This Master's thesis is focusing on why the United States of America never ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is analysing the prevailing arguments which were used in 1982, which led to President Ronald Reagan never ratifying the Convention. As well as why the same thing happened in 1994 when the United Nations agreed on an Update to the Convention. Then the thesis is focusing on crucial parts of the Convention, which are part of the arguments for or against the ratification of the Convention, as well as those which have a great influence on the American approach to the high seas. Furthermore, this thesis is trying to offer a current insight into the problematic of why the United States still did not ratify the Convention, despite the fact that they used the Convention as an explanation why they patron the high seas as well as the right of innocent passage. At the same time, the findings are then looked at from the perspective of the South China Sea, which is a region the United States monitor. This last part is attempting to do several things. First, it is explaining the issue of the South China Sea and the interest of the United States in it. Then it is looking at the way by which the United States try to promote their interests in the region on how the fact them...

2001年5月29日第11次《聯合國海洋法公約》締約國會議通過SPLOS/72號決定，於1999年5月13日以前對其生效之公約締約國，如欲依《聯合國海洋法公約》第76條規定主張200海里以外之大陸礁層，必須在1999年5月13日起算10年內向聯合國大陸礁層界限委員會提交與其所主張大陸礁層外部界限相關科學及技術佐證資料。由於《聯合國海洋法公約》所定義之大陸礁層外部界限範圍可能超越專屬經濟海域範圍，而大陸礁層不僅是魚類資源較豐富也是漁業活動重要資源地，同時也是海底油氣與礦場等重要自然資源的集中地區。因此，包括我國相鄰之日本、菲律賓、越南、馬來西亞等公約締約國紛紛進行大陸礁層調查來擴展自己國家的海洋權益。至2009年12月止，已有51個延伸大陸礁層外部界限之提案，及44個初步資訊，聯合國大陸礁層界限委員會並已就部分提案作成決議。 日本於2008年11月12日向聯合國大陸礁層界限委員會提出該國延伸大陸礁層外部界限之申請，卻也因此引起中國大陸及韓國對日本提案中以「沖之鳥礁」為基礎劃定超出200海里延伸大陸礁層之主張提出反對意見，質疑「沖之鳥礁」之法律地位及其所能享有的海域管轄空間。本論文爰由《聯合國海洋法公約》第121條「島嶼制度」形成的過程、相關國家實踐及學者見解，以及《聯合國海洋法公約》中「大陸礁層」之相關規範及聯合國大陸礁層界限委員會之組織與運作情形，探討日本的延伸大陸礁層外部界限提案中以「沖之鳥礁」為基礎主張延伸大陸礁層之適法性問題，並分析以聯合國大陸礁層界限委員會作為「沖之鳥礁」法律地位爭端解決途徑之可能性等。研究結果顯示，日本提案以「沖之鳥礁」為基礎主張延伸大陸礁層外部界限不符合《聯合國海洋法公約》第121條第3項規定，但該項規定並未具備有習慣國際法的效力，亦缺乏客觀的認定標準，聯合國大陸礁層界限委員會的場域無法解決「沖之鳥礁」的法律地位爭端，其他沿海國僅能利用聯合國大陸礁層界限委員會中「第三國意見」之機制凸顯爭端的存在，提醒國際社會注意此類島礁的海域管轄空間主張的合理性問題，並應尊重公約所賦予的權利與義務。 / On 29 May 2001, the 11th Meeting of States Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) adopted the SPLOS/72 Decision regarding the date of commencement of the ten-year period for making submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set out in Article 4 of Annex II to the UNCLOS. It was decided that, in the case of a State Party for which the Convention entered into force before 13 May 1999, the ten-year time period for it to submit the scientific and technical data supporting the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles under Article 76 of the UNCLOS shall be taken to have commenced on 13 May 1999. For quite a few States the outer limits of their continental shelf as defined by the UNCLOS may go beyond the limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Besides, continental shelf is abundant in fisheries resources, crude oil, natural gas and minerals. Consequently, the neighboring States of Taiwan, including Japan, the Philippines, Viet Nam, and Malaysia, have already begun their surveys on continental shelf in order to expand their interests hidden in the ocean. As of December of 2009, there have been 51 formal submissions and 44 Preliminary Information delivered to the United Nations. The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) has been undertaking the consideration of these submissions and already completed such process for some of them with recommendations. For Japan, the submission to support the outer limits of its extended continental shelf was made on 12 November 2008 to the CLCS. Such submission was challenged by China and Korea whose focus is on the part of extended continental shelf generated by Oki-no-tori Shima. The legal status of Oki-no-tori Shima as being capable of generating EEZ, continental shelf, and extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, is being disputed by the communications from China and Korea. To provide educated