All organizations involved in war are concerned with military cohesion. Yet previous studies have only investigated cohesion in a very narrow manner, focusing almost solely on Western state militaries or on micro-level explanations. This dissertation argues for the need to broaden this perspective. It focuses on three classic sources of cohesion – coercion, compensation and constructs (such as identity and ideology) – and investigates their relevance in the Second Liberian Civil War (1999-2003). More specifically, this dissertation consists of an inquiry of how the conflict's three main military organizations – Charles Taylor’s Government of Liberia (GoL), the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) – drew on these three sources to foster cohesion. Based on thirteen months of ethnographic fieldwork with former combatants, this dissertation contains five parts: an introduction, which focuses on issues of theory and method, and four essays that investigate the three sources of cohesion in the three organizations. Essay I focuses on the LURD rebels, and provides an insider account of their strategy. It shows that even decentralized movements like the LURD can execute strategy, and contends that the LURD fought its fiercest battles not against the government, but to keep itself together. Essay II focuses on coercion, and counters the prevailing view of African rebels’ extensive use of coercion to keep themselves together. Since extreme coercion in particular remained illegitimate, its use would have decreased, rather than increased, cohesion. Essay III investigates the government militias to whom warfighting was subcontracted. In a context characterized by a weak state and fragmented social organization, compensation may have remained the only available source of cohesion. Essay IV investigates identities as sources of cohesion. It argues that while identities are a powerful cohesive source, they must be both created and maintained to remain relevant. Taken together, this dissertation argues for a more comprehensive approach to the investigation of cohesion, and one that also takes into account mezzo- and macro-level factors.

The legislation governing the care of people with dementia is based on consent and therefore reflects the western society’s idealization of autonomy. However, common symptoms of dementia include decreased ability to make adequate decisions and an impaired judgement. The purpose of this study was to understand the rationality in organizing the care of people with dementia without the presence of coercion, based on experience of nursing staff working in dementia care. How does the nursing staff reason about the use of coercion in the care of people with dementia? How do they relate to current legislation? To answer these questions three focus group interviews were made, consisting of nursing staff working at special units for people with dementia. The study was based on a critical hermeneutic perspective where ruling norms, values and beliefs were questioned. The result showed that the nursing staff considered use of coercion as an inevitable part of their work to ensure safety for people with dementia. Additionally, the result showed that the nursing staff used various strategies to work in a way that was compatible with the current legislation, although these strategies often failed to be sufficient enough to ensure the protection of people with dementia. Based on the result, this study discusses the conflict occurring between the discourses on autonomy in the society in relation to organizing a safe dementia care

In recent years, political legitimacy as a concept distinct from full justice has received much attention. Yet in addition to querying the specific conditions legitimacy requires, there is a more general question: What is legitimacy even about? How ought we identify and conceptualize these conditions? According to the regnant justificatory liberal (JL) approach, legitimate legal coercion is based on reasons all reasonable persons can accept and JL is explicated in terms of a hypothetical procedure. Alas, Part I explains why JL is inadequate. First, I argue that it de-legitimizes all coercion. Second, it undercuts the proposition that there are certain basic rights which must be protected for legitimacy. Third, I suggest that JL structurally involves paternalism. Where should theorists turn? My perhaps surprising proposal is that they turn to the Christian Reformed (CR) tradition of social thought. As I take it, this tradition is composed of such figures as Augustine and Calvin, Abraham Kuyper and Herman Dooyeweerd, and, more recently, Francis Schaeffer. It has long theorized such issues as church-state separation and permissible coercion, and is replete with conceptual resources. Thus, Part II reconstructs an alternative legitimacy framework out of these resources. The central CR insight is this: legitimacy is a function of preventing basic wrongs. Legal coercion is only necessary "by reason of sin". I develop this insight in terms of three ideas. First, those wrongs which must prevented as conditions of legitimacy are objective wrongs, obtaining universally regardless of consent. Second, they presuppose some view of basic teleology. A teleological view is needed to elaborate contentful basic rights non-arbitrarily, but only a basic teleological view insofar as legitimacy is distinct from full justice. Third, I suggest these wrongs are fruitfully understood as constituting an exogenous standard, one that is neither the product of actual nor hypothetical self-legislation. Part III brings JL and CR legitimacy into dialogue. Understanding legitimacy in terms of objective, teleological, and exogenous wrongs, respectively, helps us avoid each of the unacceptable consequences of JL covered in Part I. Legitimacy is better conceptualized in CR terms; preventing such wrongs is what legitimacy is about. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2013-11-13 04:18:01.642

