L’objectif majeur de ce mémoire est d’étudier la notion de la faute et le degré deculpabilité dans les tragédies inspirées du personnage de Phèdre. Nous allonsanalyser la notion de la faute et ses conséquences dans trois différentes tragédies àsavoir Hippolyte d’Euripide, Phèdre de Sénèque et celle du même titre de JeanRacine. Nous allons faire une étude comparative entre les trois versions enmontrant les ressemblances et les différences dans le traitement de la faute. Enfin,on va voir comment la faute commise volontairement pousse une personne à secondamner elle-même. / The main aim of this thesis is to study the concept of fault and the degree ofculpability in the tragedies inspired of the character Phaedra. We will analyze theconcept of fault and its consequences in the three tragedies namely Hippolytus ofEuripides, Phaedra of Seneca and of the same title by Jean Racine. We will makea comparative study of the three versions by showing the similarities anddifferences in the treatment of the fault. Finally, we will see how the faultcommitted intentionally pushes a person to condemn himself.

Crime of fraud, credit and loan fraud pursuant to section 209,210, 211 and 212 of the Criminal Code Criminal code, No. 40/2009 Coll., contains the criminal offence of a fraud (Section 209) and it's special cases such as the insurance (Section 210), loan (Section 211) and subsidy fraud (Section 212), in total of four separate offences dealing with fraudulent deliquency. The author of the thesis deals with the characterization of facts of fraud. Property fraud (Section 209) is a damage crime, but the special forms of fraud have features of pre-accomplished crime (preparation of crime). Fraudster's criminal liability for insurance, loan or subsidy fraud is rather larger than criminal liability for general type of fraud. Analysis of the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of the Czech republic is one part of the diploma thesis. From the results of the analysis the author concludes that there is a personal criminal liability for fraud when the perpetrator sues for a fake debt. This kind of deceptive activity is an attempt of crime of the fraud. The difference between special type of fraud (insurance, loan or subsidy Sec. 210 - 212 Criminal code) and general fraud (Sec. 209 Criminal code) is evident also in the level of evidence. Culpability of fraud must comprise of the intent to...

Fréquente en droit pénal, jamais entreprise en droit civil ou en droit administratif, cette étude révèle l’abondante appréhension juridique de la notion de la provocation. Malgré cette richesse, aucune étude transversale n’a jamais été menée à son propos et cette notion demeure encore indéfinie. Il est pourtant apparu que, non seulement que la conceptualisation de la provocation était rendue souhaitable par son absence d’approche cohérente, mais encore que cette conceptualisation était parfaitement envisageable. A cette fin, une typologie des comportements de provocation, leur nature et leur caractérisation purent être établis. Puis, la dualité de la provocation, résultant de la nécessaire relation d’influence du provocateur sur la personne provoquée, commanda l’étude des manifestations de la provocation sur cette dernière. Il apparut, à cet égard, que la subjectivité du concept de provocation se confrontait fréquemment à l’objectivation croissante des responsabilités et expliquait, au moins en partie, le recul de son appréhension légale, notamment en droit pénal. Dès lors, cette conceptualisation s’est heurtée à de sérieuses difficultés, tant définitionnelles que conceptuelles, de notions afférentes à la provocation et inhérentes à la responsabilité, telles que la culpabilité, la volonté, l’intention, l’imputabilité ou encore la causalité et l’imputation. Sans prétendre à un renouvellement de la théorie de la responsabilité, des clarifications de ces notions se sont avérées un préalable nécessaire au travail de conceptualisation de la provocation et à son application pratique. Enfin, au constat d’une nature éminemment subjective de la provocation, s’est naturellement imposé celui d’un régime spécifique. Le régime de la provocation, à l’instar de sa nature, se révèle dual : il engage ou atténue la responsabilité selon que la personne envisagée est provoquée ou provocateur. Spécifique, dual et subjectif, le régime juridique de la provocation en révèlera l’ampleur et lui assurera une pleine effectivité. / Common in criminal law, never undertaken in civil law or in administrative law, this research shows the wide legal approach of the notion of provocation. Despite this richness, no transverse study has never been done about it. Moreover, this notion remains undefined. Nevertheless, not only the conceptualisation of provocation has been necessary, owing to the absence of coherence regarding its approach, but this conceptualisation was also not perfectly conceivable.To