Today’s high school students will face a host of economic problems such as the demise of the social safety net, mounting college student debt, and costly health care plans, as stated in the rationale for financial literacy provided by the Council for Economic Education’s National Standards for Financial Literacy. These problems are compounded by growing income and wealth inequality and the widespread influence of neoliberal ideology. Although one of the major goals of economics education is to teach students to make reasoned economic choices in their public and private lives and provide the skills to solve personal and social economic problems, little empirical research has been conducted on how these goals are addressed. Secondary economics education research has primarily focused on measuring students’ grasp of neoclassical economics while a separate body of literature provides theoretical critiques of that approach. This study responds to the gap presented by these separate camps by capturing the economics discourse of a high school economics and personal finance course in relation to the role of economic decision-making in a democracy, and the space to hold values discussions. Using case study methodology that included analysis of student and teacher interviews, classroom observations, the standards and official curriculum, lesson plans, and student-produced documents, the study provides deep, context-dependent knowledge about how the official curriculum is manifest in the classroom. Findings reveal that the role of economic decision-making and values discussions were given very little space. The discourse was heavily focused on the acceptance of the science and mastery of technical knowledge about personal finance for the dual purposes of preparing students to succeed on the W!SE Financial Literacy Certification Test and preparing students to navigate and succeed in a fixed economic reality firmly committed to neoclassical economics. The role of economic decision-making was diminished by the foregrounding of financial literacy over economics, which served as a mechanism of power to send the silent message that economic circumstances (such as wealth inequality) change through individual choices and that economic and social phenomena can be understood and addressed through the application of technical approaches.

Educational assortative mating and earnings inequality has both increased in both Europe and the United States in the last decades. As a result, educational assortative mating, or educational homogamy, has been suggested as a potential explanation for the increase in earnings inequality. According to this hypothesis increased sorting on education will lead to polarization between lower and higher-educated couples where the advantages of the latter will compound on one another and lead to increased economic inequality.   The majority of the studies to date report a non-relationship between educational assortative mating and earnings inequality, one of the exceptions being a study of Denmark. This exception has led sociologists to theorize that the impact of educational assortative mating could be especially strong in the Nordic countries. In this study I test this hypothesis by employing a novel decomposition method, the Theil-index, to answer if increases in educational assortative mating are associated with increases in earnings inequality in Sweden between 2000 and 2010, using data from the Standard of Living Survey (LNU).   The result is a non-relationship between homogamy and earnings inequality and an overall decrease in earnings inequality in the sample. The result is another null result for the hypothesis that educational homogamy leads to inequality, and points to a larger discrepancy between singles and couples than between couples. If corroborated, this decrease in earnings inequality would mean a divergence, in earnings inequality, between partnered individuals and the general population. Future studies should focus on the extent of this divergence.

Research suggests that society is facing continued increasing economic inequalities where structural forces such as neoliberalism and globalisation are behind the emergence of a new group of globally super-rich. Since media is a place where social class is expressed, depicted and represented, it can have a particularly important role regarding what discourses about the global upper class are generated. The purpose of this study is to critically examine how the portrayal and re-contextualisation of the global upper class can produce discourses, by specifically analysing semiotic elements in the film Triangle of Sadness by Ruben Östlund. The following research question was formed: What discourses are produced about the globally super-rich in the film Triangle of Sadness?  The theoretical framework of this study has a critical point of departure, according to which media is not a neutral means of communication, and through various expressions media can produce discourses that serve certain groups and interests. This framework also includes contrasting the concept of culture industry to other perspectives such as Bourdieu’s field theory, which serves the study as reflective perspectives that can provide generalising arguments about the role that the film industry plays in a society. The method used in this study is a multimodal critical discourse analysis, which permits a rather detailed analysis of a choice of semiotic resources in the chosen film. The selection of empirical material was made by first watching the film as a whole, then identifying relevant parts for analysis. The sequences were chosen based on where the super-rich are in focus and portrayed in the film. The analysis is structured by the identified discourses in regard to the representation of the super-rich. The result of the study is that Triangle of Sadness produces five discourses about the globally super-rich: The extreme wealth of the global super-rich, the global super-rich as wicked, the fall of the global super-rich, the super-rich as vulnerable and the super-rich as powerless. Overall, the film is a mockery of the super-rich. An explanation for why Östlund produces this discourse, according to Bourdieu, could have to do with his position as a consecrated avant-garde in the production field.