The 2014 cyber attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment is an example of a disruptive event where a nation state utilized cyber tools in order to coerce a target into changing their course of action. Cyber attacks, something that might be perceived as a looming futuristic threat, became reality for Sony and its employees under the course of a few months in late 2014. The coercer’s attempt to change the behavior of the company eventually failed and North Korea who was attributed as coercer was imposed with new sanctions. This paper takes on the task of evaluating the Sony case against both the traditional theory of coercion and specific factors of cyber coercion in order to determine how the failure can be explained. The findings implicate that the failure can be explained by the traditional theory but needs to be complemented with the specifics of cyber coercion due to the difficulties in assessing the credibility of cyber attacks. Further studies are advised in the area of cyber coercion and a comparative approach would do particularly well in assessing causal explanations in a more comprehensive way.

No description available.

Even though it may not seem like it at first glance, the phenomenon of rape conceals in fact much more than anyone who has ever faced this problem we are dealing with could say about it. Worse, it is these people, the vast majority of them men, where the tendency is to downplay this crime and, under the influence of ignorance and myths associated with rape or even religion and ideology, often see it as made up by the victims or as completely removed from the intentions of the offender. And because the aim of this work is not only to provide a view of rape in terms of criminal law, but also from a criminological, i.e. view of a number of other scientific disciplines, that this is indeed the case, that rape cannot be seen in this manner, this is also - and no less important - the task of this work. The fundamental part of this work, as a work looking at the issue addressed especially in terms of criminal law, and its main investigative contribution provide not only an analysis of the various elements of the crime of rape, but primarily an attempt within it to completely categorize all hitherto considered and neglected forms of sexual behavior within individual - prescribed by law - forms of sexual intercourse. The same is true then and the main investigative contribution of this work can be...

