This study concerns the terms liberalism, the political, democracy, and liberal democracy focusing on the application of the terms in the discourse of two distinct political theorists: Carl Schmitt and Sheldon S. Wolin. I address the question of whether similarities exist between Schmitt and Wolin's theories? Specifically, are there similarities in their use of the terms listed above? Although both emphasize different aspects of the terms, I suggest they simultaneously share similar perspectives on them. In particular, I suggest that Schmitt and Wolin share in common attributes in their views on the purported problematic of liberal democracy. Furthermore, I suggest both theorists speak to the general concern that if the political cannot be realized, then democracy cannot be practice. / Master of Arts

O presente estudo parte da proposta de um pacto narrativo com o leitor, envolvendo uma dupla operação: renunciar, provisoriamente, o formato usual de uma tese dirigida contra ou a favor do pensamento conservador (sem perder de vista o posicionamento político e filosófico em questão), e assumir, enquanto isso, a complexidade da perspectiva de autores que se apropriaram e polemizaram questões políticas e temas filosóficos tendo em vista o seu tempo. Quanto ao gênero em questão, a proposta de desenvolver uma reunião de ensaios procura delimitar as configurações teóricas que permitiram o incremento de um pensamento conservador. A partir das leituras que Carl Schmitt e Leo Strauss estabeleceram sobre a filosofia de Thomas Hobbes, uma das principais problematizações tratadas aqui é a que vê na filosofia hobbesiana a fundação do liberalismo. Para tanto, a questão da adesão ou da separação entre a filosofia política e a filosofia natural torna-se bastante polêmica no tratamento que ambos os intérpretes dão a Hobbes. Como críticos dos rumos da política contemporânea, Schmitt e Strauss entenderam a instauração filosófica do racionalismo moderno como a base teórica que permitiu, a um só tempo, a consolidação de um Estado político que superou a ordem passada, o incremento de um regime absoluto de dominação da sociedade e a abertura que viabilizou, pelo desenvolvimento técnico da nova ciência da natureza e pelo rebaixamento moral da finalidade da vida humana, a ascensão liberal. Como uma tentativa de compreensão da força e das consequências que tais intérpretes tiveram, o presente estudo ainda explora uma recepção crítica brasileira da obra de Strauss que questiona e limita a interpretação da fundação hobbesiana do liberalismo. / This study proposes a narrative pact with the reader, involving a double operation: a temporary renouncement of the usual format of a thesis directed against or in favour of conservative thinking (without losing sight of the political and philosophical positioning in question), and assuming, meanwhile, the complexity of the perspective of authors who take political issues and philosophical subjects aiming at polemizing and debating problems that belong to their own times. As to the literary genre, the proposal of making up a set of essays aims to delimit the theoretical settings that enabled the development of a conservative thought. Considering the interpretations that Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss set out concerning the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, a major question treated here is that which sees the Hobbesian philosophy as the foundation of liberalism. For this purpose, the issue of adherence or separation between political philosophy and natural philosophy becomes quite provocative in the way both authors treat Hobbes. As critics of the contemporary political directions, Schmitt and Strauss consider the settlement of modern philosophical rationalism as the theoretical basis that made at the same time possible the consolidation of a political State that overcame the former order of politics, the instauration of an absolute regimen of domination of the society and, finally, the breach which, through the technical improvement of the new science of nature and the debasement of the moral purpose of human life, made the liberal ascension feasible. As an attempt to understand the strength and the consequences that such interpreters had, this study also explores the Brazilian critical reception of the works of Strauss, which discusses and delimits the interpretation of the Hobbesian foundation of liberalism.