In 2005 the largely indigenous country of Bolivia elected its first indigenous president, Evo Morales of the Movement toward Socialism (MAS) Party. Morales ran on a promise of re-distributing wealth, to aid in the development of one of Latin America's poorest countries. Morales' first term in office marked a historical achievement for the indigenous movement in Bolivia, and sparked social change in the country. The government also experienced a momentous achievement through the re-writing of the Bolivian constitution, acknowledging the country's multi-ethnic and pluri-national character. Although his social, domestic and foreign policies have been controversial, particularly in the United States, Morales was re-elected to serve a second term in 2009. This research analyzes the outcomes of Morales' policy changes during his first term in office, from 2006-2009 to examine how the election of the MAS has impacted the marginalized status of indigenous people in Bolivia.

This study examines the effects of political representation on economic inequality across western industrialized democracies. I explore an explanation of increases in economic inequality as a consequence of less representative democratic institutions. Explaining economic inequality in this manner is a shift from to the Transatlantic Consensus that attributes increased economic inequality to globalization. I expect to find that more representative electoral and governments institutions will be associated with lower levels of economic inequality. The analysis takes place across twenty-three countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) over the past forty years using a cross-sectional longitudinal model. Variables used to operationalize the level of representation of democratic institutions include a novel variable of the representative ratio, the effective number of parties, an index of institutional constraints, presidential system, single member districts, and judicial review. Voter turnout, the percentage of seats held by women, gross domestic product per capita, unemployment, and the size of the industrial sector are used as control variables. The findings support the main hypothesis: as political representation increases, economic inequality decreases.

本研究主旨是從人力資本理論以及勞動市場條件的觀點，來探討原、漢族群的工資不平等之現象根源。長久以來，原住民從成長、學校教育，到進入職場，莫不受各種條件的不足所制，以至於與主流社會的社經處境有難以克服的落差。本研究採用2007年「社會變遷基本調查第五期第三次」階層組以及休閒組調查，和2007年「臺灣原住民社會變遷與政策評估調查研究」，三筆具代表性且規模相近的面訪資料、共2393位私部門受雇者來加以比較。透過群體加權校正，本研究首先透過多元迴歸與交互作用分析，來探討兩族群的人力資本和勞動市場條件與工資取得高低之間的關係。接著，再以經Heckman校正Blinder-Oaxaca差異分解，來分析兩族群工資落差中的結構與現象差異。 研究結果顯示，人力資本和勞動市場條件能說明原住民族與漢人之間，確有工資上的族群歧視現象。原住民教育的工資報酬率在義務教育階段後即無顯著效果，而不同於漢人能持續成長；不論是年資、職業聲望或是工作型態，原住民的工資報酬率都顯著也比漢人低落，且影響更勝教育差異。這些現象即使是在差異分解校正結構差異後依舊存在。是故，既有量化研究除了從教育面向來探討原、漢族群社經不平等之外，實應持續重視原住民族進入職場後，所面對的勞動市場問題。 / The aim of this research is to study the wage gap between aborigines and Han Chinese in Taiwan. The research explores the impacts of human capital and labor market conditions on the wage gap. Throughuot the life course trajectories of schooling and labor market participation, aborigines in Taiwan persistently face dire straits, resulting in insurmountable soci-economic gaps with Han Chinese. The data sources of the research are from Taiwan Social Changy Survey (TSCS) 2007, Phase 5, Wave 3: The Social Stratification module and The Leisure Time module, and Social Change and Policy of Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples Survey (TIPS) 2007, which are representative to the adult population in Taiwan. The total sample sizes are 2393 employees in private sector and roughly equal in size between two ethnics. With weighting, regression interaction effects were estimated to analyze the impacts of human capital and labor market conditions on wage differences between aborigines and Han Chinese. Moreover, the research uses two-steps Heckman selection model to correct selection bias of labor marke participation as well as Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to analyze the ethnic disparities in wage. The finding of interaction models show that human capital and labor market conditions can explain the wage gap and reveal the negative effects of discrimination against aborigines. While only the compulsory education has positive effects on aborigines’ wage, Han Chinese could benefit from all stage of education. Job tenures, occupational prestiage, and employment types are more benefitical to Han Chinese than to aborigines, and the impacts of these factors on wage are greater than education. These results are also consistent with decomposition analysis. Other than education inequality, the finding of this research suggests that future studies of ethnic disparities in soci-economic inequality should concern more about ethnic differences in labor market conditons.