Submitted by Nara Lays Domingues Viana Oliveira (naradv) on 2015-07-08T18:04:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 lutecildo.pdf: 1805156 bytes, checksum: 24fdf0c633a6b7124a32bfd0e929e18e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-08T18:04:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 lutecildo.pdf: 1805156 bytes, checksum: 24fdf0c633a6b7124a32bfd0e929e18e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-05-22 / Nenhuma / No Teeteto de Platão a aporia é como uma espécie de vazio filosófico, pois aniquila a mais bela definição de conhecimento, isto é, a definição como crença verdadeira justificada. Um Diálogo aporético é um Diálogo sem a resposta pretendida e esse é exatamente o caso do Teeteto. Sócrates alega algumas necessidades prementes para não suster a definição. Todavia, uma investigação cautelosa revela alguma insuficiência nos contra-argumentos. Alguns, além de insuficientes são também expostos de modo sumário. Fez-se necessário então perscrutar a fim de sanar a validade dessas refutações que desembocaram na aporia do Diálogo. Mas independente disso, o problema do Teeteto é, de fato, difícil. Existe, por exemplo, uma enorme propensão à amalgamação dos conceitos de crença verdadeira e de logos. A mera definição de um logos já por si consiste numa tarefa extenuante. No século XX o conciso texto de Gettier reavivou a mesma discussão do Teeteto. Em poucas palavras ele reiterou a refutação platônica e chamou muita atenção sobre si. Esta tese versa mais propriamente sobre o Teeteto de Platão, pois esse Diálogo é o texto base e delimitado para a investigação. O que se questiona é primeiramente a validade dos contra-argumentos platônicos e em menor escala o de Gettier. Se eles não se sustêm, então ainda estamos autorizados a continuar definindo o conhecimento como crença verdadeira justificada. Após a publicação do Teeteto, com efeito, muita epistemologia foi produzida e muito do que se responde a Gettier também responde, de algum modo, ao Teeteto. A justificação epistêmica de que tanto hoje se fala, parece tratar-se do mesmo logos justificacional tratado no Teeteto. Os contemporâneos parecem perseverantes à procura do logos que os dialogantes, supostamente não encontraram. Esta tese mostra como nem Platão nem Gettier conseguiram refutar a definição tripartite. A sugestão de Costa sobre a necessidade de pressupor uma condição perspectivista e uma atualista é deveras plausível quanto à resolução do contraexemplo de Gettier. O fundacionalismo neoclássico de Bonjour é, de igual modo, uma alternativa muito plausível. É que a sua pressuposição de crenças não carentes de justificação nos livra da antiga preocupação do regresso infinito. Esse autor pressupõe uma noção de consciência não aperceptiva, através da qual se dá a relação entre a experiência sensorial e a crença básica. Em parte, pode-se dizer que o próprio Teeteto, se esquadrinhado apropriadamente, acaba por responder algumas questões, pois revela a insuficiência dos contra-argumentos. Por outra, a doxastologia contemporânea arrefece o problema com novas propostas. Em síntese, uma análise cuidadosa do próprio Teeteto aliada a um fundacionalismo claro e elucidativo responde de modo plausível ao problema aqui proposto. Todavia, sendo o Teeteto o texto base para a investigação, esta tese foca-o mais abundantemente. / In the Plato’s Theaetetus the aporia is one specie of empty philosophical, because it postpones the most admirable definition of knowledge, i. e, the definition as justified true belief. An aporetic Dialogue is a Dialogue without the answer that’s been searched and this is the case of the Theaetetus. Socrates claims some urgent necessities to does not maintain the definition. However, a careful investigation reveals some insufficiency in those counterarguments. Some of them, besides insufficient, are exposed of one summarized way. In this way, it had become necessary an investigation to attain the validity about those refutations, which ended in the Dialogue’s aporia. But despite that, the problem of Theaetetus is, in fact, very difficult. There is, for example, an enormous tendency of amalgamation among the concept of true belief and the concept of logos. The simple definition of logos is an extenuated work. In the 20th century, the concise text of Gettier gave rise to the same discussion that Theaetetus. In a few words, it corroborated with the platonic refutation and attracted much attention to itself. This thesis discusses more specifically about Plato’s Theaetetus, which is the Dialogue delimited and fundamental text to investigation. What is inquired is primarily the legitimacy of the platonic counterarguments, which one of Gettier comes in less proportion. If they are not consistent, then we are yet warranted to carry on defining knowledge as justified true belief. After Theaetetus’ publishment a large amount of epistemologies have been produced and many answers to the problem of Gettier are also, in a certain way, answers to Theaetetus. The epistemic justification that is so discussed nowadays is seems to be the same justificational logos debated in the Theaetetus. The contemporary philosophers search for the logos that the dialoguers probably did not attain. This thesis displays how neither Plato nor Gettier made to refute the tripartite definition. Costa’s suggestion about the necessity of assuming a perspectivist condition and a current condition is, indeed, plausible as the resolution of Gettier’s counterexample. Neoclassic foundationalism of Bonjour is also one alternative too plausible. Indeed, his presupposition of beliefs without necessity of justification let us free of the ancient worry of infinite regress. According to the author, is necessary to presuppose one notion of non apperceptive consciousness, whereby occur the relation between the sensorial experience and the fundamental belief. In part, if the Theaetetus, is adequately investigated, it answers some questions, because, at the end, we can see the insufficiency of the counterarguments. In other, the contemporary doxastology relieves the problem with new proposals. In short, one careful investigation of own Theaetetus allied to one clear and elucidative foundationalism answer, of plausible way, the problem here exposed. However, since that the Theaetetus is the main text to investigation, this thesis stress it more abundantly.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2016-08-09T13:09:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Stella Economides Maciel.pdf: 1369384 bytes, checksum: 882c5f3aa431e7ad819bd0146fca90c8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-09T13:09:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Stella Economides Maciel.pdf: 1369384 bytes, checksum: 882c5f3aa431e7ad819bd0146fca90c8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-31 / Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo / The astreintes as instrument of coercion so that their recipients meet the legal commands addressed to them should be implemented in order to provide the greatest possible procedural effectiveness. The way the mechanism developed over time and after the reforms that took place in procedural law certainly allows the conclusion that it is a device with great potential to achieve its purpose. Nevertheless, some issues related to its legal system generate some distortions in its implementation, notably the concern that exists with respect to the lender's enrichment of their product. Consequently, the mechanism ends not reaching its intention. So we tried to establish a form of application of coercive fine in order to extract him the greatest potential possible, to comply with court orders. Certainly, the issue involves many stormy issues that deserve serious thought. But the ideas here thrown aim that its application be given the most successful way possible: that astreintes applied by the judiciary even relates / As astreintes, como instrumento de coerção para que seus destinatários cumpram os comandos judiciais que lhes são dirigidos, devem ser aplicadas de modo a se propiciar a maior efetividade processual possível. A forma como o mecanismo se desenvolveu ao longo do tempo e após as reformas que ocorreram na legislação processual, certamente permite a conclusão de que se trata de um meio com grande potencial de atingir a sua finalidade. Não obstante, algumas questões relativas ao seu regime jurídico geram algumas distorções na sua aplicação, notadamente a preocupação que se verifica em relação ao enriquecimento do credor de seu produto. Em consequência, o mecanismo acaba não atingindo o seu desiderato. Assim, procurou-se estabelecer uma forma de aplicação da multa coercitiva, de maneira a extrair-lhe o maior potencial possível, para o cumprimento de ordens judiciais. Certamente, o tema envolve muitas questões tormentosas que merecem aprofundada reflexão. Mas as ideias aqui lançadas visam a que a sua aplicação se dê da forma mais bem sucedida possível: que as astreintes aplicadas pelo Poder Judiciário sequer incidam