comments on such controversy, this thesis will discuss the legislative process of Article 121 of the UNCLOS, namely, the regime of islands. Related state practices and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists will be studied in this connection. The author will also examine the regime of continental shelf under the UNCLOS and the institution of the CLCS. These will pave the way to scrutinize the legality of using Oki-no-tori Shima as the basis to generate extended continental shelf as having been done by Japan in its submission. The author will also explore the feasibility for the CLCS to settle the dispute over the legality of Japanese submission with respect to Oki-no-tori Shima. As shown by research works, the Japanese submission using Oki-no-tori Shima to generate extended continental shelf is inconsistent with Article 121(3) of the UNCLOS. However, the rule as contained in Article 121(3) has not yet been received into customary international law. Also lacking are the objective criteria to decide whether a given rock meets the conditions as stipulated by Article 121(3) or not. The forum of the CLCS is not suitable to settle the dispute over the legality of using Oki-no-tori Shima by Japan to generate extended continental shelf. Other coastal States can only use the forum of the CLCS to demonstrate the legal controversy over this case through sending third party communications to notify the CLCS the existence of dispute and their unwillingness to support the CLCS to consider the Japanese submission with respect to the part of Oki-no-tori Shima. As submitted by this author, the international community should be reminded of the necessity to respect the integrity of the rights and duties enshrined by the UNCLOS. Also worthy of careful scrutiny is the legitimacy of such kinds of exaggerated maritime claims generated by the rock as defined by Article 121(3) of the UNCLOS.

This thesis examines the process applied by international tribunals for delimiting Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf boundaries under international law. Maritime delimitation is governed by articles 74 and 83 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which are customary international law. However, owing to the vagueness of such legal provisions, international tribunals have been developing a standard process for delimiting maritime boundaries. The delimitation process has evolved significantly since the 1969 judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in North Sea Continental Shelf. The ICJ re-stated this process in its 2009 Black Sea judgment as being constituted of three stages: first, an equidistance line is provisionally drawn; second, this line is adjusted should relevant circumstances so require; third, the overall equitableness of the boundary is evaluated by assessing the proportionality between the length of the relevant coast and the marine areas appertaining to each state. This thesis analyses each stage of the delimitation process as re-stated in Black Sea. By way of introduction, chapter 1 outlines the relevant legal provisions and the historical evolution of the delimitation process through the jurisprudence of international tribunals. Chapter 2 discusses both the notions of the relevant coast and of the relevant area, and the practical methods for their identification. Since Black Sea, international tribunals have tended to identify the relevant coast and the relevant area prior to establishing a provisional equidistance line. Chapter 3 discusses the issues concerning the drawing of the provisional equidistance line. Chapter 4 examines relevant circumstances and the methods for adjusting an equidistance line. Chapter 5 discusses proportionality. Using doctrinal legal research methodologies, this thesis aims to assess the degree of consistency in the international tribunals’ application of the three-stage delimitation process. It argues that, while great leaps forward have been made since 1969, there is still a number of unresolved issues, in relation to which this thesis endeavours to provide some workable solutions.