that purpose, the typology of provocation’s behaviours, its nature and characterisation were able to be set up. Then, the duality of provocation, which is the result of the essential influence’s relation of the provoker on the provoked person, required studying expressions of the provocation on the one who is incited. Regarding this matter, it seemed the subjectivity of the concept of provocation often faced with the increasing objectivation of liabilities and explained, at least partially, the decline of its legal approach, in particular in criminal law. Therefore, the conceptualisation of the provocation was confronted to serious difficulties, regarding both the definition and the concept, of notions relating to provocation and inherent in the legal responsibility, such as culpability, will, intention, accountability or the causal link and imputation as well. Without expecting a total renewal of the notions belonging to the theory of liability, a clarification of these ones seems to be a necessary precondition for the conceptualisation of provocation and its practical application. Eventually, to the finding of an eminently subjective nature of provocation, must be added the one of a special legal regime. The regime of provocation, following the example of its nature, turns out to be dual: it involves or reduces the legal responsibility depending on the person charged is the provoked or the provoker. Special, dual and subjective, the legal regime of the provocation will point out its extent and assure it of real efficiency.

Since the pre-requisites for common-purpose liability where there was no prior agreement were laid down in S V Mgedezi 1989 (1) SA 687 (A), the appellate division has moved to resolve related controversial issues. These include the question whether a joiner-in is a perpetrator or accomplice, and whether he should be convicted of murder or attempted murder. It is the question of dissociation which has remained elusive. Courts accept that a person should only be criminally liable when his dissociation from a common purpose takes place after the commencement of execution stage is reached. My submission is that whether one dissociates himself should be a question of fact, to be determined according to the circumstances of each case. Such determination should pay close attention to the doctrine of proximity. Where a person played a minor role, or acted under the influence of a dominant partner, this should be reflected in the punishment imposed. / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M. (Criminal & Procedural Law)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:26:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 JORGE DOS SANTOS GOMES SOARES.pdf: 526928 bytes, checksum: f4cd3bcc168ee83398ef62be3d8c2818 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-10-28 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The Problem of evil is very vast; we can approach it in many different ways. Our point of view will be on the anthropological philosophy. The aim of the research is the evil, from the human existence point of view on the first philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. We emphasize two underlying intuitions in his philosophy: the concurrence of good and evil in the human existence and the priority of the conscience of culpability in relation to the final consciousness. We start with a reflection on the anthropology of fallibility as a constituent of the ontological statue of man. The anthropology of the fallibility allowed us to arrive at the idea of the possibility of the written evil in its ontological constitution. The philosophical speech of man will be enriched by the symbolism of the present evil in the mythical narrations. We give the priority to the adamic myth, for being considered the only anthropology. At last, the evil is a challenge to the philosophy and theology; the great of the challenges, once it involves the questionings of the God´s conception valid in the occidental world, as almighty and absolutely good. In other words, it is about overcoming the contradiction of the existence of God and the existence of evil (pain, suffering, death) After all the inquiries made to discover the presence of evil in the existence of man, the interrogations about evil will always be a perpetual problem of man, deriving from his historical condition. Therefore, the question remains: What can we do to combat evil ? Evil is what it is and what did not have to be. It is to that which did not have to be, that we must answer . Ricoeur´s answer, which we agree with, is that in the plan of action, evil is synonymous with violence; to diminish it in the world, with ethical action and politics, is to diminish evil. In conclusion, don t let yourself be taken by evil; overcome evil with goodness (Roman 12, 21) / O problema do mal é muito vasto, podemos abordá-lo de diversas formas. O