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China and India relations changed tremendously after the Cold War. Economic development is the utmost priority at the end of the Cold War, deriving from recognition that international competition is shifting from military confrontation to overall economic, scientific, and technological capabilities. Therefore, the two countries appeared to recognize the futility of confrontation, and moves to rebuild confidence proceeded apace. With an emphasis on seeking co-operation in other areas of mutual benefit, both sides agreed to break the impasse on the boundary question and to maintain peace and stability along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This positive spirit was reflected in the signing of Confidence-building measures (CBMs) and Trade Protocol which helped develop better mutual understanding. But India feels uneasy to observe China's rising economic and military capability across East Asia, because the 1962 War had cast long shadows in their elite¡¦s memory. New Delhi is concerned about China¡¦s assistance to Pakistan¡¦s nuclear and missile program, and offer military weapons to Sri Lanka, Nepal and Myanmar by far. New Delhi has always viewed any China, Pakistan and Myanmar¡¦s relationship as a scheme to strangle or restraint India¡¦s strategic throughout the Indian Ocean. Thus India drive for defense modernization focuses on strategic forces, especially its acquisition of certain high-profile naval ships and systems, and prepared to assert its interests to counter the rise in Chinese interest there. Moreover, India spreads China threat when China rising across East Asia that reinforced the worry of China¡¦s neighbors about China¡¦s power spread through their countries. It is obvious that one of the reasons why ASEAN was keen to bring India into the regional affairs was the concern with China. Therefore, India proceeds to more bilateral exchanges and boost economic, even military exercises with each Southeast Asian country. Furthermore, Indian continued hosting of the Tibetan government in exile to counter China support of the Pakistan. The study focuses on : India and China, the two most populous nations on earth, how these two emerging great powers manage their cooperation and competition in the coming years will have a major impact on regional security. The purpose of this research is from the perspective realism of geopolitics approach to analyze the factors of Sino-Indian competition and cooperation, as well as analysis the two countries historical conflict and evolution toward potential cooperation and quiet competition currently.

一、兩岸對建立軍事互信機制，避免兩岸軍事衝突雖有爭論，卻也希望彼此間能夠找出一條可行之路。雖然「軍事互信機制」在歐洲已經建立起一套完整的理論及發展模式，但是其經驗未必就能適用於複雜多變的兩岸關係。 二、軍事互信機制在亞洲之發展案例中，可以發現失敗原因有因雙方缺乏政治意願執行、互信基礎脆弱、核武競賽、歷史淵源與大國的戰略布局等。 三、中共提出兩岸建立軍事互信機制，始於2004年的「五一七聲明」，「胡四點」、「連胡公報」，將軍事互信機制優先順序調整；兩岸關係改善後，「胡六點」亦希望穩定台海局勢，「減輕軍事安全顧慮」，顯示胡擔心無法掌握的意外隨時會發生，這些徵候似可連結到中共迅速通過反分裂法的制定，名義上針對台灣的各項台獨作為，實質上卻將解放軍出兵的舉動用法律來約制。 四、實在廣義的層面上，兩岸對於軍事互信均抱持正面的態度，雖說在時間點、優先順序、實質交流內容等面向或有不同意見，惟大體言之兩岸之間建立軍事互信機制的環境其實已經成熟。 五、本文研究發現中共的「軍事互信機制」是階段性策略、兩岸發展「軍事互信機制」的本質與目的與歐陸不同、兩岸發展軍事安全互信機制內涵迥異、兩岸軍事互信機制建立環境已趨成熟、國防安全上的軍事衝突隱憂仍然存在、軍購仍為我建構軍事互信機制重要籌碼。 六、兩岸應在九二共識下探討軍事（軍事安全）互信機制建構框架，我應建置對中國大陸談判軍事互信機制之跨部會專責機構，以整合政府政策與資源。並應充分運用民間智庫研究能量，聚焦軍事互信機制議題與審慎培育與納管規劃及談判人才，另需積極爭取軍售，以增強軍事互信機制談判實力，最後應加速投入海西特區發展建構非軍事化區域之價值。

以往諸多研究兩岸軍事互信機制（Military Confidence-Building Measures, MCBMs），始終糾結於兩岸主權之議題，於是陷入兩岸各自堅持「一中原則」或「九二共識」及「維持現狀」的「非此即彼」胡同中，甚而忽略此問題的癥結是兩岸共同的安全問題。因為兩岸「我執」的關係，於是化約成國家主權而不見，或犧牲全球或次國家社會及群體個人的共同安全利益，故本文主張超越國家主權的思維，以兩岸共同安全為前提，透由第三選擇之安全治理的格局，融入第三者美國或區域國家來共同推動兩岸軍事互信機制，方能突破僵局，共創兩岸安全、穩定與和平。 / Many studies in the past cross-strait Military Confience-Building Measures, always entangled in the issue of cross-strait sovereignty, then caught the two sides adhere to their "one China principle" or the "1992 consensus" and "status quo" in "either-or" alley, and even ignore this the crux of the problem is on both sides of common security problems. Because cross-strait "ego" relationship, so for about a country's sovereignty and not see, or at the expense of common security interests of the global or national community and groups of individuals, therefore we advocate supranational sovereignty of thinking, cross-strait common security as a precondition, through the pattern third choice of security governance, into the United States or other countries in the regin to jointly promote cross-strait Military Confience-Building Measures to break the deadlock and create a cross-strait security, stability and peace.