Cette recherche s’attache à l’étude d’une institution britannique, à son rôle et son organisation depuis la fusion, en 1968, du Commonwealth Office et du Foreign Office, jusqu’à l’année 1985.Il s’agit ainsi de voir comment le Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) fonctionne et comment il a su évoluer au gré du temps, du changement de la place de la Grande-Bretagne dans le monde, et des conflits internationaux. Ainsi, on peut se demander quelles influences le contexte a eu sur l’institution en elle-même. Dès lors, une place particulière est accordée à l’Europe, la ‘relation spéciale’ avec les États-Unis et la décolonisation.La politique étrangère britannique semble aujourd’hui être principalement dans les mains du pouvoir politique : du ministre des Affaires étrangères (Foreign Secretary), et du Premier ministre. Quelle place le FCO occupe-t-il alors, et quelles relations entretient-il avec le pouvoir politique ?Il s’agit ainsi de considérer la place du FCO au sein des différents acteurs internes et externes de la politique étrangère britannique en analysant trois cas concrets : une réorganisation interne de l’institution (la fusion de 1968), une gestion de crise (l’indépendance retardée de la Guyane britannique, 1953-1966), et une négociation d’accord en temps de paix (l’échec des négociations de la Convention des Nations unies sur le droit de la mer, 1973-1982).Ce travail de recherche tente ainsi d’offrir une interprétation allant au-delà du fonctionnement interne de l’institution. Il s’agit de mettre en relation le Foreign and Commonwealth Office et le pouvoir politique, et ainsi d’étudier les pouvoirs et influences du FCO tout en s’attachant à des périodes clés à l’orée de changements. / This research work is devoted to the study of a key British institution, its function and its organization, from the merger of the Commonwealth Office and the Foreign Office in 1968, until 1985.Of particular interest is the way the changing role of Britain in the world and international conflicts bear upon the functioning and the evolution of the FCO. The point is to assess to what extent the context influences the institution itself.British foreign policy seems to be mostly determined by the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister. It is therefore well worth gaging what the function of the FCO is, and its relationship with the holders of political power.The role of the FCO as one of the internal and external agents of British foreign policy is assessed here, through three cases: the internal reorganization of the service in 1968, the management of a crisis – the postponements of independence for Guiana from 1953 to 1966, and the failure of a negotiation in peacetime – the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1973 to 1982.Beyond the internal functioning of the institution, this research work strives to offer an interpretation of the changes. The relationship between the FCO and the holders of political power, the real power and influence of the FCO are under consideration, in particular during key moments of particular significance for the institution.

A diversidade do uso do espaço oceânico e a antiga concepção da “doutrina da liberdade dos mares” forçou uma readequação do ordenamento político-econômico e espacial do ecossistema oceânico. Este redirecionamento, que envolveu o sistema internacional, originou uma nova geopolítica ou uma nova ordem global para o planejamento espacial oceânico, nos termos da Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar (CNUDM). Em razão de tais alterações, contextualizar-se-á a história do mar territorial brasileiro, em 1970, e suas implicações políticas nacionais e internacionais. Após, serão averiguadas as coalizões integradas pelo Brasil em uma aparente “batalha diplomática”, que se estendeu além de nove anos, envolveu mais de 130 países e originou um dos tratados mais bem sucedidos da história: a Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar. A partir de então, dentre outras conquistas, os Estados Partes garantiram o seu direito legal ao solo e subsolo marinho, mediante submissões para a plataforma continental além das 200 milhas náuticas, definidos no artigo 76 da Convenção. Tal conquista possibilitou aos países em desenvolvimento e a pequenas nações insulares acesso a valiosos recursos naturais, como o petróleo, gás e minerais. Os Estados costeiros, signatários da Convenção, passaram a ter assegurado o direito de reivindicar seu território submerso, ou a plataforma continental estendida, para até 350 milhas náuticas. Com a nova regulamentação, a análise das submissões passou a ser feita pela Comissão de Limites da Plataforma Continental (CLPC), organismo derivado da CNUDM, onde especialistas, selecionados segundo o critério de equidade geográfica, aceitam, modificam ou rejeitam as reivindicações. Demonstrar-se-á procedimentos adotados por Estados