Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-06-07T13:19:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 roneydeseixasandrade.pdf: 2043362 bytes, checksum: f07ce08899e9bc5e6716764db3bbcd68 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-07-13T13:14:05Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 roneydeseixasandrade.pdf: 2043362 bytes, checksum: f07ce08899e9bc5e6716764db3bbcd68 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-13T13:14:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 roneydeseixasandrade.pdf: 2043362 bytes, checksum: f07ce08899e9bc5e6716764db3bbcd68 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-29 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Esta tese tem como objetivo analisar o discurso dos principais autores neoateístas, a partir de um ponto de vista que considera o neoateísmo como um movimento atual que, diferentemente do ateísmo tradicional, tem uma pauta que não é apenas filosófica, mas também decididamente político-cultural. Ele emerge em reação aos eventos que marcaram o atentado ao World Trade Center, em 2001, e particularmente, em reação ao ressurgimento e à crescente influência cultural e política do neofundamentalismo cristão nos Estados Unidos, a partir da década de 1970. Na percepção dos neoateístas a religião está se tornando uma força politicamente organizada em ascensão, dentro e fora dos EUA, e que na avaliação desses atores pode ser definida como perigosa, destrutiva e irracional, haja vista as ações da direita religiosa norte-americana, as ações dos extremistas radicais islâmicos, e por fim, o próprio 11 de setembro de 2001. Os autores aqui analisados entendem que a postura neoateísta é crítica e renovadora. Em nossa avaliação, todavia, esta postura, apesar de se diferenciar dos ateísmos tradicionais, constitui o que entendemos ser um “neofundamentalismo secularista” cujos promotores também veiculam ideias efetivamente radicais no atual contexto político-cultural norte-americano caracterizado, como assinala James Hunter, por verdadeira guerra de culturas. / This thesis aims to analyze the discourse of the main new atheists authors, from a viewpoint that considers new atheism as a current movement that, unlike traditional atheism, has an agenda that is not only philosophical but also decidedly political and cultural. It emerges as a reaction to the terrorist attacks to the World Trade Center in 2001, and particularly in response to the resurgence and increasing cultural and political influence of Christian Neo-fundamentalism in the United States starting in the 1970’s. In the perception of new atheists, religion is becoming a politically organized force on the rise both within and outside the US, and that the evaluation of these actors can be defined as dangerous, destructive and irrational, given the actions of the US religious right, the actions of radical extremists Islamic, and finally, the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. The authors analyzed here understand the new atheist posture as critical and refreshing. In our assessment, however, this stance despite being different from traditional atheism is what we understand to be a "Neo-secularist-fundamentalisms" whose promoters also convey effectively radical ideas in the current North American political-cultural context characterized, as noted by James Hunter, by a real culture war.

