Dans ce mémoire, nous proposons d’observer la réception de l’ouvrage Force de loi – le « fondement mystique de l’autorité », du philosophe Jacques Derrida, dans la pensée juridique nord-américaine. Dans un premier temps, nous nous attardons au contexte de production de cet ouvrage et en proposons une analyse détaillée. Nous tentons également de définir sommairement les concepts clés de la pensée derridienne mobilisés dans Force de loi, principalement la déconstruction, laquelle a suscité l’intérêt des juristes. Dans un second temps, nous proposons de retracer la trajectoire de Jacques Derrida en Amérique du Nord, sachant que sa pensée y a été reçue selon des termes bien précis, qui ont influencé l’inscription de ses travaux dans la pensée juridique. Dans un troisième temps, nous proposons de poser un regard critique sur la réception de la déconstruction derridienne dans les Critical Legal Studies. Nous soutenons que la pensée derridienne a été mobilisée par les critical legal scholars avant tout comme une technique servant à alimenter leur critique politique du droit. Or cet usage technicien de la déconstruction se serait fait au détriment de sa véritable substance éthico-politique. Nous proposons donc finalement de réfléchir à ce qui pourrait constituer un usage de la déconstruction en droit qui permettrait d’actualiser son plein potentiel critique, en conviant les juristes à élargir le champ épistémologique de leur discipline. / This essay considers the reception and interpretation of Jacques Derrida’s Force de loi – le « fondement mystique de l’autorité » in North American legal theory. In the first chapter, we examine the context in which Force de loi was written and pronounced, provide definitions of the key Derridean concepts mobilized in Force de loi and offer a detailed analysis of the text. In the second chapter, we argue that Jacque Derrida’s work was read and interpreted by American and English-speaking scholars in a very specific way, which shaped its reception in legal thinking. In the third chapter, we look at how Force de loi and “la deconstruction” were mobilized in the Critical Legal Studies. We argue that the critical legal scholars coined a “technical” use of deconstruction that did not fully integrate its ethical and political potential. Finally, we reflect on how deconstruction could be mobilized by legal scholars and jurists to open epistemological and political horizons that Derrida himself had not envisioned.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luiz Carlos Montans Braga.pdf: 2026970 bytes, checksum: b9e75123d2d8a0ce2129b35361430610 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-10-30 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The research started from the relationship among affects, politics and right in Spinoza s philosophy. Indeed, the Ethics Part III is the place where all affects are taken as specific topic. However, the affect subject also appears, in a more or less explicit way, in the exclusively political texts of the author, namely the Theological-Political Treatise and the Political Treatise, in addition to being quickly presented in argumentative moments of the Ethics Part IV, in which the issue of civitas is posed. Another aspect is the presence of the concept of power in the very definition of the concept of affect, in the Ethics Part III, thus closing the circle where the three concepts are presented, because Spinoza identifies right to power (jus sive potentia). The initial hypothesis referred to the existence of ties and intersections between such concepts, which was later confirmed by the detailed reading of Spinoza s texts, as well as of some of his commentators that have worked on the topics presented in the initial issue. The hard core of the dissertation tries to approach this conceptual relationship, explaining it by analyzing the author s texts, namely Ethics, the Theological-Political Treatise and the Political Treatise. In this argumentative proposition, the main thesis I try to defend is that Spinoza creates a political philosophy founded in the theory of affects. From this assumption, a second formulation comes up (but not a second thesis) over the pertinence of Spinoza s concepts for the contemporary emancipatory right. So, the path followed throughout the research has had two approaches, one far more finished and derived from the initial project, which makes an effort to solve the issue hereby posed, and another one more characterized by notes, bringing Spinoza s concept to the analysis of contemporary legal issues. This second moment of the dissertation looks into the pertinence of Spinoza s natural right concept for the contemporary right, besides analyzing the importance of the author s concepts to lend potency to one of the aspects of critical legal studies / O problema do qual partiu a pesquisa foi o da relação entre afetos, política e direito na filosofia de Espinosa. Com efeito, a Ética III é o local em que os afetos são tomados como tema específico. Ocorre que o tema dos afetos aparece também, mais ou menos explicitamente, nos textos exclusivamente políticos do autor, a saber, o Tratado Teológico-político e o Tratado-político, além de ser apresentado brevemente em momentos da argumentação da Ética IV em que a questão da civitas é posta. Outro ponto é a presença do conceito de potência na definição mesma do conceito de afeto, na parte III da Ética, fechando-se o círculo em que se apresentam os três conceitos, pois Espinosa identifica direito a potência (jus sive potentia). A hipótese inicial foi a da existência de laços e intersecções entre tais conceitos, o que se confirmou pela leitura em detalhe dos textos espinosanos, bem como dos comentadores que trabalharam os temas apresentados no problema inicial. O núcleo duro da tese procura alinhavar esta relação conceitual, explicitando-a por meio da análise dos textos do autor, especialmente a Ética, o Tratado Teológico-político e o Tratado-político. Neste movimento argumentativo, a principal tese que procuro defender é a de que Espinosa constrói uma filosofia política fundada na teoria dos afetos. Decorre desta tese uma elaboração (não uma segunda tese) acerca do tema da pertinência dos conceitos espinosanos para o direito emancipatório contemporâneo. Assim, o caminho percorrido em todo o trabalho tem dois movimentos, um mais bem acabado e decorrente do projeto inicial, o qual procura resolver a questão lá posta, e outro mais caracterizado por apontamentos, trazendo os conceitos espinosanos para a análise de questões jurídicas contemporâneas. Esse segundo momento da tese se debruça sobre o tema da pertinência do conceito de direito natural espinosano para o direito contemporâneo, bem como analisa a importância dos conceitos do autor para dar potência a uma das vertentes do direito crítico