costeiros (insulares ou arquipelágicos) ao solicitar a ampliação de seus limites oceânicos, o modo dos especialistas brasileiros trabalharem a ampliação da plataforma continental estendida e de que forma foi feito o planejamento e o gerenciamento em termos políticos, através da Comissão Interministerial para os Recursos do Mar. Finalmente, averiguar-se-á se o Governo do Brasil terá condições de assumir tal responsabilidade, considerando o possível aumento de suas fronteiras e a capacidade do Estado, em termos científicos, tecnológicos e políticos, de internalizar e cumprir os preceitos da Convenção em sua política nacional para o mar. / The diversity of uses of the oceanic space and the old conception of “freedom of the seas doctrine” has compelled an adaptation of the political-economic and spatial legal framework for the oceanic ecosystem. This changing of direction encompassed the international system and has given rise to a new geopolitics for the legal framework of oceanic spaces around the globe, in terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Because of such modifications, this study contextualizes the history of Brazilian territorial sea in 1970 and its political implications, on the national as well as on the international level. After that, it examines the alliances Brazil has formed, engaging in a so called “diplomatic battle”. This process went on for over nine years, comprised more than 130 countries and originated one of the most successful treaties in history: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, the signatory states managed to secure their legal rights over the maritime soil and subsoil by means of submissions for the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, as defined by the Convention in its article 76. This achievement was of utmost importance because it enabled developing countries and small island states to access valuable natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals. Every coastal state who has signed the Convention acquired the right to claim its underwater territory or extended continental shelf up to 350 nautical miles from its coast. Due to the new regulations, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) began to undertake the analysis of submissions. This Commission is a body set up by the UNCLOS, in which experts, selected according to the criterion of geographic equity will accept, modify or reject claims. Furthermore, this study aims to account for procedures taken by coastal, insular, and archipelagic states when claiming the extension of its oceanic limits, with the main focus on measures taken by Brazil. More specifically, it intends to explain how Brazilian experts have brought about the expansion of the extended continental shelf and in which way planning and management, in political terms, can be carried out through the Interministerial Commission for Maritime Resources. Ultimately, it will be examined if the Brazilian government is able to assume such responsibility in the face of the growth of its borders and the capability of the state, in scientific, technological and political terms, of incorporating and enforcing the precepts of the Convention in its national policy for the seas.

A diversidade do uso do espaço oceânico e a antiga concepção da “doutrina da liberdade dos mares” forçou uma readequação do ordenamento político-econômico e espacial do ecossistema oceânico. Este redirecionamento, que envolveu o sistema internacional, originou uma nova geopolítica ou uma nova ordem global para o planejamento espacial oceânico, nos termos da Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar (CNUDM). Em razão de tais alterações, contextualizar-se-á a história do mar territorial brasileiro, em 1970, e suas implicações políticas nacionais e internacionais. Após, serão averiguadas as coalizões integradas pelo Brasil em uma aparente “batalha diplomática”, que se estendeu além de nove anos, envolveu mais de 130 países e originou um dos tratados mais bem sucedidos da história: a Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar. A partir de então, dentre outras conquistas, os Estados Partes garantiram o seu direito legal ao solo e subsolo marinho, mediante submissões para a plataforma continental além das 200 milhas náuticas, definidos no artigo 76 da Convenção. Tal conquista possibilitou aos países em desenvolvimento e a pequenas nações insulares acesso a valiosos recursos naturais, como o petróleo, gás e minerais. Os Estados costeiros, signatários da Convenção, passaram a ter assegurado o direito de reivindicar seu território submerso, ou a plataforma continental estendida, para até 350 milhas náuticas. Com a nova regulamentação, a análise das submissões passou a ser feita pela Comissão de Limites da Plataforma Continental (CLPC), organismo derivado da CNUDM, onde especialistas, selecionados segundo o critério de equidade