Does Yahweh exist? What is the ontological status of Yahweh-as-depicted in the Old Testament texts? Is the deity merely a character of fiction or does He also exist in extra-textual reality? According to the viewpoint of the devil’s advocate whose perspective on the issue is articulated in this thesis, the answer to the question is simply, no – Yahweh does not exist. He may seem real to those who believe in him and in the world of the text but he has no extra-textual and extra-psychical counterpart. To prove such a controversial claim, the philosophy of religion has been utilised as auxiliary discipline within Old Testament studies in the form of philosophicalcritical analysis (philosophical criticism / philosophy of Old Testament religion). A devil’s advocate's case against realism in Old Testament theology has been reconstructed in the form of seven arguments against the existence of Yahweh. According to the argument from theological pluralism, one element of the depiction of Yahweh in the text that is rather suspicious is the fact that Yahweh is characterised in ways that blatantly contradict each other. Both synchronic and diachronic perspectives on the theological contradictions suggest that there is no coherent biblical view of what Yahweh is actually like, what his will is and what he supposedly did. This deconstructs realism since the same actually existing entity cannot have discrepant attributes, hold mutually exclusive moral beliefs and have a history of both doing something and not doing the same thing at the same time. From the perspective of the argument from unorthodox theology, it is apparent that Yahweh is often depicted in ways most unorthodox from the point of view of Christian philosophical theology. Some texts appear to suggest he may not be eternal, single, omnipotent, omniscient, precognisant, immutable, omnipresent or wholly uninvolved in the actualisation of evil. If there is a God and if this God has all the attributes assigned to him by popular classical Christian philosophical theology, it follows that unorthodox depictions of Yahweh must be fictitious. In the view of the argument from polymorphic projection, everything about the god Yahweh appears suspiciously all-too-human. What Yahweh believes about the world, his self-talk, what he considers morally right and wrong and the way in which his own abode is run are all uncannily similar to the worldview and superstitions of the Iron Age Levant. The divine variables never transcend this all-too-local and all-too-cultural matrix and even change along with it. This unmasks Yahweh as ananthropomorphic, sociomorphic and sychomorphic projection – a character of fiction who does not exist outside the minds of those who created him in their image. The argument from mythology and syncretism demonstrates that the discourse of Yahweh’s religion and the sacred stories and poems in which he features contain numerous parallels to the myths, legends, folklore and superstitions found in other pagan religions. There are also marked traces of syncretism between the cult and theology of Yahweh and the ideologies of the Israelites' neighbours which, in each case, predates Yahwism. This suggests that Yahweh’s ontological status may very well not be all that different from that of El, Baal, Zeus or Maduk. From the perspective of the argument from fictitious cosmography, the world in the text where Yahweh is depicted as existing, acting and in which his abode is located and of which he is the creator, does not exist. Yahweh’s world and his worldview are demonstrably fictitious. Since the Old Testament depicts Yahweh as being “up there” in the sky and since we know that he is demonstrably not there, Yahweh-as-depicted stands unmasked as a character of fiction. The argument from fictitious history asserts that the Old Testament is filled with historical fiction. For a variety of reasons, it can be demonstrated that many of the depictions of supposed historical scenarios are completely fictitious in that they never happened in the way the details of the accounts imply were the case. Since what was intended as history is actually fiction and no god literally appeared, acted and spoke as Yahweh is depicted as doing, it follows that Yahweh as thus depicted is a character of fiction. He does not exist. Finally, the argument from meta-textual history shows that, on the one hand, the all-too-recent and all-too-local origins of the worship of Yahweh on a historical and cosmic scale unmask it as a wholly human enterprise. On the other hand, the Old Testament texts themselves have all-too-human origins rather than being the result of actual divine revelation. The Old Testament appears not to be the Word of God but human words about an allegedly existing deity. The development of Yahwism and its derivatives (Judaism and Christianity) seems not to have been determined by progressive revelation but by socio-cultural paradigm shifts and a history of repressed anti-realist tendencies. From such a meta-textual historical perspective it becomes obvious that Yahweh-as-depicted in the text is indeed no more than a product of human ideological imagination. In other words, he does not really exist. Though not all seven of these devil’s advocate’s arguments may be equally devastating when viewed in isolation, in the form of a cumulative argument against realism, they constitute seemingly irrefutable proof that Yahweh-as-depicted in the text does not exist. Consequently, realism collapses not only in Old Testament theology but also in any form of theism somehow related to, rooted in and/or dependent on realism in its discourse. / Thesis (PhD (Old Testament Science))--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Old Testament Studies / unrestricted

Spirituality and religiosity can play key roles in individual lives through influencing health, social relationships, political views, as well as many other facets (Newberg, D'Aquili & Rause, 2001; Milevsky & Levitt, 2004; Hirsh, Walberg & Peterson, 2013). As important as religious and spiritual beliefs are to societies, cultures, and individuals, little is known about which psychological factors determine choices of faith. Although there are likely many determinants of religious, spiritual, atheist or agnostic beliefs, this study explored four possible factors: critical thinking skills, need for cognition, need for emotional comfort/security, and need for closure. Participants included an undergraduate sample and a community sample. It was hypothesized that religious and spiritual individuals will have lower critical thinking skills, lower needs for cognition, higher needs for emotional comfort/security and higher needs for closure than agnostic and atheist individuals. Hypotheses also included potential interactions between these variables in predicting each faith path. Religiosity was measured using the I/E Religious Orientation Scale - Revised (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989) and Spirituality was measured utilizing the Brief Multidimensional Measure of Religiousness/Spirituality (BMMRS) (Fetzer Institute, 1999). These two faith paths were also self -reported by participants after definitions of each were provided. Atheist and Agnostic beliefs were only measured through self-report. Results indicated that both measures of logic (critical thinking skills and need for cognition) and emotional comfort/security (Need to Belong and Religious Motivations) predicted various faith paths. Limitations included sample characteristics and small numbers of Atheist and Agnostic individuals. A better understanding of the motivations for choosing either spiritual or non-spiritual paths may assist in further explanation of the multiple roles each faith choice plays in individual lives.

