af / Suid-Afrika is sedert 27 April 1994 'n materiele regstaat, wat deur beide uitdruklike en 'ongeskrewe' fundamentele waardes onderskraag word. Dit is juis hierdie fundamentele waardes wat 'n blote formele konstitusie (as grondslag van 'n relative democracy) van 'n oppermagtige grondwet (as basis van 'n materiele standard-setting democracy) onderskei. Alhoewel daar 'n lewendige debat oor die toepaslikheid van die talle tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodes gevoer word, is daar nietemin tans geen oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma vir grondwetuitleg nie. Soms wil dit voorkom asof fundamentele grondwetlike waardes net as normatiewe retoriek, in stede van materiele riglyn, by grondwetuitleg gebruik word. Die owerheidsgesag is aan hoer normatiewe regsbeginsels gebonde wat grotendeels in die fundamentele regte-akte (as deel van 'n oppermagtige grondwet) vervat is. Die gewaarborgde fundamentele regte dien derhalwe as konkretisering van beide die regstaat en die demokrasie: die materiele regstaatbegrip is die basis van _die grondwetlike staat. Die materiele regstaat, as geregtigheidstaat, kan dus gesien word as die eindbestemming van die grondwet as lex fundamentalis in die regsorde. 'n Oppermagtige grondwet is egter onlosmaaklik verbind aan die materiele regstaat. Daarom behels grondwetuitleg noodwendig die aktivering van die grondwetlik-gepositiveerde waardes. Hierdie normatiewe regsbeginsels en fundamentele waardes wat in die grondwet as grundnorm van die geregtigheidstaat beliggaam is, moet dan deur 'n onafhanklike regbank gehandhaaf en afgedwing word. In beginsel is grondwetuitleg gemoeid met die identifisering, handhawing en aktivering van die fundamentele waardes wat 'n oppermagtige grondwet onderskraag. Waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg is nietemin nie 'n bloudruk waarmee aile praktiese uitlegprobleme opgelos kan word nie, maar 'n oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma: 'n dwingende, normatiewe verwysingsraamwerk waarvandaan, waarbinne en waarheen grondwetuitleg op pad is. Die tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodiek is bloat aanvullende tegnieke wat 'n waarde-aktiverende paradigma van grondwetuitleg ondersteun. Aangesien fundamentele waardes onlosmaaklik deel van die materiele regstaat is, moet grondwetuitleg nie net waardebaseer nie, maar ook waardegerig wees; nie net waardes handhaaf nie, maar ook bevorder en aktiveer; nie net waardes weerspieel nie, maar ook aktief vestig. 86 'n raamwerk vir grondwetuitleg behels die 'animering' en konkretisering van fundamentele waardes, ideale en standaarde wat die materiele regstaat onderle, kortom, waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg as vergestalting van die materiele regstaat. / On 27 April1994 South Africa became a constitutional state (Rechtsstaat), underpinned by both express, and 'unwritten' fundamental constitutional values. These values represent the distinction between a formal constitution (ie the basis of a relative democracy), and a supreme constitution (the foundation of a material standard-setting democracy). Although the merits of various methods of constitutional interpretation are hotly debated, no general value-based paradigm for constitutional interpretation has yet been established. At times it seems as if fundamental constitutional values are merely invoked as normative rhetoric during constitutional interpretation, rather than as substantive guidelines. Government institutions are bound by these higher normative legal principles, which in a supreme constitution are articulated primarily in the bill of fundamental rights. The guaranteed fundamental rights are a concretisation of both the constitutional state and democracy: the material law state principle (Rechtsstaatprinzip) as the foundation of the constitutional state. The Rechtsstaat as 'just state' is the ultimate goal of a supreme constitution as lex fundamentalis in the legal order. A supreme constitution is inextricably linked to the Rechtsstaat. As a result, constitutional interpretation inevitably involves animating and activating values positivised within the constitution.These normative legal principles and fundamental values must be maintained and enforced by an independent judiciary. In principle, constitutional interpretation deals with the identification, maintenance and animation of the fundamental values underlying a supreme constitution. Value-activating constitutional interpretation is not a blueprint for resolving all practical interpretive problems, but it is a general value-based paradigm: a peremptory, normative frame of reference from which, within which and towards which all constitutional interpretation should be directed. The traditional methodologies of constitutional interpretation are merely ancillary techniques supporting a value-activating paradigm of constitutional interpretation. Since fundamental values undeniably form part of the Rechtsstaat, constitutional interpretation should not only be value-based, but also values-directed; should not merely uphold the values, but also promote and activate them; should not only reflect the values, but also actively establish them. Such a framework for constitutional interpretation involves the animation and concretisation of the fundamental values, standards and ideals underlying the constitutional state: valueactivating constitutional interpretation as embodiment of the Rechtsstaat. / Law / LL.D. (Law)

