"In terms of what they are capable of, it seems to me, when you have the distance narrowing between humans and machines in the sense that if we are becoming more machine-like, it's easier to see the machine as more human-like. I don't want to be overly dramatic about it, but I think more and more people wonder, is this living or are we just going through the motions? What's happening? Is everything being leached out of life? Are the whole texture and values and everything kind of draining away? Well, that would take many other lectures, but it's not so much the actual advance of the technology: If machines can be human, humans can be machines. The truly scary point is the narrowing of the distance between the two".In John Zerza’s talk ‘Against Technology’ at Stanford University, he observed that when you have the distance between humans and machines narrowing then in a sense we are becoming more machine-like, and it’s easier to see the machine as more human like. These views are similar to the views I have been considering for some time in my art practice.My research paper attempts to chart the relationship between my art practice and personal and global circumstances as an international student from Beijing studying at an art school in Melbourne.Living Machines also finds expressions of these ideas in the theories of Michel Focault, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Lacan and Harold Pinter. The artists I have been investigating include Marcel Duchamp, Ai WeiWei, Ang Lee, Tom Friedman and A Constructed World .The informal nature of the writing attempts to articulate my philosophical stance taken in the studio-based research. My studio research practice comprises collaboration and installations where I construct objects from found materials, and use video, animation, and performance to explore material and spatial equivalences to the concept of body as machine.

This dissertation will use the philosophy of John Dewey to develop a conception of the individual using an ecological model as an alternative to the atomistic type more typical of Western philosophy. An ecological model presents the individual as part of a biological and cultural milieu, but, contrary to a number of critiques of the Deweyan individual, it does not subsume the individual beneath the larger processes of which it is a part or sacrifice the individual to the social institutions such as the state. The Introduction and Chapter One provide an overview of various critiques of Dewey's understanding of the individual before arguing that the Deweyan individual is best understood in ecological terms. This first section also argues in favor of Dewey's current relevance, as his philosophy provides a number of resources for addressing contemporary social problems. Chapter Two briefly examines the claim that there are possible absolutist tendencies in Dewey's thought before discussing the threat of absolutism, examining absolutist practices as types of monocultures, and arguing that far from supporting such tendencies, a Deweyan ecological individualism works against such practices. Chapter Three examines some of the implications of using an ecological model for the individual, shows that such an understanding of the individual drives home the precariousness of existence, and argues that this model thus provides the basis for a Deweyan existentialism. While Chapter Three emphasizes the ways in which our interdependence highlights the dangers that individuals face, Chapter Four responds to these worrisome implications by arguing in favor of a Deweyan art of living that builds upon our social and biological interrelatedness with a Deweyan care ethics that responds not only to our status as ecologically integrated entities with responsibilities to our social and biological communities, but that also emphasizes our need for self-care. The final chapter examines the ecological individual and moral community through the lens of a Deweyan radical democracy that emphasizes the need for ecological literacy, citizen engagement, a knowledgeable respect for our diverse heritage, and a willingness to work together continually to change our institutions and our practices toward democratic ideals.

La statuaire morale de Platon est l'activité "modelant par la parole" (République, IX, 588 b 10) de "multiples statues de l'excellence" (Banquet, 222 a 3-4) et consistant aussi à "se façonner soi-même" (République, VI, 500 d 6) d'après elles. Elle implique donc un double cheminement: l'un va des images contenues dans les Dialogues, aux valeurs qu'elles désignent, tandis que l'autre conduit à envisager l'éthique platonicienne comme une forme particulière d'art de l'existence. Sur ce second point, la thèse soutenue se situe ainsi dans l'optique de la pensée de Michel Foucault. Sur le premier point en revanche, elle a consisté à interroger le statut du langage platonicien, la nature des procédés rhétoriques mis en œuvre, ainsi que celle des figures utilisées. Ce double examen permet d'affirmer que la définition de l'éthique platonicienne comme statuaire morale n'est pas une simple métaphore: c'est une image, mais qu'il faut situer parmi les multiples images forgées par Platon. Elle se révèle alors apte à orienter la lecture et la compréhension des Dialogues. / Plato's moral statuary is the act that "moulds in words" (Republic, IX, 588 b 10) "many statues of excellence" (Symposium, 222 a 3-4) and consists of "modeling oneself" (Republic, VI, 500 d 6) on these images. Thus the statuary implies a process that is twofold: on the one hand there is a progress from the images contained in the dialogues to the values they refer to, while, on the other hand, it leads to a conception of platonic ethics as a particular art of living. This second approach follows Michel Foucault's analysis, whereas the first approach stems from an examination of the status of platonic language, a study of the rhetoric used in the dialogues as well as the figures of speech that are resorted to. This twofold approach enables to conclude that defining platonic ethics as ethical statuary is not merely a metaphor; it is an image that must be identified amidst the numerous images created by Plato, so as to provide a key to the reading and understanding of the Dialogues.