In the U.S. legal context, psychoanalysis is viewed by most scholars (and most judges) as outdated, even unscientific, and there is little room for psychoanalytic expertise in U.S. courts of law. However, there are some scholars who continue to do theoretical work in the conventional Freudian tradition, as well as numerous critical legal theorists who have appropriated the psychoanalytic conceptions of Jacques Lacan in their critiques of the law. This is a brief survey of how these scholars conceive of the law in psychoanalytic terms. Is it the judge being analyzed? Is it the lawyers, or the law students? Is the law itself viewed as subject with an unconscious and with symptoms? Or is it an analysis of legal texts as having an unconscious dimension that is hidden like an ideology? I identify examples of all four frameworks, and conclude that these scholars, notwithstanding their theoretical orientation, have practical goals for law in mind. / En el contexto jurídico de los Estados Unidos, el psicoanálisis es visto por la mayoría de académicos (y jueces) como anticuado, incluso anticientífico, y hay poca cabida para el conocimiento psicoanalítico en los tribunales de justicia estadounidenses. Sin embargo, hay algunos académicos que continúan realizando labor teórica en la tradición convencional freudiana, así como numerosos teóricos críticos del derecho que han adoptado la visión psicoanalítica de Jacques Lacan en sus críticas al derecho. Este es un breve estudio de cómo dichos académicos conciben el derecho en términos psicoanalíticos. ¿Se está analizando al juez? ¿O se está analizando a los abogados, o a los estudiantes de derecho? ¿Se percibe el derecho en sí como un paciente con subconsciente y con síntomas? ¿O se está analizando los textos jurídicos como textos que poseen una dimensión inconsciente, como una ideología? En este ensayo identifico ejemplos de los cuatro contextos y concluyo que estos académicos, a pesar de su orientación teórica, tienen metas prácticas para el derecho en mente.

The problem of cultural violence against girls in Nigeria has been discussed at length. A number of scholars have conducted empirical studies, others developed theories and tools to be used in measuring and monitoring improvement on eliminating specific cultural practices. This scholarship is vitally important. They launch feminist and other anthropological works into an arena of anti-violence work which without a doubt have a significant impact and far-reaching repercussions for girls who experience violence in Nigeria. Yet, despite the systemic change over the past years, the problem of violence against girls in Africa, more specifically Nigeria, is still persistent within cultural communities. Building on the important foundational works of these authors, my dissertation analyses this problem from a different perspective. This thesis identifies several governance gaps within the Nigerian legal framework that needs to be addressed before existing legal mechanisms can adequately address the problem of violence against girls. To ensure a proper examination of the different dimensions and changing patterns of cultural violence against girls, the dissertation focuses on the practice of child marriages within Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria. The complexity of the issues addressed in this dissertation required a variety of theoretical tools to unpack the different fields of inquiry. The dissertation uses a critical legal studies and feminist framework in studying the problem of cultural violence against girls in Nigeria. It also uses textuality, a method of inquiry within Dorothy Smith’s feminist socio-legal methodology, to investigate the text-based organization of social policy in Nigeria to ultimately reveal a legal and political system used as an instrument for consolidating power and legitimizing anti-women principles as traditional values. Using these tools, the thesis analyzed the complexity of the problem of cultural violence through a focus on co-existing institutional frameworks, that is, formal and informal legal structures and the roles they play in shaping the experiences of girls within cultural communities.

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Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis examines the relationship between law and justice. Firstly, it is argued that the concept of justice tends to be defined too narrowly as distributive justice or as a mechanism to maintain social order. It is argued that Jacques Derrida's understanding of justice not only gives a richer and broader understanding of the concept, but also on its complex relationship with the law. Lastly, some of the possible implications for jurisprudence (with specific reference to Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory and Drucilla Cornell) are examined. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis ondersoek die verhouding tussen geregtigheid en die reg. Daar word eerstens geargumenteer dat geregtigheid te maklik gedefinieer word as distributiewe geregtigheid of as In meganisme om sosiale orde te bewerkstellig. Daar word geargumenteer dat Jacques Derrida se verstaan van die konsep nie aileen 'n breer en ryker verstaan moontlik maak nie, maar dat dit ook fokus op die komplekse verhouding met die reg. Laastens word sommige van die moontlike implikasies vir regsfilosofie (met spesifieke verwysing na Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory en Drucilla Cornell) ondesoek,