O objetivo primordial deste trabalho é analisar se a democracia é uma instituição política que produz resultados econômicos menos desiguais do que os regimes autoritários. A importância deste tema reside no fato que a própria promoção da democracia na agenda da política internacional tornou-se fundamental por inúmeras razões entre as quais sua suposta propensão em reduzir estas disparidades econômicas. Em primeiro lugar apresentamos no Capítulo 1 um balanço da discussão teórica e empírica a partir da qual constatamos que, a despeito do senso comum de que a democracia está relacionada a uma cidadania mais igualitária, os seus efeitos sobre a desigualdade ainda são discutíveis. Mesmo existindo um razoável consenso teórico de que os regimes democráticos devem, de alguma forma, produzir uma melhor distribuição de bens, os resultados empíricos são inconclusivos e contraditórios. Em seguida, diante de tal impasse empírico, propomos no Capítulo 2 uma reformulação da argumentação na qual entendemos que os efeitos da democracia sobre a desigualdade devem ser reinterpretados. A principal contribuição da tese reside na constatação, tanto teórica quanto empírica, de que estes efeitos são heterogêneos e interagem com o próprio nível de desigualdade, e, por conseguinte, é equivocado o suposto de que esses efeitos são homogêneos e independentes do contexto sócio-econômico da desigualdade. No Capítulo 3 apresentamos os dados e os conceitos de democracia e desigualdade. Assumimos que democracia se caracteriza como o regime político no qual os líderes competem entre si por meio de eleições e verificamos se os seus efeitos variam ao longo da própria distribuição de desigualdade econômica mensurada pelo coeficiente de GINI. Para tal análise, realizamos uma série de modelos de regressão quantílica, a metodologia adequada para avaliar o debate sobre a heterogeneidade versus homogeneidade dos efeitos. O argumento teórico, a partir do qual elabora-se a hipótese dos efeitos heterogêneos, refere-se à necessidade de uma convergência entre os interesses eleitorais dos partidos o lado da oferta e as clivagens sobre as quais uma potencial maioria dos eleitores tem interesse em ser atendido o lado da demanda por políticas públicas e plataformas. Isto posto, é 9 necessário discutir as condições que estimulam as lideranças políticas a utilizarem o problema da desigualdade econômica como argumento eleitoral e as condições nas quais surge uma demanda dos cidadãos por redistribuição via ação estatal. Somente nas sociedades mais desiguais tanto os partidos políticos têm interesse em ofertar políticas redistributivas, quanto tende a surgir no seio da cidadania uma demanda por redistribuição por parte de uma maioria de eleitores. No Capítulo 4 comprovamos empiricamente que os efeitos da competição democrática em sociedades mais desiguais são diferentes seus efeitos em sociedades mais iguais; e estes efeitos estão em direção à maior redução da desigualdade apenas nas sociedades mais desiguais. Os resultados são robustos às mais diferentes especificações dos modelos estatísticos, dados e formas de mensuração, tanto de democracia quanto de desigualdade, em diferentes cortes temporais e horizontes históricos de análise. Inclusive quando estendemos o recorte temporal para antes do pós-2ª Guerra Mundial utilizando dados que abrangem o período de surgimento dos primeiros regimes representativos democráticos no século XIX, a veracidade das hipóteses dos efeitos heterogêneos e de que há maior contundência da democracia em direção à redução da desigualdade nas sociedades mais desiguais permanece. Por fim, além deste problema teórico e empírico de crucial importância, também controlamos a análise para a potencial relação recíproca entre democracia e desigualdade. Enquanto parte da literatura discute os potenciais efeitos igualitários da democracia, outra importante literatura debate se o aumento da desigualdade aumenta ou reduz a probabilidade de um país tornar-se ou manter-se democrático. Posto isto, apresentamos uma lista de variáveis instrumentais para estimar validamente os efeitos da democracia sobre a desigualdade independente da relação entre desigualdade e democracia / The primary aim of this study is to analyze whether democracy is a political institution that produces less unequal economic outcomes than authoritarian regimes. The importance of this issue lies in the fact that the very promotion of democracy in the international political agenda has become essential for many reasons, including its supposed propensity to reduce economic disparities. First, at Chapter 1 we overview the theoretical and empirical discussion from which we find that despite the common sense that democracy must be related to a more egalitarian citizenship, its effects on inequality is still debatable. Even with a reasonable theoretical consensus that democracies must somehow produce a better distribution of goods; the empirical results are inconclusive and contradictory. After that, facing such empirical impasse, we propose at Chapter 2 a reformulation about the rationale to explain and analyze the effects of democracy on inequality. The main contribution of this thesis lies in both the theoretical and the empirical claim that these effects are heterogeneous and should interact with the level of inequality and, therefore, the assumption that these effects are homogeneous and independent of the