The Constitution stipulates that its value-commitments are to inform the interpretation of statutes and the development of the common law and customary law. Legislative construction and law-application generally are therefore to be perceived as involving an axiological dimension. Three hermeneutical traditions are dealt with to the end of clarifying the approaches to be adopted in everyday legal• argumentation. The study culminates in the adduction of leads for substantive !juridical argument in the process of statutory interpretation and in handling common-law and customary-law sources. These leads are shown to be functional byi way of a critical discussion of recent case law and a conspectus of contemporary t~ought bearing on the nature of customary law. The social dimension of the legal process is throughout underscored as a factor of significance. Concomitantly, it is rcigistered that the jurisprudence of formalism, so marked an attitude of a previous time, should be abjured to the extent that it is disdainful of value-commitment. Conformably, literalist and literalist-cumintentionalist perceptions as well as kindred stances are berated. The penultimate chapter of this thesis suggests an encompassing approach to the interpretation of statutes, comprised of a systematic tabulation of insights previously garnered. The fmal chapter postulates that common law and customary law are not to be dealt with upon an interchangeable basis, inasmuch as the sources go out from radically divergent premises. It then proceeds to elaborate a conceptual framework for dealing respectively with each of these sources. / Law / LL.D.

Text in Afrikaans / Die sogenaamde vermoede van onskuld is via die Engelse Reg in ons reg oorgeneem en tot konstitusionele status verhoog met die daarstelling van artikel 25(3)(c) van die Grondwet, No. 200 van 1993. Hierdie reg om onskuldig geag te word en die gepaardgaande swygreg, wat hier kortliks aangeraak word, kan egter aan beperking onderhewig wees soos bepaal deur artikel 33 van die Grondwet. Die beginsels soos ontwikkel in Kanada en Amerika word ondersoek. Die slotsom waartoe geraak word is dat, alhoewel historiese en ander verskille deurgaans voor oe gehou sal moet word, die regspraak in genoemde jurisdiksies, en meer spesifiek Kanada, 'n groat rol sal speel by die inhoud wat die SuidA: frik:aanse howe, in die konteks van statutere vermoedens, aan die konstitusionele reg om onskuldig geag te word, sal gee. / The so-called presumption of innocence has been inherited from the English common law and awarded constitutional status by the introduction of section 25(3)(c) ofthe Constitution, Act 200 ofl993. This right to be presumed innocent and the accompanying right to remain silent, which is briefly touched upon, are however not absolute and can be subject to limitation as provided for by section 33 ofthe Constitution. The principles, as they have been developed in Canada and America, are investigated. The conclusion which is drawn is that, despite historical and other differences, it can be expected that foreign jurisprudence, particularly that of Canada, will play a major role in the content that will be given by the South African courts to the right to be presumed innocent in the context of statutory presumptions. / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL. M.

The issue of the vertical /or horizontal operation of the Bill of Rights (chapter 3) is a controversial one. The interim constitution deals with this controversy in a subtle way by avoiding direct horizontal operation of Chapter 3. Instead, it provides for the so-called 'seepage to horizontal relationships' in terms of section35{3). This apparently was a political compromise between the pro-vertical only and the pro-horizontal groups. The human rights history of this country justifies a Bill of Rights that would have both vertical and horizontal operation. However, in section 35 (3) there is potential for the values enshrined in the constitution and Chapter 3, and the spirit hereof, to permeate and filter through the entire legal system in all it's applications. It would seem, however, as demonstrated by the decision in De Klerk v Du Plessis, that the extent to which this filtering process will benefit individuals in their private relations, will depend on the interpretation given to section 35 (3) by the courts. If courts, as it happend in De Klerk's case fail to realise the full import of section 35 ( 3) aspects of the existing law which are unjust could remain and the process of creating a just, open and democratic society will be hampered. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.M.