This qualitative socio-legal study critically examined the protection against housing discrimination found in chapter 2 § 12 of the Swedish Discrimination Act (SFS 2008:567), in light of United Nations, Council of Europe and European Union housing and non-discrimination (human rights) standards. As an applied socio-legal study it aimed to be critical towards the limits of law in context. By applying an intersectional approach as the theoretical framework for the study, it aimed to identify legal weaknesses from an intersectional point of view. The study made use of a descriptive doctrinal analysis method and a critical text analysis method. The material for analysis consisted of civil housing discrimination law: legislation, preparatory works and case law. The case law, anonymized for this study, consisted of three district court judgments and three appeal court judgments processed during the years 2007-2016. The first research question asked what, if any, forms of intersectional discrimination the housing discrimination law face and comprise. The descriptive doctrinal analysis revealed that all cases shared the discrimination ground ‘ethnicity’ and discrimination form ‘direct discrimination’. The critical text analysis resulted in three themes illustrating intersectional discriminating facing the law: “aggressive men” (the intersection of sex and ethnicity), “resourceless women” (the intersection of sex, socio-economic class and ethnicity) and “unsettled strangers” (the intersection of socio-economic class and ethnicity). The second research question asked what, if any, the limits of law are from an intersectional point of view. By discussing the three themes in relation to the legal landscape and previous research it was possible to identify several limits of law relating to intersectionality, such as the exhaustive list of discrimination grounds, absent discrimination grounds and an absence of intersectional awareness. The study concluded that Swedish housing discrimination law rely on formal equality, which renders intersectional discrimination invisible and the power of housing human rights disputable.

Apparently the existence of deepgoing antinomies in our system of contracts is an experience too painful to rise to the full level of our consciousnes. In the current transformative milieu, the South African law of contract continues its attempts to convey an image of contract as a coherent system of clear and neutral rules. These attempts stem from the belief that the rule-book, in and of itself, can offer us determinate answers in all contractual disputes. This study was borne out of a concern that in its commitments to sustain this image, the South African law of contract is not sufficiently concerned with transformation and the ideal of justice. In the seventies, Kennedy exposed the ambivalence of the contract system and argued that private law vividly reflected the fundamental contradiction; the irresolvable tension in and among us between acting purely out of self-interest or allowing our actions to be informed, influenced and curtailed by others. Kennedy asserted that the fundamental contradiction could be construed as a continuum with two opposing ‘ideal typical’ positions on both the level of form and substance. On the substance level he referred to this warring engagement as individualism and altruism. On the form level, the ideal typical commitments prefer law either in the form of rules or as open-ended standards. Kennedy’s most provocative claim was that individualism preferred law in the form of rules whereas altruism favoured the open-ended standard form. This claim reflected the understanding that form and substance are interdependent because it is impossible not to ask: ‘Form of what?’ Dalton later added more explicitly that form and substance would politically always generate a hierarchy within a legal system. Following Kennedy, this study engages with the South African law of contract in a similar way. It argues that the South African law of contract not only reflects the fundamental contradiction profoundly, but also privileges and works to sustain the individualism/rule position. This position is not sufficiently concerned with the ethical element of contract (good faith) and with the ideal of contractual justice. I consider whether and how the transition from a totalitarian state to a constitutional democracy affected this hierarchy. I arrive at disappointing but nevertheless hopeful conclusions in the sense that the bias inculcated in the law of contract cannot take anything away from the fact that it operates in the penumbra of a Constitution which is committed to openness, equality, dignity and freedom in all human relationships, including those of a contractual nature. In resisting the traditional representations of contract and in support of the above, I propose a re-emphasis on good faith as the ethical element of contract. Good faith cannot be contained in a neat and tidy legal definition. It realises that we are, in the community of contracting persons, each responsible for the other’s well-being and that we should ultimately remain concerned with the constitutive values of the supreme law under which the subordinated but indispensable law of contract must continue to operate. The difficulty and complexity of this exercise provides no alibi. Copyright 2005, University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, without the prior written permission of the University of Pretoria. Please cite as follows: Barnard, AJ 2005, A critical legal argument for contractual justice in the South African law of contract, LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, viewed yymmdd < http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-06192006-083839/ > / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Jurisprudence / LLD / Unrestricted

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Law and development mainstream conceptions of labour market policies, while still marked by long-dominant views of contract law as economically superior to any labour regulation, have recently incorporated certain specific labour (human) rights. Core labour rights are thus accepted by global policy-makers, on the basis of their radical distinction from non-core labour standards and their rationalization according to certain foundational principles. This thesis criticizes the prevailing dichotomies between core labour rights and non-core standards, on the one hand, and contract law and regulation, on the other, bringing to bear the post-legal realist idea of legal indeterminacy. It argues that the organizing legal concepts that justify these dichotomies contain gaps and ambiguities that often lead to contradictory and indeterminate outcomes. It thus suggests that the core/non-core labour standards and contract/regulation distinctions are unproductive and should be rejected if a better conception of labour governance is to come to fruition.