O presente estudo parte da proposta de um pacto narrativo com o leitor, envolvendo uma dupla operação: renunciar, provisoriamente, o formato usual de uma tese dirigida contra ou a favor do pensamento conservador (sem perder de vista o posicionamento político e filosófico em questão), e assumir, enquanto isso, a complexidade da perspectiva de autores que se apropriaram e polemizaram questões políticas e temas filosóficos tendo em vista o seu tempo. Quanto ao gênero em questão, a proposta de desenvolver uma reunião de ensaios procura delimitar as configurações teóricas que permitiram o incremento de um pensamento conservador. A partir das leituras que Carl Schmitt e Leo Strauss estabeleceram sobre a filosofia de Thomas Hobbes, uma das principais problematizações tratadas aqui é a que vê na filosofia hobbesiana a fundação do liberalismo. Para tanto, a questão da adesão ou da separação entre a filosofia política e a filosofia natural torna-se bastante polêmica no tratamento que ambos os intérpretes dão a Hobbes. Como críticos dos rumos da política contemporânea, Schmitt e Strauss entenderam a instauração filosófica do racionalismo moderno como a base teórica que permitiu, a um só tempo, a consolidação de um Estado político que superou a ordem passada, o incremento de um regime absoluto de dominação da sociedade e a abertura que viabilizou, pelo desenvolvimento técnico da nova ciência da natureza e pelo rebaixamento moral da finalidade da vida humana, a ascensão liberal. Como uma tentativa de compreensão da força e das consequências que tais intérpretes tiveram, o presente estudo ainda explora uma recepção crítica brasileira da obra de Strauss que questiona e limita a interpretação da fundação hobbesiana do liberalismo. / This study proposes a narrative pact with the reader, involving a double operation: a temporary renouncement of the usual format of a thesis directed against or in favour of conservative thinking (without losing sight of the political and philosophical positioning in question), and assuming, meanwhile, the complexity of the perspective of authors who take political issues and philosophical subjects aiming at polemizing and debating problems that belong to their own times. As to the literary genre, the proposal of making up a set of essays aims to delimit the theoretical settings that enabled the development of a conservative thought. Considering the interpretations that Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss set out concerning the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, a major question treated here is that which sees the Hobbesian philosophy as the foundation of liberalism. For this purpose, the issue of adherence or separation between political philosophy and natural philosophy becomes quite provocative in the way both authors treat Hobbes. As critics of the contemporary political directions, Schmitt and Strauss consider the settlement of modern philosophical rationalism as the theoretical basis that made at the same time possible the consolidation of a political State that overcame the former order of politics, the instauration of an absolute regimen of domination of the society and, finally, the breach which, through the technical improvement of the new science of nature and the debasement of the moral purpose of human life, made the liberal ascension feasible. As an attempt to understand the strength and the consequences that such interpreters had, this study also explores the Brazilian critical reception of the works of Strauss, which discusses and delimits the interpretation of the Hobbesian foundation of liberalism.

[pt] A tese toma como problema central discutir a possibilidade de ruptura da ordem constitucional por meio do estado de exceção, compreendido a partir das leituras de Carl Schmitt e Walter Benjamin. Propõe-se refletir sobre o estado de exceção não tanto como um conceito jurídico, mas como um momento que tem a possibilidade de romper ou não com a ordem jurídica até então vigente. Sendo assim, a hipótese defendida por este trabalho consiste na premissa da existência de um ponto cego no constitucionalismo liberal — uma forma de pensar o direito que, em linhas gerais, garante aos indivíduos, primeiramente, a não interferência do Estado nas relações privadas e, em segundo lugar, a possibilidade de participar do processo decisório -, qual seja: o estado de exceção. Carl Schmitt e Walter Benjamin - autores situados em extremos opostos do espectro