nosso viés será o filosófico-antropológico. O objeto da pesquisa é o mal, do ponto de vista humano-existêncial, na primeira filosofia de Paul Ricoeur. Realçamos duas intuições subjacentes em sua filosofia: a simultaneidade do bem e do mal na existência humana e a anterioridade da consciência de culpabilidade em relação à consciência de finitude. Iniciamos com uma reflexão sobre a antropologia da falibilidade como constitutiva do estatuto ontológico do homem. A antropologia da falibilidade permitiu chegar a idéia de possibilidade do mal, inscrita na sua constituição ontológica. O discurso filosófico sobre o homem foi enriquecido pelo simbolismo do mal, presente nas narrações míticas. Demos prioridade ao mito adâmico, por ser considerado o único, mais especificamente, antropológico. Por fim, o mal como desafio à filosofia e à teologia; o maior dos desafios, uma vez que envolve o questionamento das concepções de Deus vigentes no mundo ocidental, como onipotente e absolutamente bom. Ou seja, trata-se de superar a contradição entre a existência de Deus e a existência do mal (sofrimento, dor, morte). Após todas as investigações feitas para descobrir a presença do mal na existência do homem, as interrogações sobre o mal subsistirão sempre como eternos problemas do homem, oriundos de sua condição histórica. Por isso, a pergunta continua: O que podemos fazer contra o mal?... o mal é o que é e o que não devia ser. É ao que não devia ser que nós devemos responder . A resposta de Ricoeur, a qual concordamos, é que no plano da ação, o mal é sinônimo de violência; diminuí-la no mundo, pela ação ética e política, é diminuir o mal. Enfim, Não te deixes vencer pelo mal; vence antes o mal com o bem (Romanos 12,21)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:19:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Paulo Henrique Aranda Fuller.pdf: 507781 bytes, checksum: ccef426f79b27531f0ded48e5299796d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-11-09 / This paper tries to analyze the legal circumstances of a subjective nature - culpability, history, social behavior, agent s personality and motives of the crime - that occupy a central position in determining the sentence (cognitive judicial individualization), directing the court decision on the kind of penalty in case of alternative commination - the quantification of the base penalty, the initial regime s determination of the performance of the liberty s private penalty, the sufficiency of its replacement, the exasperation in particular continuing offense, the possibility of probation, criminal transaction and conditional suspension of the process. The indeterminacy of concepts, the shallowness of cognition and the absence of judicial reasoning properly about these conditions can transform the discretion legally bound to unwanted arbitrariness or absolute decisionism. The culpability, in its meaning of the penalty s amount, performs different functions and may act as the upper limit of the penalty (proportionality to the unjust criminal and legal ward) and as a judicial circumstance (individualization of the defendant s personal conditions). As the upper limit of the penalty, the culpability represents assurance (limiting retributive function as the ruling purpose of the penalty) in the face of preventive circumstance - general and specific, positive and negative. As a judicial fact, it allows the individual measurement of the unjust level of consciousness and of the diverse behavior chargeability s degree and of the subject s internal participation. We argue that the judicial circumstances imply the discretion in the penalty s determination, which must be controlled by defining its limits and cognitive materials (fission of the instruction and trial: interlocutory of the penalty s culpability and determination) / O presente trabalho busca analisar as circunstâncias judiciais de natureza subjetiva culpabilidade, antecedentes, conduta social, personalidade do agente e motivos do crime , que ocupam posição central na determinação da pena (individualização judicial cognitiva), orientando a decisão judicial sobre a espécie de pena em caso de cominação alternativa , a quantificação da pena-base, a determinação do regime inicial de cumprimento da pena privativa de liberdade, a suficiência da sua substituição, a exasperação em crime continuado específico, a possibilidade da suspensão condicional da pena, de transação penal e de suspensão condicional do processo. A indeterminação de conceitos, a superficialidade da cognição judicial e a ausência de fundamentação adequada a respeito dessas circunstâncias podem transformar a discricionariedade juridicamente vinculada em indesejada arbitrariedade ou puro decisionismo. A culpabilidade, em sua acepção de medida da pena, desempenha funções distintas, podendo atuar como limite superior da pena (proporcionalidade ao injusto penal e ao bem jurídico