socio-economic context of inequality is wrong. In Chapter 3, we present the data and concepts of democracy and inequality. We assume that democracy is characterized as a political regime in which leaders compete through elections and we test whether the effects vary along the distribution of economic inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. To do that, we conducted a series of quantile regression models, appropriate to evaluate the alternative hypothesis whether the effects are heterogeneous or homogenous. The theoretical argument, from which we elaborate the hypothesis of heterogeneous effects, refers to the need for a convergence between the electoral interests of the parties - the supply side - and the political cleavages on which a majority of voters have potential interest being played - the demand side for other public policies and platforms. Hence, it is necessary to discuss the conditions that lead the political leadership to use the problem of economic 11 inequality as an electoral argument and the conditions under which a demand by citizens for redistribution via state action rises. Only at the most unequal societies the political parties have an interest in offering redistributive policies, as well as there is a higher propensity for a redistribution demand by a majority of voters. In Chapter 4, we proved empirically that the effects of democratic competition at more unequal societies are different from the effects of democracy in more equal societies; and these effects tend to be greater toward inequality reduction only at more unequal societies. These results are robust to different statistical model specifications, data and measurement methods, about both democracy and inequality, and to the use of different time horizons. Even when we extend the time frame of the analysis to the period before World War II - using new data that covers XIX century, the veracity of the hypotheses about the heterogeneous effects and that these effects of democracy toward the reduction of inequality are larger at the most unequal societies remains intact. Finally, beyond this theoretical and empirical issue of crucial importance, we also control the analysis for potential reciprocal relationship between democracy and inequality. This is because while much of the literature discusses the potential effects of egalitarian democracy, another important literature debate discusses whether greater inequality increases or reduces the probability of a country become or remain democratic. Hence, we present a list of valid instrumental variables to estimate the effects of democracy on inequality independent of the relationship between inequality and democracy

Cette thèse s’inscrit dans l’analyse diachronique et synchronique des liens entre lesformes de capitalisme et leur environnement. Le premier chapitre propose de mettre enlumière la manière dont la coévolution entre le capitalisme et l’environnement a pu s’opéreren croisant les apports théoriques et empiriques de l’école de la régulation avec des travauxdu champ de l’histoire environnementale et de l’économie écologique. Nous montrons que lesdifférentes formes historiques du capitalisme ont généré des conséquences environnementalesimportantes et différenciées. A l’inverse, il s’avère que le rapport à l’environnement a eu uneinfluence primordiale sur les formes de capitalisme, notamment par l’intermédiaire dedispositifs institutionnels environnementaux (DIE). Le second chapitre vise à savoir dansquelle mesure ces dispositifs subissent un processus d’adoption différencié selon les formescontemporaine de capitalisme dans lequel ils s’inscrivent. A cet égard, une certainecorrespondance entre notre typologie des DIE nationaux et la typologie des capitalismesapparaît. Enfin, le troisième chapitre porte particulièrement sur la manière dont les niveauxd’inégalités, en grande partie dépendants des différentes formes de capitalismes, peuventinfluencer l’adoption des DIE. Par le biais d’une analyse économétrique, nous tentons de faireapparaitre les mécanismes les plus à même d’expliquer ce phénomène. / This thesis contributes to the diachronic and synchronic analysis of the linksbetween the forms of capitalism and their environment. The first chapter proposes to highlightthe manner in which the coevolution between capitalism and the environment was carried outby crossing the theoretical and empirical contributions of the régulation school withenvironmental history and ecological economics studies. We reveal that the differenthistorical forms of capitalism have led to extensive and differentiated environmentalconsequences. Conversely, it turns out that the relationship with the environment has had amajor influence on the forms of capitalism, especially through institutional environmentaldevices (EID). The second chapter aims at deciphering in which extent these devices undergoa process of differentiated adoption depending on the contemporary forms of capitalismwithin which they take place. In this framework, some degree of correlation appears betweenour EID based typology of countries and the typology of capitalism. Finally, the third chapterfocuses on how levels of inequality, which are largely dependent on different forms ofcapitalism, can influence the adoption of EID. By means of an econometric analysis, weattempt to determine which mechanisms are most likely to explain this phenomenon.