político - compreendem a exceção nesse sentido, ou seja, como uma incapacidade do constitucionalismo liberal para tratar da possibilidade da ruptura da ordem. Por não tratar dessa fissura a partir da qual se inicia o direito, também não discute a violência que o funda e o mantém. Em outras palavras, o constitucionalismo liberal não enfrenta a exceção porque ela minaria sua própria existência e seu pressuposto. O estado de exceção, pensado tanto como mecanismo garantidor da ordem quanto como momento de ruptura, abala tais pressupostos, desnudando o constitucionalismo liberal. Para corroborar tal hipótese, o trabalho será dividido em três capítulos. No primeiro deles, expõe-se um rápido quadro histórico do momento de Weimar para contextualizar o surgimento de tais teorias. Em seguida, trata-se de aproximar e afastar Walter Benjamin e Carl Schmitt nos pressupostos que irão levar os autores a pensar o estado de exceção: a teologia política, a social-democracia e a crítica à técnica. No segundo capítulo, levanta-se a hipótese de que Schmitt teme a exceção como momento de ruptura que desencaderia o caos, por isso sua defesa de uma constituição autoritária. Para tanto, o capítulo divide-se em quatro partes. Na primeira delas, aborda-se a relação entre sujeito romântico e liberalismo. Na segunda, a tensão entre política e direito. Adiante, aborda-se soberania, política e democracia e, por último, a questão da ruptura. O último capítulo trata de pensar o direito a partir de Walter Benjamin, em especial no que diz respeito à lei e à soberania. Primeiramente, a análise centra-se na questão da soberania, para em seguida, desenvolver as concepções metodológicas e políticas de história que levaram Benjamin a pensar em um permanente estado de exceção. / [en] This thesis takes as its central problem the discussion on the possibility of rupture of the constitutional order by means of the state of exception, as understood by Carl Schmitt s and Walter Benjamin s readings. It proposes the comprehension of the state of exception not so much as a legal concept, but as a moment that can or cannot break the actual juridical order. Thus, the hypothesis assumed by this thesis is that there is a blind spot in liberal constitutionalism — a point of view on law that, in general terms, assures the individual, firstly, the nonintervention of the State on private affairs, and, secondly, the possibility of taking part in the decision-making process —, that is, the state of exception. Both Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin — authors who hold opposite positions on the political spectrum — understand exception according to this meaning, that is to say, as the impossibility of liberal constitutionalism to deal with an eventual break of the order. Since it does not treat on this fissure from which law begins, it also does not discuss the violence that founds it and keeps it. In other words, the liberal constitutionalism does not faces exception because it would undermine its very existence and premises. The state of exception, considered both as a guarantor of order and as a moment of rupture, unsettles those premises, exposing liberal constitutionalism. In order to corroborate this hypothesis, this thesis is divided in three chapters. In the first one, a brief historical background of the Weimar Moment is presented, in order to contextualize the emergence of those theories. Then, it deals with the accords and discords between Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt concerning the assumptions that move both authors to think of the state of exception: political theology, social democracy, and critique of technique. In the second chapter, it is proposed the hypothesis that Schmitt would be afraid of exception as a moment of rupture that could initiate chaos, hence his defense of an authoritarian constitution. For this purpose, the chapter is divided in four parts. The first one treats on the relation between romantic subject and liberalism. The second, on the tension between politics and law. Further on, it treats on sovereignty, politics and democracy, and, finally, the issue of rupture. The last chapter thinks Legal Studies on the basis of Walter Benjamin s ideas, especially those concerning law and sovereignty. First, the analysis is centered on the question of sovereignty, and, next, it develops the methodological and politic conceptions of history that moved Benjamin to think of a permanent state of exception.