tutelado) e como circunstância judicial (individualização das condições pessoais do acusado). Como limite superior da pena, a culpabilidade representa garantia (função retributiva limitadora, como finalidade preponderante da pena) em face de considerações preventivas gerais e especiais, positivas e negativas. Como circunstância judicial, permite a aferição individual do nível de consciência do injusto e dos graus de exigibilidade de comportamento diverso e de participação interna do sujeito. Defendemos que as circunstâncias judiciais implicam discricionariedade na determinação da pena, que deve ser controlada por meio da definição dos seus limites materiais e cognitivos (cisão da audiência de instrução e julgamento: interlocutório de culpabilidade e determinação da pena)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nayara Graciela Sales Brito.pdf: 1228124 bytes, checksum: 994fcb02f2abcb654e77ed919e77f2fa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-07-06 / The scope of this study is to examine the ignorance of the law issue beginning with a historical study of criminal liability and mistake, moving on to the birth of culpability theories and the approaches to the knowledge of unlawfulness. This study addresses the development of culpability and mistake of law in Brazil, mainly through the study of Brazilian criminal statutes and bills. To this end, this study shows the development of the theory around the object of the knowledge of unlawfulness, and the prevailing opinions of Brazilian jurists in the sense of considering it to be in opposition to the established order of the community. This study is justified by the complexity and importance of the topic, both to crime theory and legal pragmatics, especially when one considers the numerous statutes enacted in Brazil, many of which date from the post-industrial period, as a means of keeping up with the risks posed by a global and technological society. The theoretical framework follows the historical and chronological line, and is not intended to exhaust the approaches to the subject nor is it aimed at offering solutions to all the lines of thought herein mentioned. This study covers different conceptions of culpability: psychological, normative, finalist, and the functional views of Claus Roxin and Günther Jakobs. Next, formal, material and intermediary theories of the object of the knowledge of unlawfulness is addressed in order to attain a critical view of inexcusable nature of the ignorance of the law defense in the face of the dignity of the human person / Esta dissertação tem como escopo a análise da especial questão do desconhecimento da lei penal, partindo-se do estudo histórico da responsabilidade criminal e do erro até o advento das teorias da culpabilidade e os respectivos tratamentos sobre a consciência da ilicitude. Examina-se a evolução da culpabilidade e do erro de proibição no Brasil, sobretudo por meio do estudo dos diversos diplomas penais, como também de alguns projetos de lei. Expõem-se o desenvolvimento teórico sobre o objeto da consciência da ilicitude e a posição majoritária da doutrina brasileira no sentido de considerá-lo como sendo a contrariedade à ordem comunitária. Justifica-se o trabalho pela complexidade e relevância do tema, tanto para a teoria do delito, quanto para a pragmática jurídica, mormente em se considerando a edição de inúmeras leis que ingressam no ordenamento jurídico pátrio, muitas delas advindas do período pós- industrial, como meio de se acompanhar os riscos da sociedade globalizada e tecnológica. O percurso teórico filia-se à linha histórico-cronológica, sem a pretensão de esgotar as abordagens relativas ao assunto, nem oferecer soluções para todas as correntes de pensamento expostas. Apresentam-se as concepções sobre a culpabilidade: psicológicas, normativas, finalistas e as visões funcionalistas de Claus Roxin e de Günther Jakobs. Em seguida, o estudo perpassa pelas teorias formal, material e intermediária do objeto da consciência da ilicitude, para se alcançar um posicionamento crítico da inescusabilidade da ignorância da lei penal em face do princípio da culpabilidade e da dignidade da pessoa humana

L’image de l’enfant constitue un élément fondamental de la communication de l’UNICEF. L’utilisation de cette image a fait l’objet d’un certain nombre d’interrogations traitées dans cette étude en Sciences de l’Information et de la Communication. Ainsi, afin d’approfondir suffisamment les différents aspects de cette utilisation, nous avons choisi de nous baser sur une approche comparative. / The image of the child takes a central place in the communication of the UNICEF. The use of this image has been a subject of a number of questions that we addressed during this interdisciplinary study. In order to do an in-depth evaluation of the different aspects of the use of this image, we have chosen to base our study on a comparative approach.

