Ett offentligt uppköpserbjudande skiljer sig från andra typer av företagsförvärv på så sätt att det riktar sig till en större ägandekrets. Eftersom köparen av praktiska skäl inte kan förhandla enskilt med aktieägarna riktar sig köparen istället, i ett offentligt erbjudande, till alla aktieägare i bolaget. Aktieägarna har sedan att förkasta eller acceptera erbjudandet. Förfarandet kring ett offentligt uppköpserbjudande kräver en aktiv målbolagsstyrelse för att tillvarata aktieägarnas intresse. Takeover-reglernas koppling till LUA har i och med revideringen tydliggjorts och de två regelverken utgör tillsammans stommen i regleringen av offentliga uppköpserbjudanden. Målbolagsstyrelsens roll vid ett offentligt uppköpserbjudande kommer främst till uttryck i punkterna II.17, II.19 och II.20 i takeover-reglerna. Takeover-reglerna har reviderats ett antal gånger sedan de första reglerna, då benämnda rekommendationer, utkom 1971 och målbolagsstyrelsens roll har vid varje revidering utvecklats till att bli mer omfattande. De nya takeover-reglerna träder i kraft den 1 juli 2012. Förutom frågan om hur de nya reglerna kommer att påverka målbolagsstyrelsens roll framträder frågan om vilka intressen som målbolagsstyrelsen ska tillvarata och hur dessa förhåller sig till varandra. Intressebegreppen, aktieägarnas intresse och bolagets intresse, kommer till uttryck såväl aktiemarknadsrättsligt som aktiebolagsrättsligt. Märkbart vid analys av ändringarna är att de till viss del har skett genom kodifiering av AMN:s uttalanden och doktrin på området. Reglerna har även anpassats, om än inte fullt ut, till brittiska Takeover Code. Ett tydligt exempel är ändringen avseende avtal om deal protection-arrangemang. För att utröna de konkreta konsekvenserna av regeländringarna krävs, i vissa fall, uttalanden från AMN eller komplettering och uppdatering av doktrin på området. Målbolagsstyrelsens roll har, i och med de nya takeover-reglerna, blivit än mer omfattande samtidigt som dess position, gentemot budgivaren, har stärkts genom tydligare reglering för hur styrelsen ska agera.

I have developed a multiagent system platform that provides a valuable complement to the alternative research methods. The platform facilitates the development of heterogeneous agents in complex environments. The first application of the multiagent system is to the study of sealed-bid auctions with two-dimensional value signals from pure private to pure common value. I find that several auction outcomes are significantly nonlinear across the two-dimensional value signals. As the common value percent increases, profit, revenue, and efficiency all decrease monotonically, but they decrease in different ways. Finally, I find that forcing revelation by the auction winner of the true common value may have beneficial revenue effects when the common-value percent is high and there is a high degree of uncertainty about the common value. The second application of the multiagent system is to the study of English auctions with two-dimensional value signals using agents that learn a signal-averaging factor. I find that signal averaging increases nonlinearly as the common value percent increases, decreases with the number of bidders, and decreases at high common value percents when the common value signal is more uncertain. Using signal averaging, agents increase their profit when the value is more uncertain. The most obvious effect of signal averaging is on reducing the percentage of auctions won by bidders with the highest common value signal. The third application of the multiagent system is to the study of the optimal payment rule in Treasury auctions using Canadian rules. The model encompasses the when-issued, auction, and secondary markets, as well as constraints for primary dealers. I find that the Spanish payment rule is revenue inferior to the Discriminatory payment rule across all market price spreads, but the Average rule is revenue superior. For most market-price spreads, Uniform payment results in less revenue than Discriminatory, but there are many cases in which Vickrey payment produces more revenue.