Nous examinons d’abord les aspects de la souveraineté politique sur la scène shakespearienne. À la lumière des analyses consacrées par Walter Benjamin au drame baroque, en 1928, et de la réaction de Carl Schmitt dans Hamlet ou Hécube (1956), nous montrons que Shakespeare met en scène la mortalité des corps politiques et la souveraineté nouvelle de l’intrigant dans le temps terrestre. Sommé de maîtriser l’art et le tempo de l’intrigue, le Prince est néanmoins impuissant à empêcher la décomposition de l’État. En prenant appui sur le drame élisabéthain, notamment sur le vertige mélancolique et sceptique d’Hamlet, nous interrogeons alors l’effort contemporain en vue de l’ordre et de la synchronisation dans la cité. La théorie hobbesienne de la représentation politique et juridique moderne rompt avec la conception mystique de l’unité politique et toute écriture inspirée des lois, tandis que la scène civile y est dédiée à la paix du commerce entre les individus afin de garantir les conditions d’une autonomie réelle dans la sphère privée. Réciproquement, cette autonomie doit pérenniser les solutions à la mélancolie et au scepticisme conceptualisées dans Léviathan. Tout en entérinant la tragédie de l’existence humaine et de tout savoir déjà mise en scène par Shakespeare, Léviathan évite d’emblée l’exaltation schmittienne ainsi que la violence « pure » logée, selon Benjamin, dans l’état d’exception de la subjectivité. À travers les spectres qui, chez Hobbes, n’ont plus droit de cité, la scène shakespearienne défait cependant les mécanismes de l’ordre et de la synchronisation continus, cela sans congédier le droit ni le projet de l’autonomie. / First, we examine the aspects of the political sovereignty on the Shakespearean stage. In the light of Walter Benjamin’s Origin of the German baroque drama (1928) and of Carl Schmitt’s answer to Benjamin in Hamlet or Hecuba (1956), we show that Shakespeare stages the mortality of the political bodies and the new sovereignty of the plotter. Urged to master the art and the tempo of the plot, the prince is nonetheless unable to prevent the decomposition of the state. Then, drawing on the Elizabethan drama, and especially on Hamlet, we question the contemporary effort towards order and synchronization within the city. Hobbes’s theory of political and juridical representation breaks with the mystical conception of political unity and with any inspired legislation, whereas the civil scene is dedicated to the peace between individuals in order to ensure the possibility of a real autonomy in the private sphere. Reciprocally, this autonomy must consolidate the solutions to the problems of melancholy and skepticism conceptualized in Leviathan. While endorsing the tragedy of human condition and of knowledge already put on stage by Shakespeare, Leviathan prevents Schmitt’s exaltation as well as the « pure » violence which, according to Benjamin, lies in the subject’s state of exception. Yet, through the ghosts that Leviathan cannot tolerate within the public sphere, the Shakespearean stage unravels the mechanisms of perpetual order and synchronization without rejecting the law and the project of autonomy.

Le concept de totalitarisme élaboré par Hannah Arendt à partir de 1951 est aujourd'hui une référence incontournable. Son examen critique, ici proposé, commence par resituer cette théorie arendtienne dans l'histoire des idées juridiques. Ce faisant, il apparaît que non seulement la terminologie, mais également une partie des arguments et des conclusions de la philosophe ont été élaborés dès les années 1920 par la doctrine juridique, aussi bien anti- que pro-totalitaire.Dans un second temps, la théorie du droit, qui a nourri les réflexions de Hannah Arendt, est utilisé comme un instrument pour la critique. En particulier, la thèse la plus polémique défendue par la philosophe - à savoir qu'il n'y eut que deux régimes totalitaires, l'Allemagne nazie et l'Union soviétique – ne résiste guère à l'examen juridique et théorique.À travers ce dialogue historique et critique entre le droit et la philosophie, cette thèse interroge l'idée d'un droit totalitaire, qu'il s'agisse de sa nature, de ses conditions de possibilité ou de sa distinction avec l'Etat de droit. / The concept of totalitarianism developed by Hannah Arendt from 1951 is a major reference today. Its critical review, proposed here, begins by re-placing this arendtian theory in the history of legal ideas. In doing so, it appears that not only the terminology, but also some of the arguments and conclusions of the philosopher were developed from the 1920's by the theory of law, anti- and pro-totalitarian as well.In a second step, the theory of law, which nourished Hannah Arendt's reflections, is used as an instrument for criticism. In particular, the most controversial thesis defended by the philosopher - namely, that there were only two totalitarian regimes, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union - can hardly withstand a legal and theoretical scrutiny.Through this historical and critical dialogue between law and philosophy, this thesis questions the idea of a totalitarian law, its nature, its conditions of possibility and its distinction with the rule of law.