O objetivo primordial deste trabalho é analisar se a democracia é uma instituição política que produz resultados econômicos menos desiguais do que os regimes autoritários. A importância deste tema reside no fato que a própria promoção da democracia na agenda da política internacional tornou-se fundamental por inúmeras razões entre as quais sua suposta propensão em reduzir estas disparidades econômicas. Em primeiro lugar apresentamos no Capítulo 1 um balanço da discussão teórica e empírica a partir da qual constatamos que, a despeito do senso comum de que a democracia está relacionada a uma cidadania mais igualitária, os seus efeitos sobre a desigualdade ainda são discutíveis. Mesmo existindo um razoável consenso teórico de que os regimes democráticos devem, de alguma forma, produzir uma melhor distribuição de bens, os resultados empíricos são inconclusivos e contraditórios. Em seguida, diante de tal impasse empírico, propomos no Capítulo 2 uma reformulação da argumentação na qual entendemos que os efeitos da democracia sobre a desigualdade devem ser reinterpretados. A principal contribuição da tese reside na constatação, tanto teórica quanto empírica, de que estes efeitos são heterogêneos e interagem com o próprio nível de desigualdade, e, por conseguinte, é equivocado o suposto de que esses efeitos são homogêneos e independentes do contexto sócio-econômico da desigualdade. No Capítulo 3 apresentamos os dados e os conceitos de democracia e desigualdade. Assumimos que democracia se caracteriza como o regime político no qual os líderes competem entre si por meio de eleições e verificamos se os seus efeitos variam ao longo da própria distribuição de desigualdade econômica mensurada pelo coeficiente de GINI. Para tal análise, realizamos uma série de modelos de regressão quantílica, a metodologia adequada para avaliar o debate sobre a heterogeneidade versus homogeneidade dos efeitos. O argumento teórico, a partir do qual elabora-se a hipótese dos efeitos heterogêneos, refere-se à necessidade de uma convergência entre os interesses eleitorais dos partidos o lado da oferta e as clivagens sobre as quais uma potencial maioria dos eleitores tem interesse em ser atendido o lado da demanda por políticas públicas e plataformas. Isto posto, é 9 necessário discutir as condições que estimulam as lideranças políticas a utilizarem o problema da desigualdade econômica como argumento eleitoral e as condições nas quais surge uma demanda dos cidadãos por redistribuição via ação estatal. Somente nas sociedades mais desiguais tanto os partidos políticos têm interesse em ofertar políticas redistributivas, quanto tende a surgir no seio da cidadania uma demanda por redistribuição por parte de uma maioria de eleitores. No Capítulo 4 comprovamos empiricamente que os efeitos da competição democrática em sociedades mais desiguais são diferentes seus efeitos em sociedades mais iguais; e estes efeitos estão em direção à maior redução da desigualdade apenas nas sociedades mais desiguais. Os resultados são robustos às mais diferentes especificações dos modelos estatísticos, dados e formas de mensuração, tanto de democracia quanto de desigualdade, em diferentes cortes temporais e horizontes históricos de análise. Inclusive quando estendemos o recorte temporal para antes do pós-2ª Guerra Mundial utilizando dados que abrangem o período de surgimento dos primeiros regimes representativos democráticos no século XIX, a veracidade das hipóteses dos efeitos heterogêneos e de que há maior contundência da democracia em direção à redução da desigualdade nas sociedades mais desiguais permanece. Por fim, além deste problema teórico e empírico de crucial importância, também controlamos a análise para a potencial relação recíproca entre democracia e desigualdade. Enquanto parte da literatura discute os potenciais efeitos igualitários da democracia, outra importante literatura debate se o aumento da desigualdade aumenta ou reduz a probabilidade de um país tornar-se ou manter-se democrático. Posto isto, apresentamos uma lista de variáveis instrumentais para estimar validamente os efeitos da democracia sobre a desigualdade independente da relação entre desigualdade e democracia / The primary aim of this study is to analyze whether democracy is a political institution that produces less unequal economic outcomes than authoritarian regimes. The importance of this issue lies in the fact that the very promotion of democracy in the international political agenda has become essential for many reasons, including its supposed propensity to reduce economic disparities. First, at Chapter 1 we overview the theoretical and empirical discussion from which we