Today’s societies are characterised by a host of opportunities and challenges. The pace of life is quicker than ever before, and the changes and developments in societies, science and technology come about faster every day. One of the major challenges for human beings is to make a myriad of choices on a daily basis, which will define their place in society, in life and in the world altogether. To make prudent and sensible decisions is, therefore, one of the key competencies for a successful and good life. This study revisits the idea of an education focused on the personal development and well-being of human beings instead of economic growth. Drawing on philosophical ideas about the good life -- especially Schmid’s art of living concept Lebenskunst -- and recent research in positive psychology, an argument is made for a shift of focus in education and schooling towards a good life and an art of living for today's students. Possible implications of this change of focus for educational practice are discussed, including suggestions for curricula and school subjects, the structure of schools and learning environments, teaching methods, and teacher training. The original contributions to knowledge in this study are: a critique of Schmid's concept from an educational point of view; a comparison of positive psychology research and philosophical concepts of the art of living with a focus on Schmid's work; the development of an educational approach to the art of living, including a discussion of schooling in relation to the art of living; and consequent first steps towards the development of an education for life concept.

Inwiefern, so konnte man sich zu Beginn dieses renditeorientierten, hoch kapitalistischen und allzeit praxisbezogenen 21. Jahrhunderts durchaus zu Recht fragen, gehört Kunst überhaupt zum Leben, inwiefern gehört Literatur zur Lebenskunst, und inwiefern trifft dies im Besonderen auch auf den Akt der Lektüre selbst zu? [...] Im Mittelpunkt der Analyse steht deshalb Jude the Obscure als 'medialer', fast schon medientheoretischer Roman, in dem es primär um den gelungenen oder gescheiterten Lektüreprozess von Zeichen geht, wobei gezeigt werden soll, dass Hardys letzter Roman gleich auf mehreren Textebenen sehr dezidiert verdeutlicht, wie Literatur gelesen werden und welche Kriterien eine adäquate Lektüre erfüllen sollte.

L’objet de ce travail est d’éclairer l’esthétique et l’éthique de la poétique de Francis Ponge à partir de la notion de Nature. La première partie étudie la notion de Nature chez Ponge en tant que monde extérieur et son matérialisme qui, fortement influencé par le matérialisme antique, est caractérisé par l’antimétaphysique. Cette partie met également en relief le rapport étroit entre sa pensée matérialiste et la pensée immanente spinoziste, résumée dans l’expression de « Dieu ou la Nature ». Les aspects immanents des choses dans ses œuvres peuvent être mieux saisis, en effet, à l’aide de la notion d’« immanence » spinoziste. La deuxième partie explore, quant à elle, la relation entre la Nature et la littérature et le développement d’un nouveau lyrisme matérialiste chez Ponge. Pour lui, la littérature se naturalise et la Nature se littérarise. Son approbation de la Nature se traduit par sa contresignature apposée aux choses.Son nouveau lyrisme matérialiste, qui s’oppose au lyrisme traditionnel, se caractérise autour de notions telles que la vibration, l’aspiration, ou la « réson ». La troisième partie, enfin, examine le nouvel humanisme de Ponge ainsi que son éthique.La relation entre la Nature et l’homme s’articulera autour de thèmes éthiques essentiels comme l’altérité, le nouvel humanisme et le salut de l’homme. Son éthique consiste à vivre heureux. Nous l’aborderons à travers différents thèmes tels que la sagesse antique, l’harmonie du « non-soi » et du « soi », l’éthique de la joie, le hasard et la liberté. / The purpose of this study is to examine the aesthetics and the ethics of Francis Ponge’s poetry through the notion of Nature. The first part examines the concept of Nature in Ponge as the outside world and his materialism which, heavily influenced by ancient materialism, is characterized by the anti-metaphysical. This part also explore the close relationship between his idea and Spinoza’s immanent idea, summarized in the expression of "God, or Nature". The immanent aspects of things in his work can be fully understood with the help of the concept of "immanence" of Spinoza. The second part examines the relationship between Nature and literature and the development of Ponge’s new materialist lyricism. For him, literature becomes naturalized and nature becomes literarized. The approval of nature is reflected in his countersignature for things. His new materialist lyricism, contrasted with the traditional lyricism, is characterized by notions such as vibration, aspiration, "réson". The third part will focus on the new humanism and the ethics of Ponge. The relationship between Nature and man will be treated primarily on certain essential themes of ethics such as otherness, the new humanism and the salvation of man. His ethics is to live à happy life. Various topics, such as ancient wisdom, the harmony of the "non-self" and the "self", the ethics of joy, chance and freedom, will be discussed.