This thesis provides more precise characterisation of patterns, causes and consequences of takeover activity in Australia over three decades spanning from 1972 to 2004. The first contribution of the thesis is to characterise the time series behaviour of takeover activity. It is found that linear models do not adequately capture the structure of merger activity; a non-linear two-state Markov switching model works better. A key contribution of the thesis is, therefore, to propose an approach of combining a State-Space model with the Markov switching regime model in describing takeover activity. Experimental results based on our approach show an improvement over other existing approaches. We find four waves, one in the 1980s, two in the 1990s, and one in the 2000s, with an expected duration of each wave state of approximately two years. The second contribution is an investigation of the extent to which financial and macro-economic factors predict takeover activity after controlling for the probability of takeover waves. A main finding is that while stock market boom periods are empirically associated with takeover waves, the underlying driver is interest rate level. A low interest rate environment is associated with higher aggregate takeover activity. This relationship is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1992)'s liquidity argument that takeover waves are symptoms of lower cost of capital. Replicating the analysis to the biggest takeover market in the world, the US, reveals a remarkable consistency of results. In short, the Australian findings are not idiosyncratic. Finally, the implications for target and bidder firm shareholders are explored via investigation of takeover bid premiums and long-term abnormal returns separately between the wave and non-wave periods. This represents the third contribution to the literature of takeover waves. Findings reveal that target shareholders earn abnormally positive returns in takeover bids and bid premiums are slightly lower in the wave periods. Analysis of the returns to bidding firm shareholders suggests that the lower premiums earned by target shareholders in the wave periods may simply reflect lower total economic gains, at the margin, to takeovers made in the wave periods. It is found that bidding firms earn normal post-takeover returns (relative to a portfolio of firms matched in size and survival) if their bids are made in the non-wave periods. However, bidders who announce their takeover bids during the wave periods exhibit significant under-performance. For mergers that took place within waves, there is no difference in bid premiums and nor is there a difference in the long-run returns of bidders involved in the first half and second half of the waves. We find that none of theories of merger waves (managerial, mis-valuation and neoclassical) can fully account for the Australian takeover waves and their effects. Instead, our results suggest that a combination of these theories may provide better explanation. Given that normal returns are observed for acquiring firms, taken as a whole, we are more likely to uphold the neoclassical argument for merger activity. However, the evidence is not entirely consistent with neo-classical rational models, the under-performance effect during the wave states is consistent with the herding behaviour by firms.

Cette thèse est consacrée à l'étude des applications de la théorie des erreurs par formes de Dirichlet. Notre travail se divise en trois parties. La première analyse les modèles gouvernés par une équation différentielle stochastique. Après un court chapitre technique, un modèle innovant pour les carnets d'ordres est proposé. Nous considérons que le spread bid-ask n'est pas un défaut, mais plutôt une propriété intrinsèque du marché. L'incertitude est porté par le mouvement Brownien qui conduit l'actif. Nous montrons que l'évolution des spread peut être évalué grâce à des formules fermés et nous étudions l'impact de l'incertitude du sous-jacent sur les produits dérivés. En suite, nous introduisons le modèle PBS pour le pricing des options européennes. L'idée novatrice est de distinguer la volatilité du marché par rapport au paramètre utilisé par les traders pour se couvrir. Nous assumons la première constante, alors que le deuxième devient une estimation subjective et erronée de la première. Nous prouvons que ce modèle prévoit un spread bid-ask et un smile de volatilité. Les propriétés plus intéressantes de ce modèle sont l'existence de formules fermés pour le pricing, l'impact de la dérive du sous-jacent et une efficace stratégie de calibration. La seconde partie s'intéresse aux modèles décrit par une équation aux dérivées partielles. Les cas linéaire et non-linéaire sont analysés séparément. Dans le premier nous montrons des relations intéressantes entre la théorie des erreurs et celui des ondelettes. Dans le cas non-linéaire nous étudions la sensibilité des solutions à l'aide de la théorie des erreurs. Sauf dans le cas d'une solution exacte, il y a deux approches possibles: On peut d'abord discrétiser l'EDP et étudier la sensibilité du problème discrétisé, soit démontrer que les sensibilités théoriques vérifient des EDP. Les deux cas sont étudiés, et nous prouvons que les sharp et le biais sont solutions d'EDP linéaires dépendantes de la solution de l'EDP originaire et nous proposons des algorithmes pour évaluer numériquement les sensibilités. Enfin, la troisième partie est dédiée aux équations stochastiques aux dérivées partielles. Notre analyse se divise en deux chapitres. D'abord nous étudions la transmission de l'incertitude, présente dans la condition initiale, à la solution de l'EDPS. En suite, nous analysons l'impact d'une perturbation dans les termes fonctionnelles de l'EDPS et dans le coefficient de la fonction de Green associée. Dans le deux cas, nous prouvons que le sharp et le biais sont solutions de deux EDPS linéaires dépendantes de la solution de l'EDPS originaire.

I have developed a multiagent system platform that provides a valuable complement to the alternative research methods. The platform facilitates the development of heterogeneous agents in complex environments. The first application of the multiagent system is to the study of sealed-bid auctions with two-dimensional value signals from pure private to pure common value. I find that several auction outcomes are significantly nonlinear across the two-dimensional value signals. As the common value percent increases, profit, revenue, and efficiency all decrease monotonically, but they decrease in different ways. Finally, I find that forcing revelation by the auction winner of the true common value may have beneficial revenue effects when the common-value percent is high and there is a high degree of uncertainty about the common value. The second application of the multiagent system is to the study of English auctions with two-dimensional value signals using agents that learn a signal-averaging factor. I find that signal averaging increases nonlinearly as the common value percent increases, decreases with the number of bidders, and decreases at high common value percents when the common value signal is more uncertain. Using signal averaging, agents increase their profit when the value is more uncertain. The most obvious effect of signal averaging is on reducing the percentage of auctions won by bidders with the highest common value signal. The third application of the multiagent system is to the study of the optimal payment rule in Treasury auctions using Canadian rules. The model encompasses the when-issued, auction, and secondary markets, as well as constraints for primary dealers. I find that the Spanish payment rule is revenue inferior to the Discriminatory payment rule across all market price spreads, but the Average rule is revenue superior. For most market-price spreads, Uniform payment results in less revenue than Discriminatory, but there are many cases in which Vickrey payment produces more revenue.