Since the pre-requisites for common-purpose liability where there was no prior agreement were laid down in S V Mgedezi 1989 (1) SA 687 (A), the appellate division has moved to resolve related controversial issues. These include the question whether a joiner-in is a perpetrator or accomplice, and whether he should be convicted of murder or attempted murder. It is the question of dissociation which has remained elusive. Courts accept that a person should only be criminally liable when his dissociation from a common purpose takes place after the commencement of execution stage is reached. My submission is that whether one dissociates himself should be a question of fact, to be determined according to the circumstances of each case. Such determination should pay close attention to the doctrine of proximity. Where a person played a minor role, or acted under the influence of a dominant partner, this should be reflected in the punishment imposed. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M. (Criminal & Procedural Law)

The South African legal system is dualistic in nature with the one part consisting of the Western common law and the other consisting of African customary law. Although these two legal systems enjoy equal recognition, they regularly come into conflict with each other due to their divergent value systems. It is especially within the context of the South African criminal law that this conflict becomes apparent, because an accused's conduct can be viewed as lawful in terms of African customary law, but unlawful in terms of the South African common law. In such cases the accused may attempt to raise a cultural defence by putting forth evidence of his cultural background or values to convince the court that his prima facie unlawful conduct is actually lawful and that he should escape criminal liability. Alternatively, an accused may put forth evidence of his cultural background or values in an attempt to receive a lighter sentence. The question which therefore arises is whether a so-called "cultural defence" exists in the South African criminal law, and if so, what the influence of such a defence on the South African criminal law is. The conflict between African Customary law and the South African common law in the context of the criminal law arises due to the fact that the indigenous belief in witchcraft, (including witch-killings), the indigenous belief in the tokoloshe and the use of muti-medicine (including muti-murders), as well as the phenomenon of "necklacing" and the custom of ukuthwala can result in the commission of various common law crimes. In the case of witch-killings, the perpetrators can be charged with the common law crimes of murder or, if the victim survives, attempted murder, common assault or assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. Similarly, necklacing, as a method used for killing witches, can also result in the commission of these common law crimes. What is more, the perpetrators of witch-killings can also be charged with the statutory crimes of accusing someone of witchcraft, pointing the victim out as being a witch or wizard or injuring a person based on information received from a traditional healer, or similar person. The indigenous belief in the tokoloshe can lead to the commission of the common law crimes of murder or, if the victim survives, common assault or assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. The perpetrators of mutimurders can also face charges of murder or attempted murder, if the victim survives. The indigenous custom of ukuthwala can result in the commission of common law crimes such as abduction, kidnapping and common assault, as well as the statutory crime of rape. A perusal of South African case law dealing with the indigenous beliefs and customs above reveals that the accused in such cases have indeed attempted to put forth evidence of their indigenous beliefs or customs to persuade the criminal courts that they should escape criminal liability for a particular crime. In fact, these arguments were raised within the context of the existing common law defences such as private defence, necessity, involuntary conduct and a lack of criminal capacity. However, the South African criminal courts have up till now in general been unwilling to accept arguments of indigenous beliefs and customs to serve as a defence, either alone or within the context of the existing defences above, for the commission of a common law or statutory crime. They have, however, been more willing to accept evidence of an accused's indigenous belief or custom to serve as a mitigating factor during sentencing. The extent to which an accused's cultural background will serve as a mitigating factor will, of course, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. As a result an accused who is charged with the commission of a culturally motivated crime has no guarantee that his cultural background and values will in fact be considered as a mitigating factor during his criminal trial. It is thus ultimately concluded that a so-called "cultural