[pt] Esta dissertação tem como escopo a interpretação da obra jurídico-política de Jürgen Habermas à luz dos problemas e desafios formulados por Carl Schmitt. A hipótese inicial, confirmada ao longo da exposição, versa sobre o caráter de modelo negativo que a obra weimariana de Schmitt adquiriu para Habermas. Trata-se de um trabalho que se propõe a ocupar a intercessão entre a teoria política e a filosofia do direito. O pensamento do político e das condições normativas da democracia articula-se com um determinado conceito de filosofia do direito - enquanto pensamento que não admite o esquecimento da questão da legitimidade do direito. Atua, ainda, num registro marcadamente contemporâneo. São as exigências, os problemas, as crises do mundo de hoje que norteiam as leituras de Schmitt, a compreensão da experiência de Weimar e dos elementos fundamentais da obra de Habermas nos anos 90. / [en] This research aims to interpret the legal-political work of Jürgen Habermas in light of the problems and challenges indicated by Carl Schmitt. Initial hypothesis, confirmed later, affirms that Schmitt s Weimar work has a negative model function in the Habermasian theoretical perspective. The present work places itself in the interdisciplinary field of philosophy of law and political theory. The thought of the political and the normative conditions of democracy interweave into a certain concept of philosophy of law - as a thought that does not allow itself to forget the issue of legal legitimacy. It works yet in the contemporary register. Requirements, problems and crises of the current world are those which guide the readings of Schmitt, the comprehension of the Weimar experience, and of the fundamental elements of the work of Habermas in the 90 s.

Este estudo tem como objetivo compreender o mal-estar contemporâneo partindo da experiência clínica. Traduz um verdadeiro testemunho da autora enquanto pesquisadora, psicoterapeuta e supervisora. Parte de inquietações desalojadoras experienciadas na clínica e utiliza como objeto de reflexão teórica a Abordagem Centrada na Pessoa, mais especificamente, a Terapia Centrada no Cliente. Realiza uma leitura crítica da teoria da Terapia Centrada no Cliente, analisando a concepção de ciência e a trajetória conceitual empreendida por Carl Rogers. Partindo dessa analise, aponta para a insuficiência dos conceitos de Tendência Atualizante e Angústia para acolher e dar passagem ao mal-estar contemporâneo, indicando a necessidade de uma outra via de acesso que apreenda a condição fundamental e originária do homem. Por fim, apresenta o conceito de angústia de Heidegger enquanto possível contribuição para fecundar e re-significar a prática clínica. Como resultado do percurso empreendido, a autora revela o momento de trânsito em que se encontra, encaminhando-se para uma clínica psicológica enquanto cuidar (Sorge), vinculada a uma teoria do existir humano que pode ser lida como uma ética de aceitação da finitude, da transitoriedade, e dos conflitos. Tal teoria enseja uma prática clínica, que envolva um ato de criação, como abertura de acolhimento para algo que não se conhece, com disponibilidade para se lançar nas complexidades do ser-aí. Aponta que, apesar de ter encontrado algumas respostas para as inquietações desalojadoras que motivaram o presente estudo, a temática abordada, pela sua complexidade e dinâmica própria, esteve e estará sempre aberta a novos olhares e leituras / Departing from clinical experience, this study aims to comprehend the contemporary uneasiness. It shows the author's true testimony not only as a researcher, but also as a psychotherapist and supervisor. This research is based on disruptive clinical experiences by taking into account, as object for theoretical reflection, within the Person-Centered Approach, the Client-Centered Therapy. It makes a critical overview of the Client-Centered Therapy theory by analyzing Carl Rogers' concept of science as well as his conceptual path. Such analysis points to an insufficiency of the Actualizing Tendency and Anguish concepts toward sheltering and, at the same time, to promote a passage for the contemporary uneasiness. Thus, it indicates the need of another way to access and comprehend the fundamental and original human condition. Finally, this study presents Heidegger's anguish concept as a possible contribution to fertilize and re-signify the clinical praxis. As a result of such path, the author reveals her transitional moment of theoretical reflection, directing herself