‘Moses’ segment of the ‘Exposition,’ many of Philo’s discourses on knowledge are marked by an interest in presenting Moses as the ideal king, lawgiver, prophet and priest who surpasses Plato’s paradigm of the philosopher-king. In keeping with this view, Philo insists that the written laws of Moses represent the perfect counterpart to the unwritten law of nature. The life and laws of Moses serve as the paradigm for Philo to understand his own experiences of noetic ascent and exhort readers to cultivate similar aspirational notions and practices.

Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The central idea developed in this thesis is that meaningful work provides the normative standard of what work should be for all human beings, based on the normative idea that being human entails a realization of one’s potential and the expression of one’s intellect and creativity as a necessary part of living a full and flourishing life. Thus the key ethical foundation upon which my argument was built rests primarily upon classic Aristotelian ethical theory as well as more contemporary adaptations thereof. In reality, however, research reveals that up to eighty percent of people engage in work that is not meaningful in the sense that they are unable to experience both excellence and enjoyment through their work. This problem has been labeled as “employee disengagement” and has been acknowledged by organizations as a disturbingly growing trend particularly because of the financial cost it carries through lost productivity. My objective in this thesis was to outline the scope of the problem, and to make a strong case for the recognition of employee disengagement as a moral problem, and not simply as an economic one. Thus a major focus of this thesis was to unpack the concept of meaningful work and to argue for its moral value. Throughout my thesis, the importance of understanding meaningful work as a balance between both the subjective and objective elements that make work meaningful for the individual was emphasized. Having established employee disengagement as a moral problem, my attention then turned towards analyzing the potential causes of the problem at a systemic, organizational and individual level. My primary conclusion was that the modern paradigm facilitated a certain way of organizing business activity as well as a certain way of construing the relationship between work and life that has ultimately had a deep seated causal effect upon the absence of meaningful work. Thus addressing the problem entails a detachment from this paradigm and challenging some of the basic assumptions about organizational life. Finally, I proposed a business model that serves as a framework for a new way of working which has the capacity to be more fulfilling to the human spirit. This model assumes the tenets of virtue ethics as its core. In this model, individual employees, the organization as a community and leaders in the business all have specific roles and responsibilities to bring the model to life, and thus the quest for meaningful work has to be undertaken as a collaborative effort. The field of business ethics, with a refreshed Aristotelian mindset, has a lot of value to add in offering much needed ethical guidance to help steer this radical, yet exciting workplace transformation process in the right direction. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die kerngedagte van hierdie tesis is dat betekenisvolle arbeid die normatiewe standaard sou skep van wat werk vandonderstel is om vir die mensdom te beteken. Dit berus op die veronderstelling dat menswees meebring dat die individu se volle potensiaal, intelligensie en kreatiwiteit sal lei tot ‘n betekenisvolle bestaan. Die sleutelargument steun primêr die klassieke Aristoteliese etiese teorie asook hendendaagse aanpassings daarvan. Navorsing bewys egter dat tot 80% van die arbeidsmag betrokke is in betekenislose (sinlose) arbeid in die sin dat hulle geen genot of uitnemendheid ervaar nie. Die probleem word geetiketteer as “werknemersonttrekking” en word deur maatskappye beskou as ‘n onstellende tendens ten opsigte van die finansiële impak en die gepaardgaande verlies van produktiwiteit. Die oogmerk van die tesis is om die omvang van die probleem uit te lig en om redes aan te voer dat werknemers onttrekking as ‘n morele vraagstuk aangespreek moet word en nie net gesien sal word as ‘n finansiële dilemma nie. Die beweegrede van die tesis is om die begrip van betekenisvolle arbeid te ondersoek en om die morele aspek daarvan te debatteer. Die belangrikheid van die begrip, betekenisvolle arbeid, as ‘n balans tussen beide die subjektiewe en objektiewe beginsels word deurgaans onderstreep. Aangesien “werknemersonttrekking” as ‘n morele probleem beskou word is die oogmerk om die oorsake van die probleem te analiseer, op ‘n sistematiese, organisatoriese en individuele vlak. Die gevolgtrekking is dan dat die moderne paradigma ‘n sekere invloed het op die organisasie se besigheidsaktiwiteite en is ook ‘n metode om die verhouding tussen werk en bestaan te bepaal, wat uiteindelik ‘n diepgesete redegewende invloed het in die afwesigheid van sinvolle arbeid. ‘n Skeiding van die voorbeeld en die basiese veronderstelling van georganiseerde bestaan word benodig om begenoemde begrip te bevraagteken. Laastens is daar ‘n besigheidsmodel wat dien as ‘n raamwerk vir ‘n nuwe manier van werk, wat sal meebring dat werk meer vervulling aan die menslike gees sal bied. Díe model, veronderstel die beginsel van eerbare etiek as die grondslag. Werknemers van organisasies, die organisasie as ‘n gemeenskap en besigheidsleiers het spesifieke rolle en verantwoordelikhede, om lewe te gee aan die model. Daarvolgens moet die soeke na sinvolle arbied as ‘n kollektiewe poging beskou word. Die gebied van besigheidsetiek , met ‘n vernuwende Aristoteliese denkwyse, het tot voordeel , ‘n waardevolle bydrae tot ‘n onmisbare etiese leiding, om hierdie radikale maar opwindende transformasie in die werkplek mee te bring.

This thesis focuses on the ancient reception of the Categories of Aristotle, a work which served continuously, from late antiquity into the early modern period (Frede 1987), as the student’s introduction to philosophy.  There had previously been no comprehensive study of the reception of the Categories during the age of the first philosophical commentaries (c. 80 BC to AD 220). In this study, I have collected, assigned, and analyzed the relevant fragments of commentary belonging to this period, including some that were previously undocumented or inexplicit in the source texts, and sought to establish and characterize the influence of the early commentators’ activity on the subsequent Peripatetic tradition. In particular, I trace the early evolution of criticism and defense of the text through competing accounts of its aim (skopos), which would ultimately lead Stoic and Platonic philosophers to a partial acceptance of the Categories and frame its role in the later Neo-Platonic curriculum.

Le traité De l’âme (DA) et les traités connexes (Parva Naturalia) contiennent les éléments d’une théorie de la phantasia, souvent nommée « imagination », ou « représentation ». Dans ce texte, Aristote affirme à plusieurs reprises qu’il est impossible de penser quoi que ce soit sans phantasia. Le DA contient toutefois peu de précisions quant à la portée de cette affirmation. Ce que cela signifie trouve cependant une élucidation si l’on transfert la théorie de la phantasia à un autre texte, les Seconds Analytiques II, 19, portant sur l’acquisition du premier savoir universel à partir de la perception, et des premiers principes intelligibles. Cette étude se propose d’abord de montrer en quoi la théorie de la phantasia s’applique aux SA, et comment ce texte, lu en regard de la phantasia, peut répondre à la question de savoir ce que cela signifie que l’intellect doit nécessairement s’appuyer sur la phantasia pour penser. / The treaty On the Soul (DA) and the connex treaties (Parva Naturalia) expose a theory of phantasia, often translated as « imagination » or « representation ». In the DA, Aristotle maintains that it is impossible to think without phantasia, yet this text offers little precision on the exact signification of his affirmation. An elucidation may however be found in another text, the Posterior Analytics II, 19, which focuses on the acquisition of knowledge, that is, the first universals implanted by perception and the first intelligible principles. This text, as we will firstly demonstrate, has to be read in the frame of the theory of phantasia, which will show that the acquisition of klowledge depends on phantasia. Thus and secondly, it will be clearer what it means that it is impossible for the intellect to think without phantasia.