defence" does not exist in the South African Criminal law. The indigenous beliefs and customs above not only result in the commission of common law or statutory crimes, but also in the infringement of various fundamental human rights in the Constitution. Witch-killings result in the infringement of the constitutional right to life and the right to freedom and security of the person. However, witches and wizards who are persecuted for practising witchcraft are also denied their right to a fair trial entrenched in the Constitution. Similarly, muti-murders and necklacing also result in the infringement of the right to life and the right to freedom and security of the person entrenched in the Constitution. The custom of ukuthwala results in the infringement of the right to equality, the right to freedom and security of the person, the right to live in an environment that is not harmful to health or well-being, the right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour, the right to basic education and other constitutional safeguards aimed at protecting children. In light of the constitutional right to freedom of culture and the right to freely participate in a cultural life of one's choosing the question can be asked whether the time has come to formally recognise a cultural defence in the South African criminal law. In this study it is argued that these constitutional rights do not warrant the formal recognition of a cultural defence. Instead, it is recommended that the conflict between African customary law and the South African common law can be resolved by bringing indigenous beliefs and customs in line with the values that underpin the Constitution as the supreme law of South Africa. Of course, this does not mean that the courts should ignore cultural considerations during a criminal trial if and when they arise. In fact, as pointed out in this study, the courts have a constitutional duty to apply African customary law when that law is applicable. It goes without saying that, when an accused attempts to escape criminal liability for his unlawful conduct by raising arguments of his cultural background, African customary law will be applicable and must be considered by the court. This in turn raises the question as to how the criminal courts can ensure that they give enough consideration to the possibility that an accused's criminal conduct was culturally motivated so as to comply with their constitutional mandate referred to above. Although it would be nearly impossible to formulate a perfect or flawless approach according to which a judicial officer can adjudicate criminal matters involving culturally motivated crimes, the author suggests the following practical approach which may provide some guidance to judicial officers in dealing with cases involving culturally motivated crimes: • Step 1: Consider whether the commission of the crime was culturally motivated or not. If it seems as though the accused did not commit a culturally motivated crime, the trial can continue on that basis. If, however, it is evident that the accused indeed committed a culturally motivated crime, step 2 follows. • Step 2: Once it has been determined that the commission of the crime was culturally motivated, the next step is to determine which indigenous belief or custom led to the commission of the crime. Once the relevant indigenous belief or custom has been identified, step 3 follows. • Step 3: When it is clear which indigenous belief or custom led to the accused's commission of the crime, the next step is to determine whether arguments pertaining to that particular indigenous belief or custom may be raised within the context of the existing defences in the South African Criminal law in order to exclude the accused's criminal liability. If an accused relies on one of the existing defences in the South African criminal law, he will have to lay a proper evidential foundation for his defence before the court. In assessing the evidence put forth by the accused, the judicial officer must consider the judgment and reasoning in previous cases dealing with the particular indigenous belief or custom. A judicial officer must also consider the values underpinning the Constitution when conducting such an assessment. If a judicial officer upholds an accused's defence, the accused is acquitted. However, if the judicial officer rejects an accused's defence, the accused must be convicted and step 4 follows. • Step 4: Once an accused has been convicted, a court should consider whether arguments of his cultural background can serve as an extenuating circumstance, mitigating the punishment to be imposed on him. However, the practical approach above merely serves as a suggestion to judicial officers in dealing with culturally motivated crimes and ultimately it will be up to the judiciary to develop both the Western common law and African customary law to resolve the criminal law conflicts between these two legal systems. The research for this study was concluded in November 2013. / LLD, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014