Cette thèse est composée de 3 essais. Le 1er essai traite de la problématique du risque de pertes extrêmes dans le secteur bancaire dans un contexte du problème d'agence entre les actionnaires et les top managers des banques. Pour pouvoir inciter les banques à ne pas prendre le risque de pertes extrêmes, il est proposé d'appliquer la régulation des fonds propres sous forme d'une politique de recapitalisations obligatoires, dont les paramètres sont choisis pour inciter les actionnaires à rémunérer leurs managers de la manière à les détourner des stratégies au risque de pertes extrêmes.Le 2ème essai développe le design de la supervision bancaire qui vise à éliminer le problème d'aléa moral au sein d'une banque, tout en assurant un coût minimum de supervisions. Les banques, dont la situation financière commence à se dégrader, doivent être soumises à des audits aléatoires. Les banques, dont la valeur de l'actif s'est dégradée considérablement, doivent être mises sous tutelle pour un redressement financier. Les auditeurs externes peuvent être impliqués dans le processus de supervision, mais ne doivent pas complètement remplacer les régulateurs. Le 3ème essai étudie comment la capacité d'emprunt de l'entreprise non-financière affecte sa politique d'investissement en présence des coûts d'émission de la dette. Il est montré que les entreprises, dont la capacité d'emprunt est moyenne, ont intérêt à réaliser un investissement plus important par rapport aux entreprises dont la capacité d'emprunt est relativement faible/forte. Cela est entièrement dû à l'effet des coûts fixes d'émission de la dette, qui émerge dans le contexte dynamique d'investissement. / This dissertation consists of 3 self-contained theoretical essays.Essay 1 brings into focus the problem of "manufacturing" tail risk in the banking sector. This work shows that, in order to prevent banks from engaging in tail risk, bank capital regulation should account for the internal agency problem between bank shareholders and bank top managers. It is proposed to design bank capital requirements in the form of incentive-based recapitalization mechanism which would induce bank shareholders to shape executive compensation in such a way as to prevent top managers from engaging in tail-risk.Essay 2 deals with the problem of moral hazard in bank asset management. It proposes the concept of incentive-based bank supervision aimed at preventing moral hazard at a minimum cost to the regulator. It is shown that the intensity of supervision efforts should be gradually adjusted to the bank's financial health: banks in the mild form of distress should be subject to random audits, whereas deeply distressed banks should be placed under temporary regulatory control. To prevent double moral hazard, external auditors involved in supervision should be offered the optimal incentive contract.Essay 3 examines the impact of credit rationing (debt capacity) on corporate investment in the setting with costly debt financing. It is shown that, when credit constraints are binding, the firms with intermediate levels of debt capacity will establish larger investment projects than the firms with relatively low or high debt capacity. This non-monotonicity of investment on debt capacity arises due to the effect of the lump-sum debt issuance costs in the dynamic context of investment.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:48:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Joaquim Tavares Perrelli.pdf: 352748 bytes, checksum: 648c3d5b5458029109e0889fb78da741 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-05-16 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The bank regulation is developed as the financial markets become more complex and sophisticated, consequently increasing its exposition to a greater risk level. Bank supervision is an institution that depends on bank regulation to act, monitoring and inspecting financial institutions, in order to accomplish it aim, financial stability. Basel II agreement incorporates two decades´ concepts, since its previous editions, improving and estabilishing principles for effective supervision and monitoring risk levels according its classification. Its implementation depends however from each evaluated country´s context. In the case study ahead, there are being analysed data and information from World Bank´s research on supervisory structure, budgetary and operational authonomy, among others. So, bank supervision belongs to a proccess and as an activity itself, its evaluation is difficult due to the dynamic nature of the capitalist system. The economies operate in cycles and when economic activity is high, credit operations levels increases too. Between these operations hired during the high level economic activity, there are the operations that will generate troubles when economic activity level becomes lower. So the supervision alternates position between a preventive and corrective set of actions. Its procedures will never be perfect and there will always be financial institutions in trouble so as there