二十世紀的最後十年，東亞無疑地是一塊讓研究者目眩神迷的地方：一方面有著人類歷史上最快的經濟發展成績；另一方面，卻又在冷戰結束後興起另一波的區域危機暗流，一九九四年北韓核子危機、一九九六年台海危機、一九九八年北韓大浦洞飛彈引爆的日本安保效應、乃至二○○○年台灣總統選舉風雲與南北韓高峰會、加上美國在二○○一年「九一一」事件後即將在東亞及世界推動的「反恐」所產生的未知效應，都在再地反應此一區域對安全機制的迫切需要。 　　最常被提及的安全機制，就是不斷被討論的「信心建立措施」(Confidence-building Measures: CBMs)或是延伸的概念「信心暨安全建立措施」(Confidence-Security building Measures：CSBMs)，但是東亞現狀仍為冷戰對峙氣氛所籠罩，安全機制乏善可陳，在南海問題方面，各國仍以擱置暫代安全機制的建立；中共在台海危機中的態度更證明了信心建立措施主張的無力。在另一方面，中共在朝鮮半島與中亞扮演完全不同的角色，積極地扮演負責任的區域大國的任務，試圖在亞洲大陸中佔一個關鍵的地位，並以此外拒其它勢力染指此一區域。更為明顯的是，在東亞安全局勢的變化中，朝鮮問題與台海問題是最可能的爆發點，而其中共同的關鍵即是作為新興列強的中國大陸了，中共無疑是東亞地區關鍵的外交行為者，中共在區域安全事務上的矛盾性與特殊地位正給研究者一個重新檢視安全機制理論的良好例證。 　　也因此本論文的重點即是重新評價與建構安全機制理論，分成兩大部分，第一是從理論的角度批判與補強信心建立措施，主要是由新現實主義的體系理論觀點批判信心建立措施的自成性與先驗性 ，另一方面也從建構主義 (construcivism)與國際建制理論(internaional regimes theory)的最新發展擷取靈感，補足其在方法論與分析架構的不足。就東亞安全的環境而言，「政治安全」的優先地位必須被特別加以考量，一方面是因為東亞國家在主觀意識上仍以國家利益的考量為依歸(就中共而言是「新安全觀」)，另一方面，政治安全上的互信與互賴在被充分滿足的情形下，軍事安全、經濟安全等等次領域建制化的合作才能依次建立。 　　另一個重點則是由實際的例證出發，分析中共在東亞安全的角色與作為，就同樣的理論基礎而言，中共也同樣地受主觀意願與客觀體系所制約，究竟何種因素推動中共的安全作為？其與體系成員的互動為何？又未來的安全架構如何建立？筆者認為東亞並非缺乏多邊安全建制的主張，而是缺乏如何建構安全機制的階段性手段，中共周邊安全機制發展成功與失敗的例子，都足以凸顯何種因素對於建構區域安全機制是最重要的，在朝鮮半島，大國的互動促成了兩韓和解與「四方會談」體制的實現，但也因為大國間的互信基礎在國內因素轉變下瓦解，而導致和解遲滯不前；在東協與東協區域論壇的發展上，雖然取得相當好的建制化成果，但在處理南海問題上，仍因區域論壇缺乏大國的積極參與而沒有任何突破性的進展；「上海合作組織」的出現顯示中共的確願意發展區域多邊安全機制，但這個機制的成員與目標則必須符合中共國家安全戰略的考量。 　　因此，本文提出一個東亞「信心暨安全建立機制」的基本架構，第一個部分，這個機制在研究途徑上，除了新自由主義的方法與工具外，同時必須包含新現實主義的體系觀，也就是國家行為的產出包含主客觀因素的「體系十國家利益」的綜合考量（以中共而言，就是「大國外交」＋「新安全觀」）；第二個部分，釐清安全機制的發展階段概念，提出「東亞安全的發展光譜」，尤其著重「政治CBMs」的重要性。第三個部分，配合「東亞安全發展光譜」，與各吹區域建制水準與信心水準的觀察，可以得出一個東亞「信安機制」發展階段的客觀評估。最後，本文整理出一個東亞「信安機制」成立的十一個要件，作為本文對於「何謂東亞安全機制」與「東亞安全機制如何運作」這兩個核心問題的解答。