I have developed a multiagent system platform that provides a valuable complement to the alternative research methods. The platform facilitates the development of heterogeneous agents in complex environments. The first application of the multiagent system is to the study of sealed-bid auctions with two-dimensional value signals from pure private to pure common value. I find that several auction outcomes are significantly nonlinear across the two-dimensional value signals. As the common value percent increases, profit, revenue, and efficiency all decrease monotonically, but they decrease in different ways. Finally, I find that forcing revelation by the auction winner of the true common value may have beneficial revenue effects when the common-value percent is high and there is a high degree of uncertainty about the common value. The second application of the multiagent system is to the study of English auctions with two-dimensional value signals using agents that learn a signal-averaging factor. I find that signal averaging increases nonlinearly as the common value percent increases, decreases with the number of bidders, and decreases at high common value percents when the common value signal is more uncertain. Using signal averaging, agents increase their profit when the value is more uncertain. The most obvious effect of signal averaging is on reducing the percentage of auctions won by bidders with the highest common value signal. The third application of the multiagent system is to the study of the optimal payment rule in Treasury auctions using Canadian rules. The model encompasses the when-issued, auction, and secondary markets, as well as constraints for primary dealers. I find that the Spanish payment rule is revenue inferior to the Discriminatory payment rule across all market price spreads, but the Average rule is revenue superior. For most market-price spreads, Uniform payment results in less revenue than Discriminatory, but there are many cases in which Vickrey payment produces more revenue.

Submitted by Mariana Pereira de Morais Pacheco (marianapmpacheco@gmail.com) on 2018-02-15T18:45:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Thesis_final.pdf: 659810 bytes, checksum: 96b9dc5caecd59d87012b2db6362ec20 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Josineide da Silva Santos Locatelli (josineide.locatelli@fgv.br) on 2018-02-15T18:51:44Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Thesis_final.pdf: 659810 bytes, checksum: 96b9dc5caecd59d87012b2db6362ec20 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-02-16T11:43:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Thesis_final.pdf: 659810 bytes, checksum: 96b9dc5caecd59d87012b2db6362ec20 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018 / This thesis discusses the financial, commercial, political and legal risks of international trade operations involving International Bank Guarantees. It starts by defining the most usual international trade instruments and, then, defining Standby Letters of Credit, Performance Bonds and Bid Bonds issued according to the ISP 98, URGD 758 or UCP 600 as International Bank Guarantees. Later, it explores each specific risk. The financial risks are divided into foreign exchange risk, applicant's default risk and bank reputation risk. It is considered as a commercial risks frauds and low quality products. Legal risks are legal battles and local legislation. There is a topic that discusses specifically the U.S. related risks, as the country has a very particular legislation when it comes to International Bank Guarantees. The political risks are related to commercial embargoes and sanctions, changes in foreign policy and to the deterioration of commercial reations. The following section discusses how to mitigate each of the risks discussed. It shows whether or not this risk can be mitigated and if it also affects internation trade operations that do not use International Bank Guarantees. Lastly, the thesis discusses about the ideal international trade instrument. At the moment, International Bank Guarantees are the best instrument, still not the perfect one as it has some limitations. / Esta tese debate os riscos financeiros, comerciais, políticos e legais relacionados a operações de comércio internacional. A tese começa definindo os principais instrumentos usados em transações de comércio internacional. Em seguida, define como Garantia Bancária Internacional as Standby Letters of Credit, Performance Bonds e os Bid Bonds, emitidos de acordo com a ISP 98, URGD 758 ou UCP 600. Depois, a tese explora os riscos específicos das Garantias Bancárias Internacionais. São considerados riscos financeiros o risco cambial, o risco de calote da parte que solicitou a garantia e o risco de reputação dos bancos envolvidos na transação. Riscos comerciais são as fraudes e produtos de má qualidade. Os riscos legais analisados são referentes a batalhas judiciais e legislação local. Além disso, há uma parte da tese dedicada a discutir especificamente os riscos relacionados a legislação americana, que é muito diferente dos outros países em relação a Garantias Bancárias Internacionais. São considerados riscos políticos embargos e sanções comerciais, mudanças na política externa e a deterioração das relações comerciais entre dois países. A última seção da tese discute como mitigar os riscos involvidos em transações com Garantias Bancárias Internacionais. Nesta parte, discute-se quais riscos podem ou não ser mitigados eq quais riscos são inerentes a transações comerciais internacionais, independentemente do uso de Garantias Bancárias Internacionais. Conclui-se que, no momento, Garantias Bancárias Internacionais ainda são o melhor instrumento para assegurar transações comerciais internacionais. Contudo, estes intrumentos ainda não são perfeitos e estão sujeitos a muitos riscos e limitações.