will always be financial crisis / A regulação bancária é desenvolvida à medida que os mercados financeiros tornam-se mais complexos e sofisticados em suas operações, e conseqüentemente, ficando mais expostos a riscos. A supervisão bancária é uma instituição que, a partir da regulação da atividade do sistema bancário, fiscaliza e inspeciona as atividades das instituições com o objetivo principal de promover a estabilidade financeira. O acordo de Basiléia II, incorpora os conceitos de mais de duas décadas de acordos anteriores, no estabelecimento de princípios para a supervisão bancaria efetiva e técnicas de monitoramento de riscos bancários. A sua implantação entretanto, depende de diversas etapas e preparação. As atividades de supervisão variam de contexto, conforme cada país analisado. No estudo de caso apresentado adiante estão sendo analisados dados e informações coletados em pesquisas do Banco Mundial e outras entidades acerca da estrutura da supervisão bancária, autonomia operacional e orçamentária além de outras. A partir desses dados e dos textos coletados nas fases da pesquisa, pode se concluir que a supervisão faz parte de um processo, e torna-se de difícil mensuração a partir da própria dinâmica do capitalismo. As economias operam em ciclos, e nos ciclos de alta na atividade econômica ocorre a alta nas operações de crédito. Entre essas operações de crédito do ciclo de alta encontram-se as operações que poderão causar problemas ao sistema no ciclo de baixa. A supervisão portanto alterna entre uma postura preventiva e corretiva. Ela nunca será perfeita em seus procedimentos, sempre ocorrerão problemas com instituições financeiras e crises de mercado

Three essays are comprised in this dissertation to examine how institution and regulation frameworks affect the quality of financial reporting by banks. The empirical investigation on whether some governance mechanisms provide incentives for banks to report high quality financial information can have policy implications regarding bank regulation. Financial reporting quality is measured either by the level of earnings management or the extent of reporting conservatism. Using these two types of proxies for financial reporting quality, we examine whether reporting quality is affected by the legal protection on investors, bank supervision/regulation practices, or securities market governance mechanisms. In the first essay, we examine international differences in bank earnings management around the world. Following Leuz et al. (2003), we argue that bank earnings management is closely linked to private benefits of insiders. As a result, bank earnings management should be negatively related to institutional factors such as legal protection on investors and bank supervision policies that encourage market discipline on banks. Consistent with this prediction, we provide evidence that earnings management is less pervasive for banks in countries where investors are better protected and where supervision policies strongly encourage private-sector monitoring on banks. We also show that the legal protection mechanisms have stronger effects on curbing activities of earnings discretion, but bank supervision policies that encourage private-sector monitoring are better at limiting income smoothing activities. Our results also suggest that stringent capital requirement or strong government supervisions are less effective in reducing earnings activities of banks. In the second essay, we document that banks, especially those that are publicly traded, are conservative in their financial reporting. In particular, banks are conservative in reporting earnings changes and they incorporate more loan loss provisions when their operating cash flows decrease or when the amount of their problem loans increases. Banks also charge off more problem loans when their loan loss provisions increase. Our cross-country comparison shows that conservative financial reporting is more pronounced in countries where supervisors are empowered to take adequate actions against banks or where bank supervisory policies to encourage private-sector monitoring are more prevalent than in countries where there is less supervision or where there is less private-sector monitoring. In the third essay, we further investigate whether securities market governance explain the international differences of reporting conservatism across listing status of banks. Our results indicate that, after controlling for banking industry regulations, securities market governance has incremental effects on the reporting conservatism by public banks. The conservative reporting by public banks is stronger in countries where securities regulators are more empowered to intervene in banks for violations to securities laws. Furthermore, the stronger conservatism for public banks relative to private banks is widespread in countries with more developed bond market. The evidence suggests that public banks practice more conservative reporting than their private counterparts when debt contracting mechanisms function well.