This diploma thesis is an analysis of Bush and Obama administrations' approach towards Sino-American military relations. The topic of this thesis is the military cooperation between the People's Republic China (PRC) and the United States. The paper analyzes the trends and topics of the military-to-military contacts through the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) theory. The bilateral relationship between the two countries is the most important relationship in the 21st century and its development has worldwide implications. Historically, there have been multiple points of tension where interests of both countries collided, many of which persisted to be sources of the new unease. The American support to Taiwan through numerous arms-sales, increased Chinese militarization of space, cyberspace and the South China Sea are the main causes of reluctant military-to-military cooperation between the PRC and the U.S. It is vital for the rest of the global community that both superpowers keep an acceptable amount of tensions between their armies and ideally pursue more cooperation than competition. The paper concludes that the Sino-American military relations have gone through an on-and-off pattern during both Bush administrations, mainly due to aforementioned American support for Taiwan, and due to the types...

「上海合作組織」是第一個以中國城市為名的永久性政府間組織，以中文及俄文為正式語言，成員國包括中國、俄羅斯及地處中亞的哈薩克、吉爾吉斯、塔吉克、烏茲別克。而「上海合作組織」的前身是建立於1996年的「上海五國」機制，2001年中，烏茲別克加入「上海五國」機制，同年6月15日，六國元首共同發表「上海合作組織成立宣言」，宣佈在「上海五國」機制基礎上成立「上海合作組織」，當時中共藉著這個機制與俄羅斯及中亞四國開始展開邊境地區信任和裁軍的談判，而這也是「上海合作組織」軍事合作的開端。 本論文以「上海合作組織」軍事合作為研究主題，首先主要探討的目的為從「上海五國」到「上海合作組織」，其軍事合作形成的背景有那些主要因素、其演進的歷程及其內容，其次「上海合作組織」軍事合作的主要內容有那些，接著探討「上海合作組織」軍事合作發展至今，不論外部或內部有那些限制因素影響軍事合作，最後逐一分析「上海合作組織」的軍事合作對全球、區域及台海兩岸的安全情勢未來的發展。 研究發現隨著「上海合作組織」的成立，中共在中亞地區的影響力逐漸加大，中共在中亞日益提昇的力量也形成對俄羅斯的另一種挑戰。2007年6月27日「上海合作組織」六個成員國簽署「上海合作組織成員國關於舉行聯合軍事演習的協定」，使聯合軍演朝向定期化、常態化與制度的趨勢發展，而「上海合作組織」軍事合作發展至今，雖然有許多內外的限制因素，但是其範圍及影響層面卻日漸擴大，對全球、亞太地區或台海兩岸的安全情勢都產生重大的影響，不論兩岸和平談判如何發展，我們都要密切注意「上海合作組織」軍事合作對我軍事、外交等層面所造成的威脅。 / The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the first permanent inter-government organization named by one of the Chinese cities. Its official language is Chinese and Russian, and its members include China, Russian Federation, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Tajikistan and Republic of Uzbekistan. "Shanghai Five" mechanism, established in 1996, was the forerunner of SCO. In 2001, Republic of Uzbekistan joined the "Shanghai Five" mechanism, and in the same year of June 15, the leaders of the six countries announced a joint statement－"the founding declaration of SCO", which declared SCO was established on the basis of the "Shanghai Five" mechanism . By using this mechanism, China started the negotiation, which is about a mutual trust of boarding area and disarmament issues with Russia and four center Asia countries, and this mechanism started the military cooperation in SCO. This thesis mainly focuses on the military cooperation of SCO. First, it will be discussed that the purpose of the organization from the "Shanghai Five" to SCO, including what are the primary factors of forming the military cooperation and its courses of evolution and contents. Second, we talk about what are the main contents of the military cooperation, and the SCO’s external or internal limitation which may influence the military cooperation. Finally, we analyze its future development of security situation in global, regional, and the two sides of the Taiwan Strait areas step by step. The research discovered, with the foundation of SCO, that the China’s influence in center Asia is increasing, which will form another challenge to Russia. On June 27, 2007, the six members of SCO signed “an agreement of holding joint military maneuvers among SCO members” to have them held periodically, normally, and systematically. From now, although there are a lot of limitations, the influence of the military cooperation is increasing and it has played a key role in global, Asia Pacific and the two sides of the Taiwan Strait areas. No matter how the peace negotiation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait areas will go, we must keep a close eye on the fact that the military cooperation could cause Taiwan’s military and diplomacy to be under threat.