Contemporary debates in ethics are characterised by opposing views that appear to be irreconcilable. Rational debates seem to be making no headway due to the fact that the incompatibilities of the different views seem to lie within the very premises of the different arguments. These debates acquire an interminable character, because representatives of the different standpoints refuse to accept each others’ premises. MacIntyre attributes this state of affairs to the failure of the Enlightenment project. In their attempt to create a universally valid moral system the Enlightenment philosophers discredited the ethical traditions and emphasized reason as the only authority on these matters. The supposedly “universal” rational arguments are built on premises the Enlightenment thinkers inherited from the exact same ethical traditions whose authority they consciously undermined. The irony of the Enlightenment project is therefore that it caused its own failure. MacIntyre believes that the Enlightenment thinkers were mistaken in undermining the authority of all the ethical traditions. He argues that the authority of the critical traditions is legitimate. A critical tradition is a moral tradition where some form of rational enquiry is embodied in the tradition itself. MacIntyre defends the authority of the Aristotelian tradition as the critical tradition per se. In my own enquiry I defend the authority of the Stoic tradition. I attempt to point out the flaws in MacIntyre’s understanding of the Stoics and argue that in some respects the Stoic tradition is a better alternative to the Aristotelian one. After having justified the authority of the Stoic tradition I take a closer look at what their ethics entail. The Stoics have what Cottingham refers to as a “synoptic” conception of philosophy. This means that they tried to integrate all the aspects of human understanding into a single system. Therefore, if one wishes to give a comprehensive picture of their ethics it is necessary to explain their philosophical work on physics and logic as well. I do so by comparing their understanding of physics to the contemporary understanding thereof. The Stoics believed that philosophy is not an abstract theoretical discipline, but rather a way of life. Theoretical arguments play an important role in so far as it helps us to comprehend the nature of the good, but ultimately philosophy is about helping us to live a good life. In light of this understanding I argue that they conceived of ethics as the art of living. The Stoics also believed that one could practice ethics as a form of therapy for our emotions. They believed that emotions such as anger and depression are caused by misguided ways of thinking and that ultimately the good life would cultivate our spirit and enable us to become more resistant to these types of emotions. Simultaneously it will enable us to experience more rational emotions such as joy. The ultimate aim of my research project is to highlight the important contributions the Stoics can make to the crisis we are currently experiencing in ethical discourse. / Dissertation (MA (Philosophy))--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Philosophy / unrestricted

A Sceptical Aesthetics of Existence: The Case of Michel Foucault Emmanouil Simos (Hughes Hall) Michel Foucault's genealogical investigations constitute a specific historical discourse that challenges the metaphysical hypostatisation of concepts and methodological approaches as unique devices for tracking metaphysically objective truths. Foucault's notion of aesthetics of existence, his elaboration of the ancient conceptualisation of ethics as an 'art of living' (a technē tou biou), along with a series of interconnected notions (such as the care of the self) that he developed in his later work, have a triple aspect. First, these notions are constitutive parts of his later genealogies of subjectivity. Second, they show that Foucault contemplates the possibility of understanding ethics differently, opposed to, for example, the traditional Kantian conceptualisation of morality: he envisages ethics in terms of self-fashioning, of aesthetic transformation, of turning one's life into a work of art. Third, Foucault employs these notions in self-referential way: they are considered to describe his own genealogical work. This thesis attempts to show two things. First, I defend the idea that the notion of aesthetics of existence was already present in a constitutive way from the beginning of his work, and, specifically, I argue that it can be traced in earlier moments of his work. Second, I defend the idea that this notion of aesthetics of existence is best understood in terms of the sceptical stance of Sextus Empiricus. It describes an ethics of critique of metaphysics that can be understood as a nominalist, contextualist, and particularist stance. The first chapter discusses Foucault's late genealogy of the subject. It formulates the interpretative framework within which Foucault's own conceptualisation of the aesthetics of existence can be understood as a sceptical stance, itself conceived as nominalist, contextualist and particularist. As the practice of an aesthetics of existence is not abstract and ahistorical but the engagement with the specific historical circumstances within which this practice is undertaken, the second chapter reconstructs the intellectual context from which Foucault's thought has emerged (Heidegger, Blanchot, and Nietzsche). The third chapter discusses representative examples of different periods of Foucault's thought -such as the "Introduction" to Binswanger's "Traum und Existenz" (1954), Histoire de la folie (1961), and Histoire de la sexualité I. La volonté de savoir (1976)- and shows in which way they constitute concrete instantiations of his sceptical aesthetics of existence. The thesis concludes with responses to a number of objections to the sceptical stance here defended.