Bakgrund: Personer med allvarlig psykisk ohälsa kan behöva vårdas under tvång på en sluten psykiatrisk avdelning. För att kunna förbättra tvångsvården krävs en förståelse för dessa patienters upplevelser. Syfte: Syftet var att beskriva patienters upplevelser av tvångsåtgärder inom psykiatrisk slutenvård. Metod: En litteraturstudie med kvalitativ ansats där resultaten från tio originalartiklar har analyserats enligt en innehållsanalys av Forsberg och Wengström (2015). Den teoretiska referensramen som valdes var Katie Erikssons omvårdnadsteori. Resultat: Resultatet påvisar att patienter har liknande upplevelser av tvångsvård i samtliga artiklars resultat. I alla resultat framkommer det att patienter har upplevt någon form av negativ känsla i samband med tvångsvård. Majoriteten av resultaten visar att patientens integritet, autonomi eller mänskliga värde blir kränkt i samband med tvångsvård, vilket i sin tur leder till ett försämrat psykiskt mående. En positiv upplevelse av tvångsvård kan uppnås då personalen ser till att patienten blir väl informerad, känner delaktighet och tillit, genom att få patienten att känna sig sedd, hörd och respekterad. Slutsats: Hur patienter upplever och påverkas av tvångsvård är individuellt och upplevelsen av vården är unik för varje patient. Samma typ av tvångsvård kan i vissa fall ge motsägelsefulla resultat för olika patienter. Det finns dock gemensamma nämnare som kan vara avgörande för patienternas upplevelser. Sjuksköterskan har stora möjligheter att skapa en positiv upplevelse av vården för patienten. Genom en humanistisk vård, som grundar sig i respekt, lyhördhet och medkänsla, där patienten blir delaktig i sin vård. / Background: People with severe mental illness may need to be cared for in a closed psychiatric ward. In order to improve coercive care, an understanding of these patients' experiences is required. Aim: The purpose was to describe patients’experiences of coercive measures in psychiatric inpatient care. Method: A literature study with qualitative approach where the results from ten original articles have been analyzed according to a content analysis by Forsberg and Wengström (2015). The theoretical frame of reference selected was Katie Eriksson's nursing theory. Result: The result shows that patients have similar experiences of coercive care in the results of all articles. In all results it appears that patients have experienced some form of negative feeling in connection with coercive care. Most of the results show that the patient's integrity, autonomy or human value is being violated in connection with coercion, which in turn leads to deterioration in mental health. A positive experience of coercive care can be achieved when the staff ensures that the patient is well informed, feel trust and is involved, by making the patient feel perceived, heard and respected. Conclusion: How patients experience and are affected by coercive care is individual and the experience of care is unique to each patient. The same type of coercive care may in some cases give contradictory results for different patients. However, there are common denominators that can be crucial for the patients' experiences. The nurse has great opportunities to create a positive experience of the care for the patient. Through a humanistic care, which is based on respect, responsiveness and compassion, where the patient becomes involved in their care.

This thesis is a study of the coerciveness of legal systems. I defend two main claims: that typical legal systems are much less coercive than most legal and political philosophers think, and that legal systems are not necessarily coercive. My defence is developed in three parts. The first is dedicated to building the necessary theoretical framework to defend the main claims of this thesis. This is where I offer a rigorous formulation of the questions that this thesis addresses and contextualise them within broader debates about the relationship between law and coercion. A substantial portion of the first part of the thesis is devoted to the development of two accounts: an account of coercion and an account of the conditions legal systems must satisfy in order to be coercive. The second part is where I advance two arguments for the claim that typical legal systems are much less coercive than it is usually thought. The first is an argument that establishes that our legal systems rarely issue conditional threats. Given that issuing conditional threats is a necessary condition for any legal system to be coercive - or so I claim in the first part of the thesis - the fact that our legal systems rarely do so undermines the view that our legal systems are pervasively coercive. The second argument is based on the reasons why citizens comply with legal mandates. I analyse the relevant empirical data and show that compliance is not frequently owed to the threat of unwelcome consequences. This should not have been the case had our legal systems been as coercive as philosophers generally think. The third part deals with the claim that legal systems are necessarily coercive. There I address some methodological concerns that this claim gives rise to and propose two arguments for viewing coerciveness as a contingent feature of our legal systems.