Based on studies of religion and atheism in Greece, which show different results, theinterest was aroused to study the matter more closely and in depth through qualitativeinterviews with four persons living in Chania in Crete where the Greek OrthodoxChristian culture has long been visibly established. The essay concerns the practice ofreligion as it is expressed through Greek Orthodox Christianity in relation to religiosity,atheism and secularization. The survey shows four people's views and experiences ofreligion, atheism, secularization and Orthodox Christianity and the church, as well as ifand how this affects their lives. The interview results have been analysed in comparisonwith surveys and literature regarding Orthodox Christianity, religious practice, atheismand secularization. The analyses show that there are very different thoughts and beliefsabout the concepts of religion, atheism and secularization, perceptions about the concepts'relationship to each other and to what extent this affects the interviewees. The discussionmentions the degree of religiosity and religious practice in relation to the view of atheismand secularization as well as a possible ongoing loosening of the tradition of the OrthodoxChurch.

Since the 1960s there has been a rapid increase in the number of individuals throughout much of the Western world who identify as having no religion. This is particularly so in Canada where individuals who identify as having no religion now account for a rather sizeable portion of the total population. Despite the rapid and exponential growth in the number of people who no longer affiliate with religion, however, the sociological study of who the nonreligious are and what a social world not necessarily rooted in religion—what I call nonreligion—might entail have only recently captured the interests of sociologists. As a result, relatively little is known about this growing group of people and nonreligion. One such area that remains significantly understudied is the intersection of nonreligion and law. Canadian law has been called on by the nonreligious to decide upon the constitutionality of various legislation including that which has prohibited access to same-sex marriage, abortion, and physician-assisted dying. The intersection of nonreligion and law thus provides valuable insight into how nonreligious individuals attempt to promote social change in Canadian society. But, the law also acts as a window through which to explore the often-ignored meaningful beliefs, values, and practices of the nonreligious, or the positive content of nonreligion. Much research about nonreligion and the nonreligious has focused on what nonreligion is not and what the nonreligious do not do vis-à-vis religion, very little research engages with the meaningful aspects of nonreligion and nonreligious identities. This thesis seeks to explore the meaningful aspects of nonreligion and contribute original research to this lacking body of scholarship. This thesis asks: How is nonreligion conceptualized in Canadian law and is this framing of nonreligion characterized by more than the simple rejection or negation of religion? In other words, does nonreligion have positive content in the context of law, and if so, what is this positive content? Drawing on the discourse analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s Latimer (2001), Bedford (2013), and Trinity Western (2018) cases, I explore the concepts of human rights, morality, and dignity to draw attention to the ways in which nonreligion is socially constructed in law. My analysis shows that nonreligion is conceptualized in legal discourse as encompassing positive content. I argue that social constructions of nonreligion in law are inclusive of meaningful beliefs, values, and practices and that it is no longer sufficient to think of nonreligion and the nonreligious as simply deficit in nature.

The diploma thesis entitled The Atheization Policy of the Czechoslovak Republic from the End of 1940s to the Mid-1950s Illustrated on the Example of the Historical Regional Media introduces to the reader how Marxist-Leninist ideologies approached the topic of atheism and the process of atheization, and how they presented this worldview to the popular masses. The reader will also learn about the region of Teschen Silesia (where the research is based), its media and the media system established in Czechoslovakia at the time under discussion. The work also reflects on the post-war rise of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and its coup in 1948. The practical part of the thesis then reflects how the editors of the selected media (the widely available regional daily Nová svoboda, the newspaper of the Polish minority Głos Ludu and the company magazine Třinecký hutník) published topics that were supposed to lead their readers to secularization from 1948 to 1952. However, it is clear from the conclusions of the individual editions that the promotion of scientific atheism had minimal space, and the editors focused primarily on international, domestic social and political events. As time went on, however, even these contributions dwindled. Judicial monster trials of inconvenient clerics were also...

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Il est peu de notions aussi vastes que celle du non-savoir, mais le flou du caractère nécessairement négatif de sa définition s’accompagne tout de même du sentiment que la source de ce qui ne peut qu’être déterminé négativement par la pensée (non, cela n’est pas le savoir) ne peut qu’être positive. Notion à l’applicabilité infinie, parce qu’en elle vient s’abîmer tout ce qui ne peut tenir dans l’espace de la maîtrise relative à ce dont on peut dire : je sais de quoi il s’agit. Est non-savoir tout ce qui se rapporte au bouillonnement pulsionnel de la vie et à l’échéance fatale de la mort. Ce qui pousse l’homme au meurtre, au génocide, à la guerre et à la violence révolutionnaire se confond avec un contenu affectif et identitaire qui ne peut être ramené au savoir sans laisser de reste. Mais tenter de comprendre ce qui échappe à l’entendement est cela même qui relance sans cesse la réflexion comprise comme cœur du savoir. Le savoir se montre ainsi sous une extrême dépendance face à son Autre. À la lumière de cette hypothèse devant beaucoup aux découvertes de la psychanalyse, le présent mémoire s’est donné pour objectif de jeter un regard frais sur quelques grandes tensions sociopolitiques de l’Histoire; mais il a d’abord fallu évaluer philosophiquement la possibilité d’un concept de non-savoir. Des champs identitaires majeurs — révolutions totalitaires ou démocratiques, bouleversements ou synergies culturelles — sont ainsi analysés sous l’angle d’une économie pulsionnelle qui s’inscrit dans une interaction perpétuelle avec ce qui s’ébauche ici comme une économie du rapport entre non-savoir et savoir. Est ainsi produite une esquisse des rapports possibles entre la vie pulsionnelle de l’homme, le savoir institutionnel et le monde sociopolitique. / Few notions are as vast as that unknowing; but the imprecise nature of its definition is nonetheless accompagnied by the implication that what offers itself only negatively to the mind has a positive source. The applicability of the notion of unknowing is infinite; it swallows up all that resists the mastery indicated by statements about that which is. Unknowing encompasses all that belongs to the boiling drive of life and to the faceless moment of death. What leads human beings to murder, to genocide, to war and to revolutionnary violence is bound up with an affective content of identification that cannot be subsumed by knowledge without leaving a residue. Yet attempting to understand what exceeds the mind’s grasp serves as the motor of mental reflection at the heart of knowledge production itself. In this sense, knowledge is inescapably dependent on its « other ». In light of this hypothesis drawn from the domain of psychoanalysis, this thesis aims to reexamine the conceptual underpinnings of basic sociopolitical tensions in History. The conceptual impetus driving major identity movements — such as totalitarian or democratic revolutions and cultural disruptions or synergies — is analysed in terms of a libidinal or drive-oriented economy which is in perpetual interaction with what this thesis characterizes as an economy of the relation between knowing and unknowing, between knowledge and its negation.

Ce mémoire se propose d’étudier la manière nouvelle dont se présente la croyance religieuse à l’âge séculier dans la philosophie de la religion du philosophe Charles Taylor. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à démontrer que la croyance et l’incroyance possèdent les mêmes fondements phénoménologiques, qui sont à trouver du côté des questions identitaires. Afin d’y arriver, nous commençons par analyser sa redéfinition de la sécularité afin de comprendre pourquoi l’âge séculier n’est pas en soi un âge irréligieux. Nous montrerons en quoi, selon Taylor, les Occidentaux partagent un même « arrière-plan » moral et spirituel – le « cadre immanent », que nous appréhendons comme le contexte au sein duquel émergent les positions croyantes et athées. Nous présentons ensuite une brève analyse des éléments historiques et phénoménologiques du cadre immanent ainsi que de sa fonction « transcendantale », ce qui nous permet d’expliquer la raison pour laquelle Taylor soutient que la croyance et l’incroyance relèvent avant tout de l’identité morale et des considérations éthiques qui soutiennent notre vision du monde. Ici nous suivons Taylor en affirmant que ce sont toutes deux des expériences vécues qui a priori s’équivalent sur le plan rationnel. Enfin, au cœur de notre réflexion se trouve la mise en valeur d’un concept très important que Taylor développe à partir des travaux de William James, à savoir l’« espace ouvert jamesien ». Cette ouverture, rendue possible par la sécularité elle-même, vise à rendre compte d’un état de lucidité par lequel nous pouvons ressentir la force des deux options. / This paper aims to describe how Charles Taylor articulates his philosophy of religion in his major work, A Secular Age. We argue that belief and unbelief share the same phenomenological fundamentals, which can be found in the constituents of identity. In order to do that, we shall first analyse his redefinition of secularity in order to see how the secular age is not irreligious in itself. What will emerge of this preliminary investigation is the Taylorian idea that all Westerners share the same spiritual and moral “background”, the “immanent frame”, which must be understood as the context in which we form our beliefs. Then we develop an analysis of the historical elements of the immanent frame and of its “transcendental” function, which makes it possible to explain why Taylor conceives belief and unbelief as questions of moral identity. We follow Taylor in arguing that they are both lived experiences of equal rational value. At the heart of our paper, there is an important concept that Taylor has developed from William James’s work, which is the “Jamesian open space”. This openness illustrates a state of lucidity that is characterised by the ability to feel the force of both options, belief and unbelief.