geográfica, aceitam, modificam ou rejeitam as reivindicações. Demonstrar-se-á procedimentos adotados por Estados costeiros (insulares ou arquipelágicos) ao solicitar a ampliação de seus limites oceânicos, o modo dos especialistas brasileiros trabalharem a ampliação da plataforma continental estendida e de que forma foi feito o planejamento e o gerenciamento em termos políticos, através da Comissão Interministerial para os Recursos do Mar. Finalmente, averiguar-se-á se o Governo do Brasil terá condições de assumir tal responsabilidade, considerando o possível aumento de suas fronteiras e a capacidade do Estado, em termos científicos, tecnológicos e políticos, de internalizar e cumprir os preceitos da Convenção em sua política nacional para o mar. / The diversity of uses of the oceanic space and the old conception of “freedom of the seas doctrine” has compelled an adaptation of the political-economic and spatial legal framework for the oceanic ecosystem. This changing of direction encompassed the international system and has given rise to a new geopolitics for the legal framework of oceanic spaces around the globe, in terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Because of such modifications, this study contextualizes the history of Brazilian territorial sea in 1970 and its political implications, on the national as well as on the international level. After that, it examines the alliances Brazil has formed, engaging in a so called “diplomatic battle”. This process went on for over nine years, comprised more than 130 countries and originated one of the most successful treaties in history: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, the signatory states managed to secure their legal rights over the maritime soil and subsoil by means of submissions for the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, as defined by the Convention in its article 76. This achievement was of utmost importance because it enabled developing countries and small island states to access valuable natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals. Every coastal state who has signed the Convention acquired the right to claim its underwater territory or extended continental shelf up to 350 nautical miles from its coast. Due to the new regulations, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) began to undertake the analysis of submissions. This Commission is a body set up by the UNCLOS, in which experts, selected according to the criterion of geographic equity will accept, modify or reject claims. Furthermore, this study aims to account for procedures taken by coastal, insular, and archipelagic states when claiming the extension of its oceanic limits, with the main focus on measures taken by Brazil. More specifically, it intends to explain how Brazilian experts have brought about the expansion of the extended continental shelf and in which way planning and management, in political terms, can be carried out through the Interministerial Commission for Maritime Resources. Ultimately, it will be examined if the Brazilian government is able to assume such responsibility in the face of the growth of its borders and the capability of the state, in scientific, technological and political terms, of incorporating and enforcing the precepts of the Convention in its national policy for the seas.

A diversidade do uso do espaço oceânico e a antiga concepção da “doutrina da liberdade dos mares” forçou uma readequação do ordenamento político-econômico e espacial do ecossistema oceânico. Este redirecionamento, que envolveu o sistema internacional, originou uma nova geopolítica ou uma nova ordem global para o planejamento espacial oceânico, nos termos da Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar (CNUDM). Em razão de tais alterações, contextualizar-se-á a história do mar territorial brasileiro, em 1970, e suas implicações políticas nacionais e internacionais. Após, serão averiguadas as coalizões integradas pelo Brasil em uma aparente “batalha diplomática”, que se estendeu além de nove anos, envolveu mais de 130 países e originou um dos tratados mais bem sucedidos da história: a Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar. A partir de então, dentre outras conquistas, os Estados Partes garantiram o seu direito legal ao solo e subsolo marinho, mediante submissões para a plataforma continental além das 200 milhas náuticas, definidos no artigo 76 da Convenção. Tal conquista possibilitou aos países em desenvolvimento e a pequenas nações insulares acesso a valiosos recursos naturais, como o petróleo, gás e minerais. Os Estados costeiros, signatários da Convenção, passaram a ter assegurado o direito de reivindicar seu território submerso, ou a plataforma continental estendida, para até 350 milhas náuticas. Com a nova regulamentação, a análise das submissões passou a ser feita pela Comissão de Limites da Plataforma Continental (CLPC), organismo derivado da CNUDM, onde especialistas, selecionados segundo o critério de equidade geográfica, aceitam, modificam ou rejeitam as reivindicações. Demonstrar-se-á procedimentos adotados por Estados costeiros (insulares ou arquipelágicos) ao solicitar a ampliação de seus limites oceânicos, o modo dos especialistas brasileiros trabalharem a ampliação da plataforma continental estendida e de que forma foi feito o planejamento e o gerenciamento em termos políticos, através da Comissão Interministerial para os Recursos do Mar. Finalmente, averiguar-se-á se o Governo do Brasil terá condições de assumir tal responsabilidade, considerando o possível aumento de suas fronteiras e a capacidade do Estado, em termos científicos, tecnológicos e políticos, de internalizar e cumprir os preceitos da Convenção em sua política nacional para o mar. / The diversity of uses of the oceanic space and the old conception of “freedom of the seas doctrine” has compelled an adaptation of the political-economic and spatial legal framework for the oceanic ecosystem. This changing of direction encompassed the international system and has given rise to a new geopolitics for the legal framework of oceanic spaces around the globe, in terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Because of such modifications, this study contextualizes the history of Brazilian territorial sea in 1970 and its political implications, on the national as well as on the international level. After that, it examines the alliances Brazil has formed, engaging in a so called “diplomatic battle”. This process went on for over nine years, comprised more than 130 countries and originated one of the most successful treaties in history: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, the signatory states managed to secure their legal rights over the maritime soil and subsoil by means of submissions for the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, as defined by the Convention in its article 76. This achievement was of utmost importance because it enabled developing countries and small island states to access valuable natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals. Every coastal state who has signed the Convention acquired the right to claim its underwater territory or extended continental shelf up to 350 nautical miles from its coast. Due to the new regulations, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) began to undertake the analysis of submissions. This Commission is a body set up by the UNCLOS, in which experts, selected according to the criterion of geographic equity will accept, modify or reject claims. Furthermore, this study aims to account for procedures taken by coastal, insular, and archipelagic states when claiming the extension of its oceanic limits, with the main focus on measures taken by Brazil. More specifically, it intends to explain how Brazilian experts have brought about the expansion of the extended continental shelf and in which way planning and management, in political terms, can be carried out through the Interministerial Commission for Maritime Resources. Ultimately, it will be examined if the Brazilian government is able to assume such responsibility in the face of the growth of its borders and the capability of the state, in scientific, technological and political terms, of incorporating and enforcing the precepts of the Convention in its national policy for the seas.

從1982年之《國際海洋法公約》規定相關國家在爭議之海域劃界達成協議之前，有權利就爭議海域的管理和開發做出臨時性的安排。而共同開發正是作為一種解決海域劃界爭端而被廣泛採用的臨時性辦法，共同開發方案一經提出便得到了國際實踐的認同。 通過國際實踐案例的分析，並從中汲取國際共同開發成功案例中的經驗和啟示，總結出國際共同開發的管理模式及其特點並促進我國參與南海油氣共同開發，強化與周邊國家區域利益協調和合作局勢，積極推動共同開發合作建立，避免南海周邊國家避開我國簽訂雙邊或多邊協議去侵占我國南海油氣資源及海域主權，並就我國南海管轄權範圍內積極進行合作以維護我國在南海的海洋權利。 / 1982’s International Law of the sea has prescribed that the related countries are liable to make every effort to make an interim arrangement upon the management and utilization of maritime space after coming an agreement on maritime delimitation. Joint development that is the interim arrangement with broad adoption on solving the dispute of maritime delimitation, which now has been acknowledged in international practices. Through analyzing the international cases, and the ultimate goal of this paper is that R.O.C will learn the experience and inspiration from the successful international joint development model, effectively accelerate the joint development of oil and gas, strengthen the coordination and cooperation of regional benefit with surrounding countries, and actively promote the joint development and cooperation to establish, to avoid the neighboring countries of the South China Sea to avoid bilateral or multilateral agreements signed to occupy Republic of China's oil and gas resources and sea sovereignty, and within the jurisdiction of China's South China Sea within the active cooperation to safeguard Republic of China's maritime rights in the South China Sea.