find that despite the common sense that democracy must be related to a more egalitarian citizenship, its effects on inequality is still debatable. Even with a reasonable theoretical consensus that democracies must somehow produce a better distribution of goods; the empirical results are inconclusive and contradictory. After that, facing such empirical impasse, we propose at Chapter 2 a reformulation about the rationale to explain and analyze the effects of democracy on inequality. The main contribution of this thesis lies in both the theoretical and the empirical claim that these effects are heterogeneous and should interact with the level of inequality and, therefore, the assumption that these effects are homogeneous and independent of the socio-economic context of inequality is wrong. In Chapter 3, we present the data and concepts of democracy and inequality. We assume that democracy is characterized as a political regime in which leaders compete through elections and we test whether the effects vary along the distribution of economic inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. To do that, we conducted a series of quantile regression models, appropriate to evaluate the alternative hypothesis whether the effects are heterogeneous or homogenous. The theoretical argument, from which we elaborate the hypothesis of heterogeneous effects, refers to the need for a convergence between the electoral interests of the parties - the supply side - and the political cleavages on which a majority of voters have potential interest being played - the demand side for other public policies and platforms. Hence, it is necessary to discuss the conditions that lead the political leadership to use the problem of economic 11 inequality as an electoral argument and the conditions under which a demand by citizens for redistribution via state action rises. Only at the most unequal societies the political parties have an interest in offering redistributive policies, as well as there is a higher propensity for a redistribution demand by a majority of voters. In Chapter 4, we proved empirically that the effects of democratic competition at more unequal societies are different from the effects of democracy in more equal societies; and these effects tend to be greater toward inequality reduction only at more unequal societies. These results are robust to different statistical model specifications, data and measurement methods, about both democracy and inequality, and to the use of different time horizons. Even when we extend the time frame of the analysis to the period before World War II - using new data that covers XIX century, the veracity of the hypotheses about the heterogeneous effects and that these effects of democracy toward the reduction of inequality are larger at the most unequal societies remains intact. Finally, beyond this theoretical and empirical issue of crucial importance, we also control the analysis for potential reciprocal relationship between democracy and inequality. This is because while much of the literature discusses the potential effects of egalitarian democracy, another important literature debate discusses whether greater inequality increases or reduces the probability of a country become or remain democratic. Hence, we present a list of valid instrumental variables to estimate the effects of democracy on inequality independent of the relationship between inequality and democracy

Trust in other people and society is fundamental for it to work well. There is also a knowledge gap in research on how and why trust changes over time. To find strategies and reverse negative trust trends and bring about change and increase the willingness to cooperate, knowledge of the phenomenon's change over time is needed. In the last decade, Russia has taken a turn and is becoming more undemocratic. Since President Vladimir Putin's return to power, the country has experienced a democratic decline. Several critical events have taken place and laws have been enforced that restrict human rights and freedoms. The purpose of the study is therefore to examine how social and institutional trust has changed from 2012 until 2020. The empirical material in the essay consists of factors such as: perception of corruption, social trust, institutional trust, economic inequality, and civic participation in in non-profit organizations in the society. The results showed that social trust has decreased while institutional has increased slightly. However, confidence levels are generally low in the Russian society and also in comparison with other democratic countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands.