Thesis (Ph. D.)--Miami University, Dept. of English, 2004. / Title from second page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 94-98).

This diploma thesis deals with the Aristotelian virtue ethics and its renaissance in the twentieth century. Ethics is first defined generally as a separate science which belongs to the practical sciences. Subsequently, the emphasis on virtue ethics as one of the directions of normative ethics. A key part of the thesis deals with the ethics of virtue in Aristotle and interpretation corresponding more or less to the interpretation of the work of Nicomachean Ethics. The emphasis is on concepts of virtue, bliss and goodness. The development of u virtue ethics from the time of Aristotle until the twentieth century is also mentioned. The last part deals with the form of virtue ethics in the twentieth century, including the process how the ethics of virtue acquired its present form. It is also compared to the interpretation of virtue ethics in Aristotle and in the works of modern moral philosophers, particularly the work of Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue is emphasized.

Liberal thinkers have suggested different theories that legitimise the state's various processes, institutions, and use of coercive power. However, their theories cannot account for those motivations that cause men to put their lives in danger when standing against political oppression. The study of Montesquieu's theory of government can aid liberalism's incomplete account of the political motivations that incline men to defend their liberty. Toward this end, this thesis studies Montesquieu's notions of virtue and honour, and challenges the meaning they have been accorded in previous studies. This thesis suggests that Montesquieu combined these notions in order to conceive a type of motivation that inclines individuals to defend their liberty against encroachment. In order to recover this type of motivation, this study will adopt an approach of close textual analysis with attention to the context. Virtue and honour play a crucial role in Montesquieu's political thought because they foster the preservation of government. Virtue inclines citizens in republics to act with self-sacrifice. However, that virtue does not aim toward the attainment of excellence or of God's grace; rather, Montesquieu conceived virtue in relation to public utility. Honour inclines the subjects of monarchy to pursue their selfish desires in order to derive public benefits. However, Montesquieu did not conceive honour in connection with the liberal motif of the invisible hand; rather, he conceived honour in connection with the pursuit of glory. By combining honour and virtue, Montesquieu conceived a type of motivation that can foster the preservation of liberty in modernity. This motivation enables individuals to enjoy their liberty in times of peace by pursuing their selfish desires; in times of crisis, it inclines them to perform great actions in order to defend that liberty against political oppression. Considering Montesquieu's type can aid liberalism's account of political motivations in the contemporary debate.

A presente pesquisa tem como objetivo desenvolver um estudo acerca da noção aristotélica de constituição orgânica, no qual procurarei propor um exame da filosofia da natureza de Aristóteles referente ao aspecto, atribuído ao organismo, de ser substância natural no seu mais elevado grau, estabelecendo uma análise comparativa entre os compostos elementares, os compostos homogêneos inanimados e os compostos orgânicos. Para tanto, pretendo, primeiramente, promover uma análise a respeito do caráter substancial dos organismos vivos. Em seguida, delimitar uma investigação em torno dos tipos de composições naturais, levando em conta a maneira pela qual a necessidade natural estaria envolvida no processo constitutivo de tais composições. E, por fim, oferecer uma interpretação relativa ao capítulo 12 do livro IV dos Meteorológicos, a qual tem por base discernir a natureza formal associada, por um lado, às propriedades características dos corpos homogêneos em geral, considerados em si e por si mesmos, e, por outro, às propriedades características da constituição orgânica, de modo a precisar as diferenças entre elas. Penso que, com este estudo, também será possível compreender de um modo claro o motivo pelo qual, nesta concepção de natureza, toma-se o organismo vivo como o paradigma de substâncias (ousiai) naturais. / This research aims to develop a study on the aristotelian notion of organic constitution, which seek to propose an examination of the natural philosophy of Aristotle concerning the aspect, assigned to the body, to be natural substance in its highest degree, establishing an analysis comparative between elementary compounds, inanimate homoeomerous compounds and organic compounds. Therefore, I intend, first, to promote an analysis regarding the substantial nature of living organisms. Then delimit an investigation around the kinds of natural compositions, taking into account the way in which natural necessity would be involved in the constitutive process of such compositions. And finally, offer an interpretation relating to Chapter 12 of De Caelo IV, which relies on discerning the formal nature associated, on the one hand, the characteristic properties of homoeomerous bodies generally considered in themselves and for themselves, and, on the other hand, the characteristic properties of the organic constitution in order to clarify the differences between then. I think that, with this study, also will be possible understand in a clearly way the reason, in this conception of nature, it takes the living organism as the paradigm of natural substances (ousiai).

Este trabalho investiga o lugar da téchne no mundo antigo por meio dos instrumentos musicais, enquanto artefatos físicos e modelos matemáticos, geométricos e mecânicos. A escassez de informações sobre as técnicas de construção dos instrumentos leva a examinar outras atividades artesanais, especialmente aquelas ligadas à carpintaria e ao trabalho com metais. O exame da natureza do poder encantatório da música e sua relação com os instrumentos será realizado por meio da abordagem de figuras como as musas e os daimónes, e também da organização concebida pelos filósofos no período clássico. Apesar do lugar de inferioridade que importantes pensadores conferiram aos artesãos, evidências mostram que a téchne dos artífices marcou profundamente o pensamento grego. No que diz respeito à música, o papel do luthier foi fundamental na medida em que proporcionou o substrato material para desenvolvimentos na linguagem musical. Além dos artefatos, os modelos matemáticos, geométricos e mecânicos da música também nasceram nas oficinas. Ao serem dominados pelos músicos, tais rtefatos e modelos serão igualmente responsáveis por grandes transformações musicais. / This work investigates the Greek notion of téchne in the ancient world through its musical instruments, in the form of physical artifacts and mathematical, geometrical and mechanical models. Because of the lack of information about ancient lutherie, it examines other forms of craftsmanship, like carpentry and metallurgy. The inquire into the nature of the musical powers of music, and its relation to musical instruments, will be done by the examination of characters like muses and daimónes, and also of the organization models of the classical philosophers. Despite the inferior place that great philosophers give to the technicians, this study sustains that they had deeply influenced the Greek thought. Regarding music, its possible to say that the luthiers role was fundamental because the material foundation conducted developments in the musical language. Besides the artifacts, the mathematical, geometrical and mechanical musical models were born in the workshops. Artifacts and models, mastered by the musicians, will be equally responsible for the musical developments.

Dans le cadre d’une approche philosophique et épistémologique, qui privilège le point de vue rhétorique sur l’argumentation et la ligne de pensée Aristote-Vico-Perelman, la thèse essaye d’analyser la construction de la subjectivité dans le discours argumentatif. Je cherche à montrer qu’il est possible de tracer une théorie de l’argumentation dans laquelle subjective n’est pas synonyme de fallacieuse.<p>En général, la thèse analyse le rôle de celui qui parle et de celui qui écoute dans l’argumentation et dans tous les discours. Je vais soutenir est que la dimension personnelle n’est pas un élément qu’il faut supprimer mais, au contraire, un élément essentiel du discours argumentatif.<p><p>Une approche rhétorique au problème du sujet se base sur une intuition fondamentale de la rhétorique d’Aristote .Comme nous le savons, dans le premier livre de la Rhétorique, Aristote affirme que le discours (logos) est composé (synkeimai) de trois éléments :l’orateur, le sujet traité et l’auditoire .Au même temps la rhétorique est composée des trois éléments :Logos, Pathos et Ethos. La pratique linguistique inclut la dimension émotive, l’orateur et l’auditoire, qui sont des éléments discursifs. De même, l’ethos et le pathos ne sont pas des moyens de preuves irrationnelles ou des fallacies. On verra que cette idée implique un système philosophique et épistémologique assez différent du système normativiste des théories contemporaines :cela implique de revenir sur le concept de rationalité et sur le rapport entre la rationalité, la praxis et son incertitude essentielle.<p><p>Pour question de temps, la thèse ne parle pas de pathos. Elle s’occupe de l’ethos soit du point de vue de celui qui parle (Partie I) soit du point de vue de l’auditoire (Partie II).<p><p>Dans la première partie, on analyse la question de la rationalité rhétorique et des paralogismes et les définitions historiques de la dimension personnelle de l’argumentation (ethos, personne, ad hominem).<p><p>Dans la deuxième, on analyse le rapport entre la dimension personnelle, le sens commun, la vérité, la certitude et la fides.<p>En conclusion, on soutiendra que l’ethos est soit une pistis technique de la rhétorique, soit une des conditions préalables du discours même.<p> / Doctorat en Langues et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Cette thèse cherche à reconstituer les bases philosophiques de la pensée juridique de H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), figure majeure du positivisme juridique anglo-saxon au XXe siècle, et professeur de jurisprudence à l'université d'Oxford de 1952 à 1968. Ses travaux demeurent largement méconnus en France.Dégager les sources philosophiques du « positivisme analytique » de Hart permettra, premièrement, de reconstruire le dialogue entre le juriste d'Oxford et certaines figures importantes de la théorie du droit continentale. Hart oppose d’importantes critiques à certaines formes continentales de positivisme juridique, comme le normativisme de Hans Kelsen ou le réalisme scandinave d'Alf Ross. Cependant, cette thèse montrera également qu'il est possible d'établir des rapprochements étroits entre la pensée de Hart et celle du juriste francophone Chaïm Perelman. L'étude des bases philosophiques de la pensée juridique de Hart offre ainsi des points de contact intéressants entre ces différentes cultures juridiques.Deuxièmement, cette thèse cherche à faire ressortir l'influence déterminante de la philosophie du langage ordinaire qui se développa à Oxford au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Notre propos s'appuiera notamment sur un « premier corpus » de textes philosophiques publiés avant son accession à la chaire de jurisprudence en 1952, ainsi que sur les travaux préparatoires à son ouvrage The Concept of Law (1961). Nous défendons l'idée que ses prises de position philosophiques se retrouvent dans sa réflexion juridique et permettent de comprendre la cohérence de son œuvre, ainsi que la forme d'empirisme juridique qui sous-tend sa conception de la notion de Constitution. / This thesis bears on the implicit epistemology and methodological considerations underlying the legal philosophy of H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), the major representative of XXth century legal positivism in the English speaking world, and Oxford chair of jurisprudence (1952-1968). His work remains little known in France.We will seek to answer the view that Hart might not really have been durably influenced by ordinary language philosophy. We will address these questions by examining a corpus of earlier (overlooked) articles which he published as a young Oxford linguistic philosopher. This “early work” consists of the articles which Hart published before he in was elected to the Oxford chair of jurisprudence. Our view is that the work in general philosophy which he did in this early period is crucial to understand some of the positions which he defends in his legal writings. This thesis will thus show that Hart was active in the epistemological debate opposing the Oxford philosophers and the British representatives of logical atomism and logical empiricism. It will also show that these early positions are carried over into his later jurisprudence, including his major work The Concept of Law (1961).Shedding light on these philosophical foundations of Hart’s legal theory will ultimately allow us to reconstruct the debate opposing his own “analytical positivism” and Continental forms of positivism, such as Hans Kelsen’s normativism or Alf Ross Scandinavian legal realism. It will also allow us to draw important parallels between Hartian legal theory and that of the francophone philosopher Chaïm Perelman.

Le traité des Catégories d’Aristote est l’une des premières œuvres de la philosophie occidentale traduite en chinois. Introduit par les jésuites en Chine au XVIIème siècle, sa traduction fut une confrontation entre la pensée gréco-chrétienne et la pensée chinoise. Elle nous renseigne sur le rapport entre la langue et la pensée. Le premier chapitre est un aperçu de l’environnement historico-culturel dans lequel cette traduction a été réalisée. Le deuxième chapitre présente notre méthode et nos outils de travail. Nous expliquons, dans le troisième chapitre, le titre de l’ouvrage en chinois : il est censé être la traduction du mot « logique », mais il est composé de mots qui renvoient à des doctrines philosophiques chinoises traitant de problèmes fondamentalement différents de ceux dont s’occupe la logique aristotélicienne. Les quatrième et cinquième chapitres constituent un commentaire de la traduction chinoise du premier chapitre du traité aristotélicien. Les différences linguistiques entre le chinois et les langues indo-européennes se révèlent tant sur le plan lexical que sur le plan grammatical. Nous terminons notre travail par une discussion sur la traduction du verbe « être ». Notre objet est de montrer que ce qui est perdu dans la traduction est moins le sens du mot « être » que sa syntaxe et le mode de pensée qui lui est lié. Étudier les intraduisibles en philosophie, c’est découvrir les différentes façons de thématiser et de problématiser, qui caractérisent chaque système de pensée. Cette étude de philosophie comparée gréco-chinoise espère contribuer à la réflexion sur la pluralité linguistique et culturelle. / Aristotle’s Categories is one of the first Western philosophical texts translated into Chinese. Since Jesuit missionaries introduced scientific thoughts into China in the 17th century, Chinese literati have shown a strong interest in the demonstration method that was originated in Aristotelian logic. This dissertation presents a detailed study of the Chinese translation Ming li tan, with the aim of addressing several issues on the relationship between language and thought. Chapter 1 is an overview of the historical and cultural environment in which the translation took place. Chapter 2 presents our approach to comparative philosophy. Chapter 3 discusses the translation of the title “Ming li tan”. The term “ming li” is used as a translation of the word “logic”, but is actually composed of terms referring to Chinese philosophical doctrines which deal with problems fundamentally different from those of the Aristotelian logic. Chapters 4 and 5 provide a detailed commentary of the Chinese translation of the first chapter of Categories, focusing in particular on three notions: homonym, synonym and paronym. We conclude our work with a discussion on the translation of the verb “to be” and its derivatives (e.g., being, substance), and explain the reasoning behind its various Chinese renditions. Our central claim is that what is lost in translation is less the literal meaning of word “to be” than its syntax and the way of thinking underlying the use of this word. The focus on translation provides a unique approach to studying linguistic relativism and linguistic and cultural pluralism. A good understanding of these issues is crucial for improving the intercultural dialogue.

Poser la question du divin chez Aristote, c’est déterminer à quelle question la conception aristotélicienne du divin est censée répondre. L’examen méthodique de l’intégralité du corpus aristotelicum et, tout particulièrement, des trois textes dans lesquels Aristote place l’étude des réalités divines au centre de son enquête (Physique, VII-VIII ; De Cœlo, I-II, Métaphysique, Lambda) permet de formuler deux conclusions principales. En premier lieu, il apparaît clairement que la question du divin n’est pas, aux yeux d’Aristote, de nature théologique, mais archologique. Nulle part, en effet, l’étude du divin n’est menée pour elle-Même ; elle s’ancre, au contraire, dans un examen explicitement dédié aux principes premiers de la phusis ou des ousiai. La conception aristotélicienne du divin et des dieux est ainsi le produit d’un examen méthodique des êtres premiers et des principes, examen grâce auquel Aristote espère produire une détermination rigoureuse du mode d’être du principe en tant que tel et résoudre, par là même, certaines apories relatives à la question de l’archè. En second lieu, il convient de noter que les principaux textes dévolus à l’étude des êtres divins se distinguent les uns des autres par des nuances méthodologiques significatives. Selon que la question du divin prend naissance au sein de la science naturelle ou de la science des substances, selon qu’elle appartient à la physique ou à l’ousiologie, la preuve de l’existence des réalités divines, de même que la description de leur nature et de leurs fonctions, font l’objet de formulations diverses, toutes inféodées à la logique conceptuelle de la science qui les rend possibles. En somme, chaque examen des réalités divines se distingue par sa tournure singulière, qui n’est autre que le produit de la régionalisation des discours, c’est-À-Dire de leur adaptation méthodologique aux outils de la science qui les engendre. / Studying the question of the divine in Aristotle implies to determine to which problem the Aristotelian conception of the divine is supposed to answer. Two conclusions can be drawn from close examination of the corpus aristotelicum in its entirety, and particularly of these texts in which the study of divine realities is Aristotle’s major concern (Physics, VII-VIII; De Cœlo, I-II, Metaphysics, Lambda). In the first place, it clearly appears that, according to Aristotle, the question of the divine is not a theological question, but an archological one. Indeed, nowhere Aristotle studies the divine beings in order to explore deeply the nature of the gods, but rather with the intention of investigating the first principles of phusis and ousiai. The Aristotelian conception of the divine is thus the consequence of the detailed examination of the first principles, thanks to which Aristotle thinks he will be able to define precisely the nature of the principle qua principle and then to solve some aporia about the archè. In the second place, it is worth noting that each of the three main texts in which Aristotle develops his conception of the divine is characterized by slight but significant differences in method. Depending on whether the question of the divine belongs to the science of nature (physics) or to the science of ousia (ousiology), the demonstration of the existence of divine beings and the description of their nature and causality are expressed in different ways, in accordance with the concepts employed in each science. In short, each investigation about divine beings is characterized by its singular form, which is the product of the regionalization of each inquiry, i.e. of its methodical adaptation to the conceptual tools of the science to which it belongs.

Ce travail a pour but de montrer quelles logiques de la finalité sont en jeu dans le travail du manager. Nous avons distingué deux façons d’aborder la finalité. La première, proche des notions d’objectif, d’intérêt, d’utilité, constitue le soubassement des façons d’aborder classiquement le travail du manager. Nous avons fait émerger, en nous appuyant sur la pensée d’Aristote, Thomas d’Aquin, et Spaemann, une conception alternative de la finalité, qui diffère de l’objectif et de l’intérêt en ce qu’elle n’est pas construite. Ce concept de finalité permet de voir autrement trois dimensions essentielles du travail du manager : le management par objectif, le faisceau d’exigences contradictoires dont le manager est le point focal, et le dilemme qui se pose à lui entre éthique et efficacité. Enfin, une enquête de terrain permet de montrer que cette logique alternative de la finalité, rattachée à l’éthique des vertus, trouve une certaine place dans le discours des managers de la FDJ, aux côtés du conséquentialisme, qui consacre l’acception utilitaire de la finalité, et du déontologisme qui évacue le recours à la finalité. / This thesis aim is to show which notion of purpose is at stake in the manager’s work. It differentiates two ways to address the concept of purpose. The first one, close to the notions of objective, interest, utility, forms the foundations of a classical vision of the manager’s work. However, a second one, based on Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Spaemann’s philosophies, arose. This alternative conception differs from objective and interest as it is not elaborated by the subject. It allows a different view on three essential dimensions of the manager’s work: the management by objectives, the body of contradictory requirements that built up on the manager and the dilemma between ethics and efficiency. Finally, a field survey showed that this alternative conception of purpose, linked to virtue-based ethics, has a certain place in the FDJ’s managers’ message, together with consequentialism, which expresses the utilitarian conception of purpose, and deontological ethics, which evacuates any purpose.