Text in Afrikkans / Summaries in English and Afrikaans / The capital-adequacy problem is essentially concerned with the amount of capital that a bank should maintain in order to conduct its operations in a prudent manner. Because one of the primary functions of bank capital is to act as a risk cushion for the protection of a bank's depositors, a bank's capital funds are often regarded as comprising an insurance element. The capital-adequacy concept, therefore, may be seen as part of the overall banking risk, or prudential management. An attempt has been made to indicate that bank supervisors should use not only capital ratios when analysing a bank's capital position. Other factors, such as asset quality and other financial risks, should also be taken in consideration. Financial ratio analysis, however, provides bank supervisors with useful information. When combining ratio analysis with non-quantifiable factors, bank supervisors may indeed achieve their goal of determining capital adequacy. / Die kapitaaltoereikendheidsprobleem is hoofsaaklik gebaseer op die hoeveelheid kapitaal waaroor 'n bankinstelling moet beskik, ten einde die bankbesigheid op 'n verstandige wyse te bedryf. Een van die primere funksies van kapitaal is om te dien as verliesabsorberingsbuffer ter beskerming van 'n bankinstelling se deposante, en daarom word toereikende kapitaal dikwels geag om 'n soort versekeringselement te bevat. Die konsep van kapitaaltoereikendheid kan dus beskou word as deel van die totale risikobestuurskonsep. Daar is tydens die studie gepoog om aan te dui dat banktoesighouers nie net kapitaalverhoudings behoort te gebruik om 'n bankinstelling se kapitaalposisie te ontleed nie. Ander faktore, soos batekwaliteit en antler finansiele risiko's, moet ook in ag geneem word. Finansiele verhoudingsgetalontledings voorsien banktoesighouers van waardevolle inligting. Indien verhoudingsgetalle egter met nie-gekwantifiseerde inligting gekombineer sou word, kan banktoesighouers hul doel om kapitaaltoereikendheid te bepaal, bereik. / M.Com. (Business Management)

Cette thèse est composée de trois articles d’économie bancaire empirique. Le premier article traite de l’impact des conditions d’octroi de crédit sur l’accession à la propriété et les prix immobilier. Il propose une stratégie d’identification d’effets de causalité utilisant la politique du Prêt à Taux Zéro. Il conclut qu’un relâchement des conditions d’octroi de crédit permet à des ménages au revenu relativement plus faible de devenir propriétaire mais augmente significativement les prix immobilier. Le second article traite de l’effet des exigences en capital sur l’octroi de crédit des banques aux sociétés non financières. Il isole la composante des exigences en capital exogène aux conditions macroéconomiques grâce au système de notation du superviseur bancaire français. Il montre que les mesures de la qualité de la gouvernance et de la stratégie des établissements sont des contributeurs importants aux exigences en capital. En traçant l’effet de celles-ci sur les ratios de capital des établissements puis sur l’octroi de crédit, il montre qu’augmenter les exigences en capital réduit l’offre de crédit. Le troisième article analyse la prise en compte du risque de crédit sur le marché interbancaire européen entre 2011 et 2015 et comment celle-ci est modifiée par les ajustements de la politique monétaire sur la période. Il se concentre sur le risque inhérent à la détention d’actifs situés dans les pays périphériques de la zone euro. Il montre que l’accès au marché et les taux d’intérêt payés par les emprunteurs réagissent à cette détention. La nature et l’importance de cette réaction dépendent des interventions de politique monétaire. / This thesis is made up of three empirical essays in banking economics. The first paper analyses how credit supply conditions impact access to homeownership and real estate prices.We propose an identification strategy of causal effects based on the French Interest-Free Loan policy. We find loosenning credit conditions allows households with a relatively lower income to access homeownership but significantly increases real estate prices. The second paper looks for the effect of capital requirements on credit supply to non-financial companies.We identify movements in capital requirements exogenous to the macroeconomic environment thanks to the French banking supervisor rating system. We show governance and strategy quality measures significantly contribute to capital requirements setting. Followingtheir effects onto banks capital ratios and credit supply, we show raising capital requirementsreduces credit. The third article analyses credit risk management on the European interbankmarket between 2011 and 2015 and how it is modified by monetary policy adjustments overthe period. We focus on credit risk associated with holdings of assets located in peripheral Europe countries. We show market access and interest rates served to borrowers react to their holdings of such assets. The direction and size of this reaction depends on monetary policy interventions.