Submitted by Amanda Schutze (amanda.m.schutze@gmail.com) on 2010-08-26T23:12:06Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Efeitos da regulação no custo de aquisição de energia eletrica no brasil - Amanda.pdf: 910935 bytes, checksum: 612d6d8521fa05c9c9291ff453f6f8c8 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vitor Souza(vitor.souza@fgv.br) on 2010-08-27T14:24:16Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Efeitos da regulação no custo de aquisição de energia eletrica no brasil - Amanda.pdf: 910935 bytes, checksum: 612d6d8521fa05c9c9291ff453f6f8c8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2010-08-30T12:41:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Efeitos da regulação no custo de aquisição de energia eletrica no brasil - Amanda.pdf: 910935 bytes, checksum: 612d6d8521fa05c9c9291ff453f6f8c8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-27 / Over the past twenty years, the Brazilian Electric Sector (SEB) went through profound changes including two structural changes. The first, in 1995, made the transition from a centralized model with state-owned companies operating under a monopoly model to a free market model emphasizing the privatization of the sector. The second, in 2004, recovers the state's role in planning the sector expansion, establishes the coexistence of state and private companies and seeks to promote affordable tariffs. The main reason for the changes is the need for investment to expand the electric power supply. This paper aims to present these structural changes, to display the current operation of the electric power sector and to consider the issue of the end of the generation concessions from 2015 on. The federal government vagueness between bidding or extending these concessions creates uncertainties thus postponing the investments and causing losses to the country. / Nos últimos vinte anos, o Setor Elétrico Brasileiro (SEB) vem passando por profundas transformações incluindo duas reestruturações. A primeira, em 1995, faz a transição de um modelo centralizado com empresas estatais operando no regime de monopólio para um modelo de livre mercado com ênfase na privatização do setor. A segunda, em 2004, retoma o papel do Estado no planejamento da expansão do setor, estabelece a convivência entre empresas estatais e privadas e busca promover a modicidade tarifária. A principal razão para as mudanças é a necessidade de investimento para expansão da oferta de energia elétrica. Este trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar estas reformas, descrever o funcionamento atual do setor elétrico e analisar a questão do término das concessões de geração a partir de 2015. A indefinição do governo federal entre prorrogar ou licitar estas concessões cria incertezas, adiando investimentos e provocando perdas ao país.

The research problem for this study was that forensic investigators in the Forensic Services (FS) of the City of Tshwane (CoT) are unable to successfully deal with procurement fraud as a result of the lack of knowledge, skills and resources required to conduct computer forensics during the investigation of procurement fraud. This research was conducted to ascertain the value of computer forensics in the investigation of procurement fraud. Further, the study sought to determine how to improve the CoT forensic investigators’ knowledge and competence regarding the application of computer forensics in the investigation of procurement fraud. The purpose of this study was to explore the procedures that should be followed by CoT forensic investigators when conducting computer forensics during the investigation of procurement fraud. The research also aimed to discover new information, not previously known to the researcher, related to computer forensics during the investigation of procurement fraud by exploring national and international literature. In addition, the study explored existing practices so as to use this information to improve the current CoT procedure, within the confines of the legislative requirements. The overall purpose of this study is to provide practical recommendations for best practices, based on the results of the data analysis, which address the problem and enhance the investigative skills of CoT forensic investigators. The study established that it is imperative and compulsory to apply computer forensics in any procurement fraud investigation in order to efficiently track down cyber criminals and solve complicated and complex computer crimes. It was also established that forensic investigators within the FS in the CoT lack the necessary computer skills to optimally investigate procurement fraud. It is therefore recommended that CoT forensic investigators acquire the necessary skills and essential training in computer forensics in order to improve their knowledge and competence regarding the application and understanding of the value of computer forensics in the investigation of procurement fraud. / School of Criminal Justice / M.Tech. (Forensic Investigation)

Le projet de thèse présente différentes méthodes empiriques permettant de détecter des cartels. Il vise à démontrer premièrement que des résultats efficaces peuvent être obtenus avec de simples indicateurs statistiques et deuxièmement que les méthodes économétriques traditionnelles ne sont pas aussi efficaces. / The PhD studies different empirical methods to detect bid-rigging cartels. It shows first that simple statistical screens perform very well to detect bid-rigging infringement. Second, the econometric method of Bajari, well established in the literature, produces poor results.