toward a psychological conception of clinic as "care" (Sorge), linked to a human existence theory conceived as an ethics of finitude acceptance, of transivity and conflicts. Such a theory demands a clinical praxis by conceiving a creation act as an opening to shelter something unknown, plenty of availability to carry forward onweself towards the "being-there complexity. The author manifests that, in spite to have found some possible answers to her dislodged inquietude experience that motivated this actual work, its approached thematic, by its own complexity and dynamic involved, implies in an always present openness that instigate new sights and reflections, thus deserving further re-readings

This thesis has dealt with the thought of the German legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt and with the reception of his work by the intellectual Left. The main goals of the thesis were to find out which aspects of Schmitt's work are the most popular among left-wing authors and to search for the causes of this inspiration. Thus, it was necessary to reconstruct the historical context in which such a conservative thinker becomes a frequently quoted author within various branches of leftist thought. In Carl Schmitt's case, because of his shift towards Nazism in the 1930s, there is also a methodological problem of the possible separation of his work from his career and personality, the separation of a particular theoretical approach from the motives which led to this approach. Therefore, the attempt to use Schmitt's thought for progressive left-wing goals is not easily compatible with strictly contextual reading of his work. Schmitt's work itself is described and analyzed especially in the first half of this thesis. The first chapter describes, in the historical context, some basic concepts which Schmitt deals with. The chapter is structured according to main targets of his critique: legal positivism; liberal democracy; quantitative total state, which is able to intervene in every part of society,...

Does a radical democratic pluralization of power seriously confront the problem posed to contemporary political thought by the current purchase of Carl Schmitt's political theory? Arguably not, given that the force of his approach lies not in the fascistic or dictatorial concentration of power but in his definition of sovereignty as consisting in exceptionalism, the practice whereby some agency, whether an individual or a group, decides the limits of the polity or decides what or who is fitting and appropriate to the polity and what or who is not, an inherently exclusivist act. While radical democrats attempt to overcome this problem of exclusion by being more inclusive and pluralist, they ultimately affirm this idea that the properly constituted polity, the condition of possibility of progress, emancipation, and pluralism, must be limited, excluding some forms of life while including others. They ultimately oscillate around this issue, arguing for more and more freedom and pluralization, while maintaining the need for limits. The nature of this problem stems from the ontology of the autonomous subject of modernity. In modernity, after nominalism removed God from creation, the human being came to assume disproportionate emphasis as meaning-giving subject, assuming the capacity to unilaterally determine what qualifies for existence and what does not. Just as the subject was conceived as self-sufficient in its own right, the modern polity was also so conceived. Thus, both modem subjectivity and sovereignty assume a solipsistic and monistic ontological form, in addition to being exclusive. Michel Foucault makes a concerted and sustained effort to comprehend and thus stop himself from replicating this problem, an approach far more promising than that of radical democracy, but is limited to the extent that he remains committed to freedom and human creativity and fails to see the onto-theological basis of the problem of modern subjectivity. The failure of his endeavor and that of radical democracy give a powerful indication of the persuasive force of Schmitt's theorization of sovereignty as consisting in the decision on the exception. The violently monistic and exclusive nature of this form of action indicates the need for a serious interrogation of the problem of the modern subject that continues to constitute the modern Western mode of inhabiting this world, limiting all transformations that fail to appreciate its ontological novelty and significance.