Text in Afrikaans / Bophuthatswana het gedurende 1977 tot stand gekom as 'n onafhanklike staat. In die Grondwet daarvan is 'n uitvoerige menseregtehandves vervat wat as hoogste reg gegeld het - alle wetgewing in stryd daarmee was nietig. Die hoop was dat Bophuthatswana sou ontwikkel as 'n groeipuntvir die handhawing van menseregte in Suidelike Afrika. Aanvanklik het die howe gevolg gegee aan die bepalings van die menseregtehandves. Algaande is daar teruggekeer na 'n letterknegtige soeke na die wil van die wetgewer, wat daartoe gelei het dat die burger se menseregte deur die howe misken is. Die laaste beslissings van die howe verteenwoordig 'n terugkeer na die ware rol van die howe in 'n menseregtebestel. Die Wetgewende en Uitvoerende gesag was outokraties en het geen besef gehad van die essensie van menseregte nie. Die ondervinding in Bophuthatswana is grootliks dieselfde as elders in Afrika, waar menseregte vertrap is. Teen hierdie agtergrond word die grondwetlike toekoms van Suid-Afrika in oenskou geneem. / Bophuthatswana came into existence as an independent state during 1977. A justiciable bill of rights provided for judicial review. The hope existed that Bophuthatswana would be a growing point for the protection of human rights in Southern Africa. Although earlier judgments of the courts were promising and augured well for the future protection of human rights later judgments have reverted to the positivistic approach to constitutional interpretation. This led to the bill of rights being rendered inoperative. However, in the latest and most recent judgements there was a return to the bold and innovative interpretation of the first decisions. The legislative and executive branches of state was autocratic to the core as experienced elsewhere in Africa. The constitutional future of South Africa is evaluated against this background. / Law / LL.M.

Ten einde arbitrere uitoefening van die diskresionere bevoegdhede waarmee staatsarnptenare beklee word, te voorkom en te beperk, is beheer van sodanige bevoegdhede noodsaaklik. In die verhandeling word die rol wat die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1993 (Wet 200 van 1993) kan vervul in die uitoefening van beheer oor die diskresionere bevoegdhede van staatsarnptenare ontleed. Sodanige ontleding geskied met verwysing na die Handves van Menseregte en instellings en ampte wat hulle gesag en bevoegdhede aan die 1993-Grondwet ontleen. Bykomend hiertoe, word ondersoek ook ingestel na die belang en relevansie van konstitusionalisme binne die konteks van publieke administrasie. / In order to prevent and to limit the arbitrary exercise of discretionary powers with which public officials are endowed, it is necessary to control such powers. This dissertation explores the role which the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993) can fulfil in the exercise of control over the discretionary powers of public officials. Analysis of the role of the 1993-Constitution in this regard, is done with reference to the Bill of Rights and institutions and offices which derive their authority and powers from the Constitution. In addition hereto, the importance and relevance of constitutionalism within the context of public administration is also explored. / Public Administration / M.A.

Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Text in Afrikaans / Die eiendomsklousule soos vervat in Artikel 28(1) van die Grondwet waarborg regte in eiendom. Daar word na die tradisionele eiendomsparadigma verwys, asook die leemtes in die konsep. Die "new property"-konsep word vervolgens in oenskou geneem. Sowel die gemenereg as die inheemse reg word, met verwysing na die begrippe "regte" en "eiendom", behandel. Daarna volg 'n bespreking van die konsep "regte in eiendom", wat die inhoud en omvang van die konsep aandui. In 'n afsonderlike hoofstuk word regte in grand bespreek. Die vraag of 'n konstitusionele reg ten aansien van huisvesting bestaan, geniet oak aandag. Ten slotte word regsvergelykend te werk gegaan en na buitelandse regsbronne verwys wat moontlik in die toekoms 'n rol by die uitleg van die Grondwet kan speel. Daar word gepoog om aan te dui dat die Grondwet as geheel ge"interpreteer en toegepas behoort te word. Die korrekte interpretasie en toepassing van die Grondwet word van uiterste belang beskou ten einde aan die doel van die Grondwet te voldoen. / The property clause is contained in Section 28(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees rights in property. The tradisional property paradigm is referred to, as well as its deficiencies. Thereupon the "new property" concept is taken account of. The common law and the customary law are dealt with, with reference to the concepts "rights" and "property". Subsequently a discussion of the concept "rights in property" follows, denoting this concept's contents and extent. Thereupon rights in land is dealt with. A constitutional right to housing is also attended to. Finally a comparative overview is given with reference to foreign case law, which may in future play a role in the interpretation of the Constitution. Attempts are made to indicate that the Constitution should be interpreted and enforced as a whole. In its correct interpretation and enforcement it is of utmost importance to have due regard to the objects of the Constitution. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.M.

Generally, traditional "marriages" according to Islamic custom are void in South African law because they are potentially polygynous and do not comply with the formalities prescribed by the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 . A valid concern for those who oppose polygyny is that it may enforce and promote gender inequality in that it is practised in patriarchal Muslim societies. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 contains numerous provisions aimed at combating gender inequalities, and these could be used to justify the policy of non-recognition. On the other hand, the Constitution has ushered in an era of tolerance and empathy; and the equality and religion clauses could be used to ensure that polygynous marriages are no longer ignored. This study will examine the tensions between Muslim personal law and clauses in the Constitution which have led to calls for the reformation and codification of Muslim personal law. / Private Law / LL. M.

Text in Afrikaans / The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 that took effect from 27 April 1994, gave an accused a constitutional right to legal representation. Although the right of an accused to be legally represented formed an integral part of the South African Law, the Constitution gave him the further right ofbeing provided with legal representation at the cost of the State . For the practical implementation ofthe Constitution extensive changes to the current Legal Aid Scheme are essential . This work is an investigation of the justification of an accused's right to legal representation and the right to be provided with legal representation at the expense of the State . The practical implementation of the Constitution is discussed and suggestions are made that might be a solution to the current problem of the provision of legal aid at the State's expense. / Die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 200 van 1993 wat op 27 April 1994 in werking getree het, het konstitusionele erkenning verleen aan 'n beskuldigde se reg op regsverteenwoordiging . Alhoewel die reg van 'n beskuldigde tot regsverteenwoordiging inherent deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg was het die Grondwet verder gegaan en 'n beskuldigde die reg gegee om op staatskoste van regsverteenwoordiging voorsien te word . Om die Grondwet prakties uitvoerbaar te maak sal ingrypende veranderings aan die huidige Regshulpskema noodsaaklik wees . Hierdie werk behels 'n regshistoriese - en regsvergelykende studie van die reg van 'n beskuldigde tot regsverteenwoordiging en die reg om op staatskoste van regshulp voorsien te word . Die praktiese uitvoerbaarheid van die Grondwet word bespreek en voorstelle word aan die hand gedoen om die huidige situasie, wat betref die verskaffing van regshulp op staatskoste, te verbeter . / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL. M.

The Zuma case - important as the first decision of the Constitutional Court - is primarily concerned with the constitutionality of section 217(l)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In trying to fmd an answer to this question, the Constitutional Court also addressed other important issues. In this dissertation the Constitutional Court's decision on the constitutionality of section 217(1)(b)(ii) is examined, as well as important general principles laid down by the Court regarding incompetent referrals by the Supreme Court; constitutional interpretation; reverse onus provisions and the right to a fair trial; as well as the application of the general limitation clause. A closer look is taken at adherence to these principles in subsequent Constitutional Court decisions, and finally a conclusion is reached on the value of the Zuma case. / Law / LL.M. (Law)