In the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the environmental protection of the marine environment was first addressed in a comprehensive manner on an international level. However, the Convention distinguishes between four different sorts of pollution depending on which source the pollution originates from. Still, one of these sources play a more crucial role in the protection of the marine environment than the other since that source is estimated to stand for 80 percent of all the marine pollution; namely marine pollution from land-based sources. As the throw-away culture has led to products being disposed of at a faster rate than ever before, in particular plastic products, the amount of land-based debris has also substantially increased over the last decades. This increased disposal rate of products in combination with poor waste treatment has consequently led to many kinds of wastes ending up in the ocean and causing severe harm, not only to the marine environment and its living species, but also to humans that eat the fish and use the many other ecosystem services of the Sea. In this thesis, some prominent international conventions on marine pollution from land-based sources are examined; namely the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, as well as the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. To achieve United Nations Sustainable Development Goal number 14.1 to significantly reduce marine pollution from land-based sources by 2025, this thesis claims that international laws addressing this sort of pollution need to be implemented. Moreover, this thesis rests on the belief that regional implementation is a crucial component in making states align with international law. However, while regional implementation has been ambitious in the European Union Law, many regions still lack enforceable frameworks that aim to reduce and prevent marine pollution from land-based sources.

1945年《聯合國憲章》賦予國家有義務針對彼此爭端協議和平解決爭端之方法，並且有權自由選擇和平方法解決爭端。1982年《聯合國海洋法公約》進一步確認《聯合國憲章》的和平解決爭端規範，並在尊重國家主權原則的前提下，特別載明一套關鍵維持世界海洋法制穩定存續的強制爭端解決規定。 中國大陸與東協各國於2002年針對日益激化的南海爭端簽訂《南海各方行為宣言》，其中明文重申《聯合國憲章》以及《海洋法公約》等國際法規範下的和平解決爭端原則。爾後，南海爭端隨著大國政治的發展與抗衡而顯得更加動盪，菲律賓進一步在2013年初將與中國大陸的南海爭端提交到《海洋法公約》強制仲裁程序來解決。因此，本文探討既存的《南海行為宣言》是否構成強制仲裁庭的管轄權障礙，來保障國家有自主選擇爭端解決方式的權利？又《南海行為宣言》在陸菲南海爭端中扮演何種和平解決爭端的角色，並且其意義與不足之處為何？ 在此問題意識下，首先就爭端標的進行分析，採取以國際關係及仲裁庭的角度來檢視陸菲南海爭端的性質。以國際關係的角度來檢視能發揮以下三個作用：一、理解爭端國在國際政治中的實力評估；二、檢視小國採取司法利用，以及與大國結盟以增加抗衡大國之談判籌碼及獲取法律正當性的策略；三、同時考量所涉爭端的政治與法律性質。另一方面，以仲裁庭的角度來檢視則能瞭知法院如何以國際公法原則來判斷爭端性質。 其次整理《海洋法公約》爭端解決機制以及《南海行為宣言》的內容，分析《海洋法公約》強制爭端解決機制設計的立意與《南海行為宣言》的制訂脈絡，得出《南海行為宣言》在《海洋法公約》的規範下僅為一載有「斡旋」精神的協議，爭端解決的責任仍舊交由簽署國解決。 此外，進一步再藉由仲裁庭的裁判，來分析《南海行為宣言》的法律性質。最後本文發現，中國大陸與東協各國所制訂的《南海行為宣言》僅為一重申既存和平解決規範精神的不具法律拘束力之文件，且未替簽署國創設必須由談判來解決爭端的義務。 最後，對於《南海行為宣言》作出整體評價，其彰顯具有國際法所承認之斡旋精神，展現其類似軟法性質的衝突預防之功能，然而《南海行為宣言》不具有法律實質拘束力，因而無法排除基於《海洋法公約》所提起的強制司法管轄。縱然如此，在「跨國法制歷程」概念中，《南海行為宣言》並非毫無建樹，其為透過各國「互動」而產生一行為模式之規範，然而《南海行為宣言》制訂後至仲裁庭啟動期間，並未使得相關國家對該規範進行有力「內化」的工程，使得該項規範的原則無法發揮效用。然此部分之推論尚待進一步詳細論證分析。 綜上所述，本文透過對於《南海行為宣言》之相關分析，認為我方在擬定未來南海政策時應在尊重各國主權原則的前提下，提升自身國家綜合實力以增加對外談判之籌碼，同時應增進國際法中關於和平解決爭端之研究，有效在各種方面落實國際法爭端解決規範的內化進程。